



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES



3 3433 08231911 6

What is it?
9/10/1855
M. T. C I C E R O

of Cicero
H I S

O F F I C E S,

of his **TREATISE concerning**

The MORAL DUTIES of MANKIND.

CENTRAL COLLECTION

~~=====~~

John
C A T O M A J O R,

CONCERNING

The Means of making OLD AGE happy.

H I S

LÆLIUS, concerning FRIENDSHIP.

H I S

MORAL PARADOXES.

T H E

VISION of S C I P I O,

CONCERNING

A FUTURE STATE.

His LETTER concerning

The DUTIES of a MAGISTRATE.

W I T H

NOTES Historical and Explanatory.

Translated into ENGLISH by

WILLIAM GUTHRIE, Esq;

L O N D O N:

**Printed for T. WALLER, opposite Fetter-Lane,
Fleet-Street. MDCCCLV.**


Digitized by Google

1455

$$\frac{R}{f}$$

LIBRARY

Digitized by Google



T H E

875
C

P R E F A C E.

v13

3693.



THE following is a Collection of uninspired Knowledge the most extensively useful of any ever published. It has served as a Storehouse from whence all Writers, since the Days of *Cicero*, who have treated either of Morals or Ethics, have not only adorn'd, but furnish'd, their Works. Divines have borrowed their Systems, Legislators their Constitutions, Statesmen their Maxims, and Magistrates their Practice, from our Author's Treatise *De Officiis*, which may properly be termed, *The whole Duty of Man, as practised by the Moral Part of the Heathen World, before Revelation took Place*. Our holy Religion was so far from altering or depressing *Cicero's* Doctrines, that it ennobled and improved them; so that, they may justly be look'd upon as containing a System of unrevealed Christianity.

But it is amazing to see how a great Name, springing from Excellencies for which, perhaps, its Owner is indebted to others, can absorb the Lustre of its Benefactors. *Panaetius* was the real, original, Author of *Cicero's*

8773 A

Book upon the moral Duties, but the Name of *Panatius*, as a Philosopher, is as obscure as those of *Hortensius*, *Crassus*, *Lucullus*, and other great Men, are, as Orators. The Lustre of *Cicero* has swallow'd up their Fame, and their literary Merits would hardly be mention'd were it not for his Writings.

This is not the only unjust Effect that the great Name of a Man produces in admiring Posterity; for it not only obscures Brightness in others, but brightens Defects in himself. The characteristical Excellency of *Cicero* was Eloquence; he had scarcely another Merit, I had almost said, scarcely another Virtue. He more than once owns, that all the *Greek* Learning he studied was with a View to improve himself in that Art; and there cannot be a Doubt, that all his Philosophical Writings are taken from the *Greeks*. Many Proofs of this are yet extant, but many more have perish'd through the Injury of Time, and the Universality of his Language, which render'd his Originals, dry, tedious, troublesome, and therefore disregarded by the Public. Very different has been the Fate of *Cicero's* Writings; for his Eloquence and his great Command of Expression give such Liveliness to the most barren Subjects he handles, that the Ignorant learned his Doctrine, because they loved his Writing, while the Knowing loved his Writing, because they improved by his Doctrine.

In vain do we look back to *Cicero's* Practice for the Virtues of a Philosopher, or a Patriot; yet no Man ever understood them

better than *Cicero* did in Theory, because the Study of them is the indispensable Requisite of Eloquence. But, it was only as an Orator, that he was acquainted with them; as a Man, his Conduct was, if possible, below Contempt itself. When divested of the Orator, when he suffers the Anguish of Affliction to bereave him of his Eloquence, when he pours forth his Soul to his Friends, in the Language of Nature, how despicable does he appear! How unlike a *Cato*, a *Bru-tus*, a *Socrates*, a *Charles* the First, a *More*, or a *Russel*!

A similar Observation may be made with Regard to his Writings, especially the following Treatise concerning *the Moral Duties*. That Part of it, in which he has followed *Panæti-us*, is sensible, clear, and undeniable in most of its Definitions, Descriptions, and Inferences; but having little Room for introducing into any Part of it, his favourite Accomplishment, he is sometimes dry, tedious, and tautologous, and it is easy to see when he deviates from the accurate *Greek*, in order to give himself the Air of an Original. On the other Hand, when he formally separates from *Panæti-us*, as he does at the End of the second Book, and when he, as it were, sets up for himself, how very different is then his Manner from the preceding Part of the Work! He there indulges his natural Vein. The Encomiums he runs into upon *Regulus* and his other Countrymen, are indeed the most pleasing Part of the Work, because the most sentimental, but they are unphilosophi-

cal and declamatory. While he reasons concerning the Obligation of an Oath, he hampers himself by admitting the Possibility, that Providence takes no Concern in human Actions. In short, all that Part, tho' extreamly beautiful, is destitute of that Precision and Closeness, that are required from a Philosopher, and which are visible in all our Author's Philosophical Writings, when he follows the *Greeks*.

The Conferences concerning OLD AGE, and FRIENDSHIP are as highly finished, and as fine Performances as perhaps ever appeared in any Language; for their Subjects are such as admit the most beautiful Touches of his Art, which he has every where introduced into them with the utmost Propriety. But, above all, we may remark how wonderfully cautious he is when he speaks as a Philosopher, and in his own Person, and how unreserved as an Orator. In his Treatise concerning the *Moral Duties*, the mention he makes of Providence, and a future State, is rather unfavourable than otherwise to those two Articles, and seriously speaking, it is not quite clear, that *Cicero* believed either of them. It is true, that we often find him inculcating them in his Writings, but it is always in the declamatory Way, because the Belief of those two important Doctrines gave a Glow to his Eloquence, as an Orator, and flatter'd his Vanity as a Man. It is in this Light, that I consider all the beautiful Passages of his Orations, in which he declaims with such Spirit upon the Immortality of the Soul, and the Existence of a future State. In

P R E F A C E.

like Manner, the fine Sentiments which he puts into the Mouths of his *Cato*, his *Laelius*, and his *Scipio* upon the same Subject, are, all of them, accommodated only to oratorical Purposes, and our Author, as a Philosopher, had always a ready Excuse, for those Doctrines which he puts into the Mouths of others, or which he himself preaches up as an Orator. With him the Phrase *oratorie dictum* signifies the very same Thing as *poeticè dictum* signifies among the Poets.

Notwithstanding this, I cannot absolutely pronounce, that *Cicero* disbelieved either the Immortality of the Soul, or the Existence of Providence. It is certain, that without the Belief of both, all the Plans of Philosophy, which he inculcates and lays down with so much Accuracy in the various Parts of his Writings, must be very ineffectual for the Service of Mankind.

In the following Pieces he seems to have selected whatever was most probable, and rational from all the various Sects of Philosophers. Tho' the Reader, who is acquainted with the vast modern Improvements in natural Philosophy and Astronomy, may smile at the fanciful Description, which *Scipio* gives us in his Vision, of the System of Nature, yet he will not find that Moral Philosophy has improved in Proportion to Natural. He will perceive, that it is to *Cicero* we owe what is most valuable in *Grotius*, in *Puffendorff*, in *Cumberland*, in *Woolaston*, and Hundreds of other Writers, and even in some of the Fathers, who were perpetually abusing and imitating him.

him. He will confess that, in one Respect, our Author stands yet unrivalled, and that is, in the Gracefulness and the Propriety with which he introduces his Subjects. When he is to lay down, in the following Volume, a Plan of virtuous Life, and for the Discharge of all the Moral Duties, he addresses it to his Son, with whom he can be supposed to have no Reserve, and to whom he unfolds the real Sentiments of his own Heart. When he recommends the Means of making OLD AGE happy, he puts his Sentiments into the Mouths of the elder *Cato*, the great Example of what he there describes. When he treats of virtuous FRIENDSHIP, he takes Advantage of the Character of a *Laelius*, whose Friendship with *Scipio* has been so celebrated; and the Immortality of the Soul is solemnly inculcated upon the younger, by the elder, *Africanus*.

These two are undoubtedly the greatest and most amiable Characters that ever *Rome* produced, and to the elder perhaps we owe our Treatise *De Officiis*. For, not contented to carry his Country's military Glories to a much greater Height than they ever had been at before, he strove to make her as great in Arts as in Arms. The Truth is, when the elder *Scipio* entered upon Life, the Learning of the *Romans* was very despicable, and their Taste barbarous. He improved the one, and reformed the other. He had about him none of that unamiable Haughtiness, none of those horrid Virtues, upon which his Countrymen so much valued themselves. He joined the Activity of the *Roman* to the Politeness of the *Greek*;

Greek; and crown'd all with those moral Virtues, that were uncommon in either. But it was not enough, that he practis'd them himself, for he communicated them to his Country. He first taught the *Romans*, how to engraft the Elegance of Manners upon the Practice of Morality, and he had the happy Art of making Business and Amusement subservient to each other; while all his Actions had an Air of Ease, which gave his Enemies a Handle to accuse him of Indolence. This produced an Enquiry into his Conduct, which turn'd out so much to his Advantage, that they were forced to acknowledge, that *Scipio* was the most indefatigable of Mankind, and that his Equal never was known in Application, Dispatch, and Regularity.

Such was the Patron of *Panæti*us, the Author of what is most valuable in the following Treatise upon the Moral Duties. The elder *Africanus* in all his Actions and Character was so well followed by the younger, that the Life both in public and private of the latter, was but a Transcript of the former.

I have thought myself obliged to do this Justice to those two great *Romans*, because it was in the School of Arts founded by them, that our Author acquired his Eloquence. Their Example gave the Manners of the noble *Romans*, a Turn to Learning and the polite Arts, which created amongst them an Emulation that was of the utmost Service to Literature, and which our Author availed himself of so critically, that from an obscure Birth he arrived at the highest Honours his Country could bestow.

With Regard to the following Translation, I have observed the same Method that I did in translating the other Pieces of *Cicero*. I have considered him equally as an Author and as a Writer; that is, I have equally studied his Matter and his Manner. Doctor *Cockman* undoubtedly understood him as an Author, as well as any Man, but in his Translation we see nothing of the Writer. Provided he expresses the Sense of the Author, he cares not in what poor inelegant Terms he does it; and his Inattention to the Beauties of both Languages, I mean that which he translates into, and translates from, seems to render another Translation expedient, if not, necessary.

Some of the following Pieces, appeared in *English*, almost as early as the Art of Printing itself did in *England*: A Translation of *De Officiis* was printed by *Caxton*, in the Year 1481. The famous Sir *John Falstaff*, our *Shakespeare's* favourite Character, at the Age of fourscore, recommended to the same *Caxton*, the Printing a Translation of our Author's CONFERENCE concerning OLD AGE, which *Caxton* accordingly executed, and dedicated it, together with an *English* Translation of the CONFERENCE concerning FRIENDSHIP, to King *Edward IV*. In *Caxton's* Preface we are told, that the Translation was performed by the Earl of *Worcester*, who afterwards lost his Head in the Civil Wars of *England*. The Treatise *De Officiis*, has been since several Times translated into *English*, particularly by *L' Estrange*, but as he seems to have done it from a very bad Translation of the *French*,
I should

I should not have mentioned his Performance, had it not been that it had a great Run. I have likewise seen several *French* Translations of the following Pieces, but they are so truly FRENCH, that they deserve no particular Mention.

The PARADOXES, which the Reader will likewise find in this Volume, are a kind of philosophical Exercises, which are executed with wonderful Spirit, and they have, by many learned Men, been preferr'd to any Piece of our Author. The Reader will, perhaps, be pleas'd to compare the Character, which he gives of *Cato's* Eloquence with the Speech put into his Mouth by *Salust*.

This Volume would not have been compleat, without the excellent political Letter wrote by our Author to his Brother. The Doctrine it conveys is of general Use to all Magistrates, and in all Countries, and it is laid down in a very happy Manner. The Flattery it contains was necessary to make the Subject go down with a Man so haughty, and so choleric, as *Quintus* was. Meanwhile, the Reader will perceive, with what unlimited Powers the Governors of the *Roman* Provinces were vested. Their own Edicts seem to have been their Laws, and the Injured had no Relief, but by an Application to *Rome*, and to Judges who were too much interested to do them Justice, because they might themselves, next Day, be in the Condition of the Impeached.



P O S T S C R I P T.

IT is said of a late *English* Nobleman, who was distinguish'd by a fine Taste in Architecture, and by a noble Collection of every Thing relating to that Art, that he was struck with Surprize at the Model of a beautiful Church he saw in *Italy*, and greedily enquiring where the original was to be seen, he was told in *London*, where his Lordship had spent most of his Life. I own the same, in one Respect, is somewhat my own Case, For tho' I have had thro' my Hands, I believe, about fifty different Editions of *Cicero's Offices* in the Original, I never knew, that the very best one was printed within these ten Years at *London*, till I saw it lately by Chance mentioned in the Fag-end of an Advertisement, at the latter Part of a News-Paper. The Edition, I mean, is that of Doctor *Pearce*, now Lord Bishop of *Bangor*, illustrated with his Lordship's and Doctor *Chapman's* excellent Notes.

This Omission, unaccountable as it was, gave me, however, a sensible Pleasure, when upon a Review and Comparison, I found, I had executed my Undertaking almost in the same Manner, as if I had applied to that pow-

erful Auxiliary, whose Assistance, had I had it, would at once have deprived me of great Satisfaction, and have saved me from great Labour.

I can esteem where I do not adore, I can acknowledge Merit where I cannot place Infallibility; he is a despicable Writer, who in literary Matters, pins his Faith upon any human Authority; and a weak Man who cannot differ with another without Acrimony, or vindicate himself without Ill-Manners. I have, thro' the Course of the following Notes, made free with several great Authorities who have commented upon, or translated the Treatise *De Officiis*, and if the Reader should compare my Translation and Notes, with his Lordship's Edition and Notes, he will find that I have in several Passages understood my Author in a Sense different from that of his Lordship. It is, therefore, a Piece of Respect that I owe, not only to my Readers, but to his Lordship's great Erudition, to give my Reasons, why I have not thought proper to alter the Passages in Question.

I cannot be of his Lordship's Opinion in his Note, p. 32. (p 18. l. 8. of the Translation) upon the Words, *in alterum incident*. His Lordship thinks there is no Sense in saying, that *while Men are practising one Part of the Moral Duties, and fall upon another, they are therefore to blame*. I own, that before I saw his Lordship's Edition, I had no Doubt in my own Mind, that *incidere in aliquod* may signify to fail, to break short, or to trip in a Matter. *De Oratore* l. 2. cap. 82. *Inciditur omnis*

Deliberatio, all Debate breaks short, or is at an End. Incidens Vox, a faltering Pronunciation. With numberless other Instances.

In the Passage before us, it has a peculiar Propriety; because of the Words *assequuntur* and *impediti*.

I agree with his Lordship in thinking the Passage in p. 51. (that Critics have thought not to be genuine) is *Cicero's*.

His Lordship, p. 53. (p. 27. l. 3. of the Translation) in his Note upon the Word *capitalior* seems to think it *necessarily* implies a criminal Sense; and, as such, he introduces an Alteration of the Text in p. 341. I had, before I saw his Lordship's Edition, given my Reasons (see Translation p. 192 and 193. in the Note) why I did not think that the Word *capitalis*, necessarily implies a criminal Sense.

But in the Passage, p. 53. of his Lordship's Edition, the Sense is every Whitt the same, if the Word is translated the *most guilty Villain*, as the *chief*, or the *capital Villain*.

I had translated the Words, (p. 38. l. 5. of the Translation) p. 72. of his Lordship's Edition, *quo difficilius, hoc præclarior*, "The more difficult the Task of correcting this Abuse is, it is the more glorious," and I have not alter'd the Passage, though his Lordship takes it in another Sense, *viz.* "But the more difficult it is to practise Justice, while we aim at Excellency, it is the more glorious." I am far from condemning this Sense, nay, I should have entirely embraced it, had it not been for the immediately following Words in the Original, which make

me think that the Passage is one of the many oblique Reflections, that *Cicero* throws out in this Work against the Government of *Cæsar* and his Followers, whose Practices he here describes.

His Lordship's Remark upon the Expression, p. 73. of his Edition, *et Gloriæ Cupiditate*, is certainly just, and I own it did not occur to me, but the Manner in which I have translated the whole Passage is so little different from his Lordship's Sense of it, that I scarcely think it requires any Alteration.

In the Note upon the Words *Altitudo Animi*, p. 92, (p. 50. l. 23. Translation) I beg Leave to differ widely from his Lordship. I have translated the whole Passage, "A
" Smoothness, or what we may call, a Depth
" of Temper," and I can see no Reason from his Lordship's Note for altering it. Had I found *Aptitudo*, the Word he wants to substitute, in the Text, I should have understood it; but had another Critic suggested *Altitudo*, I should have liked it much better. That *Altitudo* may signify *Depth*, his Lordship seems to allow; and there scarcely can be a Doubt that *facilis*, especially in our Author, many Times signifies *smooth*, and that Smoothness is the Effect of Depth in Water is generally admitted and experienced; therefore, the Objection his Lordship brings against the Impropriety of the Period, I think vanishes. Not to mention, that his Lordship observes *Aptitudo* to be no where else used by our Author; and that the Allusions of the Mind

to

to the Sea are frequent in *Cicero*: Add to this, that his Lordship himself mentions our Author making Use of *Altitudo Animi* in his oratorical Partitions; and if the Reader consults that Passage, he will find he does it in the very Sense contended for here, *viz.* that Depth of Temper, which is required under a free State in a great Man, who wants to rise or to rule, and which conceals the great Variety of Provocations which an Abuse of Liberty may expose him to.

I have translated the Passage of Note (8) p. 107. (p. 59. l. 13. Translation) in his Lordship's Sense, but his Lordship seems to be mistaken in the Principle of his Opposition to the common Reading; and that from his not attending to the Meaning of the Word *quidem* which with our Author often, if not generally, is almost the same with *saltem*, "at least." In this Sense, the Sentence objected to by his Lordship will run thus. "The one Kind of Wit is worthy a Man, the other is unworthy, at least, of a Gentleman." I agree, however, with his Lordship, that his Reading makes better Sense.

This leads me to his Lordship's Note (9) p. 153. (p. 83. l. 20. Translation) where he objects to the Reading from which I have translated the Passage there referr'd to; for, says he, every Thing that is worthy a *Homo*, is worthy a *Liber*; because, adds he afterwards, the Idea of the human Kind comprehends the *Liberi* as well as the *Servi*. But his Lordship in this Place does not seem to attend, that *Liber* is not put in Contradistinction to

Servus, but to *Homo*, and signifies a Man of Fortune and Education.

I cannot imagine how his Lordship comes to think that the Words in p. 158. (p. 86. l. 16. Translation) which he has enclosed within Crotchets, are misplaced, for I think nothing can come more naturally to strengthen our Author's Argument.

The Words in p. 164. (in p. 90. l. 1. Translation,) *Aut quid maxime utile*, which his Lordship thinks don't belong to *Cicero*, are translated by me without any such Mark of Reprobation; nor, even after reading his Lordship's Objection to them, do I find any Reason to be of another Opinion, than that they are genuine. *Cicero* proposes to treat of the *Utilia*, and amongst the *Utilia*, which is *Utilius*, or *Magis utile*, and which is *Utilissimum*, or *Maxime utile*. His Lordship thinks that *utilius* and *maxime utile* are the same. But whoever attends to the Thread of our Author's reasoning, which is professedly Antistonical, must see, that he lays down all the three Degrees; and admits that a Thing may be more useful or profitable than another, and yet not profitable in the highest Degree. In like Manner, as he lays it down, that Virtue is either *Sola expetenda*, or that it is *maxime expetenda*; i. e. "The only desirable Object, " (or) of all Objects, the most desirable."

I agree with his Lordship in his Notes (5 and 6) p. 165 and 166. but I have translated the Passages, (p. 90. l. 28. Translation) differently from the Sense, in which Doctor Cockman has translated them, and in which, I believe,

his Lordship understands them. For I have translated the Words *Agendo* and *Actiones* literally, but Doctor *Cockman* translates *Actiones*, *public Orations*. Now, I think it much safer to translate it *Conduct*, because that Word comprehends, not only his *Pleadings* and *Politics*, but the whole of his public Life, upon which he tells *Lentulus*, Epist. ad *Fam.* 9. he had wrote three Books. Upon the whole, I don't remember, that in all this Treatise, *Cicero* once has the Word *Actio* signifying a Pleading, tho' he frequently uses it in the Sense, in which I have translated it.

I entirely agree with the Note (5) that has *Chapman* at the End of it, p. 180. His Lordship thinks Note (1) p. 211, that the Copulative *et* ought there to be left out. I have indeed translated it (p. 115. l. 14. Translation) in that Manner, but I do not understand the Passage in the same Manner with his Lordship: *Facilis*, in our Author, does not always signify what we in *English*, term *easy*: *Ready* is here and often elsewhere the Sense of that Word, and as such it corresponds extreamly well with our Author's Meaning, which is to shew the great Advantages, which an early Prepossession of the Public of a young Man are to him; and that that Prepossession may be *readily* acquir'd by the Appearance of his attaching himself to Men of Learning and Virtue.

His Lordship's Note (6) p. 234. (p. 128. l. 17. Translation) is, I apprehend, built upon a mistaken Fact. For according to *Cicero's* Words (of which his Lordship does not impeach the Reading) the Fact was, that, even

when *Cimon* lived at *Athens*, his House in that City was open to those of his Tribe; that he had order'd his Oeconomy so; and that though he was not in the Country himself, his Villas were likewise open to them.

P. 237. Note (3) his Lordship here adopts a Note from *Manutius* which I was dissatisfied with, when I was translating the Passage (See the Translation p. 129. l. 28.) where I have translated it *who readily toils*, nor can I see the Propriety of the Note of *Manutius*.

I should be of his Lordship's Opinion in Note (8) p. 240. (p. 132. l. 5. Translation) were it not that the Word *Modestum*, which our Author joins with *Probum*, signifies the very same Thing that his Lordship contends the Word *probus* does. The Scope of the Note, however, is certainly just, but I think not quite applicable to this Passage.

P. 261 Note (9) may be just, but I think the Manner in which I have translated the Passage answers pretty well to our Author's Meaning, and is defensible from his Lordship's Objections to the common Reading of the Original. See Translation p. 143. l. 5.

I can by no Means be of his Lordship's Opinion, Note (2) p. 263. (p. 143. l. 17. Translation.) The whole of the Passage has an Air of Ridicule; and I apprehend there was as great a Difference between the *Romans*, who laid out, (as *Atticus* and other Men of Property did) their Money at legal Interest, and the *Fœneratores ad medium Janum sedentes*, as there is between the Directors of our public

Companies, and the Sharks of *Exchange-Alley*.

I cannot agree either with his Lordship or Doctor *Chapman* in their Notes, p. 200 and 201. Note (2). (p. 110. l. 1. Translation) Doctor *Chapman* thinks, that *Majores* cannot be understood in the Sense I have taken it, because, says he, it is incompatible with *Tully's* Philosophy. But I can by no Means be of that Opinion. Our Author in all this Work disclaims systematical Philosophy, and nothing can be more agreeable to his Way of thinking than that some Powers of the Soul are fitted for Magnanimity, &c. and that these are the sublimer Faculties of the Mind which Pleasures may thus warp; and which are opposed to that yeilding to Pleasure spoken of immediately before. In like Manner, *Cicero* allots Fervency to be the Property of certain great Minds, and not of others, *vide* l. 1. *De Offic.* chap. 15. Besides the Word *Plerique* which immediately follows would be superfluous if we were to understand it in the Doctor's Sense, *viz.* The greatest Part of Mankind.

I have nothing to object to his Lordship's Emendation, Note (1) p. 286. excepting that he lays it down as being more than Conjecture. But, however plausible it may be, I can retract nothing of what I have said in my Note upon the same Passage, (p. 159. see Note Translation.) The old Philosophers almost of all Denominations admitted that the unjust Affections of the Mind were the greatest of all Evils. Therefore, (says our Author) a Man rather than break into the Laws

of Society will indure the greatest Hardships of Body and Fortane; he will likewise endure the greatest Anguish of Mind, (excepting that Anguish which arises from Passions dishonest in themselves, and which give Rise to the very Evil here complained of) that is, he will endure all Kind of Afflictions on Account of his nearest and tenderest Concerns. I repeat it again, that I have nothing to object to his Lordship's Sense of this Passage, but if we admit of Conjectures not warranted by any Manuscripts, it is hard to say where the Practice may stop.

And for that Reason I cannot agree with the Conjecture of *Manutius*, which his Lordship recommends Note (4) p. 296. I have in my Note upon that Passage (p. 165. Translation) given my Reasons for the Sense in which I have translated it. I have there, indeed, blamed the obvious Acceptation of the common Reading, but upon a Review, I should chuse to adopt it, rather than a Reading that is warranted only by Conjecture. In short, I cannot see the least Foundation for that Jealousy which his Lordship seems to entertain for our Author's Principles if the common Reading is not altered; for I know no Passage in this Work less liable to an Exception of this Kind, even if we suffer the common Reading to stand.

His Lordship, p. 307 Note (3) seems to approve of *Olivet's* Alteration of *Utilitas* to *Vilitas*, but I can see no Manner of Reason for it, and, therefore, have followed (p. 173. l. 29. Translation) the allowed Reading.

I have nothing to object to his Lordship's

Note (7) p. 317 (p. 179. l. 9. Translation) but admitting the Justness of it, I see no Reason for altering my Translation of the Passage. I believe, however, it is no unusual Thing for Brokers to be in Combinations, even of the Kind his Lordship thinks to be improbable, and that many a fine Picture, for Instance, has gone at an under Value by Men, who were reputed to have Skill, putting them up at Auctions at a small Value, and after bidding a very little more, letting them fall into the Hands of those with whom they are in Combination.

His Lordship, after *Fabricius*, tells us (p. 321. Note 7) (p. 181. l. 6. Translation) that the House here spoken of was not to be demolish'd, only the highest Part of it was to be lower'd; and that upon the Authority of *Valerius Maximus*, who gives us the same Story. I should have no Manner of Objection to this Sense, if it can be made appear that *demolire Ædem*, signifies no more than taking away the upper Story of a House; for *Valerius* says, that *Calpurnius*, was *demolire Domum coactus*, and *Cicero*, *Calpurnius, cum demolitus esset*. If *demolire Domum*, therefore, in *Latin*, signifies no more than to LOWER A HOUSE, "to demolish a House" in *English* ought to have the same Signification.

I cannot see the Propriety of the Word *Principiis* (p. 184. l. 4. Translation) which his Lordship contends Note (8) p. 326. should stand in the Original there. I think it destroys the Beauty of our Author's Allusion to the Graphic Arts. Mean time, I understand

Exemplis in the same Sense as *Exemplaribus*, and, I believe, I am very well warranted by our Author in so doing.

The Word *Malitia* is by me translated *Cunning*, but his Lordship says, that *Malitia* is *si quis mala, bonis anteponit*, which are our Author's Words. I must, however, ask his Lordship's Pardon, if I think that *Cicero* gives this as a Property, but not as a Character, of *Malitia*. Nothing can be more plain than that *Malitia*, in this Work, often signifies the very same Thing that CUNNING does in *English*; nay, the Words agree so well together, that both are used sometimes in a good, or at least in no bad, Sense. Our Author, in one of his Epistles to *Atticus*, commends his *Malitia* in Dealing with another Person, as if we should say in *English*, *You were too cunning for him. Nisi Malitia supplet* is a Term in the Civil Law to imply, that young Men are under Age to a certain Time, unless their MALITIA, *Cunning*, or *Archness*, or *Sbrewdness* make up for their Want of Years.

I cannot think the Words *quam inutile*, p. 340. Note 2. to be superfluous. Our Author here (p. 192. l. 15. Translation) and elsewhere in this Work, is perpetually inculcating the Difference between seeming and real Utility, and that in Fact, Injustice is always attended by Inutility and Dishonour.

His Lordship's Note (6) p. 243. is so very ingenious and plausible, that I will translate the whole Passage. Now, (says our Author) *I will ramble to the Opinion of the Vulgar. Can any greater Benefits accrue than what ac-*

true from Sovereignty? But notwithstanding the Passages brought by his Lordship (which with Submission I do not think similar) to justify the Propriety of saying, *Ab eo ad vulgi Opinionem*, I cannot retract what I have said upon that Passage, (p. 193. Note 9. Translation) though in the Main my Translation agrees with his Lordship's Sense of the Passage.

I can by no Means be of Opinion with his Lordship Note 9. p. 345, that *Cicero* speaks, inconsistently with himself, if the common Reading according to which I have translated the Passage, (p. 195. l. 32. Translation) should stand. If an *English* Author were to write a Treatise of this Kind and had Occasion to mention, with Applause, one of Queen *Elizabeth's* Parliaments, he might naturally call it *our* Parliament; and he might do the same, if he was to censure one of the Parliaments since that Time. This is exactly the Case with that of the Passage before us.

I have been so full (Note 1. p. 197. Translation) in Defence of the common Reading, which his Lordship, p. 348. Note (3) and all the Commentators have objected to, that what I have said there, answers his Lordship's Criticism, as well as those of other Editors. I repeat what I have said in the Note refer'd to, that I can see no Reason for supposing with the Commentators, *Curio* to have been against the Measure.

There could be no Objection to his Lordship's substituting *voracem* for *furacem*. p. 352 Note (5) but that it is warranted by no MSS

or

or Edition. I therefore, chuse to translate the Passage as I find it, though there is somewhat of an Inconsistency in it, unless we suppose *furacem*, as I have translated it, a hankering after pilfering, but without carrying it into Execution, for the Seller was, I suppose, to inform the Buyer only of the Facts the Slaves had been guilty of. A Man may be *Furax* and *Ebrius*, yet neither a *Fur* nor *Ebrius*. (See p. 202. l. 11. Translation.)

I can see no Manner of Occasion for his Lordship's Note (1) p. 359, if we suppose, as I believe the Fact to have been, that the Commanders in Chief here spoken of, took the chief Command by Turns, and that it was *Hamilcar's* Turn when *Regulus* was taken.

His Lordship p. 361 Note (3) is at Pains to reconcile to Fact the Difficulty which appears upon the Face of this Passage, if we understand it in the common Sense it is taken in. (See p. 207 and Note (2) Translation) But I should be glad to know whether the Fact there laid down by his Lordship is only supposititious, or if it is supported by any good Authority. I doubt it is not; and that we ought to translate the Words, *Sententiam ne diceret recusavit* in their obvious Sense, viz. That he refus'd to conceal his Opinion, which was the Truth of the Matter, and which is the only Way we can reconcile the staring Inconsistencies of the Passage.


The Sense which his Lordship wants to introduce Note (8) p. 368 is, I am afraid, not quite consistent either with a good Man or with

with our Authors Meaning. For a Man, in many Cases, may swear to the Performance of a Thing which he may think he ought not to perform, and yet the Circumstances, under which he swears, may oblige him in Honour and Conscience to perform his Oath.

Such are the Passages in which with great Diffidence, I have differed with his Lordship, and if any Reader should think them to be too immaterial to be thus taken Notice of, he ought to know, that in a Work, that carries such Authority as this does, every Point and Particle deserves to be canvassed, and nothing it contains is immaterial.



M. T. CICERO



M. T. C I C E R O

H I S


O F F I C E S ;

Or, Concerning

The MORAL DUTIES of MANKIND*.

BOOK I. CHAP. I.

MARCUS, *my Son,*

I.  YOU have, it is true, for a Year, been studying under (a) *Cratippus*, and that too at (b) *Athens*; therefore you are doubtless well furnish'd with the Rules and Principles of Philosophy; the Character both of the Master and the City being so high ; the one improving you by his Learning, the other by its Examples.

* If we except the Holy Scriptures, the following Work has been, perhaps, of more Service to Mankind, than any that ever was publish'd. It was easy for *Cicero*, to see that his Countrymen, in general, had very imperfect Notions of the moral Duties. Their Virtues were often rather terrible than amiable, and that Patriotism which the best of them affected, often made them neglect the prior Tyes of Humanity and natural Society. This Ignorance and Disregard, had run them into great Excesses, which terminated in a bloody civil War, and the Loss of Public Liberty. But as our Author thought that

amples. Notwithstanding all those Advantages, as I, for my own Improvement, have joyn'd the Study of *Latin* to that of *Greek* Erudition, not only in Philosophy, but even in the Practice of Speaking, I recommend to you the same Method,

that to be retrieveable after the Death of *Julius Cæsar*, he applied himself to digest into a regular System, all that lay scattered in his own and the *Greek* Writings, concerning the Moral and relative Duties of Mankind. His great Character amongst his Countrymen for Learning and Erudition, soon made this Work to be the Standard of all the Moral Duties, and to this Day it continues to be appealed to and decisive. It is, in short, the Ground-Work of all that *Grotius*, *Puffendorff*, *Cumberland*, *Woolaston*, and Thousands other Writers have laid down concerning the public and private Duties of Mankind.

The Circumstance of addressing it to his Son, was a happy one. For it freed him from all Manner of Constraint, both in his Style and Sentiments, and there runs through the whole an Ease and Freedom that no other Writer has yet equalled, and is to be found in none, even of our Authors other Works.

With Regard to the Title, the Reader may, if he pleases, consult what has been said concerning it by our Author in his Epistles to *Atticus*, Ep. 13. Lib. xv. but after all, I own I should be better pleased with the *English* Title of THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN, had not our Author objected to it.

(a) *Cratippus*] This Philosopher was greatly prized both by our Author and his Son, for his Excellence in Philosophy. He was a Native of *Mitylenæ*, and by *Cicero*'s Recommendation, was raised by the *Areopagus* at *Athens*, to be what we may call Head Professor of Philosophy in their Schools.

(b) *At Athens*] *Cicero* seems (with Reason) to lay a Stress upon this Circumstance, the Propriety of which may escape the vulgar Observation. It is certain, that the Reputation and Dignity of a Place such as *Athens* was, furnished with every Object, that could awaken, fire, or correct, the Ideas, and with all Conveniencies for Study, must make a very advantageous Impression upon the Mind. Add to this, that the Antients ascribed a physical Quality to the Air of *Athens*, which they said was so pure, that it whetted and refined the Understanding. *Athenis* (says our Author in Lib. de Fatq) *tenue Cælum; ex quo, acutiores etiam putantur Attici. Crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani et valentes.* "At *Athens* the Air is pure, by which its Inhabitants are esteemed to be uncommonly penetrating; at *Thebes*, it is thick, and hence the *Thebans* are reckoned to be heavy and strong."

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 3

that you may excel equally in the Exercises of both. In this Respect, at least, if I mistake not, I was of great Service to our Countrymen, so that not only such of them as are ignorant of *Greek Learning*, but even Men of Letters amongst them, think they have profited somewhat by me both in Speaking and Reasoning.

Therefore you may study, nay study as long as you incline, under the best Philosopher of this Age, and you ought to incline it, as long as you are sensible that you improve : But you are to read my Works which are not very different from the Principles of the (c) *Perepatetics*, because I aim at a Coalition of the Socratic, with the Platonic Sect. As to the Conclusions you are to form, I leave them entirely to your own Judgment, but take my Word for it, you will, by reading my Writings, render your *Latin* Stile more copious. You are not to imagine that this is Ostentation in me, for while I yield the Superiority in Philosophy to many, I think I do no more than assert what is my own Right, if I claim, to myself, the Province peculiar to an Orator, that of Speaking with Propriety, Perspicuity and Elegance; a Study, in which I have spent my Days.

Therefore, my dear *Cicero*; I most earnestly recommend to your careful Perusal, not only my Orations, but even my philosophical Works, (d) which

(c) *The Perepatetics*] Our Author here lays aside the didactic Air which he assumes in the other Parts of his Philosophical Works. There he wants to shine, but here he strives to instruct, and therefore talks very soberly, that he wants to select what is best from every Sect of Philosophy, and to follow that:

(d) *Which fall very little short of my Orations*] Orig. *Qui jam*

4 M. T. CICERO'S OFFICES; or,

which fall very little short of my Citations in Purity of Stile. There is, it is true, a higher Glow of Eloquence in the one than in the other, but you are to cultivate at the same Time this smooth, this sober Manner of Expression. And, to say the Truth, I know none of the *Greeks* who have reconciled the two Manners in their Writings, by practising, at the same Time, the declamatory, and this argumentative, Style. If there is an Exception amongst them, it is *Demetrius Phalereus*, who tho' a refin'd Reasoner, was an enervate Speaker; but yet he was insinuating, and by his Smoothness, you may know him to have studied under *Theophrastus*. How far I have succeeded in both, let others determine; all I can say is, that I have attempted both. Mean while, I am of Opinion, that *Plato* could have succeeded had he attempted the powerful copious Manner that is required in Speaking to the Public; and had *Demosthenes* retained and repeated the Lessons of *Plato*, he would have delivered them with Gracefulness and Beauty. I form the same Judgment of *Aristotle* and *Isocrates*; but each was so pleased with his own Manner, that he neglected that of the other.

II. But resolving, at this Time, to write to you somewhat, and a great deal in Time to come, I have thought proper to set out with that Subject which is best adapted to your Years, and most becoming my Authority. For while many Subjects in Philosophy, of great Weight and Utility, have been accurately and copiously discussed by

illos ferè equarunt, which may refer to the Number as well as the Excellence of the Works. But I have followed the Sense of *Manutius* preferably to that of *Grævius*.

Phi-

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 5

Philosophers, the most extensive seems to be what they have deliver'd and enjoyn'd concerning the Duties of Mankind: For there can be no State of Life; public or private, abroad or at home; there can be no Intercourse between you and me, or between me and another, that is without its peculiar Duty. In the due Discharge of that consists all the Dignity, and in its Neglect, all the Disgrace, of Life.

This is a Principle, of which all Philosophers have treated; for where is the Man who will presume to stile himself a Philosopher, and lay down no Rules of Duty? But there are certain Schools which pervert all Duty by the Ends of Good and Evil which they propose. For if a Man should lay down as the chief Good that which has no Connection with Virtue, and value it according to his own private Views, and not according to its inherent Dignity; if such a Man I say, shall act consistently with his own Principles, and is not sometimes influenced by the Goodness of his Heart, he can be neither friendly, just, nor generous; nay, it is impossible for the Man to be brave, who shall pronounce Pain to be the greatest Evil, or temperate, who shall propose Pleasure as the highest Good.

These Truths are indeed so self-evident that they require no philosophical Discussion, and yet I have treated of them elsewhere. I say therefore, that if this Doctrine is uniform and self-consistent, the Professors of it can never treat of the moral Duties. Neither can any firm, permanent or natural Rules of Duty be laid down, but by those who esteem Virtue to be the sole, or by those who deem her to be

6 M. T. CICERO'S OFFICES; or,

the chief, Object of Desire The Doctrine of Duties therefore, is the peculiar Study of the Stoics, of the Academics and the Peripatetics; because the Sentiments of (e) *Aristo*, *Pyrrho* and *Herillus* have been long exploded. Yet even those Professors would have been entitled to have treated upon the Duties of Men had they left, in the Nature of Things, any Means of chusing what could have guided us to the Discovery of any one Duty. Let us therefore, upon this Occasion, at least, and upon this Subject, chiefly follow the Stoics, not as their Expositors, but by drawing, as usual, from their Sources whatever is for our Purpose, and in whatever Manner we please. I therefore think proper, as I propose Duty as my sole Subject, to define what a Duty is; a Definition which I am surpriz'd has been omitted by *Panæti*; because every Principle, laid down in reasoning concerning any Subject ought to be preceded by a Definition, that the Subject may be clearly understood.

III. All Questions concerning Duty are of two Sorts. The first relates to the final Good, the second consists of those Rules which are to regulate the Practice of Life in all its Relations. Examples of the former are as follow; Whether all Duties are perfect in themselves? Whether one Duty is of more Importance than another? together with other Questions of the same Nature. Now the Rules for moral Duties relate, indeed, to the final Good, but it is not so perceptible that they

(e) Our Author has in his Treatise, concerning the Ends of Things good and evil, treated very large concerning all the Sects and Philosophers mentioned in this Place.

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 7

do, because they seem chiefly adapted to the common Practice of Life, and of them, we are to treat in this Book.

But there is another Division of Duty; one probable, the other perfect. If I mistake not, the compleat or perfect Duty is the same with what we call a direct one, and by the *Greek* is called *κατορθωμα*. As to that Duty which is probable or in common to all Mankind, the *Greeks* call it *καθηκον*, and they thus define those Terms. Whatever Duty is direct, that they call a perfect Duty, and they call that Duty, for the Performance of which a probable Reason can be assigned, a probable Duty.

In the Opinion, therefore, of *Panetius*, there is a threefold Consideration, for determining our Resolution. For Men consider whether the Thing in Question be of itself virtuous or disgraceful, and in this Deliberation, the Mind often falls into opposite Sentiments. They, then, examine and deliberate whether or not the Subject of their Consideration conduces to the Utility or Enjoyment of Life, to the Improvement of their Estate and Wealth, to their Interest and Power, by which they may profit themselves or their Relations. All this Deliberation falls under the Denomination of Utility. The third Head of Deliberation is, when an apparent Utility seems to clash with Virtue. For when Utility hurries us to itself, and Virtue reclaims us, the Mind is distracted in the Choice, and the result of our Deliberation is suspended. In this Division (not to mention that an Omission is of the worst Consequence in Divisions of this Kind,) two

things are omitted. For we use to deliberate not only upon what is virtuous or shameful in itself, but of two Things that are virtuous, which is preferable? And in like Manner, of two Things which are profitable, which is most so? Thus, in fact, the Deliberation which he has made threefold only, admits of five Divisions. We will therefore, first treat of what is virtuous in itself, and that under two Heads; in like Manner, of what is profitable, and we shall next form some estimate of both.

IV. In the original Formation of Things, all living Creatures were, by Nature, endowed with this Affection or Property, that they cherished themselves, their Life, or Existence: That they avoided those things that appeared hurtful to them, and that they looked out for, and procured, whatever was necessary for their living, such as Food, Shelter, and the like. Now the Desire of Procreating their own Species is in common to all Animals, as is their Concern about what is procreated. But the greatest Distinction between a Man and a Brute lies in this, That the latter is impelled only by Instinct, and applies itself solely to that Object, which is present and before it, with little or no Marks of Sensibility of what is past, or is to come. But Man, because endow'd with Reason, can mark the Chain of Consequences; he looks into the Motives of Things and their Progress, and being acquainted, as it were, with what is past, he can draw like Consequences from like Causes; he adopts them to what is present, and connects them with what is to come. It is easy for him to foresee the future Direction of all his Life, and therefore he prepares whatever is necessary for carrying him through it.

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 9

Nature, likewise, joined to the Force of Reason, habituates Mankind to Community both in Language and in Life; above all, it plants in them a strong Love for their Offspring; it impels them to meet in Companies, to form public Assemblies, and dictates such Actions as Duties, which every Individual is to fulfil. For those Reasons, Man takes Care to provide for the decent, as well as the necessary Supports, of Life; and that not only for himself, but for his Wife, his Children and for all who have a Right to his Love or Protection. This is an Affection, which awakens every Faculty of the Mind, and enlarges its Abilities for Action.

The distinguishing Property of Man is to search for, and to follow after, Truth. Therefore, when relaxed from our necessary Cares and Concerns, we then covet to see, to hear, and to learn, somewhat; and we esteem Knowledge, of Things either obscure or wonderful, to be the indispensable Means of living happily. From this, we understand that Truth, Simplicity and Candor, are most agreeable to the Nature of Mankind. To this Passion for discovering Truth, is added a Desire to direct; for a Mind, well formed by Nature, is unwilling to obey any Man, but him, who lays down Rules and Instructions to it, or who, for the general Advantage, exercises equitable and lawful Government. From this proceeds Magnanimity and Disregard for groveling Considerations.

Neither is it a mean Effort of Nature and Reason, that Man is the only Animal, who is sensible of Order, of Decency, and of proper Fitness both in acting and speaking; therefore no o-

ther Creature perceives the Beauty, the Gracefulness and the Harmony of Parts, in those Objects which are discern'd by the Sight. This is an Idea which Nature and Reason conveys from the Sight to the Mind, and she is still more tender in cherishing Beauty, Regularity, and Order in Councils, and Actions: She is unwilling to do ought that is indecent, or effeminate, or to act, or think wantonly, in any Occurrence of Life, either when we deliberate or execute. The Effect and Result of all this, produces that *Honestum* which we are now in search of; that Virtue which is honourable without being ennobled: Which, were it admired by none, would be lovely in itself.

V. Son *Marcus*, you here perceive, at least, a Sketch, and, as it were, the Out-Line of Virtue; could we perceive her with (f) our bodily Eyes, her Beauties would, as *Plato* says, raise within us the strongest Love of Wisdom. But whatever is virtuous must arise from some one of those four Divisions. For it must consist either in the Perception of, and Perseverance in, Truth; or in cultivating Society, by giving to every Man his Due, and by punctually observing the moral Obligations; or it must consist in the Greatness and Firmness of an elevated unsubdued Mind; or in observing Order and Regularity, in all our Words

(f) *Our bodily Eyes*] This is a fine and a celebrated Sentiment of *Plato*. Οὐκ ἔστι (says he in his *Phædo*) ἡμῶν ὁρμητικὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐκείνη αἰσθησις, ἢ φρόνη εἰς ἐκδοῦναι. διὸς γὰρ αὐτὴ παροίχεται ἔντα, εἰ τοιούτοις αὐτῆς ἡμετέροις ἰδωλοῖς παροίχεται ὅς τις ἴδῃ. "Our Eye-sight (says he) is the most exquisite of our Senses; yet, it does not serve us to discern Wisdom; if it did, what a Glow of Love would she kindle within us?" The Reader, may perhaps observe, with what Propriety *Cicero* applies to Virtue, what *Plato* says of Wisdom.

and

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 31

and in all our Actions, by which we attain to Moderation and Temperance

Tho' those four Divisions are connected, and interwoven with one another, yet certain Kinds of Duties arise from each of them; as for Instance. In that Part which I first described, and under which I comprehend Sagacity or Wisdom, consists the Search after, and Discovery of, Truth; and this is the characteristical Quality of that Virtue. For the Man who is most sagacious in discovering the real Truth in any Subject, and who can, with the greatest Perspicuity and Quickness, both see and explain the Reasons that are to support it, has a Right to be esteemed a Man of the greatest Understanding and Discernment. From hence it follows, that Truth is, as it were, the subject Matter that directs and employs this Virtue. As to the other three Virtues, they necessarily consist in acquiring and preserving those indispensable Circumstances, which constitute civil and social Life, in order to preserve the Community and Relations of Mankind, and to display that Excellence and Greatness of Soul, which exerts itself in acquiring Interests and Advantages, both to ourselves and to our Friends; but becomes much more conspicuous in properly disregarding them. As to Order, Resolution, Moderation and the like, they come into that Rank of Virtues, which require not only an Operation of the Mind, but a proper Degree of personal Activity. For when we bring the Occurrences of Life under a Rule and Regularity, we then preserve Virtue and Decency.

VI. Now of the four Divisions, under which I have ranged the Qualities and Force of Virtue,
that

that which consists in the Knowledge of Truth principally, affects the Nature of Man. For all of us are impelled and carried along to the Love of Knowledge and Learning, in which we account it glorious excel; but consider every Slip, Mistake, Ignorance and Deception in it, to be hurtful and shameful. In this Pursuit, which is both natural and virtuous, two Faults are to be avoided. The first, not to presume that we know Things which we do not know, and thereby rashly give them our Assent. Every Man ought to ~~wish~~ to avoid this Error; and therefore he must apply both with Leisure and Industry to the Study of Things.

The other Fault is, that some People bestow too much Study and Pains (g) upon Things that are obscure, difficult, and even immaterial in themselves. When those Faults are avoided, all the Pains and Care a Man bestows upon Studies that are virtuous in themselves, and worthy of his Knowledge, have a Claim to our highest Regard. Thus we have heard how (b) *Caius Sulpicius*

(g) *Upon Things that are obscure*] The Emperor *Antoninus* very finely thanks the Gods, that when he applied to the Study of Philosophy, he was taught by *Junius Rusticus* to avoid this Error, Τὸν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὅπως ἐπιθύμησα φιλοσοφίας. μὴ ἐμπιστῆν εἰς τινα σοφιστὴν μηδὲ ἀποκαθίσαι ἐπὶ τὰς συχραφεῖς ἢ συλλογισμῶς ἀναλύνειν, ἢ περὶ τὰ μετεωρολογικὰ καταγίνεσθαι: "That when I applied my Mind to the Study of Philosophy, I did not meet
" with a Sophist for my Instructor, neither did I spend my
" Time in reading mean Authors, nor was I embarrassed by
" the useless Studies of Astrology."

(b) *Sulpicius*] We have in the *Roman* History, a remarkable Story of the Nobleman, by which we may see the excellent Effects of Learning in a Man of Consideration, who knows how to Time it well. For we are told, that while he served against the *Macedonians*, under *Julius Æmilius*, he foretold to the

cius excelled in Astronomy, and (*b*) *Sextus Pompeius*, to my own Knowledge, was a great Mathematician; I have known many who were eminent in Logick and more who were so in the Civil Law, all which are Arts that serve to investigate Truth; but our Duty forbids us to be diverted, by pursuing her, from carrying on our proper Concerns, because the whole Glory of Virtue consists in Activity. Yet this is often intermitted, and frequent are our Returns to our Studies. Then, there is a certain incessant Working of the Mind, which, without our taking Pains is sufficient to keep us in the Practice of Thinking. Now, all Thought and every Motion of the Mind consists in the Pursuit of virtuous Actions, or such as relate to the Enjoyment of a good and a happy Life; or else in the Pursuits of Science and Knowledge. I have now treated of, at least, the first Source of Duty.

VII. As to the other three, the most extensive System is that, by which, the mutual Society of Mankind, and, as it were, the Intercourse of Life, is preserved. It may be divided into two Parts, Honesty or Justice, in which Courage displays itself with the most distinguished Lustre, and from which Men are termed Good. To this is joined Beneficence, which may likewise be termed Benevolence or Liberality. Now the chief Property of Honesty is, that no Person hurt another (*i*), unless

Roman Soldiers an Eclipse, and explained its Causes, and thereby prevented the Conspiration they otherwise would have fallen into, and which seizing the Enemies, they were easily routed by the *Romans*.

(*b*) *Sextus Pompeius*] He was Uncle to *Pompey* the Great and is celebrated upon other Occasions by our Author, for his great Knowledge in Geometry, and the Doctrine of the *Stoics*.

(*i*) *Unless he is provoked*] Though some well-meaning Christian

14 M. T. CICERO'S OFFICES; or

less he is provoked by suffering Wrong; next, that public Property be appropriated to public, and Private to private, Good.

Now, by Nature, (*k*) there is no such Thing as exclusive Property; all that can be pleaded for it is, antient Possession (as when Men formerly came into unoccupied Territories) or Victory (as possessing it in Right of Conquest) or public Constitution, Pacton, Terms or Lot. By those the Land of *Arpinum* is belonging to the *Arpinates*, the *Tusculan* to the *Tusculans*. The like Division holds with regard to Matters of private Property. Thus, as every Man holds his own, each possesses that Portion which fell to his Share of those Things that by Nature were common; and it follows, that no Man can covet another's Property without violating the Laws of human Society.

stian Divines have found Fault with the Unchristianity of this Passage, yet it is not irreconcilable with the Doctrines of the Gospel, or the Practice of our Holy Religion. Because, if a Man has it in his Power to do good to many, by the just Punishment of one, who, by injuring him with Impunity, would set a most pernicious Example to the Society, if he does not do it, he acts against the first Principles of Christianity. The Christian Doctrine therefore against Revenge, regards that kind of Revenge that proceeds (which frequently happens) from personal or private Resentment, and which the wisest and best of the Heathens discouraged even in a just Cause, because it becomes destitute of Justice by not profiting Society through the Example. *Disiat autem ratio Homini* (says Grotius, *de jure Belli ac Paris*, L. 2. Cap. 20. § 5.) *nihil agendum quod nocet alteri, nisi id bonum habeat aliquid Propositum. In solo autem inimici Dolore, ita nudè spectato, nullum est bonum nisi falsum et imaginarium.* "Now Reason tells Men, that we should do no Hurt to another Man; unless it is to serve some good End. "For from the meer Pain of another Person, there can result "no good but what is mistaken and imaginary." *Vid. plura in Loc. cit.*

(*k*) Now by Nature] Grotius, *De jure Belli ac Pacis*, Lib. 2. Cap. 2. has largely explained all that is here laid down by our Author.

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 15

But (as *Plato* says very nobly) as we are not born for ourselves alone, and as our Country claims her Share, and our Friends their Share in our Existence; and, as the *Stoics* hold, all that the Earth produces is created for the Use of Man, so Men are created for one another, that they may mutually do good to one another. In this we ought to take Nature for our Guide, to throw into the public Stock the Offices of general Utility, by interchanging our Duties; sometimes, by receiving, sometimes, by giving; and sometimes to cement human Society by Arts, by Industry, and by Abilities.

Now *Honesty* is founded upon Faithfulness which is a Perseverance and Truth in all we say and in all we promise. Let us therefore (tho' some People may think it over doing the Matter) imitate the *Stoics*, who curiously examined the Derivation of the Word *Fides* or Faithfulness, and let us take it for granted that it is no other than a (1) Performance of what we have promised. But there are two Kinds of Dishonesty, the first is of those who offer an Injury, the second, of those who have it in their Power to avert an Injury from those to whom it is offered, and yet do it not (m). For, if a Man, prompted either by An-

(1) *Performance*] Our Author from other Parts of his Works, seems to be serious in deriving the Word *Fides*, *Quia FIAT quod dictum est*. He has been ridiculed for this fanciful Derivation by his modern Commentators, who have recommended that of *Salmasius*, but I don't know whether it mends the Matter. Foreigners, says he, (*De Usuris*) pronounced the Greek Word *πίστις*, *πιστις*, and hence came the Word *Fides*.

(m) *For if a Man*] There seems to be some Mistake in the Original here, but the Author's Sense is plainly as I have translated it.

ger or any sudden Start of Passion, unjustly assaults another Man, or seems, as it were, to lay violent Hands on his Neighbour; the Man who does not repel or withstand the Injury, if he can is as much to blame as if he forsook his Parents, his Friends, or his Country.

Those Injuries, however, which are industriously inflicted, often proceed from Fear; as for Instance, when a Man, who is contriving to injure another, is afraid, unless he executes what he is meditating, that he may himself meet with some Misfortune. But the great Incentive to doing wrong, is to obtain what one desires, and in this Crime, Avarice is the ruling Passion.

8. Now Riches are sought after, both for the necessary Purposes of Life, and for the Enjoyment of Pleasure. When Ambition is predominant in a Man, he covets Money in Order to strengthen his Interest, and oblige his Friends. As we lately heard *M. Crassus* say, that no Man who wanted to have a Direction in the Government, could be said to have Money enough, unless the Interest of it could maintain an Army. Men likewise in their Equipages, love Magnificence with Elegance, and in living, they affect Politeness with Plenty; and hence, their Desire for Money becomes boundless. There may be, indeed, in Man, a Desire to improve his private Fortune which is far from being blameable; but still he ought to avoid doing Injury to any other Person.

But the mighty Cause why most Men are seized with a Forgetfulness of Honesty or Justice, is when they stumble upon a violent Ambition after Empire, Honours and Glory. Here what *Eunius* observes, is remarkably verified. Digitized by Google

Concerning the moral Duties of Mankind. 17

Through the Thirst of Empire,

All Ties of Friendship and of Faith are broke.

For where the Object of Ambition is of such a Nature, as that several, at the same Time, cannot succeed, the Contest for it is generally so violent, that nothing can be more difficult than to preserve the sacred Tyes of Society. We had lately a glaring Instance of this in the Presumption of *C. Caesar*, who, in order to obtain that Direction in the Government which the Wildness of his Imagination had planned out, violated all Laws Divine and Human. But what is most deplorable under this Head, is, that the Desire after Honour, Empire, and Glory, is generally prevalent in the greatest Soul, and the most exalted Genius; for which Reason every Crime of that Sort is the more carefully to be guarded against. But in every Species of Injustice, it is very material to examine whether it is committed thro' a Start of Passion, which commonly is short-liv'd, or from deliberate, premeditated Malice. For whatever proceeds from a short, sudden Fit, is of slighter Moment than what proceeds from Fore-thought and Preparation. But enough has been said concerning inflicting Injury.

IX. To proceed; various are the Causes of Men omitting, or forsaking, their Duty. They may be unwilling to encounter Enmity, Toil or Expence, or perhaps they do it thro' Negligence, Listlessness or Laziness; or they are so embarrass'd in certain Studies and Pursuits, that they suffer those, they ought to protect, to be abandoned. This leads me to doubt somewhat of the Justness of *Plato's* Com-

pliment to Philosophers; "That they are Men of Integrity, because they aim only at Truth, and despise and neglect those Considerations which others value, and which generally set Mankind at Variance, amongst themselves." For, while they abstain from doing Injury to others, they indeed assert one Species of Honesty or Justice, but they fail in another; because they are so entangled in the Pursuits of Learning, that they abandon those they ought to protect. Some therefore think, that they would have no Concern with the Government, unless they were forced to it; but still, it would be more commendable, if they were to undertake it voluntarily. For even this, tho' a right Thing in itself, is commendable only when it is voluntary. There are others who either from a Desire to improve their private Fortune, or from some personal Resentments, pretend that they mind their own Affairs, only that they may appear not to wrong their Neighbours. Now such Persons in avoiding one Kind of Dishonesty strike upon another; because they abandon the Fellowship of Life by employing in it, none of their Zeal, none of their Labour, none of their Abilities. Having thus stated the two Kinds of Dishonesty or Injustice, and assign'd the Motives for each Kind, and settled previously the proper Requisites of Honesty or Justice, we may easily (unless we are extremely selfish) form a Judgment of our Duty on every Occasion.

For, to concern ourselves in other People's Affairs is a delicate Matter. Yet *Chremes*, a Character in *Terence*, thinks, that there is nothing that can befall Mankind in which he does not think

he

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 19

he has a Concern. Mean while, because we have the quicker Perception and Sensation of whatever happens unfavourably or untowardly to ourselves, than to others, which we see as it were at a greater Distance, the Judgment we form of them is very different from what we form of ourselves. It is therefore a right Maxim, to do nothing when you are doubtful whether it is honest or unjust; for whatever is honest is self-evident, but Doubt implies Suspicion of Injustice.

X. But upon certain Occasions, it frequently happens, that those Duties which form the Characteristics of an honest and a worthy Man, are alter'd and chang'd to their Contraries. For Example, to return a Deposit, to perform a Promise, and other Matters that are relative to Truth and Honesty, sometimes alter so much through Circumstances, that it is just, they should not be observ'd. For it is proper to have Recourse to those Fundamentals of Honesty which I have already laid down; in the first Place, that of injuring no Person; and secondly, that of being subservient to the public Good. When there is an Alteration in Circumstances, the Complexion of the Duty is changed likewise, for it is not unalterable.

A Promise as a Paction may happen to be made, the Performance of which may be prejudicial either to the Party promising, or to the Party to whom the Promise is made. For (as we see in the (n) Play) had not *Neptune* performed his Promise to *Theseus*, the latter would not have lost his Son

(*) Play] Written by *Eurypides*.

Hippolitus. For we are told, that of three Wishes to be granted him, the third, which he made in a Passion, was the Death of *Hippolitus*, which, when it was granted, threw him in the most dreadful Agonies. Therefore you are not to perform those Promises which may be prejudicial to the Party to whom you promise: Nor if they may be more hurtful to you than they can be serviceable to him. It is inconsistent with our Duty, not to prefer the greater Obligation to the less. For Instance, suppose you should promise to appear in Court in Favour of a another Person while his Cause is depending; now, if your Son was to be seized violently ill, in the mean Time, it would be no Breach of Duty in you not to perform what you promise; the other Person would rather be guilty of that Breach, if he should complain that he was given up. Having said thus much, there can be no Manner of Doubt, that a Man is not bound by those Promises which he makes either under the Influence of Fear, or through the Seduction of Deceit. Many such Promises are cancelled by the Edict of the Pretor's Court, some by general Acts of the Legislature. For very often a Man may be wronged by a wrong Representation of the Fact; and by a too artful, but malicious, Construction of the Law. Hence, *the Rigor of Law, is the Rigor of Injustice*, is a Saying that is now worn into a Proverb. We have known many scandalous Things of this Kind happen even in the Occurrences of Government. Thus, when a General had concluded a Truce with his Enemy for thirty Days, yet ravag'd that

Ene-

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 21

Enemy's Territories every Night, because the Truce was only for so many Days, without any Mention of Nights. Nor indeed is the Conduct of our Countryman *Quintus Fabius Labeo*, to be approved of, or, whoever he was, (for I have the Story only by Report) who being appointed an Arbiter by the Senate to settle a Boundary between the People of *Nola*, and those of *Naples*, counselled each of those People, severally, to do nothing that might look like Greediness or Forwardness, and that each ought rather to draw back than advance. Both of them taking this Advice; a Space of unoccupied Ground was left in the Middle. He therefore adjudged to each People; the Boundary to which they had confined themselves, and all that was in the Middle, to the People of *Rome*. This was not a Judgment, but a gross Cheat, and we ought to avoid all Tricks of that kind in all our Transactions.

XI. Certain Duties are to be observed even towards those who have wronged you. For there is a Mean even in Revenge and Punishments. Nay, I am not certain whether it is not sufficient for the Person who has injured you to repent of what he has done, so that he may never be guilty of the like to come; and, may be a Warning for others not to be so forward to offend in the same Manner. Now, in Government, the Laws of War are to be punctually observed; for there were two Manners of Disputing, one by debating, the other by fighting; the former characterises Men, the latter Brutes; but if the former fails, Recourse must be had to the latter. Wars there-

fore are to be undertaken that we may live in Peace, without being injured. But when we obtain the Victory, we must preserve those Enemies who behaved without Cruelty or Inhumanity during the War: For Example, our Forefathers received even as Members of their State, the *Tuscan*s, the *Æqui*, the *Volscians*, the *Sabines*, and the *Hernici*, but utterly destroyed *Carthage* and *Namantia*. I am unwilling to mention *Corinth*, but I believe they had some Motive, and particularly, they were induced to destroy it, lest the Advantages of its Situation should invite the Inhabitants to make War in future Times. In my poor Opinion, we ought always to hearken to Peace, where it is fair, and without Deceit and Subterfuge. Had my Voice been followed on this Head, we might still have had some Form of Government (tho' perhaps none of the best) whereas, now, we have none. If we are to regard those Enemies whom we conquer by Strength, we are likewise to protect those who throw themselves upon the Honour of our General, and lay down their Arms even tho' the battering Rams should have struck their Walls. In this Respect, the Roman Government so scrupulously observed the Rules of Justice, that it was a Custom among our Ancestors, that they who received, under their Protection, Cities, or Nations conquered in War, became their Patrons.

Now the Justice of War was most religiously pointed out by the (a) ceremonial Law of the *Romans*. From that we are given to understand, that

(a) *Ceremonial Law*] Orig. *Fœciali Jure*. I dont know that we have a proper *English* Term for this Law. The Powers of

that no War is just, unless it is undertaken to (p) reclaim Property, or unless it is solemnly denounc'd and proclaim'd before Hand. *Popilius*, when a General, held a Province where *Cato's* Son serv'd in his Army; it happened that *Popilius* thought proper to reduce the Legion in which he serv'd, and he dismiss'd *Cato's* Son at the same Time. The young Man, however, liked a Military Life so well, that he remained in the Army. But his Father wrote to *Popilius*, that if he suffer'd him to continue in the Army, he should for a second Time give him the Military Oath; because being free from the first, he could not lawfully fight with the Enemy.

So very exact were they in Matters of Warfare. In the Letter which old *Cato* wrote to his Son on this Occasion he tells him; " That he heard, he had got his Discharge from the Consul, while he was serving as a Soldier in *Macedonia*, during the War with *Perseus*; he therefore enjoins him to take Care not to enter upon Action;

of the College of the *Fœciales* came the nearest, of any Thing we have in *England*, to those of the Earl Marshal, and some Branches of it still remain with the College of Heralds. Their Institution, however, as appears by this and other Parts of our Author's Works, was far from being only Ceremonial; for they were the Judge of the Sense of Treaties, of the Justice of Peace and War; and they were amongst the oldest Orders in *Rome*, being instituted by *Numa Pompilius*.

(p) To reclaim Property, &c.] The formal and public Declaration of War was an indispensable Preliminary to it among the *Romans*. This Declaration was either conditional or simple. The conditional was, when it was made *cum Rerum repetitione*, which sometimes not only imply'd Satisfaction for Property, but Punishment upon the Offender. A simple Declaration was without any Condition, as when an Injury could not be repaired; or when War was first declared by the other Party. See *Grotius*, Lib. 111. Chap. 3. *De jure Belli*, &c.

24 M. T. CICERO'S OFFICES; or,

because it was not lawful for a Man who is not a Soldier, to fight with an Enemy. (q).

XII. And indeed there is one Thing very remarkable, that a Principal in War, with us, is call'd a *Hostis*, and thereby the Softness of the Appellation, lessens the Horror of the Thing. For our Ancestors called those *Hostes* whom we call Strangers. This can be proved by Expressions from the twelve Tables; for Instance, *a Day appointed for the Hostis to plead*; and again, *A Roman's Right of Property against a Hostis never perishes*. What can be more compleatly polite than this? To call those with whom you were at War, by so soft an Appellation? It is true that Length of Time has affixt an harsher Signification to this Word, which is now never applyed to the Stranger, but to him, who carries Arms against us.

Mean while, when we fight for Empire, and when we seek Glory in Arms, all those Grounds of War which I have already enumerated to be just ones, must absolutely enter into such a War. But Wars that are founded upon the Glory of Conquest alone are to be carry'd on with less Rancour. Thus we treat a Fellow-Citizen in a different Manner as a Foe, than we do, as an Antagonist. As the latter, the Struggle is for Glory and Power, as the former for Life and Reputation. Thus we fought a-

(q) *Enemy*] This is a very extraordinary Story and shews the Difference between the antient and modern Way of making War. I am not sure, however, whether there is not somewhat too scrupulous in old *Caro's* Delicacy. No War can be just but what is undertaken for the public Good, in which every Man is a Party; and tho' a military Oath is necessary for preserving Discipline and Subordination, yet every Man is justify'd, upon general Principles, in acting, even offensively, against the Enemies of his Country.

gainst

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 25

gainst the *Celiberians*, we fought against the *Cimbrians*, as against Enemies ; the Question was not who should command, but who should exist. We fought for Command against the *Latines*, the *Sabines*, the *Samnites*, the *Carthagenians*, and *Pyrrhus* ; the *Carthagenians*, 'tis true, were faithless! and *Hannibal* was cruel, but the others were better principled. The Speech of *Pyrrhus* about ransoming the Captives is a fine one and to our Purpose;

*In War not crafty, but in Battle bold,
No Wealth I value, and I spurn at Gold.
Be Steel the only Metal shall decree
The Fate of Empire, 'er to you, or me.
The generous Conquest be by Courage try'd,
And all the Captives on the Roman Side.
I swear, by all the Gods of open War,
As fate their Lives, their Freedom I will spare.*

This Sentiment is truly noble and worthy the Blood of the *Eacidae*.

XIII. Nay, if even private Persons should, upon certain Emergencies, make a Promise to the Enemy, they ought to observe it. Thus (r) *Regulus*, when he was made a Prisoner by the *Carthagenians* in the first *Punic War*, being sent to *Rome* to treat of an Exchange of Prisoners, he swore that he would return. The first Thing he did when he came to *Rome* was to deliver his Opinion in the Senate against the Exchange, and after that, when his Relations and Friends sought to detain him; he chose

(r) *Regulus*] This Passage is I think a strong Proof that the Story of *Regulus* is not, as some would have it, a meer Fiction.

to

to deliver himself up to a cruel Death rather than to falsify his Word to the Enemy. (s)

With Regard to the second Punic War; after the Battle of Cannæ, Hannibal sent ten Romans to Rome under an Oath that they would return to him, unless they procured the Prisoners to be ransomed. But the Censors disfranchised and mulcted in an annual Fine, as long as they lived, all of them that were perjur'd, as well as him who devised an Evasion of his Oath. For when, by the Leave of Hannibal, he had left the Camp, he return'd soon after, under Pretext of having forgot somewhat, and then again leaving the Camp, he pretended that he was free from the Obligation of his Oath, which he was with Regard to the Words, but not the Meaning, of it. For the moral Obligation lies in the Sense, and not in the Words of an Oath. But our Forefathers set us a most eminent Example of Justice towards an Enemy. For when a Deserter from Pyrrhus offered to the Senate to dispatch that Prince by Poison, the Senate and C. Fabricius deliver'd the Traytor up to Pyrrhus. Thus they disapproved of taking off by Treachery, an Enemy who was powerful, and was carrying on against them an unprovoked War.

Having said thus much of the warlike Duties, I must put you in Mind, that Justice is due even to the lowest of Mankind: And nothing can be lower than the Condition and Fortune of a Slave. And yet it is no unreasonable Rule to put them upon the same Footing as hir'd Labourers, oblige them to do their Work, but to give them their Dues. Now, as Injustice may be done two Ways, by Force or Fraud; Fraud is the Property of a Fox,

(s) This Section is not admitted to be genuine, and in the Original it is distinguished by different Characters.

Force of a Lion; both are utterly repugnant to Society, but Fraud is the most detestable. But in the whole System of Villany, the capital Villain is he who, in practising the greatest Crimes, deceives under the Mask of Virtue.

XIV. Having thus treated of Justice, let me now, as I propos'd, speak of Beneficence and Liberality, Virtues, that are the most agreeable to the Nature of Man, but they are to be practis'd with great Circumspection. For, in the first Place, we are to take care lest our Kindness should hurt both those whom it is meant to assist, and others. In the next Place, it ought not to exceed our Abilities; and it ought to be adapted to the Deserts of the Object. This is the Fundamental of Justice to which all I say here is to refer. For they who do Kindnesses which prove of Disservice to the Person they pretend to oblige, are neither beneficent nor generous, but execrable Sycophants. And they who injure one Party in order to be liberal to another, are guilty of the same Dishonesty; as if they should appropriate to themselves what belongs to another.

Now, many, and they especially who are the most ambitious after Grandeur and Glory, rob one Party to enrich another; and account themselves generous to their Friends if they enrich them at any Rate. This is so far from being consistent with, that nothing can be more contrary to, our Duty. Let us therefore still practise that Kind of Generosity that is serviceable to our Friends, but hurtful to none. Upon this Principle, when *Lucius Sylla* and *Caius Caesar* took Property from its just Owners, and transferr'd it to others, inso doing they

ought

ought not to be accounted generous; for nothing can be generous that is not just.

Our next Part of Circumspection is, that our Generosity never should exceed our Abilities. For they who are more generous than their Circumstances admit of, are guilty of a capital Error, by wronging their Relations; because they bestow upon Strangers those Means which they might, with greater Justice, give, or leave, to their Relations. Now a Generosity of this Kind is generally attended with a Lust to ravish and to plunder, in order to be furnished with the Means to give away. For it is easy to observe, that most of them are not so much by Nature generous, as they are misled by a Kind of Pride to do a great many Things to get themselves the Character of being generous, and this Kind of Generosity is not so much the Effect of Principle, as of Ostentation. Now such a Disguise of Disposition is more nearly ally'd to Vanity than to Generosity or Virtue.

The third Head of Circumspection I propos'd to treat of was, that in our Generosity we should have regard to Merit; and consequently examine both the Morals of the Party to whom we are generous, and his Disposition towards us, together with the general Good of Society, and how far he may have already contributed to our own Utility. Could all those Considerations be united, it were the more desirable, but the Object, in whom is united the most numerous, and the most important of them ought with us to have the Preference.

XV. As Society therefore is not compos'd of Men who are absolutely perfect and compleatly wise, but of Men who have great Merit if they possess

less the Outlines of Worth, we are, I think, from thence to infer, that no man is to be neglected, in whom we can discern the faintest Character of Virtue. Now, our Regard for Mankind ought to, be in Proportion as a Person is adorned with the milder Virtues of Modesty, Temperance, and that very Justice of which I have so largely treated. These are the Virtues that characterise a good Man, for, generally speaking, Resolution and Greatness of Soul exert themselves too impetuously in Men who are not compleatly wise and perfect.

Having said thus much of Morals; With Regard to the Kindness which a Person expresses for us, our first Duty is, to perform the most for him by whom we are most beloved. Now we are to judge of Kindness, not like giddy, young, Boys, by a Fit of Love-Passion, but by its Firmness and Perseverance. But if its Merits are such, that we are not to court, but to requite the Kindness, the greater ought our Care to be; for there is no Duty more indispensable than to pay our Gratitude where it is due. Now if, as *Hesiod* enjoyns, we ought if it is in our Power to repay a Loan with Interest, how ought we to act when call'd upon by Kindness? Are we not to imitate those rich Grounds which yeild a greater Crop than they receive Seed. For, if we readily oblige those, who, we are in Hopes, will serve us, how ought we to behave towards those who have served us already? For as Generosity is of two Kinds, the one, conferring a Favour, the other, repaying it: The conferring it is our own Option; but the not repaying it is incompatible with the Character of a good Man, providing he can repay it without Injury to any.

We

We are likewise to have regard to the Degrees of Favours, and doubtless we owe the greatest Acknowledgments, where the greatest Kindness is conferred. Mean while we are, above all Things, to consider the Spirit, the Zeal, and the Meaning with which a Favour is conferr'd. For many confer their Favours thro' Caprice, without any Judgment, upon all Mankind promiscuously, as if influenc'd by a Disease, or a sudden Whirl of Mind, that carries them away like a Hurricane: Such Favours are not to be rated so high, as those which result from Judgment, Consideration and Constancy. But in conferring or requiting Kindness, the chief Rule of our Duty ought to be, if all other Circumstances are equal, to confer most upon the Man who stands in greatest Need of it. The Reverse of this is practis'd by the Generality; who direct their greatest Services to the Men from whom they hope the most, tho' they stand in no Need of them.

XVI. Now Society and Alliances amongst Men would be best preserved if the greatest Benefits were conferr'd where there is the nearest Relation. But we ought to go higher if we are to investigate the natural Principles of Intercourse and Community amongst Men. The first is, that which is perceiv'd in the Society of the whole human Race, and its Chain is form'd by Speech and Reason, which by teaching, learning, communicating, debating and judging, conciliate Men together, and bind them into a Kind of natural Society. There is nothing in which we differ more from the Nature of Brutes than in this; for we very often allow them to have Courage; as for Instance, Horses and Lyons; but we never admit

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 31

that they possess Justice, Equity and Goodness; because they are void of Reason and Speech. Now this is the Kind of Society that is most extensive with Mankind amongst themselves, and it goes thro' all; for here a Community of all Things that Nature has produced for the common Use of Mankind, is preserv'd, so, as that they may be possess'd in the Manner prescrib'd by Laws and civil Statutes. But every Thing else is to be held according to the *Greek Proverb*, "that all Things amongst Friends are to be in Common." Now this Community consists of Things which are of that Nature as is plac'd by *Ennius* under one Head, but may be apply'd to many. *He* (says that Author) *who kindly directs the bewildered Traveller in the right Road; does as it were, light his Lamp, by his Lamp; which nevertheless continues to give Light to himself after it has lighted the other.*

In this single Instance, we are sufficiently enjoyned to perform, even to a Stranger, all the Service we can perform without Detriment to our selves. Now the following Sayings are common; *That we are to debar no Man from the running Stream; That we are to suffer Fire to be kindled at Fire; That we are to give faithful Counsel to a Person who is in Doubt:* All which are Particulars that are serviceable to the Receiver without being detrimental to the Bestower. We are therefore to practise them and be constantly contributing somewhat to the common Good. As the Means, however, of each particular Person are very confin'd and the Numbers of the Indigent are boundless, our distributive Generosity ought still to be regulated by the Saying of *Ennius*; *it must continue to give Light*

to ourselves, that we may still be possess of the Means to be generous to our Friends.

XVII. Now the Degrees of human Society are many. Not to speak of that unbounded Kind I have already mentioned, there is one more confined, which consists of Men of the same Race, Nation and Language, by which, People are more intimately connected among themselves. A more contracted Society than that consists of Men inhabiting the same City, for many Things in Cities are in common, such as their Forum, their Temples, their Porticoes, their Streets, their Laws, their Rites, their Courts of Justice, their Trials, not to mention their Customs and Intimacies, with a great Number of particular Dealings and Intercourses amongst themselves. There is a still more contracted Degree of Society, which is, that of Blood, and this closes, in a narrow Point, the unbounded general Association of the human Race.

For, as it is a common natural Principle among all animated Beings, that they have a Desire to propagate their own Species, the first Principle of Society therefore consists in the Cohabitation of Man and Wife, the next in Children, the next in a Family within one Roof, where every Thing is in common. This Society gives rise to the City, and is, as it were, the Nursery of the Common-Wealth. Next follows the Connexion of Brotherhood, next that of Cousins in their different Degrees, and when they grow too numerous to be contained under one Roof, they are transplanted to different Dwellings, as it were to so many

many Colonies. Then follow Marriages and Alliances, by which, our Kinsmen are multiplied. The Descendants, by this Propagation, give rise to Government. But the Ties and Affections of Blood bind Mankind by the most endearing Considerations.

For there is something very powerful in having the (t) Monuments of our Ancestors the same, in practising (u) the same religious Rites, and in (x) having the same Places of Burying. But amongst all the Degrees of Society, none is more excellent, none more stable than, when worthy Men, thro' a Similarity of Manners, are intimately connected together. For, as I have often said, even when we discern the (y) *Honestum* in another, it touches us and makes us Friends to the Man who possesses it.

Now though Virtue, of every Kind, attracts and charms us to the Love of those who possess it,

(t) *Monuments of our Ancestors*] This was of great Efficacy amongst the *Romans*, and the Sight of the Statues of their Ancestors was a powerful Incitement to the Brave, and a Check to the Wicked.

(u) *The same religious Rites*] Every great Family amongst the *Romans* had certain Deities, for whom they had a peculiar Reverence, and this gave Rise to the different Forms of Worship amongst them. This Veneration generally rose from the Tradition of their being descended from, or favour'd by, those Deities.

(x) *Places of Burying*] The *Romans* were so religious in this Respect, that even when they parted with their Estates, they kept the Sepulchres of their Ancestors, and a Right to a Way to come at them.

(y) *Honestum*] I have not ventured to translate this Word, because I know no single Word in the *English* Language to express it. The Word *Virtue* does not; because our Author plainly distinguishes between the *Honestum* and *Virtus*. The Word *Honesty* in *English* comes the nearest to it; but does not come up fully to the Idea of the *Honestum*, which properly implies graceful Virtue. One of our modern Poets, I think, has express'd it prettily by calling it the *Moral Venus*.

yet that Love is strongest that is effected by Justice and Generosity. For nothing is more lovely, nothing is more binding, than a Similarity of Manners amongst worthy Men; because amongst those, whose Pursuits and Pleasures are the same, every Man is pleased as much with his Neighbour as he is with himself; and that is effected which *Pythagoras* took to be the highest Effort of Friendship; "for many become one." A strong Community is likewise effected by an interchangeable Course of good Offices; which by being mutual and agreeable cement those together, amongst whom they happen, in indissoluble Bonds of Friendship.

But when we view every Thing in the Eye of Reason, of all Connexions none is more weighty, none is more dear than that between every Individual and his Country. Our Parents are dear to us; our Children, our Kinsmen, our Friends are dear to us, but our Country alone comprehends all the dearest (z) Endearments of Mankind. What good Man would hesitate to die for her to do her Service? The more execrably unnatural therefore are they who (a) wound their Country by every Species of Guilt, and who now are, and have been employed in her utter Destruction. But were we to form a Computation or an Estimate of the chief Objects of our Duty, the principal are our Country and our Parents, to whom we are bound by the strongest Obligations. The next are our Children and Family, who depend upon us alone without having any other Refuge. The next, our agreeable

(z) *Dearest Endearments*] Orig. *Omnes omnium Charitates*.

(a) *Wound their Country*] Our Author wrote this soon after *Cæsar's* Death when *Marc Antony* was endeavouring to continue his Tyranny.

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 33

Kinsmen, who generally share our Fortune in common. The necessary Supports of Life therefore are due chiefly to those I have already mentioned. But the mutual Intercourses of Life, Counsels, Discourses, Exhortations, Consultations, and even sometimes Reproaches, are the Attributes of Friendship, and those Friendships are the most agreeable that are cemented by a Similarity of Mannefs.

XVIII. But in performing all those Duties, we are carefully to consider the several Necessities of the Objects, and in what every one of them can, or cannot serve themselves without us. Therefore the Tyes of Blood must sometimes give way to the Objects of Necessity. Some Duties are owing to some preferably to others. For Instance; you are sooner to help your Neighbour to inn his (*b*) Corn, than your Brother or your Friend; but in the Case of a Law-suit, you are to take part with your Kinsman or your Friend, rather than with your Neighbour. These Considerations therefore and the like, ought to enter into every Duty, and we ought to keep ourselves in Use and Practice that we may be able to keep the Accounts of our Duties, and by adding or subtracting to (*c*) strike the Ballance, by which we can see the Proportion to which every Party is entitled.

But as neither Physicians, nor Generals, nor Orators, however perfect they may be in the Theory of

(*b*) *To inn his Corn*] The Romans in this Respect were very neighbourly; for, from several Passages of the Ancients it was usual for a Farmer to summon all his Neighbours to help him both to cut down and inn his Corn.

(*c*) *Strike the Ballance*] The Commentators have raised a great Dust about this Passage in the Original, but I think, nothing can be plainer than it should stand as I have translated it.

their several Arts, can ever perform any Thing that is great without Experience and Practice: Thus, I have laid down Rules for the Observation of Duties; and others have done the same, but the Importance of the Matter demands Experience and Practice. I have now I think sufficiently treated of the Manner in which the Honestum which gives the Fitness to our Duties, arises from those Matters that come within the Rights of human Society.

It must be understood, however, at the same Time, that when the four Springs from which Virtue and Honesty arises are laid open, that which is done with a great, elevated, and disinterested, Spirit, will always make the noblest Figure. Therefore the highest of all Reproaches is somewhat of the following Kind:

*Young Men ye carry but the Souls of Women,
That Woman of a Man —*

Or somewhat of the following Kind,

Give me a Trophy without Toil or Danger.

On the other Hand we are, I dont know how it is, inspired with a fuller Elocution when we praise Actions performed with Magnanimity, with Fortitude, and Virtue. From hence; *Marathon, Salminæ, Platea, Thermopylæ, Leuctra*, have become the Themes of Rhetoricians; and amongst ourselves, *Cocles*, the *Decii*, the two *Scipiones*, *Cneius*, and *Publius, Marcus Marcellus*; and a great many others. But above all the Roman People in general are distinguished by Elevation of Spirit; for their Fondness for military Glory appears from their Statues being generally dressed in warlike Habits.

XIX. But that Magnanimity that is discovered in being exposed to Toil and Danger, if not found-

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 37

ed on Justice and directed to public Good, but influenced by Self-Interest, is blameable. For so far from being a Character of Virtue, it indicates a Barbarity, that is destructive of Humanity itself. The Stoics therefore define Fortitude rightly, when they call it *Virtue fighting on the Side of Justice*. No Man therefore who has acquired the Reputation of Fortitude, ever attains to Glory by Deceit and Malice; for nothing that is unjust can be virtuous.

It is therefore finely said by *Plato*, that as the Knowledge that is divested of Justice deserves the Appellation of *Cunning*, rather than *Wisdom*, so a Mind unsusceptible of Fear, if animated by private Interest and not public Utility, deserves the Character of *Audaciousness*, rather than of *Fortitude*. We therefore require that all Men of Courage and Magnanimity should be, at the same Time Men of Virtue and of Simplicity; Lovers of Truth and Enemies to all Deceit; For these are the main Characters of Justice.

But there is one disagreeable Circumstance, that Obstinacy, and an undue Ambition for Power, too naturally shoot up from this Elevation and Greatness of Spirit. For, as *Plato* tells us, that all the Character of the *Lacedemonians* was, to be fir'd with a Desire to conquer; thus the Man who is most distinguished by his Magnanimity, is most animated by the Ambition of being the Leader, or rather the Master, of all. Now it is a difficult Matter in a Man, who desires to excel in every Respect, to preserve that Equanimity which is the Characteristic of Justice. Hence it is, that they will not suffer themselves to be thwarted in a Debate, nor by any Law, either general or constitutional; and in

public Matters they are commonly guilty of Corruption and Faction, in order to strengthen their Interest all they can, and they chuse to be Superi-
ors through Power, rather than Equals in Justice. But the more difficult the Task of correcting this Abuse is, it is the more glorious ; for no Exigency can happen that ought to be void of Justice.

They therefore who oppose, not they who commit, Injustice are to be deemed brave and Magnanimous. Now genuine and well conducted Magnanimity judges that the *Honestum* which is Nature's chief Aim, consists in Realities and not in Appearances ; and rather chuses to have , than to seem to have a Superiority, in Merit : For the Man who is sway'd by the Prejudices of an ignorant Rabble is not to be rated in the Ranks of the great. But the Man of a Spirit the most elevated and the most ambitious of Glory, is the most easily pushed on to Acts of Injustice. This is a ticklish and a slippery Situation ; for scarcely can there be found a Man who after enduring Toils and encountering Dangers, does not pant for Popularity as the Reward of his Exploits.

XX. It is certain that a brave and an elevated Spirit is chiefly discernable by two Characters. The first consists in despising the Outside of Things, from this Conviction within itself, that a Man ought to admire, desire, or court nothing but what is virtuous and becoming ; and that he ought to sink under no human Might, nor yeild to any Disorder, either of Spirit or Fortune. The other Character of Magnanimity is, that possessed of such a Spirit as I have pointed out, you enter upon some Undertaking, not only of great Importance in itself and of great
Utility

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 39

Utility to the Public, but extremely arduous, full of Difficulties, and dangerous both to Life and many of its Concomitants.

In the Latter of those two Characters consist Glory, Majesty, and, let me add, Utility; but the Causes and the efficient Means that form great Men is in the former, which contains the Principles that elevate the Soul, and gives it a Contempt for temporary Considerations. Now this very Excellence consists in two Particulars; you are to deem that only to be good that is virtuous; and you must be free from all mental Disorder. For we are to look upon it as the Character of a noble and an elevated Soul, to slight all those Considerations that the Generality of Mankind account great and glorious, and to despise them, upon firm and durable Principles; while Strength of Mind and Greatness of Resolution is discerned, in bearing those Calamities, which, in the Course of Man's Life, are many and various, so as not to be driven from your natural Disposition, nor from the Character of a wise Man. For there is great Inconsistency in a Man, if after being Proof against Fear, he should yield to Passion; or if, after surmounting Toil, he should be subdued by Pleasure. It ought, therefore, to be a main Consideration with us to avoid the Love of Money; for nothing so truly characterises a narrow, gravelling, Disposition, as Avarice does; and nothing is more noble and more exalted than to despise Riches, if you have them not, and if you have them, to employ them in virtuous and generous Purposes. (d)

D 4

An

(d) A Reader of very ordinary Erudition may easily perceive

An inordinate Passion for Glory, as I have already observ'd, is likewise to be guarded against; for it deprives us of Liberty, the only Prize for which Men of elevated Sentiments ought to contend. Power is so far from being desirable in itself, that it sometimes ought to be refused, nay resigned. We should likewise be free from all Disorders of the Mind, from all violent Passion and Fear as well as Languor, Voluptuousness, and Anger, that we may possess that Tranquillity and Security which are attended with both Uniformity and Dignity. Now many there are, and have been, who courting that Tranquillity which I have mentioned here, have with drawn themselves from public Affairs, to take refuge in Retirement. Amongst these, some of the noblest and most leading of our Philosophers, and some Persons of strict and grave Dispositions, were unable to bear with the Manners either of the People or the Directors; and some have lived in the Country amusing themselves with the Management of their private Affairs. Their Aim was truly royal, that they might enjoy their Liberty, without wanting any Thing, or obeying any Person; for the Characteristic of Liberty is, *to live as you incline.*

XXI. Therefore, as it is a Maxim in common with those who are ambitious for Power, and with those who court Retirement, and whom I have just now described, that the former imagine they can enjoy Liberty, if they are possess of great Interest,

perceive how greatly the best Historians and Poets amongst the Romans were indebted to this and the foregoing Chapter which have serv'd as a common Place for their finest Sentiments.

and

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 41

and the latter, if they can be contented with their own, be it ever so little; in this Respect the Sentiments of neither are to be absolutely rejected. But a Life of Retirement is more easy, more safe, less tiresome, and less troublesome than any other; while the Life of those who apply themselves to the Affairs of Government and to the Management of a State, is more beneficial to Mankind, and more conducive to Glory and Renown.

Allowances, therefore, are to be made to those who having no Management in public Matters, but happy in an excellent Genius, give themselves up to Learning: And to those who thro' Want of Health, or for some very weighty Reason, retire from Affairs of Government, and leave, to others, the Power and the Honour of the Administration. But when Men, who have none of those Reasons to plead, say, that they despise that Power and those Offices which most admire; such Men are so far from deserving Praise, that they incur Censure. It would, 'tis true, be unjust to condemn their despising and undervaluing Pomp; but then, they seem to dread the Toils and Troubles of Affronts and Repulses, as containing Ignominy and Infamy. For some there are, who, in opposing Qualities, are very inconsistent with themselves; they spurn at Pleasure, but they droop in Pain; they despise Pageantry, but sink under Unpopularity; and that too, not greatly to the Credit of their Reputation for Consistency of Character.

But the Men whom Nature has endowed with Qualities for Government, ought, laying aside all Excuses, to undertake the Discharge of all public Offices

Offices, and the Management of State Affairs. For neither can a State be governed nor can Magnanimity display itself, by any other Means. I am not, however, sure whether Statesmen ought not to be equally elevated in their Sentiments, as Philosophers, if not more so, and impressed with a Contempt of all transitory Enjoyments, and to possess that Tranquillity, that Calm of Mind, I have so much recommended; I mean, if they wish to live without Anxiety, with Dignity and Uniformity.

This may be the more easily practised by Philosophers, because their Lives are less exposed to Accidents from the Strokes of Fortune; because their Necessities are more contracted, and because, in Case of Misfortune, their Fall will not be so severe. It is not, therefore, without Reason, that the Mind is more liable to the Violence of Passion, and mightier Matters are to be attempted, by those, who undertake the Management of public Affairs, than by those who are retired: They, therefore, ought to possess greater Elevation of Spirit and be more absolutely free from Disquiets. But, whoever enters upon public Life, ought to take care that the Virtue of a Measure be not his sole Consideration; for he ought to provide at the same Time the Means of carrying it into Execution. In this he is chiefly to take care that Indolence does not make him meanly despond, nor Confidence, madly presume. Thus, in all Attempts, we ought to be very assiduous in our Preparations.

XXII. But (*e*) I must here combat a prevailing Opinion

(*e*). *I must*] It would be an Affront to the Perspicuity of our Author's Style and Sentiments to offer any Explanation of what he

Opinion that the Glory of military Exploits is preferable to that of civil Employments. For many, as generally is the Case with high Minds and enterprizing Spirits, especially if they take a military Turn, and are fond of warlike Atchievements, court all Opportunities of War from their Fondness for Glory. But if we are at the Pains to examine, many are the Employments in civil Life of greater Importance, and of more Renown, than in Military.

The Memory of *Themistocles*, it is true, has a Title to Fame; his Name is now more illustrious than that of (*f*) *Solon*, and his glorious Victory at *Salamis* is mentioned preferably to the Policy of *Solon* by which (*g*) he first confirmed the Power of the *Areopagus*; yet must I think that the Merits of *Solon* were not inferior to those of *Themistocles*. The

he has laid down immediately above, but we cannot help observing that, in this Chapter, he is unable to controul his Vanity, or, perhaps, to stifle his Jealousy, lest, he should not appear so considerable, as he wished to appear, in the Eyes of his Countrymen. See his Oration for *Murena*, where he lays down a very different Doctrine, with very great Plausibility.

(*f*) *Solon*] Posterity, however, has made *Solon* ample Amends as a Philosopher, but not in the Light in which he is here placed as a Legislator.

(*g*) *First confirmed the Power*] Orig. *Quo primum constituit Areopagus*. I own, that I cannot help suspecting that our Author strains too hard here to carry his favourite Point. Any Man of common Knowledge in the *Latin* Tongue, by the Expression of the Original must conclude, that *Solon* was the first who constituted the Powers of the *Areopagus*. Now it is most certain, from all History, that the *Areopagus* was instituted by *Cecrops* the Founder of *Athens* itself; and that in the third Year of the forty-sixth Olympiad (about 355 Years after) when *Solon* was made Archon, he introduc'd several Innovations in the *Athenian* Laws, but (See *Arist. Pol. L. 11*) he approv'd of the Powers of the *Areopagus*; and perhaps help'd to restore it to its antient Dignity. In short I shall beg Leave to refer the Reader to our Author's Oration for *Murena* for a Confutation of great Part of what the says on this Head, tho' it must be own'd that there is great Weight in his general Principle.

Victory

Victory of *Themistocles* availed his Country only for once, the Policy of *Solon* avails it perpetually ; because by it, the Laws of the *Athenians* and the Constitution of their Country, are preserved. Now the Authority of *Themistocles* gave no Strength to the *Areopagus*, but he received Strength from them ; for the War was carried on by the Direction of the Senate that was constituted by *Solon*.

We may make the same Observation with Regard to *Pausanias* and *Lysander* amongst the *Lacedæmonians* ; for all the Addition of Empire which their Conquests are supposed to have brought to their Country, is not to be compared to the Laws and Œconomy of *Lycurgus*, by which the Armies they commanded were distinguished for their Discipline and Courage. In my Eyes the Merits of (b) *Marcus Scaurus* (who flourished when I was but a Boy) are not inferior to those of *Caius Marius* ; nor, after I came to have a Concern in the Government, that *Quintus Catulus* deserved less than *Cnæius Pompeius*, of his Country. An Army abroad is but of small Service, without a wise Administration at Home : Nor did that good Man, and great General, *Africanus*, perform a more important Service to his Country when he razed *Numantia*, than did that private Citizen *P. Nasica*, when at the same Period, he killed *Tiberius Gracchus*. An Action, which it is true, was not merely of a civil Nature ; for it

(b) *Scaurus*] This great Man owes his Reputation with Posterity, in a great Measure, to our Author, who, upon many Occasions, quoted his Example to justify his own Conduct. He was Consul of Rome in the Year 646 along, with *Sergius Sulpicius Galba*, and enacted the Laws *de sumptibus*, *de Libertinorum suffragiis* & *de Virili Togâ* ; but our Author ought to have inform'd us, that he was likewise a great General, and had the Honour of a Triumph.

was

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 45

was partly military, as being the Result of Force and Courage; but it was an Action performed without an Army, and from political Considerations.

That State, described by the following Line, is best for a Country, tho' I understand that I am abused for it by the wicked and malicious;

(i) *Arms, to the Gown, and Laurels, yield to Lore.*

For, not to mention other Instances, when I sat at the Helm of Government, did not *Arms yield to the Gown*? For never did our Country know a Time of more threatening Danger or more profound Tranquillity. Yet such was my Conduct, such was my Application, that, in an Instant, the Arms of our most profligate Fellow Citizens dropt out of their Hands. Was ever warlike Exploits equal to this? or what foreign Conquest can rival its Merits?

The Inheritance of the Glory, and the Imitation of my Actions are to descend to you, my Son *Marcus*, therefore I well may be somewhat vain with you upon this Subject. It is, however, certain, that *Pompey* who was possessed of every military Accomplishment, did me the Justice to say, in the Hearing of many, that in vain would he have deserved his third Triumph, had not my public Services preserved the Place in which he was to perform it. The Examples of civil Courage are therefore no less meritorious than those of military; and they require a greater Share of Pain and Labour.

XXIII. Now all that Honestum which springs from Elevation and Extent of Genius, is absolutely

(i) Orig. *Cedant Arma Togæ, concedat Laurea linguæ.* The Reader, no Doubt, understands that our Author is here speaking of his Conduct in suppressing *Cataline's* Conspiracy.

acquired by the mental, and not by the corporeal Powers. Mean while, the Body ought to be kept in such Action and Order, as that it may be always ready to obey the Dictates of Reason and Wisdom, in carrying them into Execution, and in persevering under Hardships. But, with Regard to that *Honestum* we are treating of, it consists wholly in the Operations of the Mind; by which they who govern in Time of Peace are equally serviceable to their Country, as they who command in Time of War. For it often happens, that by such Counsels, Wars are either not undertaken, or they are finish'd; sometimes they are even declared; as the third Punic War was owing to (*k*) *Marcus Cato*; whose Authority was powerful even after he was dead.

Wisdom in determining, is, therefore, preferable to Courage in fighting; but in this we are to take care that we are not swayed by an Aversion to fighting, rather than by the Principles of public Spirit. Now in War we ought to make it appear that we have no other View but Peace. But the Character of a brave and resolute Man is not to be ruffled with Adversity, and not to be in such Confusion, as to quit his Post, as we say, but to preserve a Presence of Mind, and the Exercise of Reason, without departing from his Purpose. Such are the Properties of a great Mind; but those of an elevated extensive Genius lead us, to discern, by reasoning what will follow, and to determine, before hand, what will happen to either

(*k*) *Marcus Cato*] This was the Elder *Cato*; but, *Nasica* and other great Men of those Days, in *Rome*, shew'd themselves greater Politicians, by their opposing the utter Extinction of *Carthage*, because when *Rome* had no Rival to fear (*Remoto Carthaginis metu*, says *Paterculus*) she plung'd into Luxury, which brought on Corruption, and all the other Vices, which at last ended in the Loss of her Liberty.

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 47

Party, and, upon that, what Measures to pursue ; and never be surprized so as to say, *I did not think of it*. Such are the Operations of a Genius, capacious, elevated, of consummate Prudence and determined Resolution. But to rush precipitantly into the Field, and to encounter an Enemy has somewhat in it that is barbarous and brutal. When Opportunity, however, and Necessity require it, we are then to fight, and to prefer Death to Shame or Slavery.

XXIV. But with Regard to overthrowing and plundering of Cities, great Consideration is required, that nothing be done rashly, nothing cruelly. A great Man after he has maturely weighed all Circumstances will punish the guilty, he will spare the Many, and in every Fortune he never will depart from an upright, virtuous Conduct. For, as you find (as I have already observed) Men who prefer military to civil Duties, so will you find many of that Cast who look upon dangerous and presumptuous Resolutions to be more splendid and more dignified than calm and digested Measures. The avoiding Danger ought never to bring us under the Imputation of being irresolute and cowardly ; but, at the same Time, nothing can be more stupid than wantonly to expose ourselves to Danger.

In encountering Dangers, therefore, we are to imitate the Practice of the Physicians who apply to gentle Illnesses, gentle Medicines, but are forced to apply more desperate, and more doubtful, Cures to more dangerous Diseases. None but a Madman will wish for a Storm, while he enjoys a Calm, but every wise Man will weather the Tempest when it rises, by all the Means he can employ ; and the rather, if, after a Matter is cleared up, the Good is to

overballance the Evil, while it is doubtful. Now the Danger attending high Undertakings falls sometimes upon the Undertakers, and sometimes upon the State; and hence, some are in Danger of losing their Lives, some their Reputation and some their Popularity. But we ought to be more forward to expose our own Persons than the general Interests to Danger, and to be more ready to fight for Honour and Reputation than for any mercenary Considerations.

Tho' many have been known chearfully to venture not only their Money but their Lives for the Public; yet those very Men have refused to risque the smallest Spark of Glory even at the Request of their Country. For Instance, *Callicratidas*, who after distinguishing himself by many gallant Actions at the Head of the *Lacedemonian* Armies during the *Peloponesian* War, at last threw every Thing into Confusion by refusing to obey the Directions of those who were for removing the Fleet from *Arginussi*, without fighting the *Athenians*. His Answer was, that if the *Lacedemonians* lost that Fleet, they could fit out another, but that, should he turn his Back, his Disgrace would be irretrievable. 'Tis true, the Blow that followed upon this was not very severe to the *Lacedemonians*; but it was a deadly one, when, from a Principle of Jealousy, *Cleombrotus* fought with *Epamonidas*, and his Army was routed. How preferable to this Conduct was the Conduct of *Quintus Maximus*.

(1) *The Man who sav'd his Country by Delay,
No Tales could move him, and no Envy sway.*

(1) *The Man*] The Verses quoted here by *Ennius* seem to have been in high Reputation with the *Romans*, for *Virgil* has borrowed the first of them, and applied it, as our Author does, to the Conduct of *Fabius Maximus* against *Hannibal*.

*And thus, the Laurels on his honoured Brow
In Age, shall flourish, and with, Time shall, grow.*

This is a Species of Misconduct that ought to be avoided in civil Matters; for we know some Men who are extremely right in their Notions of Things, but, they are so afraid of being malign'd, that, they dare not express them.

XXV. All who hope to rise in a State ought strictly to observe two Rules of *Plato*. The first is, that, unmindful of their private Concerns, they direct all their Actions to the Good of their Country. The second is, that their Cares be applied to the Whole of the State, lest, while they are cherishing one Part, they abandon the others. For the Administration of Government, like a Guardianship, ought to be directed to the Good of those who confer, and not of those who receive, the Trust. Now, they who encourage one Part of a Community and neglect another, introduce into the State the greatest of all Evils, Sedition and Discord. From this Partiality, some court the People, some the great Men, but few the whole. This, amongst the *Athenians*, gave rise to great Disquiets, and in our Government, not only to Seditions, but to the most destructive Wars, which every worthy and brave Citizen, who deserves to rise in the State, will avoid and detest: He will give himself entirely up to the Service of his Country, without Regard to Riches or to Power, and he will govern the whole, so as to consult the Good of all. He will even be far from bringing any Man into Hatred or Disgrace, by ill-grounded Charges, and he will so closely attach himself to the Rules of Justice and Virtue, that

E

however

however he may incur the heavy Displeasure of others, he will preserve them, even with his Life, nay foregoe Life itself, rather than swerve from the Principles I have laid down.

Of all Evils, Ambition, and the Disputes for public Posts, are the most deplorable. *Plato*, likewise, on this Subject, says very sensibly ; That they who dispute for the Management of a State, resemble Mariners wrangling about who should direct the Helm. He then lays down as a Rule, that we ought to look upon those as our Enemies who take Arms against the Public, and not those who want to have public Affairs directed by their Judgment. For Instance, *Publius Africanus* and *Quintus Metellus* differed in Opinion, but their Difference was void of Rancour.

We are likewise to disregard all Suggestions, as if a Man of Courage ought to push his Resentments to Extremes. For nothing is more noble, nothing more worthy of a great and a good Man, than Placability and Moderation. Nay, amongst a free People, whose Laws have no Respect of Persons, a Smoothness, and what we may call a Depth, of Temper is necessary, to prevent our falling into an idle, disagreeable, Peevishness, every Time we are ruffled by impertinent Addresses or unreasonable Petitions. Yet this Politeness and Moderation ought to be so temper'd, that we remain inflexible in the Interest of our Country ; otherwise there could be no carrying on public Business. Mean while, all Reprimands and Punishments ought to be inflicted without Abuse ; without Regard to the Party so punishing or reprimanding, but to the Good of the State.

We

We ought likewise to take care that the Punishment be proportioned to the Offence, and that some be not punished for doing Things, that are not so much as noticed in others. Above all Things, in punishing, we ought to guard against Passion. For the Man, who is to pronounce a Sentence of Punishment in a Passion, never can preserve that Mean, between what is too much and too little, which is so justly recommended by the Peripatetics; did they not too much commend the Passion of Anger, by asserting it to be a useful Property of our Nature. For my Part, I think that it ought to be check'd in all Occurrences of Life; and it were to be wish'd that they who preside in Government were like the Laws, which, in punishing, are not directed by Resentments, but by Equity.

XXVI. Now, during our Prosperity, and while we sail with the Tide of Fortune, we ought the more industriously, to avoid Pride and Arrogance. For it discovers Weakness to lose our Temper in Prosperity, equally, as it does, in Adversity. It reflects great Honour upon a Man, if, as we learn of *Socrates* and *Caius Lælius*, through all Scenes of Life, he preserves the same Temper of Mind, the same Look, and the same Appearance. Tho' *Philip* of *Macedon* was inferior to his Son in his Achievements and his Renown, yet was he superior to him in the Accomplishments of Politeness and Humanity. The one, therefore, always appeared great, while the other often became detestable. So much are they in the Right who lay it down as a Rule, that the more advanced we are in our Fortune, the more affable ought we to be in our Behaviour. *Panætius* tells us, his Hearer and Friend *Africanus* used

used to say; That as Horses, grown unruly by being in frequent Engagements, are delivered over to be tamed by Riding-Masters, thus, Men who grow riotous and self-sufficient by Prosperity ought, as it were, to be exercised in the Traverse of Reflection and Reason, that they may be thereby made sensible of the Inconstancy of the World, and the Uncertainty of Fortune.

Here you are to observe, that in the Time of our greatest Prosperity we should have the greatest Recourse to the Advice of our Friends, who, ought at that Time, to have greater Weight with us than at any other. At such a Juncture, we are to take care not to lend our Ears to Flatterers, and to avoid being imposed upon by Adulation, which easily may mislead us. For we then think ourselves entitled to Praise, an Opinion that gives rise to a thousand Errors in Conduct; because, when Men are once blown up with idle Conceits, they are grossly be-fool'd, and led into the greatest Mistakes. So much for this Subject.

One Thing you are to understand, that they, who govern a State, perform the highest Exploits, and discover the most elevated Sentiments, because their Business is of such extensive Influence and general Concern. Yet there are, and have been, many Men of great Capacities, who, in private Life, have plann'd out, or attempted, mighty Matters, without exceeding their own Sphere of Action; or, being thrown into a middle State, between Philosophers and Magistrates, have amused themselves with the Management of their private Fortune, without swelling it by all Manner of Means, not debarring their Friends from the Benefit of it, but

but rather, when Occasion calls upon them, sharing it both with their Friends and their Country. But let it be, originally, acquired with Honesty, without any scandalous or oppressive Practices. Let it become serviceable to Numbers of worthy Men. Let it then be improved by Prudence, by Industry and Frugality; without serving the Purposes of Pleasure and Luxury, rather than of Generosity and Humanity. The Man who observes those Rules may live with Magnificence, with Dignity and with Spirit, yet with Simplicity and Honour, and be, all the while, THE FRIEND OF MAN.

XXVII. We are now to treat of that remaining Part of Virtue in which consist Chastity, and those (as we may term them) Ornaments of Life Temperance, Moderation, and a Mind undisturbed by Passion and regularly free. Under this Head is comprehended what in *Latin* we may call DECORUM, (or graceful) for the *Greeks* term it the *πρεπον*. Now its Quality is such, that it is indiscernible from the Honestum; for whatever is graceful is virtuous, and whatever is virtuous is graceful.

But it is more easy to conceive than to express the Difference between what is virtuous and what is graceful (or between the HONESTUM and the DECORUM). For Gracefulness, before it can appear as such, must have Virtue for the Foundation. What is graceful, therefore, appears not only in that Division of Virtue, which is here treated of, but in the other three. For it is graceful in a Man to think and to speak, with Propriety, to act with Deliberation, and in every Occurrence of Life to find out and persevere in the Truth. On the other hand, to be imposed upon, to mistake, to falter, and to

be deceived, is as disgraceful as is Dotage or Madness. Thus, whatever is just is graceful; whatever is unjust is as disgraceful, as it is criminal. We may say the same of Courage. For every manly, generous Action, dignifies and graces a Man; the Reverse both degrades and disgraces him.

This therefore, what I call, Gracefulness, is a universal Property of Virtue, and a Property that is self-evident without requiring any of the deep Powers of Understanding to discern it. For there is a certain Gracefulness that is implied in every Virtue, and which may exist distinctly from Virtue rather in Imagination than Reality. A fine Air and Beauty of Person, for Example, cannot be separated from Health; thus, the Whole of that Gracefulness which I here speak of is blended with Virtue, but may exist separately in the Mind and Idea.

Now it falls under two Heads. For there is a general Gracefulness that is the Property of all Virtue; and that includes another, which is fitted to the particular Divisions of Virtue. The former is commonly defin'd to be that Gracefulness, that is adapted to the Dignity of Man's Nature, in so far as it differs from that of the Brutes. The included Head is defined to be a Gracefulness so adapted to Nature, as to discover Propriety and Sweetness, under a certain elegant Appearance.

XXVIII. We may perceive those Definitions to be true from that Gracefulness which is followed by the Poets, and which they treat so largely of under another Head. For we define Gracefulness in Poetry to be, when a Person speaks and acts in that Manner which is most becoming his Character. Now should a Poet, introduce *Æacus* or *Mines* saying;

Let

*Let them hate me, so they fear me; or
The Father's Belly is his Children's Grave,*

he would disgrace his Characters ; because we know them to have been just Persons. But when those Sentiments are put into the Mouth of an *Atreus*, they are received with Applause ; because the Speech is in Character. Now Poets form their Judgment of this Gracefulness from personated Characters. But our Character is the Stamp of Nature, dignified and raised far above the rest of the Animal Creation.

Poets, therefore, in their vast Variety of Characters, consider what is proper and what is becoming even in the worst. But as Nature herself has cast to us our Parts in Constancy, Moderation, Temperance, and Modesty ; as she, at the same Time, instructs us how to behave to Mankind, the Effect is, that the Extent both of that Gracefulness, which is the general Property of all Virtue, and of that particular Gracefulness that is adapted to every Species of it, is discovered. For as personal Beauty by the proper Disposition of the Limbs, attracts our Attention, and pleases the Eye, by the Harmony and Elegance with which each Part corresponds to another ; so that Gracefulness, which enlightens Life, attracts the Approbation of Society, by Order, Consistency, and Modesty in all we say, and in all we do.

There is a Degree, therefore, of Respect due from us, suited to every Man's Character, from the best to the worst. For it is not only arrogant, but it is profligate, for a Man to disregard the World's Opinion of himself. But in our Estimate of human Life, we are to make a Difference between

(*m*) Justice and Morality. The Character of Justice, is, to do no Wrong, that of Morality is to give no Offence, to Mankind; and, in this, the Force of the graceful is most perceptible. The Explanation of those Points will, I believe, lead you to a full Apprehension of what we call the graceful or becoming.

Now, the Duty, resulting from it, leads directly to the Fitness and Preservation of Nature; and if we follow its Tract as a Guide, we never shall err; but, follow what is most penetrating and sagacious in Nature; whatever is best adapted to human Society, and whatever is spirited or manly. But the chief Force of the graceful lyes in the Division I now treat of. For we are to examine that bodily Department which is most pleasing to Nature, but much more the Operations of the Mind
the

(*m*) Justice and Morality] Orig. *Justiciam & Verecundiam*. This is a very fine Passage and deserves to be explain'd. *Verecundia* is commonly translated Bashfulness or Modesty; but in the Sense of our Author here, neither of those two Words will do; nor am I sure, that the Word Decency, or any Word in the *English* Tongue, comes fully up to his Meaning, which is, an inborn Reverence for what is right, and which supplies the Place of, and sometimes controuls, the Law. Many Actions may be agreeable to Law, and yet disagreeable to this inborn Principle. The Tragedian *Seneca* has distinguished them very finely. He brings in *Pyrrhus* saying.

Pyr. *Lex nulla capto parcit aut Pœnam impedit.*

To this *Agamemnon* replies.

Ag. *Quod non vetat Lex, hoc vetat feri Pudor.*

Pyr. "No Law exempts a Captive from the Sword."

Ag. "Where the Law does not, moral Duties, bind"

Our Author inculcates the same Principle in many other Parts of his Works, and it was afterwards admitted by *Justinian* into his Institutes. *Fide commissa appellata sunt, quia nullo vinculo Juris, sed tantum Pudore eorum qui rogabantur, continebantur.* "Deeds of Trust were so call'd, because the Party entrusted
" was

which are likewise best accommodated to her Qualities. For the Powers of the Mind and of Nature are two fold; one consists in Appetite, by the Greeks called *ορμη*, which hurries Man hither and thither; the other in Reason which teaches and explains what we are to do, and what we are to avoid. The Result is, that Reason should direct, and Appetite obey.

XXIX. Hence, every human Action ought to be void of Rashness and Slovenness; nay, we ought to do nothing for what we cannot give a justifiable Account. For this amounts to almost a Definition of Duty. Now we must manage so as to keep the Appetites subservient to Reason, that they never hurry away before her nor abandon her thro' Sloth and Cowardice: Let them be ever compos'd

“ was not obligated by Law, but by Conscience or Morality.”
Ovid has a very noble Sentiment which he seems to have taken from our Author and from *Plato*.

*Nondum Justiciam Facinus mortale fugarat,
Ultima de Superis illa reliquit Humum;
Proque metu, Populum, sine vi, Pudor ipse regebat.*

“ Nor Justice yet had fled from human Crimes,
“ Of all their Godheads she the last remain'd;
“ For awful Conscience, in those happy Times,
“ Rul'd without Fear, and without Force restrain'd.

Verecundia or *Pudor*, therefore, is properly an inward Abhorrence of moral Turpitude, thro' which the Conscience is aw'd, and may be said to blush. *Plato*, and from him *Plutarch*, makes Justice and this *Verecundia* to be inseperable Companions. “ God, (says the former,) being afraid lest the human Race should entirely perish upon Earth, gave to Mankind Justice and “ Morality, those Ornaments of States and the Bonds of Society.” Doctor *Cockman*, who I think understood our Author very well, has translated *Verecundia* in this Passage by three Words, *viz.* Modesty, Respect or Reverence; but I don't think all the three come up to its Sense. I am not even satisfy'd with my own Term, Morality, but I could not get one more proper in the *English* Tongue.

and free from all Perturbation of Spirit; and thus Resolution and Moderation will be displayed in their full Extent. For those Appetites that rove too far, and being, as it were, in a Flurry, either thro' Desire or Aversion, are not sufficiently under the Command of Reason; such, I say, undoubtedly transgress both their End and their Design. For they abandon and disclaim that Subordination to Reason, to which, by the Law of Nature they are subjected, and thereby, not only the Mind, but the Body, is disordered. Let us observe the Looks of Men who are in a Rage, of those who are confused thro' Desire, who despond thro' Fear, or are in a Twitter thro' too much Joy; and what a strange Alteration do we find in their Faces, their Voices, their Motions and Attitudes!

That I may return to my Description of Duty: From these Particulars we learn, that all our Appetites ought to be contracted and cool; that all our Attention and Cares ought to be awake, lest we commit some rash, random, thoughtless, inconsiderate Action. For Nature has not form'd us to Sport and Merriment, but rather to Seriousness, and Studies that are important and sublime. Sport and Merriment are not always disallowable, but we are to use them as we do Sleep, and other Kinds of Repose; when we have dispatch'd our Affairs of greater Weight and Importance. Nay, our very Manner of Joking should be neither wanton nor indecent, but genteel and good humoured. For as we indulge Boys, only in those Diversions that are consistent with genteel Behaviour; so in our very Jokes somewhat of a generous Disposition ought to appear.

The

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 59

The Manner of Joking is reduceable under two Denominations; one, that is, illiberal, provoking, profligate and obscene: Another, that is, elegant, polite, witty and good humour'd. We have Abundance of this last, not only in our *Plautus*, and the (n) Authors of the old Greek Comedy, but in the Writings of the *Socratic* Philosophers. Many Collections have likewise been made by various Writers of humorous Sayings, such as that made by *Cato*, and call'd his *Apothegms*. The Distinction therefore between a genteel, and an ill-manner'd Joke is a very ready one. The former, when Time and Inclination serves, is worthy a Gentleman: The other, if obscene Expression is joyn'd to an immoral Subject, is unworthy even of a Man. There is likewise a certain Method to be observ'd even in our Amusements; that they be not too dissipated, and that after being elevated by Pleasure we do not sink into some Immorality. Our *Campus Martius*, and the Sports of the Field in Hunting, furnish us with virtuous Means of Amusement.

XXX. But in all our Disquisitions concerning the Nature of a Duty, it is material that we keep in our Eye the great Excellence of Man's Nature above that of the Brutes and all other Creatures. They are insensible to every thing but Pleasure, and they will risk every thing to attain it. Whereas, the Mind of Man is nourished by Reading and Reflection, and being charm'd by the Pleasure of seeing, and hearing, it is ever, either enquiring or

(n) *Authors of the old Greek Comedy*] Our Author's Judgment is very questionable in this Passage. The Old Comedy of the Athenians was condemn'd even by *Aristotle* for its Lewdness and Immorality; and *Horace* thought that the Wit of *Plautus* was sometimes, at least, illiberal.

acting. But if there is a Man who has a small Byass to Pleasure, provided he is not of the Brute Kind, (for some Men differ from Brutes only in Name) but, I say, if he is ever so little elevated above Instinct, tho' he may be smitten with Pleasure, let him, thro' the Principle of Morality that is within him, hide and disguise his Inclination for it.

From this, we are to conclude, that the meer Pursuits of sensual Gratifications are unworthy the Excellency of Man's Nature; and that they ought, therefore, to be despis'd and rejected; but that, if a Man shall have a small Propensity for Pleasure, he ought to be extremely cautious in what Manner he indulges it. We, therefore, in the Nourishment and Dress of our Bodies, ought to consult not our Pleasure, but our Health and our Strength; and, should we examine the Excellency and Dignity of our Nature, we should then be made sensible how shameful Man's Life, is when it melts away in Pleasure, in Voluptuousness, and Effeminacy: And how noble it is to live with Abstinence, with Modesty, with Strictness and Sobriety.

We are, likewise, to observe, that Nature has endow'd us with, as it were, two Characters. The first is in common to all Mankind; because, all of us partake in the Excellency of Reason, which places us above the Brutes; from which is deriv'd all that is virtuous, all that is graceful, and by which we trace our Connections with our several Duties. The other Character is peculiar to particular Men. For as there is a great Variety in our Persons, some for Instance, are swift in Running, others strong in Wrestling; some have a Dignity and

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 61

and others a Sweetness of Aspect, so is there a still greater Variety in our Minds.

(o) *Lucius Crassus* and *Lucius Philippus* had a great Deal of Wit; but, *Caius Caesar*, the Son of *Lucius*, had more, and it was better polished. Their Cotemporaries *Marcus Scaurus*, and young *Marcus Drusus* were remarkably serious; while *Caius Lælius* was frank and open; but the Mind of his Friend *Scipio* was more ambitious, and his Manners more reserved. As to the *Greeks* we are told of *Socrates*, that he was agreeable and pleasing; his Conversation was full of Wit, and of that Kind of Archness (by the *Greeks* call'd *εἰρωνή*) that hits all Kinds of Characters in Discourse. On the other Hand, *Pythagoras* and *Pericles*, without the least Openness of Temper, had great Weight of Authority. Amongst the *Carthaginian* Generals, *Hannibal*, we learn, was crafty, as was *Quintus Maximus* amongst the *Roman*; their peculiar Talents were Concealment, Secresy, Diffimulation, and the rendering the Designs of their Enemies, either abortive or advantageous to themselves. Amongst the *Greeks*, *Themistocles*, and *Jason* of *Phæria* were eminent in this Character; and, above all, we are told how cunning and artful *Solon* was, when to secure his own Life, and that he might be of greater Service to his Country, he counterfeited Madness.

In Opposition to those Characters, the Tempers of many others are plain and open. Their Principles are, to love Truth, to abhor Deceit, to do nothing by Stealth, nothing by Stratagem: While others care not what they suffer themselves or whom

(o) *Lucius Crassus*] See our Author's Treatise *de Oratore* for more finish'd Characters of most of these great Men.

they stoop to, provided they accomplish their Ends: *Sylla* and *Marcus Crassus*, for Examples. *Lyfander* the *Lacedemonian*, we are told, had very great Art and Perseverance in this Character, and of a contrary Disposition was *Collicrades*, who succeeded to *Lyfander* in the Command of the Fleet. We have known another Man, who, tho' very capable to lead a Conversation, chuses to follow it in a mixt Company; such were the *Catuli*, Father and Son, and such I knew *Quintus Mucius Mancin* to be. I have heard from Men older than myself, that *Publius Scipio Nasica* was of the same Cast, but that his Father, the same who destroyed *Tiberius Gracchus* in his pernicious Designs, was void of all Politeness in Conversation: Nay, we are even told that *Xenocrates*, the most austere of Philosophers, was distinguished as a polite and a fine Gentleman. Innumerable, but far from being blameable, are the other Differences in the Natures and Manners of Men.

XXXI. Every Man, however, ought carefully to follow that Character that Nature has given him, provided it is only peculiar, without being hurtful, that he may the more easily fall in with that Gracefulness I am recommending. For we ought to manage so as never to counter-act the general System of Nature; but, having taken care of that, we are to follow the Sway of our own Constitution; in so much, that tho' other Studies may be of greater Weight and Excellence, yet we are to regulate our Pursuits by the Disposition of our Nature. It is to no Purpose to thwart her, or to aim at what you cannot attain. We therefore may have a still clearer Conception of *the graceful* I am recommending, from this

this Consideration, that nothing is graceful that goes (as the Saying is) against the Grain, that is, in Contradiction and Opposition to Nature.

To proceed: If any Thing is graceful nothing is more so than an Uniformity thro' the Course of all your Life, as well as thro' every particular Occurrence in it; and you never can preserve this Uniformity, if, apeing another Man's Nature, you forsake your own. For as we ought to converse in the Language we are best acquainted with, for Fear of making ourselves justly ridiculous, as those do who interlard their Discourse with Greek Expressions; so there ought to be no Incongruity in our Actions, and none, in all the Tenor of our Lives.

Now, so powerful is this Difference of Natures, that it may be the Duty of one Man to put himself to Death, and yet not of another, tho' both are embark'd in the same Cause. Can we suppose the Cause of *Marcus Cato* to have been different from that of those who surrendered themselves to *Cæsar* in *Africk*. Yet it had been perhaps blameable in the latter, had they put themselves to Death, because their Lives were less severe, and their Morals more pliable. But *Cato*, having by perpetual Perseverance, strengthened that Inflexibility which Nature had given him, and having never departed from the Purpose and Resolution he had once form'd, chose to die, rather than to see, in Peace, the Face of a Tyrant.

How various were those Sufferings of *Ulysses*, in his incessant Rambles, when he became the Slave of Women, (if you consider *Circe* and *Calypso*, as such), yet, in all he said, he was complaisant and agreeable to every Body; nay, put up with Abuses from

from Slaves of both Sexes, that he might at length compass his favourite Purpose. But, by what we are told of the Character of *Ajax*, he would have preferr'd a thousand Deaths to such Indignities.

They who consider all this ought to live according to their own Endowments, and they ought to manage them, without making any Experiments how another Man's become them; for that Manner which is most peculiarly a Man's own, always sits most gracefully upon him.

Every Man ought, therefore, to study his own Genius, so, as to become an impartial Judge of his own good and bad Qualities; otherwise the Players will discover better Sense than we. For, in casting their Parts, they don't chuse those that are the (p) most excellent, but, those to which they are the best fitted. The best Voices chuse the Part of *Epigonas* or *Medus*; the best Actors, that of *Menalippa* or *Clytemnestra*. *Rupilius*, whom I remember, always stuck to that of *Antiopa*; and *Esopus* seldom chose that of *Ajax*. Shall a Player then act with greater Propriety upon the Theatre, than a wise Man does, in Life? Let us, therefore, most earnestly apply to those Parts for which we are best fitted. But should Necessity degrade us into Characters unsuitable to our Genius; if we cannot grace our Parts, let us employ all our Care, Attention, and Industry, in endeavouring to disgrace them as little as possible. For we are to endeavour to avoid Ab-

(p) *Most excellent*] From this Passage of our Author we may conclude, that there was no such Thing amongst the *Roman* Players as a favourite Character, which a Performer should think himself disgrac'd did he not appear in it; but that they thought, that great Abilities in the Performance could make any Character a favourite one; and that Nature joyn'd with Study must direct the Parts they were to act.

surdities

furdities, rather than to attempt Excellencies which Nature has not given us.

XXXII. To the two Characters above described, is added a third, which is either accidental or occasional; and even a fourth, I mean, that, in which our own Judgment is to direct our Choice. Now Kingdoms, Governments, Honours, Dignities, Riches, Interest, and whatever are of Qualities contrary to them, happen thro' Accident, and are directed by Emergencies. But the Choice of the Characters, in which we are to act our Parts in Life, lies in our own Breasts. Some, therefore, apply to Philosophy, some to the civil Law, and some to Eloquence. Some endeavour, even, to shine in one Virtue, and some in another.

Men, generally, are ambitious of distinguishing themselves by those Characters in which their Fathers or their Ancestors were most famous. For Instance, *Quintus*, the Son of *Publius Mucius*, in the civil Law; *Africanus*, the Son of *Paulus*, in the Art of War. Some, however, increase, by Merits of their own, those that they have received from their Fathers; for the same *Africanus* crowned his military Glory with the Practice of Eloquence. In like Manner, *Timotheus*, the Son of *Conon*, who equalled his Father in the Duties of the Field, but added, to them, the Accomplishments of Wit and Learning. Sometimes, however, it happens, that Men, without imitating their Ancestors, follow a Purpose of their own: And this is most commonly the Case with such Men whose Descent is very mean, but their Views very high.

In our Search after what is graceful, all those Particulars ought to be duly studied and weighed.

F

In

In the first Place, we are to determine who, and what Manner of Men, we are to be, and in what Rank we are to live; a Consideration, which is of all others, the most difficult to determine. For, in our early Youth, while we are most incapable of Reasoning, every one chuses to himself that Station of Life which he has been most used to fancy. He therefore is trepann'd into some fix'd and settled Course of Living, before he is capable to judge what is the most proper.

For the *Hercules* of *Prodicus*, as we learn from *Xenophon*, in his early Puberty (an Age which Nature points out as the most proper for every Man's chusing his Scheme of Life) is said to have gone into a Desert, and there sitting down, enter'd into many deep Considerations within his own Breast, upon the Choice of two Paths that presented themselves to his Eyes, one leading to Pleasure, the other to Virtue. This might indeed happen to a *Jove*-begotten *Hercules*; but it is far from being our Case, who imitate those whom we have an Opinion of, and are thereby drawn into their Pursuits and Purposes. For generally, we are so prepossess'd by the Principles of our Parents, that we are moulded according to their Form and Habit. Others, sway'd by the general Choice, are passionately fond of any Thing that is preferr'd by the Majority. A few, however, either thro' a certain Happiness, or a certain Excellency, of Nature, or thro' the forming Care of their Parents, pursue the Path of Life that is best calculated for their Genius.

XXXIII. Now, it happens very seldom, that Men born with an exalted Genius, or improv'd by the Advantages of Education and Learning,

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 67

ing, or possessing both, have Scope enough for deliberating upon a proper Scheme of Life, and in such a Deliberation the whole Result of it ought to be determin'd by a Man's consulting his own Genius. For, since; as I said before, we require that Graceful in every Thing, to which our natural Genius leads us; before we fix the Plan of our future Life, we ought to be still much more careful in that Respect, that we may be consistent with ourselves, and not deficient in any one Duty.

But, because Nature is the most powerful Agent in our attaining this Character; and Fortune the next, we ought to pay Regard to both in fixing our Scheme of Life; but chiefly to Nature, as being endowed with much more Permanency and Perseverance; insomuch, that the Struggle, sometimes between Nature and Fortune seems to be between, a mortal, and an immortal, Being. The Man, therefore; who adapts his whole System of Living to his undeprav'd Nature, let that Man stick to his Resolution. For that, above all Things becomes a Man, provided he is not sensible that he has mistaken his Scheme of Living: Should that, as it possibly may, be the Case, all his Manners and Purposes must undergo a total Alteration; which, if other Circumstances shall concur; will be the more easily and readily effected. But should it happen otherwise; it is to be done leisurely and gradually. Thus, Men of Sense think it more decent, that disagreeable or prejudicial Friendships should be gradually untack'd, rather than suddenly cut up.

Now, after we have altered our Scheme of Life,

we ought to be at all imaginable Pains to make it appear, that we have done it upon good Grounds. But, as I said above, if we are to imitate our Ancestors, we ought, above all Things, to avoid imitating their bad Qualities. In the next Place, if, by Nature we are unable to imitate them, in some Things, we are not to attempt it. For Instance, the Son of the elder *Africanus* who adopted this latter, who was the Son of *Paulus*, could not, for Want of Health, resemble his Father so much as his Father did his Grandfather. If, therefore, a Man is unable to excel in pleading, to entertain the People by haranguing, or to make a Figure in War; yet still he ought to do what is in his Power; he ought to practise Justice, Honour, Generosity, Modesty, and Temperance, the better to cover his other Deficiencies. Now, the best Inheritance a Parent can leave a Child, and it is an Inheritance beyond all the Gifts of Fortune, is the Example of a virtuous and a noble Conduct, and he who disgraces that paternal Glory, ought to be deemed an Out-cast, and a Monster of Nature.

XXXIV. As every Duty is not suited to every Age, some belonging to the young, others to the old, we must likewise say somewhat on this Head. It is the Duty of a young Man to reverence his Elders, and amongst them, to select the best and the worthiest, in order to be directed by their Advice and Authority: For the Inexperience of Youth ought to be instructed and conducted by the Wisdom of the aged. Above all Things, the young Man ought to be restrained from lawless Desires, and patient under the Practice of all the laborious Duties
both

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 69

both of Body and Mind, that by persevering in them, he may make a Figure both in War and Peace. Nay, when they even unbend their Minds, and give a Loofe to Jollity, they ought to avoid Intemperance; and never lose Sight of Morality; and this they can more easily effect if, upon such Occasions; they admit the Company of their Elders.

As to old Men, in Proportion as they abate in bodily Exercifes, the Exercifes of their Mind ought to encrease. Their Aim should be to assist, all they can, their Friends, the Youth, and above all, their Country, by their Advice and Experience. Now, there is nothing that old Age ought more carefully to guard against, than giving itself up to Listlissness and Indolence. As to Luxury, tho' it is shameful in every Age, in old Age, it is detestable; but if, to that, is added, Intemperance in lawless Desires, the Evil is doubled; because old Age thereby becomes a Disgrace; and Youth, to Intemperance, adds Imprudence.

Neither is it foreign to my Purpose to touch upon the Duties of Magistrates, of private Citizens, and of Strangers. The peculiar Character of a worthy Magistrate consists in the Consciousness, that, as he represents the State, he ought, therefore, to keep up to its Dignity, to preserve its Constitution, to act by its Laws, and always to have Sense, that he has his Power in Trust for the public Good. As to a private Man and Citizen, his Duty is to live upon an easy and an equal Footing with his Fellow-Citizens, without Meanness, but without Arrogance. In his Sentiments of the Public

to be always for peaceful and virtuous Measures; for such are the Sentiments, and such the Expressions we ascribe to the worthy Citizen.

Now, the Duty of a Stranger and an Alien is, to mind nothing but his own Business, to attack no Man's Property, and, by no Means, to be curious about the Affairs of a Government in which he has no Concern. Thus, we will, generally, succeed in the Practice of the Moral Duties, when we enquire after what is most becoming, and best fitted to Persons, Occasions, and Ages; and nothing is more becoming than, in all our Actions, and in all our Deliberations, to proceed with Self-Consistency.

XXXV. But, because the graceful or becoming Character we treat of, appears in all our Words and Actions, nay, in every Motion and Disposition of our Person, and consists of three Particulars, Beauty, Regularity, and an Address suited to our Business; (Matters indeed that are difficult to be expressed, but it is sufficient if they are understood,) and these three Heads comprehend the Regard we ought to pay to the good Opinion of those, amongst whom, and with whom, we live, and they are Matters that I must likewise touch upon. In the first Place, Nature seems to have paid a great Regard to the Form of our Bodies, by exposing to the Sight all that Part that is most beautifully composed, while she has hid and concealed these Parts which were given for the Necessities of Nature, and which would have been offensive and disagreeable to the Sight.

This

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 71

This curious Contrivance of Nature has been seconded by the Modesty of Mankind; for all Men, in their Senses, conceal the Parts which Nature has hid; and they take care that they should discharge, as privately as possible, even the Calls of Nature. And those Parts which serve those Necessities, and the Necessities themselves, are not called by their real Names; because that which in the private Commission is not shameful, becomes obscene in the flat Expression. The public Commission therefore of those Things, as well as the obscene Expression of them, is highly impudent.

Neither are we to regard the Cynics or the Stoics, who are next to Cynics, who abuse and ridicule us for deeming Things that are not shameful in their own Nature, to become sinful thro' Words and Expressions. Now, we give every thing that is disgraceful in its own Nature, its proper Term. Theft, Fraud, Adultery, are disgraceful in their own Nature, but not obscene in the Expression. The Act of begetting Children is virtuous; but the Expression obscene. Thus, the Cynics maintain a great many Arguments to the same Purpose against Delicacy in those Matters. Let us, for our Parts, follow Nature, and avoid whatever is offensive to the Eyes or Ears; let us aim at the graceful or becoming, whether we stand or walk, whether we sit or lye down, in every Motion of our Features, our Eyes, or our Hands.

In those Matters, two Things are chiefly to be avoided; Effeminacy and Daintiness on the one Hand, and Coarseness and Clownishness on the other. Neither are we to admit, that those Considerations

are proper for Actors and Orators, but that they ought to be indifferent to us. The Manners, at least of the Actors, from the Morality of our Ancestors, are so decent, that none of them appear upon the Stage without Drawers; being afraid, lest, if by any Accident, certain Parts of the Body should be exposed, they should make an indecent Appearance. According to our Customs, Sons grown up to Manhood, do not bathe along with their Fathers, nor Sons - in - Law with their Fathers - in - Law. Modesty of this Kind, therefore, is to be cherished, especially when Nature herself is our Instructor and Guide,

XXXVI. Now Beauty is of two Kinds, one that has Loveliness, and one that has Dignity for its Character. The former we esteem the Property of Women, the latter, of Men: Therefore, let a Man remove, from his Person, every Ornament that is unbecoming a Man, and let him take the same Care of every Absurdity that may infect his Gesture or Motion. For, very often, the Movements People learn of Masters are finical, and thereby become extremely disagreeable, and we are disgusted with certain impertinent Gestures among the Players, while we are pleased, in both Kinds, with whatever is unaffected and simple. Now, Dignity in the Person is preserved by the Freshness of the Complexion, and that Freshness by the Exercises of the Body. To this, we are to add, a Neatness that is neither troublesome nor too much studied, but void of all clownish, ill-bred, Slovenness. The same Rules are to be observed with Regard to Ornaments of Dress, in which

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 73

which, as in all other Matters, a Mean is preferable.

We must, likewise, avoid a drawling solemn, Pace in Walking, as if we were carrying Pageants at a Triumph; and, likewise in Matters that require Dispatch, quick, hurrying Motions; which occasion a Shortness of Breathing, an Alteration in the Looks, and a Convulsion in the Features, all which strongly indicate a Want of Uniformity. But we are still to take greater Care, that the Movements of our Mind never depart from Nature; in which, we shall succeed, if we guard against all Flurry and Disorder of Spirit, and apply ourselves earnestly to arrive at what is graceful. Now, the Motions of the Mind are of two Kinds, some arise from Thought and some from Appetite; Thought chiefly applies itself in the Search of Truth. Appetite prompts us to Action. We are therefore to take care to employ our Thoughts upon the best Subjects, and to subdue our Appetite to Reason.

XXXVII. But great is the Force of Expression, which is of two Kinds. One proper for disputing, the other for discoursing. Let the former be employed in Pleadings at Tryals, in Assemblies of the People, and Meetings of the Senate; the latter in Visits, in Disquisitions at the Meetings of our Friends; let it likewise attend upon Entertainments. Rhetoricians lay down Rules for disputing, but none for discoursing, tho' I'm not sure but that likewise may be done. Masters are found for every other Branch of Learning, but none study this; while no Place is free from Crowds of Rhetoricians; and yet the

74 **M. T. CICERO'S OFFICES; or**
the Rules that are laid down for Words and Sentiments are likewise applicable to Discourse.

But, as the Voice utters the Speech, we are to observe two Properties in it: First, Clearness, and then Sweetness; both which are the free Gifts of Nature; and yet Practice may improve the one, and imitating those who speak nervously and distinctly, the other. There was, in the *Catull*, nothing, by which you could conclude them possessors of any deep Acquirements in Learning, tho' learned to be sure they were; and so have others been. But the *Catuli* were thought to excel in the *Latin* Tongue; their Pronunciation was harmonious, their Words were neither mouthed nor minced; so that their Expression was distinct, without being broad; while their Voice, without Strain, was neither faint nor shrill. The Manner of *Lucius Crassus* was more flowing, and equally elegant; tho' the *Catuli*, as Speakers, were in as great Esteem. But *Cæsar*, Brother to the old *Catulus*, excelled all, in Wit and Humour; for without quitting his ordinary Manner of speaking, he got the better of his Antagonists at Court, with all their studied Eloquence of the Bar. Therefore, in all those Matters, our great Aim ought to be, in every Thing, to find out what is most graceful.

Let our common Discourse, therefore, (and this is the great Excellence of the Followers of *Socrates*) be smooth and good-humoured, without the least Tincture of Arrogance. But let us not, as if we had a Right to engross all Talking, exclude others. In this, as in other Things, let us allow to every Man his fair Turn, in a Share of the Conversation.

But

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 73

But more especially we ought to consider the Nature of the Subjects we speak upon. If serious, let us treat them with Gravity; if merry, with good Humour. But a Man ought to take the greatest Care that his Discourse betray no Defect in his Morals; and this generally is the Case when we are set in to speak of the absent, in a malicious, ridiculous, harsh, bitter, and contemptuous, Manner.

Now Conversation generally turns upon private Concerns, or Politics, or the Branches of literary Knowledge. We are, therefore, to study whenever our Conversation rambles from its Subject, to call it back, let the Subject be what it will. For all Mankind is not pleased with the same Subjects, nor at the same Time, nor in the same Manner. We are, likewise, to observe the Period when a Conversation begins to grow disagreeable; that as it began for Improvement, so it may end, with Discretion.

XXXVIII. But, as we are very properly enjoyn'd, in all the Course of our Life, to avoid all Fits of Passion, that is, excessive Emotions of the Mind, uncontrouled by Reason; in like Manner, our Conversation ought to be free from all such Emotions; it ought to be neither over-angry nor over-earnest, but without Slovenness or Indolence, or the like: And, above all Things, we are to endeavour to express both Esteem and Love for those we converse with. Reproaches may sometimes be necessary, in which we may perhaps be obliged to employ a higher Strain of Voice, and a harsher Turn of Language. Even in that Case, we ought not to seem in a Passion; but as, in the Cases of Caustics and
Am-

Amputations, let us seldom and unwillingly apply this Kind of Correction; and, indeed, never, but when the Case is desperate, and will submit to no other Method of Cure; but still, away with all Passion; for, with that, nothing can be done with Rectitude, nothing with Discretion.

In General, all Correction should be gentle but effectual, and so applyed, as that the Party may feel the Smart, without resenting the Affront. Nay, even the Bitterness of a Reproach should be so conveyed, as to intimate that it is thrown out in Kindness to the Offender. Now, it is adviseable, even in our most rancorous Disputes, if we hear any that is affrontive of our own Persons, to keep our Temper, and not fall into Passion; for whatever we do under its Influence can never be either effectual, or approved of by those who are present. It is likewise disagreeable to hear a Man declaiming in Praise, (and the more so if he lyes into the Bargain) of himself, and to see him, like the swagging Soldier in the Play, become the Ridicule of of all about him.

XXXIX. Now, as I touch, at least intend to touch, upon every Matter of Duty, I shall likewise treat of the Manner in which I could wish to see the Building of a great and a leading Man conducted; the End of it being Utility, to which the Design of the Building must be adapted, but with a due Regard to Magnificence and Elegance. It is, to this Day, mentioned to the Honour of *Cneius Octavius*, the first of that Family, who was raised to the Consulship, that he built upon the *Palatium*, a House of a noble and majestic Appearance; and it had

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 77

had such an Effect in his Favour with the People, that it is thought, it was on that Account they voted him, tho' but a new Man, into the Consulship. *Scaurus* demolished this House, and took the Ground into his own Palace. But tho' the one was the first of his Family who was thereby raised to the Consulate, yet the other, tho' his Father was a Man of the greatest Rank and Distinction, carried into this, his enlarged, Palace, not only Repulse, but Disgrace, nay Ruin (*q*).

For a Palace ought to adorn an Office, but the whole Merit of a Candidate ought not to depend upon the Palace. For the House ought to receive Honour by containing the Master, and not the Master by possessing the House. And, as in other Matters, he is to regard others as well as himself. Thus, a Nobleman who is to entertain a great many Guests of all Denominations in his House, ought to be very careful that it be roomy; but a great House often reflects Discredit upon its Master, when it has an Air of Loneliness, especially if it has been occupied by another Master. It is a mortifying Thing to hear Passengers calling out with the Poet (*r*) *Ob! what a falling off is here!* and, indeed, at present, that Saying is but too applicable to a great many Houses.

(*q*) *Ruin*] Being forc'd into Banishment for some undue Practices to support his Expences.

(*r*) *O what*] Orig. *O Domus antiqua!*
Hæc quam dispari dominare Domino!

As this is a very bald Verse, I have taken the Freedom to supply the Sense from an Expression of the *English Ennius* which is applicable to the same Purpose.

stance

But you are to take care, especially if you build for yourself, not to make your House extravagantly grand and costly. Even the Example of an Excess of this Kind is of the most pernicious Consequence. For most People, particularly in this Respect, imitate the Example of their Leaders. For Instance, who imitates the excellent *Lucius Lucullus* in his Virtues? But, many there are who ape him in the Magnificence of his Villas. This Spirit is, therefore, to be restrained within the Bounds of that Moderation, which ought to run thro' all the Practice and Economy of Life. But of this enough.

Now, in all our Undertakings, we are to regard three Things. First, that Appetite be subservient to Reason; which is of all Things the best fitted for preserving the moral Duties. We are, secondly, to examine the Importance of our Undertaking, that we may proportion our Attention or Labour, so, as it may be neither more nor less than the Occasion requires. Thirdly, we are to regulate every Thing that comes under the Head of Magnificence, according to Decency and Dignity. Now, the best Rule for our Regulation is, to observe the graceful which I have recommended, and to go no further. But of those three Heads, the most excellent is, that of making our Appetites subservient to our Reason.

XL. I am now to speak concerning the Order and the Timing of Things. This is a Science that comprehends what the Greeks call *εὐταξία*, not that which we Romans call Moderation, an Expression that implies keeping within Bounds; whereas the *εὐταξία* here meant, implies a Preservation of Order. As therefore we call that, likewise, *Moderatio*, its De-

Definition by the Stoics is, that it is the Knowledge of ranging under proper Heads whatever we do or say. Therefore, the Signification of Order and of Arrangement seems to be the same. For they define Order to be the Disposing of Things into fitting and convenient Places. Now, they tell us, that the Place for an Action is the Opportunity for doing it. The proper Opportunity for Action being called by the Greeks *εὐκαιρία*, and by the Latins *Ocasio*, or Occasion. Thus, as I have already observed, that, which we call Discretion, is the Knowledge of acting according to the Fitness of a Conjecture.

But Prudence, of which we have treated in the Beginning of this Book, may admit of the same Definition. Under this Head, however, I speak of Moderation and Temperance, and the like Virtues. I shall therefore, in its proper Place, speak to all the Properties of Prudence. But at present I am to treat of those Virtues I have been so long speaking of, which relate to Morality, and the Love of those with whom we live.

Such, then, should be the Regularity of all our Actions, that in our Life, as in an Oration supported equally throughout, every Thing ought to agree and correspond. For it would be unbecoming and highly blameable, should we, when upon a serious Subject, introduce the Language of the jovial or the effeminate. When *Pericles* had, for his Colleague in the Prætorship, *Sophocles* the Poet, as they were discoursing upon the Affairs of the Magistracy, a beautiful Boy, by Accident, passing by, "*What a charming Boy!*" said *Sophocles*; but *Pericles* very

very properly told him, *a Magistrate ought to have a Restraint not only upon his Hands, but his Eyes.* Now *Sophocles*, had he said the same Thing at a Wrestling Match, would not have been liable to the Reprimand, such Importance there is in the Time and Place. A Man, for Instance, who is going to plead a Cause, if, as he walks along, he falls into musing, or appears more thoughtful than ordinary, he is not blamed. But should he do this at an Entertainment, it would be Ill-Breeding in him, for not distinguishing Times.

But those Actions that are in flat Opposition to Good-Breeding, such, for Instance, as Singing in the Forum, or any such Absurdity, are so easily discernible, that they require no great Degree of Reprehension or Advice to correct them. But inconsiderable Failings, and such as are discernible only to a few, are to be more carefully avoided. As in musical Instruments, the smallest Untuneableness is perceived by a judging Ear; thus in Life we are to guard against all Discord, and the rather as the Harmony of Morals is greater, and much more valuable than that of Sounds.

XLI. Thus, as the Ear is sensible of the smallest Discord in musical Instruments; so, if we were accurately and attentively to observe Blemishes, we might make great Discoveries, from very trifling Circumstances. The Cast of the Eye, the Bending or Unbending of the Brow, an Air of Dejection or Cheerfulness, Laughter, the Tone of Words, Silence, the Raising or Falling of the Voice, and the like Circumstances, we may easily form a Judgment which of them are in their proper State, and which of them jar with Duty and Na-

Nature. Now, in this Case, it is adviseable to judge, from others, of the Condition and Properties of every one of those; so as to be able, in ourselves, to avoid those Things that are unbecoming in others. For it happens, I know not how, that we perceive any Blemish more readily in others, than we do in ourselves. Therefore when Masters mimick the Faults of Boys, that they may amend them, those Boys are very easily set right.

Neither is it improper, in order to fix our Choice in a doubtful Matter, if we apply to Men of Learning and Experience, and learn their Sense of the several Kinds of Duty. For the greatest Part of Mankind are too apt to follow their own Dispositions. And in those Cases, we are to examine not only what a Man says, but what he thinks, and upon what Grounds he thinks it. For as Painters, Statuaries, and even Poets, want to have their Works canvass'd by the public, in order to correct any Thing that is generally disliked; and examine both by themselves, and with others, where the Defect lies; thus, we ought to make use of the Judgment of others to do, and not to do, to alter and correct, a great many Things.

As to Actions resulting from the Manners or civil Constitutions of a People, I can lay down no other Rules than those very Manners and Constitutions. But Men ought not to be under the Mistake to imagine that if *Socrates* or *Aristippus* acted or spoke in Opposition to the Manners and civil Constitutions of their Country, they therefore have the same Right to transgress them. For this was a Right they acquired by their great and divine Qualities. But as to the whole System of the Cynics, we are absolutely to reject it, because it is inconsistent with

Morality, without which nothing can be honest nothing can be virtuous.

Now it is our Duty to esteem and to honour, in the same manner as if they were dignified with Titles or vested with Command, those Men whose Lives have been distinguished by great and glorious Actions, by their Patriotism, and by the Services they have done, or continue to do, to their Country. We are likewise to have a great Regard for old Age, to pay a Deference to Magistrates; to distinguish between what we owe to a Fellow-Citizen and a Foreigner, and to consider whether that Foreigner comes in a public or a private Capacity: In short, that I may be no longer particular, we ought to regard, to cultivate and to cherish the good Will, and the Society of all Mankind.

XLII Now I am to give you my general Sentiments with Regard to what Trades and Emoluments become, and what are to be deemed below, a Gentleman. In the first Place, we are to detest those Emoluments that incur the public Hatred; such as those of Tax-brokers and Usurers. We are likewise to account, as ungentle and mean, the Gains of all hired Workmen, who earn Money not by their Art, but their Labour; for their Wages are in Consideration of their Servitude. We are likewise to despise all who retail, from Merchants, Goods for present Sale; for they never can succeed unless they lye most abominably. Now nothing is more disgraceful than Insincerity. All Labourers are, by their Profession, mean. For a Workshop can contain nothing befitting a Gentleman. We are likewise to disclaim all Trades that serve the Purposes of Sensuality, such as, to speak after *Terence*, Large-Fish-mongers, Butchers, Cooks,

Cooks, Pastry-Cooks, and Fishermen; to whom we shall add, if you please, Perfumers, Dancers; and the whole Tribe of professed Gamesters.

But those Professions that are founded upon scientific Principles, or conducive to public Utility, such as Medicine, Architecture, the Teaching the Practice of Virtue, are honourable in their several Professors. As to merchandizing, if petty, it is disgraceful, but if it is extensive and large, dealing with all Parts of the World, and giving Bread to Numbers in a fair, creditable, Way; it is not so despicable. But if a Merchant, satiated, or rather satisfied, with his Profits, as he sometimes used to leave the Deep, and make the Harbour, shall from the Harbour, step into an Estate and Lands; such a Man challenges our highest Regard. For you must know, that, of all gainful Professions, nothing is better; nothing more pleasing, nothing more delightful, nothing better becomes a Man or a Gentleman, than Agriculture. But, as I have handled that Subject at large in my *Cato Major*, I refer you thither for what falls under this Head.

XLIII. I have, I think, sufficiently explained in what Manner the Duties are derived from the constituent Parts of Virtue. Now it often may happen that an Emulation and a Contest may arise amongst Things that are in themselves virtuous: Of two Virtues which is preferable? A Division that *Panetius* has overlook'd. For as all Virtue is the Result of four Qualities, Knowledge; Justice; Magnanimity, and Moderation, so, in the Choice of a Duty, those Qualities must necessarily come in competition with one another.

I am therefore of Opinion; that the Duties of Justice are more agreeable to Nature than those

arising from Knowledge. This may be proved from the following Case. Supposing a wife Man were in that very affluent Situation of Life as to be able, with great Leisure, to contemplate and attend to every Object that is worthy his Knowledge; yet, if his Condition be so solitary as to have no Company with Mankind, he would prefer Death to it. Of all Virtues, the most leading is that which the Greeks call Σοφία, for that Sagacity which they term *φρονησις* has another Signification, as it implies the Knowledge of what Things are to be desired, and what to be avoided. But that Wisdom, to which I have given the Lead, is the Knowledge of Things divine and human, which comprehends the Community of Gods and Men and their Society within themselves. If that be, as it certainly is, the highest of all Objects, it follows of Course that the Duty resulting from this Community, is the highest of all Duties. For the Knowledge and Contemplation of Nature, is, in a Manner, lame and unfinished, if it is followed by no Activity; now Activity is most perspicuous when it is exerted in protecting the Rights of Mankind.

It, therefore, promotes the Interests of Society, and is, for that Reason preferable to Knowledge, as is to be seen from the unvarying, constant Practice and Judgment of every Man of Virtue. For who is so eager in pursuing and examining the Nature of Things, that if, while he is handling and contemplating the noblest Objects of Knowledge, he is told that his Country is threatened with the most imminent Danger, and that it is in his Power to assist and relieve her; would not instantly abandon, and fling from him all those Studies, even though he thought they

they would lead him to know how to number the Stars, or measure the Dimensions of the World? And he would do the same were the Safety of a Friend, or a Parent concerned or endangered. From this Consideration, I infer, that the Duties of Justice are preferable to the Studies and Duties of Knowledge, because the former hath for their Object the Welfare of the human Race, which of all other Considerations, ought to be the most dear to Mankind.

XLIV. But some have employed their whole Lives in the Pursuits of Knowledge, and yet have not declined to contribute to the Utility and Advantage of Society. For they have even bred up Pupils, to be good Patriots and excellent Magistrates. Thus, *Lyfis* the *Pythagorean* educated *Epaminondas* of *Thebes*, as did *Plato*, *Dion* of *Syracuse*; and, whatever Services I performed, if I did perform any, to my Country, were owing to my coming into public Life, after being furnished and adorned with Knowledge by Men of Learning.

Nor, do those Patriot Philosophers content themselves in their Life-Time only to instruct and educate Pupils; but they continue to do the same after Death, by the Monuments of their Learning; for they neglect no Point, that relates to the Constitution, the Manners and the Morals of their Country; so that, it appears, as if all, their leisure Hours, had been employed for our Advantage. Thus, it is plain, that Men, who, give up their Time to the Study of Learning and Wisdom, employ all their Understanding and all their Skill, chiefly, to the Service of Mankind. It is, therefore, most serviceable to the Public for a Man to speak copiously, provided it is to the Purpose,

than for a Man to think ever so justly, without being able to express himself; the Reason is, because good Sense rests entirely within ourselves, but Eloquence affects those of the same Society with ourselves.

Now, as the Swarms of Bees do not assemble in order to form their Combs, but, as they have, from Nature, the Property of associating together, they then form them; thus, Men being, thro' a much stronger Principle, associated by Nature, assiduously apply themselves to Speaking and Thinking. Therefore, unless Knowledge is connected with that Virtue, which, consists in doing Service to Mankind, that is, in improving human Society, all its Properties are lonely and barren.

In like Manner, Greatness of Soul, when utterly disregarding of the Company and Society of Men becomes savage and uncouth. Hence it follows, that the Company and the Community of Men are preferable to meer speculative Knowledge.

Neither is that Maxim true, which some hold, as if human Communities and Societies had been instituted, because we cannot, without the Help of others, supply the Wants of Nature, to which by the Tenure of our Lives, we are subjected. But, if we should be furnished, by a Kind of a magical Wand, with every Thing that relates to Food and Rayment, that then, every Man, of excelling Genius, laying aside all other Considerations, would apply himself to Knowledge and Learning. The Fact is not so; for such a Man, in such a Case, would avoid Loneliness, and look out for a Companion in his Studies; he would then want sometimes to teach, and sometimes to learn, to be some-

Concerning the Moral Duties of Mankind. 87


sometimes a Hearer, and sometimes a Speaker. All Duty, therefore, that operates for the Good of human Community and Society, is preferable to that Duty which is bounded by barren Speculation and Knowledge.

XLV. Here, perhaps, a Question may arise, whether the Duties of that Society, which is most suitable to Nature, are preferable to Moderation and Decency? By no Means. For some Things are partly so disgraceful, and partly so criminal in their Nature that a wise Man would not commit them, even to to save his Country. *Possidomius* has given us many Particulars of this Kind; but they are so execrable, that they are abominable, even to the Ear. A wise Man would not undertake such Things even to serve his Country, nor would his Country undertake them to serve herself. But it fortunately happens, that there never can be a Conjunction, when the public Interest shall require, from a wise Man, the Performance of such Actions.

Thus, have I prov'd, that in the Choice of our Duties, we are to prefer that Kind of Duty that contributes to the good of Society. For well directed Activity is always the Result of Knowledge and Learning. And therefore it is of more Consequence to act properly, than to deliberate justly. But, I have already treated of this; for the Matter is now so fully laid open, that it is easy for every Man in the Study of his Duties, to see which is preferable. Now, in Society, there are Degrees of Duties, by which every Man may understand what belongs to himself. The first is owing to the immortal Gods, the second

to our Country, the third, to our Parents, and so on through all the Relations of Life.

From this short State of my Subject, we perceive, that Men are sometimes not only in Doubt, whether a Thing is virtuous or disgraceful; but likewise, when two virtuous Things are proposed which is most so? This Head, as I said before, was omitted by *Panætius*. But to proceed.



M. T. CICERO



M. T. C I C E R O

H I S

O F F I C E S

U P O N

The MORAL DUTIES of MANKIND.

B O O K II. C H A P. I.

MARCUS, *my Son,*



THINK, I have, in the former Book, sufficiently explain'd in what Manner our Duties are derived from Morality, and every Kind of Virtue. It now remains, that, I treat of those Kinds of Duties, that relate to the

Improvement of Life, and to the Acquirement of those Means, which Men employ, for the Attainment, of Wealth and Interest. In this Enquiry, as I have, already, observed; I will treat of what is useful, and what is not so. Of several Utilities, I shall speak of that which is more useful, or chiefly

chiefly useful. Of all this I shall treat after pre-mising a few Words, concerning my own Intention and Purpose.

My Works, it is true, have prompted a great many to the Exercise not only of Reading, but of Writing; but, I sometimes, am apprehensive, that several of our great Men dislike the Name of Philosophy, and are surprized at my having employed so much of my Pains and Time in that Study. For my Part, as long as the State was under the Management of those into whose Hands she had thrown herself, I applied all my Attention and Thought upon the Service of the Public. But, when the Government was ingrossed by one Person, when there was an End of all public Deliberation and Authority; when I, in short, had lost those excellent Patriots, who were my Companions, when I saved my Country, I neither abandoned myself to that Anguish of Spirit, which, had I given Way to it, must have consumed me, nor did I indulge those Pleasures that are disgraceful to a Man of Learning (a).

Would to the Heavens the Constitution had remain'd in its original State; and, that it had not fallen into the Hands of Men whose Aim was, not to alter, but to destroy it! For, while our Country was free, I used, in the first Place, to be more intent upon the Propriety of my Conduct than of my Writing. In the next Place, I should not, in my Writings, have treated upon this Subject, but, as I often did, up-

(a) *Man of Learning*] This is a tacit Reproach upon *Hortensius Lucullus*, and some others of the great Men who retired to their Country Seats and Amusements during the civil War and *Cæsar's* Usurpation.

on my own Conduct. But, when the Constitution of my Country, to which I apply'd all my Care, Thoughts and Studies, ceas'd to exist, then those public and senatorial Studies were silenc'd.

But, as the Mind of Man cannot be unactive, and, as my early Life employ'd in the Studies of Morality, I thought, I could not apply a more virtuous Relief to the Anguish of my Spirit, than, by returning to Philosophy. Having, when young, spent a great Deal of my Time in its Study, when I, afterwards, enter'd upon public Offices, and devoted myself to the Service of my Country, yet I still gave to Philosophy, all the Time I could spare, from the Duties I ow'd to my Friends, and the Public. But, I spent it all in Reading having no Leisure for Writing.

II. From all my deep Distresses, therefore, this good has arisen, that I have reduc'd, into Writing, Matters, in which my Countrymen, are not sufficiently instructed, tho' nothing is more worthy their Attention. For, just Heavens! what is more desirable, what is more excellent, than Wisdom? What can more dignify a Man? They, therefore, who court her are term'd Philosophers, for Philosophy implies nothing but the Love of Wisdom.

Now, the antient Philosophers defin'd Wisdom to be the Knowledge of Things divine and human, and of the Causes by which they are effected. A Study, that if any Man despises, I know not what Study he can esteem.

For, if we seek the Entertainment of the Mind, or a Respite from Affliction, what is comparable to those Pursuits that are always contributing somewhat that

that relates to, improving the Welfare and Happiness of Life? And if we seek to re-establish the Principles of Self-Consistency and Virtue, either this is the Art, or there is absolutely no Art by which we can attain them. And to say, that the greatest Object may be without an Art, when we see that the most inconsiderable are not without it, betrays great thoughtlessness and a great Mistake in the most important Matters. Now, if Virtue has any fixt Principles where can they be found, if we abandon this Study? But this Point, is more particularly treated, in my (b) Exhortation to Philosophy, which I have made the Subject of another Book. At present, all my Intention is to explain the Reasons, why, being divested of all public Character, I chuse to apply myself to this Study, preferably to all others.

In the Course of this Enquiry, I am aware it may be objected by some Men of Learning and Knowledge, whether I act consistently with myself, when I treat upon different Subjects, and when, as now, I am laying down Rules for our Duty, and at the same Time deny that Man can have a Perception of any Object. I could wish those Gentlemen were thoroughly acquainted with my Way of Thinking. I am none of those whose Reason is always wandering in the Mist of Uncertainty, without having a fixt Point of Pursuit. For, if we abolish all the Rules not only of Reasoning but of Living, what must become of Reason, nay, of Life itself? For my own Part, while others maintain some Things to be certain, and others un-

(b) *Exhortation*] This Book was entitled by our Author, *Hortensius*, but is now lost all to a few Fragments.

certain

certain, I say, on the other Side, that some Things are probable, and others not so probable.

What, therefore, hinders me from following whatever appears to me to be most probable, and from rejecting what is otherwise; and while I avoid the Arrogance of being dogmatically positive, escape the Imputation of Rashness which is highly inconsistent with Wisdom (*c*). Now, our Sect maintains either Side of a Question, because, this very Probability cannot appear, unless the Reasons both for and against it are thoroughly canvass'd. But, if I mistake not, I have, with sufficient Accuracy discuss'd this Point in my Academics. As to you, my dear Son, tho' you are now employ'd in the Study of the oldest and noblest Philosophy, under *Craterus*, who greatly resembles the Founders of that glorious Sect, yet, was I desirous you should be acquainted with these my Sentiments, which are so corresponding with your System. But, to proceed in what I propose.

III. Having laid down the five Principles upon which we pursue our Duty, two of which relate to what is graceful and moral, two to the Enjoyments of Life, such as, Wealth, Interest and Power, the fifth to forming a right Judgment, if there should appear to be any Clashing between the Principles, I have mention'd, I have finish'd that Head of Virtue, with, which I desire you should be best acquainted. Now, the Subject, I am now to treat of, is neither more nor less than what we

(*c*) The Reader will understand this Passage best by consulting our Author's *Treatise de Finibus*, or, concerning the End of Things, good and evil, and his other philosophical Works.

call

call Utility; in which the Pre-possessions of Mankind have been so erroneous that their Practice has insensibly arriv'd to that Degree of Absurdity as to distinguish between what is moral, and what is profitable, so set up what is virtuous against what is useful, and what is useful against what is virtuous; than which Doctrine nothing can be more destructive to human Society.

It is, upon solid, virtuous; Principles, and for the best Reasons, that Philosophers distinguish only, in Idea, those three Kinds which really are blended together. For they give it as their Opinion, that whatever is just is profitable; and in like Manner whatever is virtuous is just; from whence it follows that Virtue and Utility are one and the same Thing. They who are insensible of the Truth of this Distinction, are generally Men, who, being fond of artful, crafty, Knaves, mistake Cunning for Wisdom. Now, we are to rectify all such Mistakes, and all the Reasoning of Mankind upon this Head ought to turn upon seeking the Ends they propose, by such Means as are virtuous and just, and not by such as are dishonest and wicked.

The Particulars, therefore, that relate to the Improvement of social Life, are partly inanimate, such as Gold, Silver, the Fruits of the Earth, and the like; and partly animal, which have their several Instincts and Affections. Now, of these, some are void of, and some are endowed with, Reason. The Animals void of Reason are Horses, Oxen, with other brute Creatures, and Bees, who by their Labours contribute somewhat to the Service and Existence of Mankind. As to the Animals endowed with Reason

for

son they are of two Kinds, one, the Gods, the other Men. Piety and Sanctity render the Gods propitious; and next to the Gods, Mankind is best assisted by Men.

The same Division holds as to Things that are hurtful and prejudicial. But as we are not to suppose the Gods to be hurtful to Mankind, we therefore conclude that, putting them out of the Question, Man may be most beneficial and most prejudicial to Man. For even the very inanimated Beings I have mentioned, are generally procured thro' Man's Labour; nor should we have had them but by his Art and Industry, nor can we apply them but by his Management. For Instance, the Art of preserving Health, Navigation, the Enjoying and Preserving the Fruits of the Earth, are all of them the Effects of human Industry.

Nay, the Exporting what is superfluous, and the Importing what is necessary, must have been Things entirely unknown, had not Mankind applied themselves to those Labours. In like Manner, neither Stones for our Use, nor Iron, nor Brass, nor Gold, nor Silver, would have been dug from the Bowels of the Earth, but by the Toil and Art of Man.

IV. As to Buildings which either defend us from the Violence of the Cold, or shelter us from the Inconveniencies of the Heat, how could they have originally been invented for the Use of Man or afterwards repaired, when ruined by Tempests, Earthquakes or Time, had not Mankind in social Life learned how convenient and comfortable those Things are? From whence, but from the Labour of Man, could we have had Aqueducts, the Cuts of Rivers, Water-Mounds and artificial Harbours?

From

From those, and a great many other Instances, it is plain, that we could by no manner of means have, without the Art and Industry of Man, reap'd the Benefits and Advantages arising from inanimated Things. In short, where would have been the Service and Assistance which the Brute Creation is of to Society, had it not been for the Assistance of Man? Men undoubtedly were the first who discovered the Employments proper for every dumb Creature; nor could we, even at this Time, either feed, tame, preserve, or employ them, so as to profit by their Labours in due Season, without the Help of Man. It is Man, who destroys whatever is hurtful, and procures whatever may be beneficial. Why should I enumerate the Variety of Arts, which are the Life of Life? It is this Variety that supplies us with Food and Rayment; that gives Health to the Sick, and Pleasure to the Sound.

Polish'd by those Arts, the Life of Man is so different from the Existence and the Appearance of Brutes. As to Cities, they neither could have been built, nor peopled, but by Men meeting in Society: Hence were form'd Laws and Manners, the equitable Meaning of Laws, and the Regulated Order of Life. Then follow'd Gentleness of Disposition, and Love of Morality; Security in Living, and the supply of all our Wants by giving and receiving, and by the mutual Intercourse between Services and Benefits.

V. Writers are more prolix than they need to be, on this Head. For *Panæti* employs a great many Words to prove what is self-evident, that no Man, whether he be a Commander of an Army, or

an

a Leader in the State, has ever been able to perform what was great in the one, or salutary in the other; unless he was seconded by Men. As Instances of this, he mentions *Themistocles*, *Pericles*, *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, and *Agessilaus*, who, he says, without the Aid of Men, never could have atchiev'd so many glorious Exploits. Thus, in a Matter that is undoubted, he brings Evidences that are unnecessary. But, as the Assemblage or Agreement of Men, amongst themselves is productive of the greatest Benefits; so is there no such execrable Pestilence, as that arising to Man from Man. We have a Treatise of (d) *Dicaearchus* an eminent and eloquent Perepatetic, concerning the Destruction of Mankind; and after collecting together all the different Causes, such as those of Inundations, Pestilence, Wastes, and those sudden Attacks of Swarms of Creatures, by which, he tells us, whole Nations have been destroy'd; he then calculates how many more Men have been destroyed by Men, that is, by Wars and Seditions, than by every other Species of Calamity.

As this Point, therefore, admits of no Doubt, that Man is both the greatest Blessing, and the greatest Curse of Man; I lay it down as a chief Property of Virtue, the reconciling the Affections of Mankind to herself, and employing them to her own Purposes. Therefore, all the Application and Management of inanimated Things, and of Brutes, for the Use of Mankind, is effected by the mechanic Arts. But the quick and ready Zeal of Mankind, for advancing and en-

(d) *Dicaearchus*, born in Sicily and a Disciple of *Aristotle*.

H

larging

larging our Conditions, is excited thro' the Wisdom and Virtue of the best of Mankind.

For Virtue, in general, consists of three Properties. First, in discerning in every Subject what is true and unadulterated; what is best fitted to every one; what will be the Consequence, of such or such a Thing; how one Thing arises from another, and how Effects proceed from Causes. The next Property of Virtue is, to calm those violent Disorders of the Mind, which the *Greeks* call *πάθος*, and to render obedient to Reason those Affections which they call *ορμῆς*. The third Property is, to treat with Discretion and Skill those with whom we are joyn'd in Society, that by their Means we may have the compleat and full Enjoyment of all that Nature stands in Need of; and likewise, by them repel every Injury that may be offer'd us, and avenge ourselves of those, who have endeavour'd to do us hurt, by punishing them as far as is consistent with Equity and Humanity.

VI. I shall soon consider the Means to acquire this Art of winning and retaining the Affections of Mankind, but, I must premise somewhat. Who is insensible, what great Influence Fortune has, either upon our Prosperity or Adversity? When we sail with her Blast, we are carried to the most desirable landing Places; when against it, to the most melancholy. With Regard to the Accidents of Fortune she very seldom exerts her Power; for Instance, in the first Place, in Cases of Storms, Tempests, Shipwrecks, Ruins, or Burnings from inanimated Things; in the next Place, in Cases of Blows, Bites,

Bites, or Attacks from Brutes. Those Accidents, I say, happen more seldom.

Now, with Regard to the Defeat of Armies, of which we have just now seen (e) three different Instances, and often we see more; the Overthrow of Generals, as was lately the Case of a great and an excellent (f) Personage; together with Unpopularity, by which the worthiest Citizens have been expell'd, over-born or exil'd; and on the other Hand, prosperous Events, Honours, Commands, and Victories; though all those are influenced by Chance, yet neither the bad, nor the good, could have been effected without the concurring Assistance and Inclinations of Mankind. This being premised, I am now to point out the Manner in which we may invite, and direct the Inclinations of Mankind, so as to serve our Interests; and should what I say on this Head, appear too long, let it be compar'd with the Importance of the Subject, and then, perhaps, it will seem too short.

Whatever, therefore, People perform for any Man, either to raise, or to dignify him; is done either thro' Kindness when they have a Motive of Affection for him; or to do him Honour, in Admiration of his Virtue, and when they think him worthy of the most exalted Station; or when they have such an Opinion of him as to think, that in serving him, they serve themselves; or when

(e) *Three Armies*] Meaning the Defeat of Pompey at *Pharsalia*, of his Sons at *Munda*, in *Spain*, and of *Scipio* in *Africa*, all by *Julius Caesar*.

(f) *Personage*] *Pompey the Great*.

they are afraid of his Power; or when they hope somewhat from him; as when Princes, or the leading Men in the State, propose certain Largesses; or lastly, when they are engag'd by Money and Bribery; a Motive that of all other is the vilest and dirtiest, both with Regard to the corrupted and the Corruptor.

For Matters are come to a shameful Pass, when Money must be employ'd to do what Virtue ought to effect. But as this Resource is sometimes necessary, I will show in what Manner it is to be employ'd, after I have treated of some Things, that are more the Properties of Virtue. Now Mankind submit to the Command and Power of another, for several Reasons. For they are induc'd by the Affection they have for him, or the great Services he has done them; or by his transcendent Worth, or by the Hopes that their Submission will turn to their own Account, or from the Fear of their being forced to submit, or from the Hopes of Reward, or the Power of Promises: Or lastly, (which is often the Case in our Government) they are positively hir'd to serve him.

VII. Now, of all Things, Affection is the most proper for strengthening, and Fear for weakning, an Interest. *Ennius* says very truly, *People hate the Man they fear, and wish to see the Man dead whom they hate.* It has been (g) lately, if it was not before, well known that no Man's Power can resist a combined Detestation. Nor, indeed, is the Destruction of that Tyrant, who by Arms forced his

(g) *Lately*] *Cicero* here alludes to the Assassination of *Cæsar* in the Senate.

Country

Country to endure him, and who governs it even after his Death, the only Instance of the Force of public Detestation against a public Nufance, for the latter End of other Tyrants have been like unto his: Few of them have escaped a similar Fate. For Fear is but a bad Guardian to the Permanency, whereas Affection is faithful even to the Perpetuity, of Power.

But the Truth is, Cruelty must be employed by those who keep others in Subjection by Force; as a Master must be cruel to his Slaves if they cannot otherwise be managed. But of all Madmen they are the maddest, who, in a free State, make Fear the Instrument of their Success. The Power of a private Man may weaken the Force of the Laws, it may intimidate the Spirit of Liberty, yet some Time or other they will emerge, and become visible, either by silent Intimations, or the private Sense of the People, as to public Honours. For the Stings of (*b*) Liberty when suspended, are more keen than when slackened. We ought therefore to follow this plain, this indisputed

(*b*) Liberty] Orig. *Acriores autem morsus sunt intermissæ Libertatis quam retentiæ.* I own, I cannot think that this fine Observation has ever been understood either by Critics, Translators, or Commentators; Doctor Cockman translates it thus. "And Liberty, after she has been chain'd up a while, is always, more curst and bites deeper, than she would otherwise have done, had she been never restrain'd. This is very good Sense, but not the Sense of Cicero; who did not intend to compare Liberty to a Bitch. He uses the Words *intermissa* and *retenta*, in other Places (*Vide Tusc. Disp. L. 1. C. 1. p. 1*) to signify, the first, a Suspension or Interruption, and the latter a Slackening or Relaxation. This Meaning therefore is, that the Spirit of Liberty is always more keen after its Operations have been totally suspended (as was the Case under *Cæsar*) than when they are only slacken'd, as was the Case under the Triumvirate.

Maxim, that Dread should be removed and Affection reconciled, not only to secure the Dignities we already have, but for the Acquirement of further Interest and Power ; and this is far the readiest Way to answer our Designs, both in our private Affairs, and Matters of Government. For it is a necessary Consequence, that Men fear those very Persons by whom they wish to be fear'd.

For what Judgment can we form of the elder (i) *Dionysius*? With what Pangs of Dread was he tortured? When being jealous even of his Barber's Razor, he sing'd his Face and Beard with burning Coals? In what Distraction, may it not be suppos'd (k) *Alexander the Phœrean* to have lived? who, (as we learn) though he loved his Wife *Thebe* to Distraction, yet, whenever he came into her Bed-Chamber from his Debauches, order'd a *Thracian*; nay, one, who, we are told, had his Skin (l) stigmatis'd with the Brands of Barbarism, to go before him with a drawn Sword ; and sent certain of his Attendants to search the Chests of the Ladies, and even their Cloaths, for concealed Weapons. What a Wretch! to think a barbarous, branded, Slave could be more faithful to

(i) *Dionysius*] This elder *Dionysius* was Tyrant of *Syracuse* about the Year of *Rome* 447. His Son and Successor of the same Name was expell'd by *Dione*, the Disciple of *Plato*.

(k) *Alexander the Phœrean*] This Tyrant is mentioned by *Ovid* in *Ibin*, and by *Valerius Maximus*, and other Authors, as a Monster of Cruelty.

(l) *Stigmatis'd with Brands of Barbarism*] The *Thracians* were accounted the fiercest of all the Barbarians, and they had a Custom, which was in common with many of the barbarous Nations, of making Marks with hot, or other, Irons upon their Skins. The *Greeks* and *Romans* sometimes mark'd all their Slaves in that Manner, after they came into their Possessions.

him

him than the Wife of his Bosom! Yet was he not deceived, for he was put to Death by her in a Fit of Jealousy; nor, indeed, can any Power be so well founded as to last, if it is founded on Fear.

We have another Instance of (*m*) *Phalaris*, above all others, a Tyrant most ingeniously cruel, who did not, like the *Alexander*, I have just mentioned, perish by a private Cabal, nor by the Hands of a few Conspirators, like our Tyrant of *Rome*, but was attacked by the collective Body of all the *Agrigentines*. Nay, did not the *Macedonians* abandon *Demetrius*, and with one Consent submit themselves to *Pyrrhus*? What need, I say more! were not the *Lacedæmonians*, for their tyrannical Government, abandoned by almost all their Allies, who stood by the unconcerned Spectators of their Defeat by *Leuctra*?

VIII. Upon such a Subject, it is with more Pleasure I quote foreign, than domestic, Instances; as long, however, as the People of *Rome* made Beneficence, and not Injustice, the Rule of their Government, their Wars were undertaken either to defend their Allies, or to protect their Empire, and they always made an humane Use of their Conquest, without using more than necessary Severity. The Senate was the Harbour, and the Refuge of Kings, People, and Nations.

But the noblest and most distinguished Ambition of our then Magistrates, and Generals, was

(*m*) *Phalaris*] He was Tyrant of *Agrigentum* in *Sicily*, and famous Inventor of the *Brass Bull*. He was, however, a Man Letters,

upon the Principles of Equity and Honour, to defend their Provinces and their Allies. Hence it was, that they seem to take the whole World under their (n) Patronage, rather than under their Government. For some Time, we were insensibly abating of this Practice, and those Principles; but when *Sylla* got the better, we entirely lost them. For seeing the Cruelty, which were every Day exercised upon our Fellow-Citizens, we ceas'd to think, that our Allies could suffer any Injury. He, therefore, by inhuman Conquest crown'd a (o) glorious Cause; for he had the Presumption to declare, when the Goods of Patriots, Men of Fortune, and to say no more, of *Romans*, were selling at public Auction, *that he was disposing of his own Booty*. He was follow'd by a Man, whose Cause was impious and his Conquest, still more detestable, who did not, indeed, sell the Effects of private Citizens, but involved in one System of Calamity whole Provinces and Countries. Thus foreign Nations, being harass'd and ruined, we saw (p) *Marseilles*, the Type of our perished Constitution, carried in Triumph, after being the Cause of Triumph, to all our Generals, who returned from *Transalpine Wars*. Was not this the most flagrant Indignity the

(n) *Patronage*] Orig. *Itaque illud Patricinium Orbis Terræ, verius quam Imperium, poterat nominari.*

(o) *Glorious Cause*] *Sylla's* Pretence for taking up Arms was to defend the Nobility, against the Encroachments of the Commons, headed by *Marius* whose Party *Cæsar* reviv'd.

(p) *Marseilles*] This was a favourite State with the *Roman* Republicans; but having too inconsiderately shut their Gates against, and provok'd, *Cæsar*, he treated it as is here describ'd.

Sun ever beheld! I should go on to recount a great many of his other wicked Oppressions, which our Allies suffer'd. Deservedly, therefore, were we punished; for had we not born, with Impunity, the Crimes of many, never could so much Power have been engrossed by one. The Inheritance of his private Estate descended indeed to but a few, but that of his public Ambition devolved upon many, Ruffians.

I may venture to say, that there never can be wanting a Source and Motive for civil War, while Men of abandoned Principles call to Mind that bloody Sale, and hope again to see it renew'd. For when the Spear (*q*) under which, it was made, was set up, for his Kinsman the Dictator, by *Publius Sylla*, the same *Sylla* thirty six Years after, was present at a still more detestable Sale. While another Wretch, who in that Dictatorship was only a Clerk, in the late one rose to be City-Questor. From all this we may conclude, that while such tempting Rewards are presented, there never can be an End of our civil Wars. The Walls of our City, it is true, are standing, and that too in daily Expectation of utter Destruction; but as to our Constitution, it is absolutely undone; and, that I may return to my Purpose, all those Miseries have befallen us, because we chose to govern, rather by Fear, than by love, and Affection. If this was the Case, with the People of *Rome*,

(*q*) *Spear*] Our Author here alludes to the Sales of the Estates of the *Roman* Citizens made by *Sylla*; and which always were amongst the *Roman* carried on under a Spear stuck into the Ground. The like Sales were afterwards made by some of *Cæsar's* Party.

for

for perverting the Ends of Government, what can we think will be the Consequence with Regard to private Persons? Now, as it is plain, that the Force of Kindness is so strong, and that of Fear, so weak, I am to discourse of the Means by which we may most readily attain to that Endearment, link'd with Honour and Confidence, which I have propos'd.

But of this we do not all stand in the same Need; for every Man, according to the different Purpose of his Life, is to take the proper Measures that are necessary for making himself beloved, by the many, or the few. One Thing, however, is chiefly and indispensibly necessary, that our Connections with those Friends who love our Persons, and embrace our Interests, should be indissoluble; for this is the only Particular in which Men of the highest and middle Stations of Life, agree, and it is attainable by both in much the same Manner. All, perhaps, are not equally desirous of Honours, of Popularity, and public Favour; but the Man who is furnish'd with them, is greatly assisted by them, in acquiring other Advantages of Life, as well as Friendship.

IX. But, I have in another Book, which is entitled *Lælius*, treated of Friendship. I am now to speak of Popularity, tho' I have already published two Books upon that Subject (r): Let me, however, touch upon it, as it greatly conduces to the right Management of the more important Affairs. The highest and the most perfect Popularity, lies in three Requisites; first, when the Public loves us; secondly, when it trusts us; third-

(r) *Subject*] This Treatise is now lost.

ly,

ly, when, with a certain Degree of Admiration, it judges us to be worthy of Preferment. Now, if I am to speak plainly and briefly, almost the same Means, by which those Advantages are acquir'd, from private Persons, acquire them from the Public. But there is another Passage, by which we may, as it were, glide into the Affections of the many.

And first, let me touch upon those three Rules (as I have already term'd them,) of Benevolence. That is chiefly acquir'd by good Deeds. But next to that, Benevolence is won by a beneficent Inclination, tho' destitute of Means. Thirdly, the Affections of the Public are wonderfully excited by the very Report and Opinion of Generosity, Beneficence, Justice, Honour, and of all those Virtues that regard Politeness and Affability of Manners. For the very *Honestum* and the *Graceful* as it is call'd, because it charms us by its own Properties, and touches every human Heart by its Qualities and its Beauties, is chiefly resplendent through the Medium of those Virtues I have mentioned. We are, therefore, ravished, as it were, by Nature herself, to the Love of those in whom we think those Virtues reside. Now these are the strongest Motives of Affection, some there may be which are slighter.

As to acquiring the public Confidence, or Trust, it may be effected two Ways; by being suppos'd to be possess'd of Wisdom and of Justice. For we have Confidence in those who, we think, understand more than ourselves, and who, we believe, has both greater Foresight, and when Business is actually in Hand, and Matters come to trial, know how to pursue the wisest Measures, and

and act in the most expedient Manner, as the Exigency shall require; All Mankind agreeing, that this is useful, real, Wisdom. Now, the Measure of our Confidence in honest and honourable Men, that is, Men of WORTH, is, that we have not the smallest Suspicion of their harbouring a Thought of cheating or injuring us. We therefore think we act safely and properly, in entrusting them, with our Persons, our Fortunes, and our Families.

But of the two Virtues, Honesty and Wisdom, the former is the most powerful in winning the Confidence of Mankind. For Honesty, without Wisdom, is an Inducement sufficient of itself; but Wisdom, without Honesty, is of no Effect. Because, when we have no Opinion of a Man's Probity, his Craft and Cunning serve only to make us hate and suspect him the more; Honesty therefore, joyned to Understanding, has unbounded Power in acquiring Confidence; Honesty without Understanding, can do a great Deal; but Understanding without Honesty can do nothing.

X. But, lest any one should be surpris'd, as all Philosophers are agreed in one Maxim, which I myself have often maintained, that the Man who possesses one of the Virtues, is in Possession of them all, why I here make a Distinction that implies the Possibility of a Man's not having Understanding (or Wisdom) and Honesty, at the same Time, the Accuracy which in Schools refines even upon Truth, I answer, that is different from that Accuracy that is required in adapting all our Reasoning to the Understanding of the Public. Therefore I here make use of the common Terms of Discourse,
by

by calling some Men brave, some worthy, and others wise. For when I treat of a popular Opinion, I must make use of popular Terms, and *Patius* did the same. But to return to what I propose.

Of the three Requisites of perfect Popularity, the third I mentioned was, "when the Public with a certain Degree of Veneration, judges us to be worthy of Preferment." Now, every Thing that they observe to be great, and extraordinary, is the Subject, at least, of vulgar Admiration. But with regard to particular Persons, they admire those Things in which they can see any good Qualities they did not look for. They therefore behold with Reverence and exalt with a Profusion of Praise, those Men in whom they think they can perceive any Excellency or Singularity of Virtue; whereas they despise a Man when they have no Opinion of his Honesty, none of his Spirit, and none of his Manhood. Now a Man may be an Object of their Disesteem, but not of their Contempt, at the same Time. For they by no Means condemn Rogues, Slanderers, Cheats, and those who know how to do them an Ill-turn, tho' they have a very bad Opinion of them. Therefore, as I have already said, they despise those who can neither serve themselves, nor their Neighbours; who have no Affiduity, no Industry, and no Concern about them.

Those Men are the Objects of Admiration, who are thought to have a Pre-eminence of Virtue, and to be free from every Disgrace, as well as every Failing, to which others are so liable to yield. For Pleasures, those charming Mistresses of the Soul, warp

THE M. T. CICERO'S OFFICES

warp all its noblest Faculties from Virtue, and most Men, when ready to enter into the Furnace of Affliction, are unmeasurably terrified. The Considerations of Life or Death, Wealth or Want, make the deepest Impressions upon the Generality of Mankind. But when we see a Man of a Soul so great and so elevated, as to despise all those Considerations, a Man in whom the WHOLE MAN is charmed, and impassion'd in the Pursuit of a virtuous, and a noble Object; who, when he sees such a Man, does not admire the Splendor and the Beauty of Virtue?

XI. This Sublimity of Soul, therefore, produces the highest Admiration; and, above all other Considerations, that Honesty, from which worthy Men take their Denomination, astonishes the many. And no Wonder that it does; for no Man can be honest if he is afraid of Death, Pain, Exile or Poverty, or prefers their Contraries to Justice. The Man who is incorruptible by Money excites the Wonder of the Public, and they consider every Man whom they see resist it, as ore purified by the Fire. Justice or Honesty therefore, effects all the three Means of acquiring Glory. The Love of the public, on Account of its being a general Benefit; its Confidence, for the same Reason; and its Admiration, because it neglects and despises those Objects with which the rest of Mankind is so desperately enamour'd.

In my Opinion, however, every Scheme and Purpose of Life requires the Assistance of other People. In the first Place, that you may have some Intimates to whom you can familiarly unbosom yourself, which is hard for one to do, unless

less he has an Appearance of Honesty. For this Reason, were a Man to live ever so lonely, or ever so retired in the Country, People ought to have a good Opinion of his Honesty, for, if they have it not, they will deem him dishonest, and thus he will be left defenceless, and exposed to every Kind of Injury and Insult.

Honesty, in Dealings, is necessary likewise for all who buy or sell, who hire or let out, or who are engaged in any Business whatever. For the Force of Honesty is so great, that without some Grains of it, even they whose Food is Cheating and Villany, could not subsist. For amongst those who thief in Company, if any one of them cheat or rob another, he is immediately turn'd out of the Gang: And should the Head of the Gang himself be partial in dividing the Spoils, the rest would either murder him, or abandon him. So that even Robbers have their Laws, which they obey and observe. This Impartiality in sharing the Booty greatly enriched (s) *Bardyllis* the *Illyrian* Robber, mentioned by *Theopompus*; but (t) *Viriatius* the *Lusitanian*, got a great Deal more by the like Fairness. He was the same who defeated our Armies and our Generals, but at last was humbled and checked by the Prætor *Caius Lælius*, sur-named the Wise, who thereby rendered the Management

(s) *Bardyllis*] He was probably the same *Bardyllis* who was conquered by *Philip* of *Macedon*. As to his being a Robber, that very possibly was only a term given him by *Theopompus*, perhaps for asserting the Liberties of his Country. For we find that *Pyrrhus*, the great King of *Epirus*, married his Daughter of *Bercenna*.

(t) *Viriatius*] This brave Man was once a Huntsman, and was treacherously murder'd by the Order of *Servilius Cæpio*.

of

of the War against him an easy Task to his Successors in Command. If, therefore, the Influence of Justice is so forcible as to strengthen and enlarge the Power of Robbers, how much more prevalent must we suppose it to be when Men live by the Regulations and Laws of well-tempered Government?

XII. If I may speak my own Opinion, it is, that not only the *Medes*, as we are told by *Herodotus*, but our Ancestors, raised to Royalty, Men of the best Principles, for the Benefit of their just Government. For when the helpless People were oppressed by the overgrown in Power or Riches, their Recourse was always to some one Man, who was distinguished by his Virtue: Who not only protected the weakest from Oppression, but pursued an equitable System of Government which knew no Distinction between the highest and lowest. Laws were instituted for the same Reason as Kings were: For all Mankind have always desired to live under Laws that know no Distinction of Persons.

This, and nothing else, is Justice. When Mankind could enjoy it, by the equitable, wise, Administration of one worthy Man, they were satisfied with that; but when that was not the Case, Laws were invented, which spoke in the same Terms, and with the same Tongue, to all Degrees of Men. It is, therefore, undeniable, that the Men who were in the highest Esteem for their Justice, were most commonly chosen into the Seat of Government. But when the same happened likewise to be Men of Wisdom and Understanding, there was
nothing

nothing the People did not think themselves equal to, under such an Administration. Justice, therefore, is, by all Manner of Means, to be revered and practised ; both for its own Sake, (for otherwise it would lose its Property,) and for the Enlargement of our own Dignity and Popularity. But as it is not sufficient for a Man to get Money, unless he knows how to lay it out at Interest, so as to supply him not only with the Necessities, but the Elegancies, of Living ; thus it requires Address, not only to acquire, but to secure Popularity.

It was finely said by *Socrates*, that the shortest and most direct Road to Popularity, is “ for a Man to be the same he wants to appear to be.” People are egregiously mistaken, if they think they ever can attain to permanent Popularity, by Hypocrisy, by meer outside Appearances, and by disguising, not only, their Language, but, their Looks. True Popularity, takes deep Root, and spreads itself wide ; but the false falls away like Blossoms from the Trees ; for nothing that is false can be lasting. I could bring many Instances of both Kinds ; but to cut short, I will confine myself to one Family. While there is a Trace of *Roman* Glory remaining, the Memory of *Tiberius Gracchus*, the Son of *Publius*, will be revered : But his Sons, even in Life, were not approved of by good Patriots, and after Death they are ranked amongst those who, when they were slain, were treated as they deserved.

XIII. Let the Man, therefore, who aspires after true Popularity, perform the Duties of Justice, which I have laid down in the former Book. But

tho' the Force of the Maxim, that *we should be the very Men we wish to appear to be*, carries with it great Conviction, yet must I lay down some Rules for our more readily appearing *to be the Men we really are*. For when Circumstances concur to give a Youth (as they do, if I mistake not, in you *Marcus*) a Figure and a Rank in the World, either thro' his Father's Lustre, or by some other Cause or Accident; the Eyes of all Mankind are turned towards him, and they make it their Business to enquire after his Actions and Morals: and, as if he were set up in the strongest Point of Light, nothing he says, nothing he does, can be hid from the public.

Now they who, while Children or Boys, were of too mean and obscure a Rank to be noticed by the public, when they come to be young Men, ought to raise their Views to higher Objects, and pursue them by the most direct Means: In which they will be the more encouraged to persevere, because the public is so far from checking, that it generally assists, the Pursuits of early Life. Military Merit, then, is the chief Recommendation of young Men to public Favour. Of this we have many Examples amongst our Ancestors, for they were almost always in Arms. As to you, my Son, your Youth fell in with the Time of a Civil War, in which one Party was too criminal, and the other too unsuccessful. But, when in that War, *Pompey* gave you the Command of a Squadron, you acquitted yourself to the Admiration of that great Man, and of all his Army, by your Address in managing a Horse, in darting the Javelin, and in the Performance of all military Duties.

But

But the Honour you thereby acquired, ceased with the Constitution of our Country. My Intention, however, is not to treat of you singly, but to speak in general. Let me, therefore, proceed to what remains.

As in common Occurrences we are more assisted by the Powers of the Mind, than by those of the Body, so the Measures we carry into Execution by Capacity and Reason, are more important than those we effect by bodily Strength. Now, in this Respect, a young Man's most early Recommendation to private Favour, is his Modesty, his Obedience to his Parents, and his Affection for his Relations. People are likewise very ready to be strongly prepossessed in Favour of those, who, after they are somewhat grown up, devote themselves to the Direction of eminent, wise, and virtuous, Patriots. Their frequenting such Company gives Mankind a Notion of their one Day resembling those whom they chuse to imitate.

The Public conceived an early Opinion of *Publius Rutilius*, for his Integrity and Knowledge in the Law, because he frequented the Family of *Publius Mucius*. As to *Lucius Crassus*, (u) when he was but a Stripling, he was indebted to no Man, but acquired the highest Honour from that noble, that popular Prosecution he undertook: And at an Age when even private Exercises recommend the future Speaker (as was the Case with *Demosthe-*

(u) *Crassus*] This is the great Orator our Author so much praises in his Treatise *de Oratore*. The Prosecution here mentioned was against *C. Carbo*, a Man of great Abilities and Distinction, who finding Matters likely to go against him he poisoned himself.

nes) *Crassus*, I say, at that Age, adapted with Success to public Practice in the Forum, those Studies that would have done him Honour had he confined them to private Exercises in his Chamber.

XIV. But, as we use two Methods of speaking; the one proper for Conversation, the other for Debate; the latter, without doubt, is of the greatest Efficacy to make a Man popular; for that is what we properly term Eloquence. Yet, Smoothness and Politeness in Conversation has incredible Power to win the Affections of Mankind. We have Letters from *Philip*, from *Antipates*, and from *Antigonus*, three of the wisest (x) Men we meet with in History, to their Sons *Alexander*, *Cassander*, and *Philip*, recommending to them, to gain the Kindness and Affections of their People by the open Honesty of their Speeches, and to engage their Soldiers by a winning, insinuating, Address. But the more animated Powers of public Eloquence, often seize a whole Assembly. For so much are Men wrapt up in the Admiration of an eloquent and a sensible Speaker, that, when they hear him, they are convinced he has both greater Abilities, and more Wisdom, than the rest of Mankind. But should this Eloquence be graced with a Manner that is majestically modest; nothing can have a more wonderful Effect, especially should all those Properties meet in a young Man.

Various are the Causes that require the Practice of Eloquence; many young Gentlemen in our

(x) *Wise Men.*] The first was Father to *Alexander* the great, the second was Governor of *Macedonia* during *Alexander's* Expedition against *Persia*, and the third was another King of *Macedonia*.

State have excelled in those of the Bar, and the Senate-house: But that of the Bar is the most productive of Glory, as it consists of two Parts, accusing and defending. Of those, the latter is preferable in Point of Honour; yet, the other has often been practised with great Success. Not to repeat the Example of *Crassus*, I just now mentioned, (y) *Marcus Antonius*, when a Youth, did the same. And even (z) *Publius Sulpicius* displayed his Eloquence, as a Prosecutor, when he impeached *Caius Norbanus*, a seditious and worthless Citizen.

But, to say the Truth, we ought not to make a frequent Practice of this; nay, we ought never to do it but for own Country, as in the Cases I have mentioned; or, in Order to be revenged of an Injury (a); as the two *Luculli* did; or in Case of Patronage, such as mine with Regard to the *Sicilians*, or as *Julius* accused *Albucius* for the *Sardi-*

(y) *Marcus Antonius*.] This great Man likewise is mention'd by our Author in his Book *de Oratore*, and his other Pieces, with the highest Encomiums. He was Grandfather to *Antony* the Triumvir, and the Power of his Eloquence is said to have been so great, that the Soldiers who were sent by *Marius* and *Cinna* to murder him, for some Time suspended their bloody Purpose, before they put him to death.

(z) *Publius Sulpicius*] He is another of the Interlocutors in our Author's Book *de Oratore*.

(a) *Revenged of an Injury*] Those Words were, by the first scrupulous Transcribers of this Work, omitted, as clashing with the Doctrines of Christianity. They were restored by *Langius*, and are undoubtedly Part of the Text, for the Prosecution carried on by the *Luculli*, was against the *Angur Servilius*, to be revenged on him for prosecuting their Father. Doctor *Cockman*, neither in his *Latin* Edition nor his Translation, takes any Notice of this Omission, which had crept into almost all the old printed Copies, therefore we may suppose that the Words omitted by them stand in all the MSS he consulted.

ans. The Abilities of (b) *Lucius Fufius* were displayed in the Impeachment of *Marius Aquilius*. Once, therefore, is sufficient; at least, I would not advise it very often. But, if a Man should be under a Necessity of doing it oftner, it ought to be for the Sake of his Country, for it is, by no Means, reproachful to carry on repeated Prosecutions against her Enemies. But still, I say, there ought to be a Mean in all Things. He who wantonly endangers the Lives of others, has the Nature of a Flint rather than a Man. Let me add, that the Epithet of a common Impeacher is both dangerous to your Person, and disgraceful to your Character, as happened in the Case of *Marcus (c) Brutus*, a Man of the highest Quality, and Son to the eminent Civilian of that Name.

We are, therefore, to lay it down, as an invariable Maxim of our Duty, never to endanger Innocence by a capital Impeachment, as it is an Action that must be attended with the most heinous Guilt. For can any Thing be so wicked as to prostitute, to the Persecution and the Ruin of Mankind, that Eloquence which Nature has given us, for their Safety and Preservation. We are not, however, on the other Hand, to be so scrupulous as not to speak for an Offender, if he is not notoriously profligate and wicked. The People expect this, Practice justifies it, and Good-Nature suffers it. The Duty of a Judge, in all Tryals, is to follow Truth; that of a Pleader, to follow what is most like Truth, even tho' it should not be strictly so.

(b) *Lucius Fufius*] He accused *Aquilius* of Corruption.

(c) *Brutus*] see *de Oratore*.

I should

I should not, as I am now treating of a philosophical Subject, have ventured to advance this, had I not been warranted by the Authority of *Panætius*, the strictest of all the *Stoics*. But the Defence of the impeached, makes the Pleader appear to the Public 'in the fairest and most favourable Point of Light, especially if the Client he serves, is in Danger of being trepann'd, and of sinking under the Weight of some great Man's Power. I have often undertaken those Kind of Pleadings, and, even, when young, I defended in an Oration, which you know is still extant, (e) *Sextius Roscius* of *Amerinum*, against all the Interest of *Sylla*, in the Plenitude of his Power.

XV. Having thus explained those Duties of young Men, which are conducive to their acquiring Popularity, I am now to speak of Beneficence or Generosity. This is of two Kinds; For we serve the Indigent, either by our Labour, or by our Money; the latter Method is most ready, especially to a rich Man; but the former is more dignified, is more glorious, and more worthy a Man of Courage and Eminence. For though there is, in both, a noble Disposition of doing Good, yet the Means of the one is supplied from our Coffers; those of the others from our Virtues; and the Generosity, that flows at the Expence of a private Fortune, soon dries up its own Fountain. Thus, Liberality is undone by Liberality, and the more extensive it has been formerly, the more contracted it must be in Time to come.

But as to those who expend their Labour, that is, their

(e) *Sextus Roscius*] He was accus'd of murdering his Father. See the Translation of the Orations, VOL. III.

Virtue, and their Industry, in Acts of Beneficence and Generosity; In the first Place, every Man they serve is a new Accession of Assistance to enable them to serve others. In the next Place, the Practice of doing good, renders them more ready, and what we may call more dextrous, to diffuse, through many, the Acts of their Beneficence. It is a fine Check that *Philip* gives to his Son *Alexander*, in a Letter he wrote, reproving him for endeavouring to win the Good-Will of his Subjects by Money, "A Plague (says he) upon that Method and those Hopes, as if Corruption and Bribery could give Subjects, Principles of Loyalty. Do you mean that the *Macedonians* should consider you not as their King, but their Servant, and Purse-bearer." Servant and Purse-bearer! Very proper Epithets truly, because they are disgraceful in a King; and it is with still greater Propriety, that he terms his Son's Bounty, Bribery. For a Man when corrupted becomes more debauched in his Morals than before, and more sanguine in his Expectations of having his Bribe repeated.

Philip, it is true, addresses himself to his Son particularly; but his Words are applicable to all Men. There can, therefore, be no room to doubt, that the Beneficence, which consists in employing our Talents and Industry, in the Service of others, is more honourable, more extensive, and of more general Utility, than the other. There is sometimes, however, a Necessity for expending Money, nor is there any absolute Rule against Bounties of that Kind. We may often have Occasion to assist proper and needy Objects out of our private Fortune; but in this we ought to be cautious and

and careful; for many there are who have wasted their Estates by their inconsiderate Bounty. Now, can any Thing be more stupid than to act so, as if you wanted to put a speedy Period to the Means of your doing what gives you so much Pleasure. Let me add, that Rapaciousness is the Consequence of Profusion; for when Men come to be in Want through their Squandering, they are obliged to put forth their Hand against the Property of others. Thus, when to acquire Popularity, they perform Acts of Bounty, the Hatred of those whom they plunder, weighs down the Interest they gain by those upon whom they squander. Your Purse, therefore, is not to be shut against every Call of Beneficence, nor is it to be so open, that every Man may thrust in his Hand. Moderation is best, and that, in a great Measure, is to be directed by your Abilities. In short, we ought always to keep a homely common Proverb in Remembrance, "that Bounty has no Bottom," for where can there be any Bounds to it, when they who are used to receive, expect to have it repeated, and others, from their Examples, have the same Expectations.

XVI. The bountiful may be divided into two Classes; the Spend-thrifts, and the Generous. The Spend-thrifts are they who squander their Money upon Entertainments, Doles of Meat, Shews of Gladiators, the Exhibition of Plays, or Huntings, Things that leave behind them a very short Remembrance, or none at all.

The generous are they, who, out of their own private Fortune, ransom Captives out of the Power of Robbers or Pyrates, who stand engag'd

gag'd for the Debts of their Friends, who assist them in providing for their Daughters, and contribute either to their acquiring or improving a Fortune. I am, therefore, surprized, that in the Book which (e) *Theophrastus* wrote concerning Riches, which contains so many excellent Things, he should reason so absurdly on this Point. For he is very diffuse in his Praises of the Magnificence and Pomp of popular Exhibitions. And he tells us, that the Ability of making such Entertainments, is answering the Ends of Riches. But, in my Judgment, those Acts of Generosity, a few of which I have mentioned, are far preferable, and more permanent. *Aristotle*, upon wiser and weightier Principles, reprimands us for not looking upon those Expences, that are intended to put the People into good Humour, as something monstrous. "If People in a besieged Place, (says he) should, for a little Water give a great Deal of Money, we would, at first, be apt to disbelieve the Fact; but, our Incredulity ceases, when we reflect upon the Necessities attending their Situation; yet we are not a Bit surpriz'd at the mad Extravagance, and boundless Expence we see daily; tho' it is laid out neither to relieve another Man's Want, or to advance our own Interests. Besides, the very Amusement, that it gives the many, is but of a short, inconsiderable Duration, and is calculated for very Chaff of the People, who lose in Society even the Memory of the Pleasure."

He adds very properly, "That such Exhibitions are pleasing only to Boys, loose Women,

(e) *Theophrastus*] He was a famous *Greek* Writer. The Book here mentioned is lost.

Slaves,

Slaves, and Freemen, who know no better than Slaves. But that when a Man of Sense comes to consider coolly on such Matters, he must condemn them." Mean time I am sensible, that in our Government, immemorially, and in the best of Times, the best of Men have been called upon for magnificent *Ædileships*. Therefore, *Publius Crassus*, who very properly was surnam'd *The Rich*, expended vast Sums in the Exhibitions of his *Edileship*. And soon after, *Lucius Crassus*, who was Collegue with *Quintus Mucius*, the least Showy of all Mankind, went through a most magnificent *Ædileship*. Then came *Caius Claudius*, the Son of *Appius*; then the *Luculli*, *Hortensius*, *Silanus*, and many others; but all of them were out-done by *Publius Lentulus*, who was *Ædile* in my Consulship: and he was imitated by *Scaurus*. The Entertainments of my Friend *Pompey*, however, in his second Consulship, were the most magnificent of all (*f*). You already have my Opinion of all those Matters. Mean while, all Suspicion of Avarice is to be avoided.

XVII. *Mamercus*, a Man of immense Riches, was put by the Consulship, because he declin'd the *Ædileship*. A Man, therefore, must be at those Expences, if he is call'd upon by the People, and if Men of Character, without joyning in the Cry,

(*f*) It is surprizing with what Profusion, the Magistrates, mention'd in this Place by our Author, entertain'd the People during their *Edileships*. They brought from all Parts of the World the finest Paintings and Sculptures, with which they adorn'd the Forum and other public Places, during their Year. Every succeeding *Ædile*, rack'd his Invention, for some Refinement upon the Elegance or Magnificence of his Predecessor; and the immense Expences it put them to, is reckon'd amongst the Causes of the Loss of the *Roman Liberty*.

do

do nothing to discourage it; but he still must proportion them to his Abilities, as I did when in a public Situation. Nay, if a Man can pursue to advantage some important, beneficial Measure by entertaining the People, 'tis allowable. (g) *Orestes*, for Instance, got great Credit by giving a public Entertainment in the Streets, on pretence of paying the Tithes of his Gains. Neither are we to blame *Marcus Seius*, who in a Time of public Scarcity, lower'd, at his own Expence, the Price of Corn to the People: For, by an Expence that was neither disgraceful, nor, considering that he was *Ædile*, extravagant, he got rid of a strong and deep rooted Prepossession of the Public to his Prejudice. But of all others, my Friend (b) *Milo*, lately acquir'd the greatest Glory, by employing the Gladiators he had bought, in the Service of his Country, whose Well-fare was center'd in the Safety of my single Person, by checking the Attempts and the Fury of *Publius Clodius*. The Occasions of public Expence, therefore, are to be prescrib'd, either by Necessity or Utility.

But even in those Cases, it is best to observe a Mean. It is true, that *Lucius Philippus*, the Son of *Quintus*, a Man of the greatest Abilities and Eminence, used to make a Merit of his having arriv'd to the highest Dignities of the State, without making any Present to the Public. *Cotta* and *Curio* said the same. I, too am entitled to some

(g) *Orestes*] He was Consul in the Year of Rome 682. It was common for the great Men of Rome, upon their undertaking any Expedition to vow the Tithes of all they should gain, to *Hercules*, or some other God.

(b) *Milo*] See the Translation of the Orations, Vol. 1.

Praise

Praise of the same Nature. For considering that I was exalted to the highest Dignity of the State, and that too by the Suffrages of all my Constituents, in the first Year I was qualified to stand; (a Circumstance that happen'd to none of those I have just now nam'd,) the Expence of my *Ædileship* was very inconsiderable.

Those Expences, however, are more justifiable, that are laid out upon Fortifications, Docks, Harbours, Aquaducts, and all those Things that are serviceable to the Public. The People, it is true, are better pleased with what is, as it were, paid them in Hand; but those Works will be more agreeable to Posterity. I shall, on Account of *Pompey's* Memory, be tender in blaming the Erection of Theatres, Porticoes and new Temples. It is sufficient to say, they are not approv'd of by the most learned Authors, by *Panætius*, for Instance, to whose Sentiments, but without translating his Words, I have been greatly beholden in this Work. *Phalereus Demetrius* too, reproaches (i) *Pericles* the most leading Man in Greece, for throwing away so much Money in that magnificent Portico he built for the Temple of *Pallas*. But I have been very full and particular upon every Branch of this Subject in my (k) *Treatise*.

(i) *Pericles*] This great Man laid out an incredible Sum of Money upon erecting a Portico to the *Acropolis*, a Kind of an old Building at *Athens* sacred to *Pallas*.

(k) *My Treatise upon Government*] This Work is lost, all but a few Fragments, to the great Detriment of Learning.

Notwithstanding the great Regard, I have for my Author's good Intention in this Work, and the Applause it has in all Ages met with; yet it is impossible for a Man of any Discernment, who is ever so little acquainted with the *Roman* History,

not

tise upon Government. To conclude, the whole System of this Kind of Bounty, is in its own Nature blameful; through Conjunctures it may be necessary; and, even then, it ought to be proportion'd to our Abilities, and directed by Discretion.

XVIII. With Regard to the other Species of the bountiful, I propos'd to treat of, I mean Generosity, it ought to operate in different Manners according to Circumstances.

The Circumstances of a Man overwhelm'd with Misfortunes, are very different from those of a Man, who, without meeting with any Misfortune, seeks to better his own Condition. The unfortunate, I mean those who undeservedly are so, have the foremost claim to our Generosity. Not that we are by any Manner of Means to bind ourselves up from assisting those who claim our Help, not to relieve them in Calamity, but to further them in Prosperity. But in this Case, we ought to be very exact and careful in the Choice of proper Objects. For *Ennius* observes very rightly, that

“Bounty, when misapply'd, becomes a Nuisance.”

Now, whatever is bestow'd upon a Man of Merit and Gratitude, is repaid both by the Consciousness of doing a virtuous Action, and by the other Circumstances attending it. For well judg-

not to see that he has propos'd his own Conduct as the great Model of the moral Duties, and that he has artfully thrown a Veil over it where it was blameable. He here obliquely reproaches *Pompey* and other great Men for adorning the City with Works, that, to this Day, do Honour to their Country, because he erected no such public Buildings, tho' he was immensely lavish, even to the hurting his Fortune, upon the Houses he built on his own private Estate.

ing

ing Generosity is extremely captivating, and it is the more generally applauded, because the Charity of any one great Man is a general Refuge. We are, therefore, to take Care to extend to as many Objects, as possible, our good Works, that the Memory of them, descending to their Children and Posterity, may over-awe them from being ungrateful. For the ungrateful are detested by all Mankind; who think that every Discouragement to Liberality, is of Prejudice to themselves; and that the ungrateful Man, is, therefore, the Enemy of the needy. Now there is a Charity, that is serviceable to the Public, that of ransoming Captives, and enriching the Poor; which was commonly practised by those of our Order, as we see more at large, by a written Oration of *Crassus*. I therefore think this Practice of Generosity, to be far preferable, to the Distribution of *Largesses* to the People. It is the Result of Wisdom joyned to Ability; whereas the other, belongs to the Fawners upon popular Favour; to the tickling Pleasure-mongers of a giddy Rabble.

Now, as it becomes a Man to be free in bestowing, he ought for the same Reason, not to be too rigorous in demanding; and in all his Contracts, Sales, Bargains, Engagements, and Loans, to consult the Ease and Conveniency of his Neighbours: giving up many Things he might, in Strictness, insist upon; and, as far as is consistent with his Interest, nay, were it my Case, farther too, avoid Law-Suits: For it is sometimes, not only generous, but profitable, for a Man to give up a little of his Right. We ought, however, to have Regard to our private Estate, for none but

a Pro-

a Profligate will suffer that to slip from him: but, even in this Case, there should not be the smallest Appearance of Sordidity or Avarice. For the great Art of enjoying Money, is to be liberal in the Eyes of all the World, and yet not hurt ones private Estate. *Theophrastus* very properly commends Hospitality likewise. For, in my Opinion, at least, there is somewhat very becoming in illustrious Men having their Houses open to illustrious Guests; and it is one of the Glories of our State that Strangers in *Rome* are never at a Loss for Instances of this Generosity. It is likewise of vast Advantage for those who seek to rise upon virtuous Principles, to have by Means of their Guests, a great Character amongst Foreigners for Riches and Power. We are told by *Theophrastus*, that *Cymon*, even when he lived at *Athens*, was hospitable to his own Tribe of the (1) *Laciadae*; for he laid it down as a Rule to furnish them with every Thing; and he gave the same Orders to his Stewards, if any of that Tribe came to his Country House.

XIX. The Benefits, however, that we confer not by our Purse but our Talents, redound to the Profit of the whole State as well as to that of the particular Persons obliged. For, to give an Opinion in a Law Case, to assist by our Advice, and to be serviceable in this Way to as many as possible, is wonderfully effectual towards encreasing a Man's Power and Interest. Therefore, among the many other excellent Constitutions of our

(1) *Laciadae*, The Inhabitants of *Attica*, were divided into one Hundred and Seventy four Tribes, and *Cimon* the famous *Athenian* General, who beat the Enemy by Land and Sea, in one Day was of the Tribe of *Laciadae*.

Ancestors, the Knowledge and the Interpretation of the civil Law, which is so well calculated to defend the Rights of Mankind, was always amongst them in the highest Reputation; nay, before we fell into those Times of public Confusion, the greatest Men of our Government have ever appropriated the Study of it to themselves. But now the Glory of that Science is extinct, together with all Honour and Distinctions among *Romans*, and what makes this the more deplorable is, that it happen'd at a Time when a Man (*m*) was alive who in Dignity, equalling all who had gone before him, was, in this Study, by far their Superior. This therefore is an Accomplishment that gives Relief to many and is calculated for attaching Mankind to our Interest, by the Service it does them.

Nearly allied to this, is another more weighty, more agreeable, and more ornamented Art; I mean that of speaking well. For what is more excellent than Eloquence, with Regard to the Admiration it creates in the Hearers, the Hope it raises in the distressed, or the Interest it begets in those for whom it is employed. It was, therefore, for this Reason, that our Ancestors assigned to Eloquence the most distinguished Place amongst all the civil Accomplishments. Extensive therefore, are the Benefits, which the eloquent Man confers, and the Dependencies which he creates, who readily toils, who earnestly labours, in the Service of many, and, like our Ancestors, all without Fee or Reward.

(*m*). A Man] Meaning *Servius Sulpicius* the famous Civilian.

K

This

This Subject gives me a fair Opportunity of bewailing the present Cessation, not to say the Extinction, of Eloquence; but I am afraid my Complaints will seem too much to regard myself. Let me, however, observe, that amongst our surviving Orators, few promise much, fewer perform well, yet many undertake boldly. But tho' of all Mankind, not very many can excel in the Knowledge of the Law, or the Practice of speaking; they may, however, by their Application serve a great many People, by soliciting Favours for their Clients, by recommending them to Judges or Magistrates, by taking care of their Interest, and by soliciting the Assistance of skilful Lawyers, or able Speakers. Whoever pursues a Practice like this, must acquire great Interest, and the Effects of their Industry will be very diffusive.

I scarcely need to put such upon their Guard in a Matter that is obvious, that they take great Heed while they are serving some, that they do not disoblige others. Oftimes, however, they are unjust, or imprudent, in their Provocations; if this is done unwillingly, it betrays Negligence; if knowingly, Presumption. Wherever you offend against your Intention, you are to make the best Apology you can, and to shew the Party that what you did was through Necessity, or Inability to act otherwise; and if any Injury is done, you are to make amends for it by subsequent Acts of Justice and Duty.

XX. But, as in assisting Mankind, we are generally directed by either the Morals or the Situation of the Party, it is a common Saying, that drops out upon all those Occasions, "that in conferring Favours we regard not the Fortune, but the Merits

rits of a Man". The Saying I own contains a fine Sentiment. But after all, shew me him who does not chuse, by his Services, to oblige the Man of great Estate and Power, rather than the Man who, with no Riches, has great Merit. For wherever we think our Services can meet with the surest and the quickest Return, we are always there most ready to oblige. But we ought more carefully to examine the Nature of Things: For though the poor Man may not have the Means, yet he may, if he is an honest Man, have Inclination, to be grateful. It was, therefore, shrewdly said, say it who will; "Money that is owing is not paid; and "Money that is paid is not owing; but the Man "who pays Gratitude possesses it, and the Man "who possesses it, pays it."

Besides, when Men imagine themselves to be rich, honoured and happy, they are unwilling to be put under Obligations by Services. Nay, they think you are indebted to them by their deigning to be indebted to you, even for a considerable Service. They are likewise jealous that you expect, or are to ask them, somewhat in Return: But it is Death to them to be obliged to a Patron, or to be called Clients; while the poor Man who receives a Favour, in which he knows that his Poverty was the sole Motive for conferring it, strives to oblige not only those who have served him, but those (for many such he wants) who he expects are to serve him in Time to come. And if he chances to discharge any Part of the Obligation he is so far from magnifying it by any Expression, that he strives to lessen the Value of the Return he makes you. There is another Thing to be considered,

that, if you defend, in a Court of Justice, a Man of Fortune and great Rank, all the Acknowledgment you are to expect is confined to his single Person, or his Children. But if you defend a poor, yet worthy and modest, Man, all the lower People, who are not quite profligate, (of whom there are great Numbers) will consider you as being their ready Refuge. I therefore, conclude, that an Obligation is better bestowed upon an honest, than upon a happy, Man.

We ought, it is true, to endeavour to serve all. But should two Sorts come into Competition, we are to follow the Example of *Themistocles*, when one asked him, whether he chose to give his Daughter in Marriage, to a Man who had little Wealth but great Merit; or a Man who had great Wealth and little Merit? For my Part, said he, "I prefer the Man without the Money, to the Money without the Man;" but our Morals are corrupted and debauched, by the Court we pay to Riches. And yet, what Concern can we have in this, or that, or a third Man's having an overgrown Estate? It is very well, (and that is not always the Case) that it is of Service to the Owner. But granting it is, it may make him a more considerable, but it cannot make him a more honest Man. But supposing one to be a Man both of Fortune and Merit; I am far from thinking that his Riches should be a Hindrance to his being served, I only would not have them to be the chief Inducement; for we are not to examine into a Man's Riches, but into his Morals. The last Rule I am to give, concerning serving others, is

is, that we take care that we contend for nothing that is inconsistent with Justice, nothing that injures another Party. For Justice is the Basis of lasting Fame and Reputation, and without it nothing can be glorious.

XXI. Having treated of those Services, that regard Particulars; I am now to explain those that relate to the Generality of Mankind, and to our Country. Of these, some Regard the Community, others (and those are the most agreeable) the Individuals composing that Community. Could we reconcile the Interests of both, it would be so much the better; but let us at least serve the Individuals; yet in a Manner they may be profitable, or, at least, not detrimental, to the Public. The large Distribution of Corn made by *Caius Gracchus* exhausted the Treasury; but the moderate one of *Marcus (n) Octavius* relieved the People, without being burthensome to the State. It was, therefore, salutary both to Individuals and to the Community.

Now it ought to be a preferable Consideration with him who has a Direction in the State, that every Man's Right be secure, and that no public Act encroach upon private Property. For the *Agrarian (o)* Law, that *Philippus* when Tribune brought in, was a destructive Measure; he easily suffered it, however, to be over-rul'd, and thereby

(n) *Marcus Octavius*] He was joint Tribune of the People with *Tiberius Gracchus*, and by him deprived of that Office for opposing his Schemes.

(o) *Agrarian Laws*] Those Laws for a Distribution of Lands created great Disturbances at *Rome*, between Men who had Property and those who had none.

discovered the greatest Moderation. But amongst many popular Actions, he had one wicked Speech; *That there were not in Rome two thousand Men who had Property.* This remarkable Speech pointed directly to a levelling Principle, the greatest Curse that can befall a Government. For the securing every Man's Property to himself is a chief Reason why Governments and States were formed. Nature it is true, directed Mankind to associate together, but it was in Order to secure their separate Properties, that they sheltered themselves in Cities.

Care should likewise be taken to avoid burthening the People with Taxes, as they often were in the Days of our Ancestors, when the public Treasure was low, or when Wars were incessant. And to effect this, requires great Foresight. But should any Government be under a Necessity of this Kind, for I chuse not, to forebode any Misfortune to my own Country, nor do I speak of our own State but of Government in general, Care should be taken to make the public sensible, that the Measure is indispensibly necessary for their Safety. All, therefore, who have the Direction of Government ought to provide Plenty of every Thing that is necessary for the public Service. In what Manner or Quantity, those Things are to be provided, I need not to point out; for all that is obvious; I only have thought proper to mention the Head.

Now in the Management of all public Business, one main Consideration is to remove from oneself even the slightest Suspicion of Avarice. "I wish said *Caius Pontius* the General of the *Samnites*, that
Fate

Fate had reserved me to be born at the Time when the *Romans* shall begin to take Bribes, I should then have rendered their Empire of no long Duration." He must, however, have waited for many (p) Generations; for that Evil is but of late Date in our Country. I am, therefore, very well pleased, that *Pontius*, as he was so vigorous a Person, did not live in our Days. It is not an hundred and ten Years since *Lucius Piso*, carried thro' the Law against Corruption; there being no such Law before. But many such Laws, and each more severe than the other, have been made since that Time. So many have been impeached, so many condemned, such a War was raised in *Italy* thro' the Fear of the Laws, and so much, in Disregard to all Laws and all Forms of Justice, have we stript and plundered our Allies, that we subsist thro' the Weakness of others, and not by our own Virtue.

XXII. *Panatius* praises *Africanus* for being incorruptible; and well did he deserve the Encomiums he gives him. But he had greater Good Qualities; for Integrity was not only a Merit of his, but of the Times. *Paulus* was Master of all the immense Treasures of *Macedonia*; which brought such Riches into the public Treasury, that the Booty made by that one Commander, put an End to Imposts. And yet he brought into his Family nothing but the eternal Glory of his Name. *Africanus* imitated his Father, and was not a Far-

(p) Many Generations] The *Pontius* here spoken of was General of the *Samnites* when the *Romans* underwent the famous Disgrace of the *Furæ Caudinæ*. I have translated the Word *Sæcula*, Generations; for only 260 Years fell between the Time of *Pontius* and our Author's Consulship,

thing the richer for having destroy'd *Carthage*, But why multiply Instances? Was *Lucius Mummius*; who was his Colleague in the Censorship, the Richer for having raz'd to the Foundation the (g) richest of all Cities. He chose to adorn *Italy*, rather than his own House; and, in my Opinion his House was adorn'd by the Ornaments of *Italy*.

To return from this Digression; no Vice is more detestable than Avarice, especially in those who sit at the Helm of Government. For it is not only base, but wicked and execrable, for a Man to make a Job of public Property. The Oracle, therefore, that was utter'd by the *Pythian Apollo*, that, *Sparta would be destroy'd only by her Avarice*, was applicable not only to the *Spartans*, but to all wealthy States. Whereas, the Heads of a Government can recommend themselves to the People by no more effectual Means, than by Integrity and Uprightness.

As to the Hunters after popular Applause, who either attempt levelling Measures, by turning lawful Proprietors out of their Possessions, or by pushing on Acts of Insolvency in Favour of Debtors; such Men weaken the very Fundamentals of Government. They destroy, in the first Place, all Unanimity, by forgiving to some, what they take from others; and in the next Place, all Equity, by not suffering every Man to have his own. For, as I said before, the great Advantage arising to Men from their living in a Community or City, is by every Man enjoying his own Property freely and securely.

(g) Richest of all Cities] Meaning *Corinth*.

Nay,

Nay, the Patrons of public Corruption, that Bane of Government, are far from gaining so great an Interest by it as they imagine. The Man who is deprived of his Property becomes an Enemy. He to whom it is given, pretends that he did not desire to have it; and (especially in the Case of an insolvent Act) he dissembles his Joy, lest it should appear, that he must, without it, have been a Bankrupt. As to the Man who receives the Wrong, he not only remembers it, but carries the Pain it gives him always about him. Nay, granting that the Number of those who suffer unjustly is not so great as that of those who are befriended dishonestly by such Measures, the latter are not therefore the stronger; for we are to judge, of both not by their Numbers but their Weight. Now where is the Equity, that an Estate, which for many Years, nay Ages, has been in one Man's Family, should go to a Man who has none; and that the Man who had it, should lose it?

XXIII. It was for Injustice of this Nature that the (r) *Lacedæmonians* expelled *Lyfander* their *Ephorus*: And put to death *Agis* their King, a Thing that never before had happened in that State: And the Disorders that immediately succeeded upon that Period were so great, as to give rise to Tyrants and Destruction to their Nobility, till that Constitution, that was so excellently well modelled, was ruined. Nor was it ruined alone, for the Mis-

(r) *Lacedæmonians*] Their *Ephori* were Officers of Government, who were a Kind of Check upon their Kings. The *Agis* here mentioned was murdered for endeavouring to revive some obsolete Laws of *Lycurgus*, that tended to levelling Property in the State. See his Life by *Plutarch*.

chiefs

chief diffused itself more widely and the Contagion that broke out in *Lacedæmon* destroyed the Rest of *Greece*. But what am I saying; did not our Country Men the *Gracchi*, Sons of the excellent *T. Gracchus*, and the Grandsons of *Africanus*, perish in the same levelling Controversies?

(5) *Aratus* the *Sicyonian* has a just Title to Glory; who, when his Country, for fifty Years, had been possessed by Tyrants, came from *Argos* to *Sicyon*, which City he made himself Master of, by entering it in the night Time, after surprizing and killing the Tyrant *Nicocles*. He recalled from Exile six hundred Men of the greatest Property in all the State; and by this Adventure, he delivered his Countrymen from Slavery. But observing insurmountable Difficulties with Regard to Properties and Possessions, he thought it highly unjust, that those he had restored should be in Want, when others had their Estates; nor did he think it quite fair to displace the present Proprietors, after fifty Years Possession; because, during that Time, a great Deal of Property must have passed from Hand to Hand, without any Fraud, by Heritages, by Purchases, and by Dowries. Upon the whole, he thought it imprudent to dispossess the one, and iniquitous, not to satisfy the others, whose Properties had been usurped.

Seeing that the Matter could only be made up by Money, he declared, that he intended to go

(5) *Aratus*] His Life is likewise written by *Plutarch*, and tho' his Conduct in the Instance mentioned by our Author was truly wise and virtuous, yet I own I should have been glad our Author would have told us how *Aratus* ought to have behaved, had he not had the Purse of his good Friend *Ptolemy* to serve him at this Pinch.

to *Alexandria*, and ordered every Thing to stand just as it was, till his Return. He then posted away to his Guest *Ptolemy*, the second King who reigned at *Alexandria*, after it was built, and imparted to him his Intention of delivering his Country, and the Scheme he was pursuing: Upon which, that wealthy King, readily gave this great Patriot so large a Sum as answered his Purpose. Returning with this Money to *Sicyon*, he appointed fifteen Commissioners with himself, to try all Matters of Property between those who possessed the Estates of others, and those who had lost their own, and by the Means of an Inquest into the Value of the Estates, he persuaded some to quit Possession in Consideration of Money, while others, by his Persuasion, thought it more convenient to take ready Money, than to re-enter into Possession of their own. By this Management, he preserved Unanimity in the State, and all Parties went away satisfied.

What a glorious Patriot was this! A Patriot whose Birth would have done Credit even to the *Roman Republic*; his Management was an equitable President for treating with Fellow-Citizens, instead of proclaiming a Sale in the Forum (as has twice been the Case in my Time) and selling the Properties of Citizens by the Voice of a public Crier. But that illustrious *Greek*, like a wise and virtuous Patriot as he was, consulted the Good of the whole; for the highest Character, the truest Wisdom of a Patriot is to preserve the Properties of his Fellow-Citizens, and to bind all within one undistinguishing Rule of Equity. There is a Fellow who lives Rent-free upon my Estate. The Reason?

Reason? Am I to buy, build, inspect, and expend, while you, in Spite of me, enjoy all the Benefit? Is not this the Case, when this Man is deprived of a Property, that is his, and that Man is presented with an Estate that is anothers? For what Meaning is there in an Act of Insolvency, but that you may buy an Estate with my Money. You are to have the Estate, and I am to lose my Money.

XXIV. Such a Plan of Government, therefore, ought to be laid down, as that no private Debts should be prejudicial to the State. Many are the Ways of effecting this, and should there be already any Excesses of that Kind, the rich are not to lose their own, nor are the Debtors to engross another's Property. Of all the Barriers of Government, the strongest is Public Credit, which must be destroyed, unless the Payment of Debts is made one of its indispensable Rules. Never was a more violent Struggle for a general Act of Insolvency, than what happened when I was Consul. The Measure was pursued by Armies and Encampments of Men, of all Ranks and Orders, but so vigorous was my Resistance, that this detestable Principle was abolished out of the Constitution. Never was there so much Money owing, and never was it more faithfully or more readily paid: For when all the Means of cheating were taken away, the Necessity of paying followed. But our late (t) Master, who

(t) *Late Master*] Meaning *Julius Cæsar*, Orig. *nunc Victor, tum quidem victus*. In this and many other Passages of this Work relating to that great Man, I think our Author does no great Honour either to his own Gratitude or Judgment or Stead-

who was mastered, at that Time, wantonly carried into Execution his Projects, when he was under no Necessity of doing it, for such was his Propensity to Wickedness, that he was wicked for the Sake of Wickedness.

True Patriots, therefore, while they are at the Head of Government, will detest all that Kind of Bounty which robs one, to enrich another; and their chief Care will be, that the Law and the Courts of Justice preserve every Man in quiet Possession of his own Property; that thus the meaner Sort, may, thro' Weakness, suffer no Injustice, nor the Richer be prejudiced, by public Clamour, either in asserting or recovering what is their own. In other Respects, let them employ all Measures they can, either in War or Peace, to enlarge the Empire, the Possessions and the Revenues of their Country. Such are the Duties of great Men; such were the Duties practised by our Ancestors. Those are the Duties which will bring public Favour and Popularity to the Persons, and Peace, and Prosperity to the County, of all who practise them.

But with Regard to Rules of Utility (*u*) *Antipater* of *Tyre*, a Stoic who lately died at *Athens*, thinks that *Panætius* has omitted two, the Care of our Person, and of our Purse: I think that great Philosopher omitted them, because they were easy

Steadiness. The very Reflection thrown out here is not only rancorous and indecent, but unjust and wicked, nay cowardly,

(*u*) *Antipater* of *Tyre*] *Antipater* was the Name of several Stoic Philosophers; he, mentioned here, was the Friend, Companion and Tutor, of *Cato* of *Utica*.

and

and obvious ; but useful they certainly are. Now, Health is preserved by our knowing the Constitutions of our own Bodies, and by observing what Things are prejudicial, or serviceable to our Health, by our being temperate in Food and Raiment, so as that they may preserve our Persons ; by our avoiding Pleasures ; and lastly, by the Skill of those who possess the Art of Medicine.

As to our private Estate, it ought to be acquired by Means that have nothing dishonest in them, it ought to be preserved by Industry and OEconomy, and enlarged by the same Virtues. *Xenophon*, the Disciple of *Socrates*, has treated those Matters with great Propriety in his Book called and entitled *OEconomics*, which, when I was about the Age you are now, I translated from *Greek* into *Latin* (x).

XXV. But the Comparison of Things useful, as that is the fourth Head which has been omitted by *Panetius*, is often necessary. For bodily used to be compared with external Advantages ; and external, with bodily Advantages amongst themselves, and the same with Regard to external Advantages. External Advantages are compared with bodily, in this Manner : You prefer good Health to much Riches. Bodily are compared with external Advantages, thus, it is better to possess Riches than the most vigorous Constitution of the Body. Our bodily Advantages are thus compared with one another ; good Health is preferable to Pleasure, and Strength to Swift-ness. Externals thus ; Glory is preferable to Riches, and an Estate in Town to one in the Country.

A Saying of the Elder *Cato* falls under this Head

(x) The Translation here mention'd is lost.

of Comparison. Being asked, what is the first Method for improving a private Estate; his Answer was, *by feeding Cattle very well.* What is the second? *By feeding them pretty well.* What the third? *By feeding them, tho' but poorly.* What the fourth? *To labour the Ground.* Being asked what he thought of a Man, who took Usury for his Money? his Answer was, *What do you think of a Man, who murders another?* From this, and many other Instances, it is plain that Comparisons of Advantages are usually made, and that I was in the right to add this as the fourth Head for finding out our Duty.

But the whole of this Subject, and whatever relates to gaining, laying out, or lending Money, is much more accurately discuss'd by certain Men of Worth who ply near the (y) Exchange, than it can be in all the Schools of the Philosophers on Earth. It is proper, however, we be acquainted with those Matters for they relate to Utility which is the Subject of this Book. Now to proceed.

(y) *Exchanges* Orig. *Ad Medios Janum sedentibus.* The *Medios Janus* answers to our Exchange, and was a Place of Rome resorted to by all Brokers and monied Men, for laying their Money out to Advantage.





M. T. C I C E R O

H I S

O F F I C E S

U P O N

The MORAL DUTIES of MANKIND.

BOOK III. CHAP. I.

MARCUS, *my Son,*



THE Elder *Cato*, who was almost of the same Age with *Publius Scipio*, the first who was furnam'd *Africanus*, has told us, that that great Man, was wont to say, he (*a*) never was less idle than when he had nothing to do; and that he never was less alone when he was by himself. This was a truly noble Saying, and worthy a great, and a wise Man;

as

(*a*) *Never less idle*] *Nunquam se minus otiosum esse quam otiosum, nec minus solus quam cum solus esset. Paterculus, perhaps of all*

as it intimated, that even, when he had nothing to do, he thought of Business, and, when alone, he conversed with himself: So that, in Fact, he never was idle, and he did not even want the Company of any other Person to keep him from Loneliness. Leisure, therefore, and Loneliness, which generally make other Men listless, made him all alive. I wish, I had reason for saying the same Thing of myself. But if I cannot by Imitation attain to that Excellency of Spirit; yet to endeavour it, is certainly in my Power. For I am enjoying my Leisure, being debarr'd by execrable Force and Violence, from acting in Affairs of State, or following the Business of the Bar. Having, therefore, left the City, while I rove from Place to Place in the Country, I am often by myself.

all Writers, either antient or modern, has given us the most finish'd Character of this great Man, and I shall here both transcribe it as being a Master-Piece of intellectual Painting. *Scipio*, says he, *tam elegans liberalium Studiorum, omnisque Doctrinae, & Auctor, & Admirator, fuit, ut Polibium Panætiumque, præcellentes ingenio Viros, domi Militiæque secum habuerit. Nec vero quisquam, hoc Scipione, elegantius, intervalla Negotiorum, otio dispenxit, semperque aut Belli, aut Pacis, servivit, Artibus; semper inter Arma ac Studia versatus, aut Corpus Periculis, aut Animum Disciplinis, exercevit.* Though the translating a Sentence from this inimitable Author, to do him Justice, costs more than translating whole Chapters and Pages from almost any other, yet I shall attempt it on this Occasion.

“ *Scipio* so elegantly both practis'd and admir'd, the whole
 “ Circle of the liberal Art and Sciences, that *Polibius* and *Panætius*, Men eminent for Genius, were his Companions both
 “ at Home and Abroad. Never did Man make more elegant
 “ Stops, than this *Scipio* did, in the Leisure of Life, and the
 “ Pauses of Business; for he made them ever subservient to
 “ the Arts either of Peace or War. Ever habituated to Arms
 “ or to Learning, he was always employing his Body in Dan-
 “ gers, or his Mind in Study.”

But neither does this Leisure resemble that of *Africanus*, nor is my Loneliness to be compar'd with his. For in the Intervals of his glorious Services to his Country, he sometimes indulg'd a Leisure Hour, and retired to Solitude, as to a Harbour, to shelter him from Crowds and Company. But my Leisure proceeds from the Want of Employment, and not from the Love of Retirement. For now that the Senate is dissolv'd, and the Courts of Justice abolish'd; what Business, either in the State, or in the Forum, can I follow with Dignity?

Thus, I, who, in the former Part of my Life, was follow'd by Crowds, and was dear to my Country, now live in Solitude, and now hide myself, as much as I can, that I may avoid those Villains who infest every Place. But I have been told by Men of Learning, that of all Evils we ought not only to chuse the least, but that, even out of that least, we ought to pick all the Good, if there is any in it. Thus, I make the best Use of my Ease, (not such an Ease, indeed, as the Man ought to enjoy, who brought Ease to his Country) nor do I suffer myself to be listless amidst my Loneliness, which, with me, is the Effect, not of Choice, but Necessity.

But even in my Opinion, *Africanus*, in this Respect, had greater Merit than I: For there is extant in Writing no Monument of his Genius, no Proofs of his Leisure, no Productions of his lonely Hours. From thence we may conclude, that, the revolving and investigating the Subjects which occur'd to his Thoughts, gave him full Business and Employment. But as I have not such a Strength of Genius as to live

in Loneliness upon silent Meditation only, I have thus employed myself in committing to Paper, all the Subjects of my Study and Concern. Thus, I have written more in a short Time since the Constitution has been overturned, than I did for many Years while it existed.

Now, no Part of Philosophy, my dear *Marcus*, is barren or waste, for all is rich and fruitful; but no Spot of it is more fertile or plentiful, than that which treats of the Duties which furnish the Rules for our living uniformly and creditably. Therefore, tho' I dare to say, you daily hear and learn those Rules from *Cratippus* the greatest Philosopher of this Age, yet, I think it is for your Edification, that such Precepts should be for ever sounding in your Ears; and, were it possible, that you should hear nothing else.

Tho' the same Thing is expedient for every Man who wishes to enter into Life with Credit, yet, I believe, for none more than yourself (*b*). Some perhaps expect that you will succeed me in Glory; many, in Application, and more in Dignities. You have, besides, loaded yourself with the weighty Care of attending *Cratippus*; and at *Athens* too, that great Mart of all the fine Arts; and to return empty from thence would be shame-

(*b*) *Some perhaps*] I cannot help thinking, while I am translating this Work, that in some Passages we see the Distress *Cicero* was in when he wrote it, by his Inattention to the Style, and sometimes a Repetition of Sentiment. But that is far from being the Case in this Introduction, which is both noble and elegant. There is in this Passage an inimitable Conciseness of Expression, which I have endeavoured, but I am afraid in Vain, to imitate. *Sustinet enim non parvam Expectationem imitandæ Industriæ nostræ, magnam Honorum, nonnullam fortasse Nominis.*

ful to yourself, and disgraceful to the Reputation both of the City and the Master. Put forth therefore, every Power of Mind, exert every Effort of Labour (if you take Study to be rather Labour than Pleasure) to succeed in what you are about. And endeavour, as I have taken care you should be supplied with every Thing, that you appear not wanting to yourself. But of this enough; for often and much have I wrote to instruct and advise you. I return to the remaining Part of my proposed Division.

Now *Panætius*, who doubtless is the most accurate that has treated of the Duties of Man, and whom I have chiefly, with some Emendation, followed, laid down three Heads of Consideration upon Duty. One when a Man doubted whether what he was about was virtuous or disgraceful: The second whether it was profitable or unprofitable: The third, if there was any Jarring between Virtue and Utility, how we are to make the most proper Distinctions. His three first Books treat of the two first Kinds; and he promised to treat of the third, but never did. This, to me, is the more surprizing, as we are told by his Disciple *Possidonius*, that *Panætius* lived thirty Years after he had published those Books; and I am farther surprized, that *Possidonius* has in some loose Notes so cursorily treated of this Subject which he owns to be the most important in all Philosophy.

I differ, however, with those who think that *Panætius* omitted this Subject, not thro' Oversight but Design, and that he never intended to discuss it, because, say they, what is profitable never can jarr with what is virtuous. Whether this Division, which is the third with *Panætius*, ought to be

be omitted or not, is Matter of Doubt; but there can be none, that *Panaetius* laid it down and left it untouched. For when an Author divides his Subject into three Parts, and discusses two of them, it is plain the third remains to be handled. Nay he himself, in the latter Part of his third Book, tells us, that he was still to treat of that Division.

Add to this, the unquestionable Evidence of *Pesfidonius*, who, in one of his Letters tells us, that *Publius Rutilius Rufus*, who was a Hearer of *Panaetius*, used to say, that as no Painter ever attempted to finish that Part of the (c) *Venus of Coos*, which *Apelles* had but just touched, because the Beauty of her Face made them despair of making the Rest of her Person answerable; thus no one had presumed to attempt what *Panaetius* had omitted or left unfinished, because the Parts he has finished are executed by so masterly a Hand.

III. There can, therefore, be no Doubt with Regard to the Intention of *Panaetius*, but some may perhaps arise about the Propriety of the third Head he laid down, for enabling us to judge of our Duty. For whether, with the Stoics we account the *Honestum* to be the sole Good; or

(c) *Venus of Coos*. *Apelles* painted two Figures of *Venus*. The latter which is mentioned here, he left imperfect at his Death. Mean while, we find by the Testimony of all Antiquity that in *Greece* this great Master and his Contemporaries carried Painting as high as Sculpture was. Now that the *Greeks* have not been outdone or perhaps equalled in the latter, is certain from the many Monuments that remain of their Sculpture, but we have none by which we can judge of their Painting. The Remains of painting at *Rome* reach, some of them, so high as the *Augustan* Age, but they are by no Means equal to the great Idea we conceive of the Performances, of an *Apelles*, a *Protogenes* or a *Zeuxis*.

with you Perepatetics; that it is so much the highest Good, that all that can be brought to counter-balance it, is next to nothing, yet there can be no Doubt, that Virtue and Profit never can come in Competition with one another. We, therefore, are told, that *Socrates* used to mention, with Detestation, the Men who first disputed into a Distinction those two Principles which Nature has closely united. Nay, the Stoics go so far, as to affirm, that whatever is virtuous is profitable; and that nothing can be profitable but what is virtuous.

Now, if *Panætius* had been one of those, who, estimating every Thing according to the Pleasure, or the Privation of Pain, that attends it, think Virtue desirable, as being the Efficient of what is profitable; he might very properly say, that Profit sometimes comes into Competition with Virtue. But, as he held the *Honestum* to be the only Good, and, as to those Considerations that oppose it with some Show of Profit or Utility, that Life was neither rendered better by their Accession, nor worse by their Departure; there seems to be some Inconsistency in his making it any Subject of Deliberation, whether the seemingly profitable may come in Competition with the *Honestum*?

For I am of Opinion, the Meaning of our living conformably to Nature, which the Stoics maintained to be the highest Good, was, that we should always live agreeably to Virtue; and that we should make use of all the other Circumstances that Nature approves of; but so as that they may not clash with Virtue. This being the Case, some People think that *Panætius* has improperly introduced the Competition he here speaks of, and that

it is a Division that does not admit of any Rules. Now, the *Honestum*, properly and truly so called, remains only with the compleatly wise, and is inseparable from Virtue; but, where Wisdom is not perfect, the perfect *Honestum* cannot reside, tho' the Resemblance of it, may.

For all the Duties that are the Subject of this Treatise, are, by the Stoics, called *middle* or *subordinate Duties*; and are common to all, and extensive, and practicable by many thro' the Force of Understanding and the Progress of Study. But the Duty which they term right or direct, is perfect and finished, and, to speak in their own Terms, compleat in all Respects; nor can it fall to the Lot of any, but a Man absolutely wise.

Now all Actions that give Proofs of the subordinate Duties being observed, seem to be compleatly perfect; because People in general, have no Notion, how far they fall short of Perfection: According to the Measure of their Understanding, they think that nothing is wanting. As we see it often happens, that People who are no Judges, are pleased with Poems, Pictures, and the like, and praise them for Properties they are void of; because, I suppose, there may be in them, some Degree of Merit that takes with the unskilful who are unable to point out the Defects of the Piece, but when they are better informed by Men of more Knowledge, they readily give up their Opinion.

IV. The Duties, therefore, that we treat of in these Pages, are but Virtues that are subordinate to right Duty: Nor are they the peculiar Properties of the wise alone, but are in Common to all the Race of Man. They therefore, touch all who

have a Disposition for Virtue. But when the *Decii* or the two *Scipiones* are mentioned as brave Men, or when an *Aristides* or a *Fabrizius* is termed "The just;" we are not to expect from the former such a Pattern of Courage, or from the latter of Justice, as we look for in a compleatly wise Man. For none of them are supposed to be so wise as to come up to what we understand by a *wise Man*. Even they, such as *Marcus Cato* and *Caius Lælius*, who are reputed, and said to be, wise, were not wise in the strict Sense of the Word; nay, not all the seven wise Men together were; but thro' a full Assemblage of the subordinate Duties, they wore a Kind of Semblance and 'Shew of perfect Wisdom.

As, therefore, we are not to put the true *Honestum* in Competition with any Measure of the profitable, or beneficial, neither is the supposed *Honestum*, I mean that which is practised by Men who wish to appear to be Men of Virtue, ever to be put in Comparison with private Gain. And we ought as much to preserve and cherish that Measure of the *Honestum* which falls within our Conception, as the wise are supposed to do that which is really and perfectly the *Honestum*. For otherwise we never can persevere in our Progress, if we have made any, towards Virtue. But all this is applicable only to those who are accounted Men of Virtue by practising the moral Duties.

Men who weigh every Thing in the Scale of Profit or Conveniency, and will not suffer the Ballance to be cast by Virtue, such Men use to deliberate about the Preference of the *Honestum* to the profitable; but good Men never use to do that. I am therefore, of Opinion when *Panaetius* said it was the Custom of some Men to he-

sitare

hesitate about this Competition, that he meant, according to the Letter of his own Expression, it was indeed their *Custom*, but not their *Duty*. For it is not only disgraceful to prefer a seeming Profit to Virtue, but even to suffer them to come into Competition, and to hesitate about the Preference. Then what is it that we use to doubt and deliberate about? In my Opinion, if a Doubt arises, it is concerning the Nature of the Thing that is the Subject of our Deliberation.

For it often happens thro' Circumstances, that what is generally held to be dishonest is not really dishonest. Let me give one Instance that reaches to a Variety of Cases. Can any Thing be more wicked than to kill a Man, nay an intimate Friend? But are we to load the Man with Guilt, who kills a Tyrant, even tho' he should happen to be an intimate Friend? The People of *Rome*, at least, are not of that Mind: For they esteem it of all glorious Actions the most lovely. In this Case, you may say, the Benefit conquered the Honesty of the Action. By no Means; but the Honesty of it resulted from its Benefit. Therefore, that we may form an unerring Judgment; if, what we call beneficial, at any Time should clash with what we conceive to be honest, we are to lay down a certain Criterion for the Rule of the Estimate we make, and then we never can depart from our Duty.

Now, this Criterion, or Rule of judging, is principally calculated for the Doctrine of the Stoics, which I have chiefly followed in these Pages; because, tho' the antient Academics, and your Sect of the Peripatetics (who were formerly the same with the Academics) preferred what is honest to

what

what is profitable; yet, it is more nobly sentimental to maintain, that whatever is virtuous, is, at the same Time, profitable; and that nothing can be profitable, that is not virtuous; this is, I say, a nobler Doctrine than that of those who maintain, that there is a Kind of Virtue that is not profitable, or a Kind of Profit that is not virtuous. But our Academy gives us a great Latitude, by leaving us at Liberty to defend whatever carries with it the greatest Face of Probability. But, to return to our Criterion.

V. To rob a Man of any Thing, or to accommodate yourself by incommoding him, is more contrary to Nature, than Death, Poverty, Pain, or any other Misfortune, that can happen either to our Person or our external Circumstances. For, in the first Place, it ruins all Intercourse and Society amongst Men. Because should we once indulge ourselves, in robbing or injuring another, for our particular Profit, the necessary Consequence is, the Dissolution of that Society amongst Men, which is chiefly agreeable to Nature.

Let us suppose, that every one of our Members is endowed with a Property of Consciousness, and perswades itself, that it would be more vigorous, if it could draw to itself, the Health of its neighbouring Member. The Result would necessarily be the Consumption and Death of the whole Body. In like Manner, was every Man to engross to himself, the Properties of others, and to rob his Neighbour of all he could, for his own Benefit, the necessary Consequence would be, the Destruction of Intercourse and Society amongst Men. For as Nature does not oppose giving ourselves the Preference to any other,

or our endeavouring to acquire whatever can make our own Life more happy, she is absolutely against enlarging our own Abilities, Riches, or Power, by robbing our Neighbour.

Nor is this Provision made only by Nature, that is by the Law of Nations, but likewise by the municipal Laws, that regulate the Government of all States; and which say that we are not to injure another, that we may benefit ourselves. This is the Design, this is the meaning, of Laws; to preserve the Connections of Fellow-Citizens, and whoever breaks into them is punished with Death, with Exile, Imprisonment or Loss of Property. Now the Properties of Nature, which is a Law both divine and human, are much more positive in this Command; and whoever follows them (as all will do, who wish to live agreeable to Nature) he never can fall into the Crimes of Coveting what is another's, or securing to himself what he robs from another.

To proceed. Sublimity and Greatness of Soul, Politeness, Honesty, and Generosity, are much more agreeable to Nature, than Pleasure, than Life, than Riches: The Neglect or Contempt of which, when put in Competition with the public Good, is the Character of a great and an elevated Soul. But to rob another for your own Advantage is more contrary to Nature than Death, than Pain, or any of their Concomitants.

In the like Manner, it is more agreeable to (*d*) Nature, to undertake the greatest Toils and Troubles

(*d*) Nature] An Italian, one *Cælius Calcagninus*, a Man of great Reputation for Learning and Genius, who liv'd in the 16th

Troubles, were it possible for the Preservation or Assistance of all Mankind; like the mighty *Hercules*, whom the grateful Voice of Mankind, mindful of his Services, have placed in the Assembly of the Gods: This, I say, is more agreeable to Nature, than with all the Excellencies of Beauty and Strength, to live in Retirement, not only without Trouble, but amidst the most exquisite Pleasures. Therefore, every Man of an elevated noble Genius prefers the one Life to the other. From hence it follows, that the Man who is directed by Nature never will injure another.

Lastly, whoever injures his Neighbour for his own Profit, either thinks, that he does nothing contrary to Nature, or he thinks that Death, Poverty, Pain, the Loss of Children, Relations and Friends

16th Century, took it into his Head to treat this Work of *Cicero*, with great Freedom and some Indecency, by writing twenty five, what he calls, Disquisitions, arraiguing him of Inconsistency, both with himself and other Authors, whom he follow'd; and the Doctrine of the Passage before us gives rise to one of his Disquisitions; "What *Cicero* writes on this Head, (says he) is directly contrary to what *Aristotle* has advanc'd; who says, that Virtue is perpetually at War with our natural Affections, and has for its Objects the Part of us, that is least subjected to Reason; for continues he, no Man is by Nature endowed with Virtue; but all Mankind may attain to it thro' long Practice; now there is no Occasion for Practice to acquire a Thing that is natural In short, it is the common Opinion of all Philosophers, particularly St. *Paul*, in his Epistles, and *Plato*, in his *Gorgias*, that Virtue is not natural, tho' at the same Time it has nothing in it that is repugnant to Nature"

Notwithstanding this Charge, if we take the whole of what our Author says, under one View, his Argument is very strong and conclusive.

"Man, (says he) was born with certain Affections of Nature amongst which Self-Preservation was the first, and his Reason (which, likewise, is natural to him) led him to cultivate that Affection, by associating himself with others, .. and

Friends, are more to be avoided than doing wrong to another. If he thinks, that by doing Injustice to another, he does not commit a Sin against Nature; away with all reasoning with such a Man, who (e) deprives human Nature of Humanity. But if he thinks, that Injustice ought indeed to be avoided, but not so much as the more terrible Evils of Death, Poverty, and Pain, he is mistaken in thinking that the Evils which affect either the Body, or the Fortune are more heavy, than those which debauch the Mind.

VI. We, therefore, all of us, ought to have it in View, that our own private Advantage is the same with that of the Community; which, whoever engrosses to himself, puts an End to all social In-

“ and making general Provisions, in Order that the Preservation
“ of himself may be secured by the Preservation of the
“ whole. Virtue was pointed out by Reason, as being the
“ Basis of all those Provisions; they could have had no other
“ Basis; and Virtue, therefore, is most agreeable to the Nature
“ of Man. Besides this, as Virtue is the only Thing that
“ ought to be desirable in Life, and as, Men, by Nature,
“ aim at Perfection, Virtue in this Sense, likewise is most agree-
“ ble to Nature.”

Cicero, therefore, does not, as *Calpurnius* would have him, say, that Virtue is natural to Man, but that it is of all Objects, the best suited to Man's Nature, that is, to the first Affections of his Nature, which are to seek his own Happiness and Preservation. Our natural Affections may, indeed, make War upon Virtue, but that can only be, when Reason which is a constituent Part of Nature, is left out, or is too weak; and *St Paul* applies to Grace, what *Cicero* applies to Reason. As to the Passage in the *Gorgias* of *Plato*, it is misunderstood, and it is surprizing so able a Man, as *Calpurnius* was, should misunderstand it. For in that Dialogue, *Plato* introduces *Socrates* disputing with a Rhetorician, one *Gorgias*, and *Polus* his Disciple, and having brought them over to his Sentiments, a young Fellow one *Callides* takes up the Argument against *Socrates* and endeavours to prove, that civil Constitutions are repugnant to Nature.

(e) Deprives] *Orig. Omnino Hominem ex Hecmine tollit.*

tercourse, amongst Men. Now, if it is a Rule prescrib'd by Nature itself, that *Man* ought to assist *Man*, be who he will, meerly because he is MAN, she necessarily, by that Rule, implies that the Good of *all* ought to be the CONCERN of *all*. Which being the Case, it follows, that we are all bound by one and the same Law of Nature; and consequently, that the Law of Nature forbids us to injure one another. Now, the first Proposition being undoubtedly true, the latter must be so likewise.

For it is absurd in some People to say, that they would not take any Thing from a Father or a Brother, in order to Benefit themselves; but that the Case is different with Regard to the rest of the Community. Such Men suppose that no Rights and no Relation amongst Fellow-Citizens arise on Account of the public Good. A Supposition that unhinges all Society amongst Men! Others say, that we ought to pay a Regard to the Interests of our own Community, but not to those of Strangers; now such Men break into the Laws of that more extended Society, that is dictated to all Mankind by Nature: Which, if dissolv'd, puts an entire End to all Beneficence, Liberality, Goodness and Honesty: and the Man who abolishes these, ought to be look'd upon as an Offender against the immortal Gods; because he subverts human Society, which is the Appointment of the Gods themselves; and the strongest link of it is, that we hold it as a Principle, that it is more contrary to Nature for one Man to rob another, than for him to endure all the unjust Persecutions of Fortune,

Fortune, of Person, or even of Mind, (f) excepting those that are dishonest in themselves; for Honesty or Justice, is the Mistress or Queen of all the Virtues.

Here, I may be ask'd; is he not a wise Man who, when he is himself starving with Hunger carries off Victuals from a Fellow who is good for nothing, upon Earth? I say, by no Means. For my Life is not more valuable to me, than the Principle, of wronging no Man for my Advantage, ought to be. Again, should a worthy Man, who is ready to perish with Cold, have it in his Power to strip *Phalaris*, a cruel, inhuman Tyrant, of his Robe; is he not to do it?

There is a very ready Rule for judging in all such Cases. For if you carry off any Thing from a Fellow who is absolutely worthless, only that you may accommodate yourself; your Conduct is unjustifiable, and a Violation of the Law of Nature. But if you are in such a Situation, as that, by saving your own Life, you can be greatly beneficial to your Country, and the Community; I say, in such a Case, your stripping another Man of a Thing, is not blameable. But if that is not the Case, every Man is to take up with

(f) *Excepting*] The Original here, is not a little obscure. *Quæ vacant Justitia*, is the common Reading; in which Case *Grævius* thinks, that *quæ* is the Relative to *Incommoda*; and the Sense will be, *That is it more eligible for a Man to be persecuted unjustly by Fortune*: and I am not sure, whether he is not in the Right. I have however follow'd the Sense of those, who read *quæ non vacant Justitia*, because I think it much more agreeable to *Cicero's* Manner of Writing, and his Principles likewise; for not only the Stoics, but other Philosophers maintain'd, that the unjust Affections of the Mind, were the greatest of all Evils. So that the Evils of the Mind, *Cicero* here means, are the Griefs and Concern that afflict the Mind, for the Loss of Friends, Fortune, or the like.

his own Inconveniency, rather than deprive another of what is his Property. Upon the whole, therefore, Disease or Poverty, or the like, is not more against Nature, than is our taking away, or coveting what is the Property of another.

But, at the same Time, it is not agreeable to Nature for us to abandon the Good of the Community; for it carries with it Injustice. That very Law of Nature, therefore, which preserves, and describes, the Interests of Mankind, absolutely dictates, that the necessary Supports of Life, may be transferr'd from an idle, useless, Member of Society, to a worthy, and a brave Man, whose Death would bring great Detriment to the Community. Provided, that the Party does not invade the other's Property from an over-weening Conceit of his own Qualities, or Love for his own Person, but in the Practice of every Duty, consults the Interests of Mankind, and of that human Society so often recommended to our Conduct.

As to the Case of *Phalaris*, it is very plain: For, so far from our having a Fellowship with Tyrants, they ought to be the Object of our Aversion. Neither can it ever be against Nature, if we can, to strip the Man, whom it is meritorious to kill. Nay, the whole pestilential, execrable, Brood of Tyrants, ought to be extirpated from human Society. For, as we cut off those Limbs, that begin to be without Circulation and Sensation, and to infect the rest of the Body: Thus, when the Wildness and Cruelty of a Brute, lives in the Form of a Man, he is, as it were, to be separated from all who possess the other inherent Properties of human Nature. All Questions about Cases, where, in

our

our Duty is determin'd by Circumstances, are of the like Kind.

VII. I am, therefore, convinc'd, that *Panætius* would have discuss'd this, and other Points of the same Nature, had he not been prevented by Accidents, or other Business. But we have Abundance of Rules laid down in his former Books, upon those very Heads, by which we may learn, what we are to avoid, on account of its Wickedness, and what is not absolutely to be avoided, because it is not absolutely wicked. But, as I am, as it were, to give the finishing Hand to a Work, that was left imperfect, but almost compleated; I shall imitate the Mathematicians, who, instead of demonstrating all they teach, demand some Principles to be granted them, that they may more readily explain their Meaning. I, therefore, my dear *Cicero*, desire you would allow me this Principle, if you can, that nothing is in itself desirable, besides the *Honestum*. But if *Cratippus* will not suffer you to grant me so much, you must certainly allow, that the *Honestum* is the Object, in the World, that is most desirable in itself. Either Concession will answer my Purpose; both the one and the other are probable, which is more than any other Proposition, upon this Head, is.

And, in the first Place, *Panætius* is right in maintaining it to be possible, (not that profitable Objects, for in that he would have gone against his own Positions) but, that Objects which have an Appearance of Profit, may sometimes jar with those that are virtuous. As to what is profitable he repeats it, that nothing is so, but what is virtuous at the same Time, and that nothing is virtuous that is not profitable. And he maintains

that of all Opinions, that are the Plagues of human Society, the most detestable is that of Men who separate those two Principles. He, therefore, laid down that seeming, (and it only was a seeming) Contrariety; not that we should ever prefer the profitable to the virtuous, but that we might form a just Estimate of both, should we ever fall into any doubt upon that Head. I am now to finish that Part of his Plan which he has not touch'd upon; and that too, out of my own Funds (as the Saying goes) without Assistance from any other. For nothing has been wrote since the Days of *Panæti*us, concerning this Subject: at least, nothing that I have seen and can approve of.

VIII. Now, we necessarily are touched with every Object that presents itself with an Appearance of Profit or Utility. But if, upon examining it more attentively, you perceive Wickedness to be connected with that Object which is thus seemingly useful, you are then not to abandon the true Utility, but you are to take it for granted, that where there is Wickedness, there can be no such Thing as Utility. Now as nothing is so contrary to Nature as Wickedness, so nothing is more agreeable to it, than Utility; for Nature affects whatever is fair, whatever is agreeable, whatever is uniform, and loaths their Opposites. It therefore infallibly follows, that Utility and Wickedness cannot exist in the same Object. In like Manner, if Nature has form'd us to Virtue, and if she, according to *Zeno*, is the only Object that is desirable, or, according to *Aristotle*, if she infinitely out weighs all other Objects, it will follow, that whatever is virtuous is either the sole, or the supream, Good. Now what is good cer-

tainly is profitable, therefore, whatever is virtuous is profitable.

The mistaken Principles, therefore, of dishonest Men, whenever they fasten upon an Object that has an Appearance of Profit to themselves, immediately put all Consideration of Virtue aside. This gives Rise to Assassinations, Poisonings, and forg'd Wills, Thefts, public Corruption, Rapine and the plundering of our Allies, and Fellow-Citizens. Hence proceeds the intollerable Insolence of overgrown Power: this, in short, is the Root of undue Ambition, and Despotism in free States, is the most frightful, the most execrable Monster we can figure to our Minds. For they who possess it form their Notions of the Advantages attending it, upon mistaken Principles, without having any Notion of the Penalties inflicted by the Laws, which they often violate, nor indeed of the Wickedness of the Thing, which of all Punishments ought to be the most tormenting.

Away, therefore, with all who doubt (for the whole of their System is wicked and detestable) whether they should follow what they see to be virtuous, or whether they should wilfully pollute themselves with Guilt. There is Wickedness in the very Doubt, though nothing actual should follow upon it. We ought, therefore, never to doubt when it is wicked even to doubt. And if, at any Time, we should have a Subject of Deliberation, the Hope and Expectation of our being conceal'd and undiscovered, ought never so much as to enter into our Heads. For, if we have made any Proficiency at all in Philosophy, we ought to lay it down as a fixt Principle, that supposing it could be conceal'd from the Knowledge of Gods

and Men, yet are we to do nothing that is Avaritious, nothing that is dishonest, nothing that is lewd, nothing that is lascivious.

IX. Upon this Principle it is, that *Plato* introduces his Fable of *Gyges*; who, at a Time, went into an Opening that had been made into the Earth by excessive Rains, and observed there a brazen Horse with a Door in its Side, which he opened, and saw within, the dead Body of a Man unusually large, with a gold Ring upon one of its Fingers, which he took, and put upon his own Finger. Being the King's Shepherd, he immediately returned to assist at an Assembly of Shepherds. There, when he turned the Stone of the Ring to the Inside of his Finger, he became invisible to all, while he himself saw every Thing; and when he turned the Stone to the outside of his Finger, he became visible again. Taking Advantage of this Quality of the Ring, he first lay with the Queen, and then, by her Assistance, he murdered his Sovereign and Master, and destroyed every Body who he thought would stand in the Way of his Ambition, without being visible to any Eye, while he was perpetrating his Crimes. Thus, by the Assistance of this Ring, he became, all of a sudden, King of *Lydia*. Now, if a Man perfectly wise, were to wear this Ring, he would think himself no more at Liberty to do a bad Thing, than if he had it not. For Men of Virtue love not what is dark, but what is honest.

Here, some Philosophers, otherwise well intentioned, but not quite penetrating, say, (as if *Plato* either affirmed the Truth, or the Possibility, of the Fact,) that the whole of the Story, is a lying, impudent, Fiction. Now, the Meaning of the

Ring, and the Moral of the Fable, is this. Are you to commit a wicked Action, to gratify your Avarice, your Ambition, your Lust, or your Love of Power, tho' nobody was to know it, tho' nobody was to suspect it; and tho' it was to be for ever a Secret, both to Gods and Men? The Ring, say those Philosophers, is an impossible Case; (g) Granting them to have a Right to make this Objection; yet still, I insist to know, were the Thing possible, which they say is impossible, how they would behave? Their Way of arguing is very illiberal. For they persist in denying the Possibility of the Thing, and there they hinge; without knowing the true Meaning of the Question; which is; What they would do, could they be concealed, without launching into the Question, whether it is possible for them to be conceal'd? But supposing that they are to be pressed to Death if they don't answer. Well: Should their Answer be, that, provided they were sure of Impunity, they would act as best suited their own Interests and Desires; why then, they confess themselves to be bad Men. But should their Answer be in

(g) Granting] Orig. *Negant id fieri posse; quanquam potest id quidem.* I own myself very much dissatisfy'd with the common Acceptation of this Passage, as it has been understood by Critics and Commentators, who make Cicero say, that the Case of Gyges is not an impossible one. This is, I think, a Sentiment unworthy of Cicero. I am, therefore, apt to think, that the common Reading is wrong; or else, that it is to be understood in the Sense I have translated it. And even in this Sense the Passage, as it stands, is not indefensible, *Quanquam potest id quidem (subintelligitur negari) sed quero, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent?*

As to what Commentators talk of Cicero being here an Advocate for Providence, and the Power of God, there is no more Foundation for it, than there would be, for calling a Man a good Christian, for asserting the Reality of all our Saviour's Parables.

the Negative, they then admit, that every Thing that is wicked, is, from its own Nature, to be avoided. But to return to my Subject.

X. Many Incidents, with Regard to Utility, happen, that are so specious, as to confound our Reason. I don't mean, so as to hesitate upon the Preference of Virtue to the greatest Utility, (for the very Doubt carries Wickedness along with it) but whether we may not, without any Imputation of Wickedness, pursue a Measure that has an Appearance of Utility or Profit? When *Brutus* deprived his Colleague (*b*) *Collatinus* of the consular Command; he might be thought to act unjustly, because he was equally active with *Brutus*, and assisted in all the Measures they took in expelling the royal Family. But when the leading Men of *Rome* came to a Resolution of removing the Kindred of the Proud, the Surname of the *Tarquins*, and the very Traces of Monarchy; as those Measures were for the public Good, they were so virtuous, that they ought to have been approved of by *Collatinus* himself. The Utility of the Measure, therefore, in this Case, was sanctify'd by its Virtue; which gave it all the Utility it had.

But the Case of the royal Founder of *Rome* was different. His Reason was hoodwink'd by the Appearance of Profit; for he killed his Brother, because he thought it more profitable for him to reign by himself, than jointly with ano-

(*b*) *Collatinus*] I can't help thinking, that *Cicero* said to this Treatise, what *Ovid* said to one of his Poems, *In felix habitum Temporis hujus habet*. He seems to be immoderately exasperated at all Tyrants for *Cæsar's* Sake. For unless he knew more of the Story of *Brutus* and *Collatinus*, than has come to our Hands, I cannot think it very applicable in this Case. The *non Civium ardor patris jumentum* of *Horace* is a much better System of Patriotism, than that which he approves of here.

cher. Thus did he divested himself of the Affections, both of a Brother and a Man, in order to attain to that which appear'd to be, but, in Reality, was not, profitable. Mean while, he alledged the Story of the Walls in his own Vindication; an improbable, shuffling Apology. He therefore, acted wickedly, no Offence to the Memory, either of the (i) God or the Monarch.

We are not, however, to overlook our own Advantages, or to make them over to another, when we stand in need of them ourselves: For every Man, when he can do it without injuring his Neighbour, ought to avail himself of the Advantage he possesses, (k) *Cbrissippus*, amongst many other sensible Things, says:

The Man who runs a Race, ought to stretch and to strain all he can, in order to come in foremost, but he ought, by no Means, to jostle, or to trip up the Heels of the Man he runs with. Thus, in Life, it is not unfair for a Man to appropriate to himself, whatever may conduce to his Utility; but it is unjust for him to rob another of it.

Now the Duties are very liable to be confounded in Matters of Friendship; it being equally inconsistent with our Duty, not to do a Friend all the Services you fairly can; and to perform Services for him that are unjustifiable. But the Rule in all Matters of this Kind is short and easy. For no Considerations of Profit, such as Riches, Honours, Pleasures, and the like, are ever to take place of Friendship. Yet a good Man will not, to

(i) *God or the Monarch*] Orig. *Pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim.* Romulus killed his Brother, pretending that the latter had been guilty of an Insult upon him, by leaping in Derision over his Walls, which he was erecting. After his Death, which he probably came to, by his Tyranny, he was made a God by the Name of *Quirinus*.

(k) *Ghrissippus*] He was a Stoic of great Reputation.

serve his Friend, do any Thing inconsistent with the Good of his Country, his Oath, or his Promise; even supposing him to be a Judge (*l*) in a Matter that concerns his Friend; for he puts off the Character of the Friend, when he assumes that of the Judge. All, in such a Case, that Friendship requires, is, to wish his Friend to have Justice on his Side; and, as far as Law admits of, to indulge him in a convenient Time for pleading his Cause.

But when he is to give his Verdict upon Oath; he ought to remember that he calls Divinity to witness; meaning, in my Opinion, his own Conscience, the most divine Thing that Divinity has bestowed upon Man. It was, therefore, a most commendable Practice of our Ancestors, (and I wish it had descended to their (*m*) Posterity) for when they solicited a Judge, they bespoke his Favour *as far as was consistent with his Oath*. This Solicitation is of the same Nature with what I before observed a Judge might virtuously grant to his Friend. But were Men to do every Thing their Friends

(*u*) *Judge in a Matter*] Orig. *Judex*. I have in the Course of my translating other Works of our Author, occasionally taken notice, that in *Cicero's* Time the simple Word *Judex* did not properly signify a Judge, who gives a definitive Sentence, but in Fact, a Jury-Man: and were it not, that it would give too modern an Air to this Translation, I would translate it so: The Judge, in a Cause whether civil or criminal, was either the *Judex Questionis*, or the *Praetor*, who was obliged to pronounce Sentence according to the Verdict of the *Judices* or Jury-Men, which he collected from the Majority of their Voices. They were in all seventy two, sometimes more sometimes fewer, and the Party tried in criminal Matters, was, as with us allowed a Challenge, (giving his Reasons,) against as many as he thought fit.

(*m*) *Posterity*] I cannot conceive what *Grævius* means in objecting to the Genuineness of this Passage. "We cannot imagine, (says he) that the *Romans* in *Cicero's* Time, were so abandoned and so wicked, as to require any thing of a Judge that was inconsistent with his Oath." I can very well imagine it, considering their great Degeneracy and Disregard, not only, of the Spirit, but the Forms of their Constitution. Google

desire them, such Men would not be Parties in Friendship, but Confederates in Guilt.

I speak all this Time of Friendship, as it is commonly understood and practised; for in Men who are wise and perfect, no such Thing can exist. We are told, an Instance of the Union of Affections between *Damon* and *Phitias*, who were *Pythagoreans*. The Tyrant *Dionysius* condemn'd one of them to be put to death on a certain Day, but he obtaining his Liberty for a few Days to put his Affairs in Order, the other became Bail for him, Body for Body, that in Case his Friend did not return by the Day, he should dye in his Stead. But the condemned Person returning to the Day, the Tyrant was so much struck with this Generosity, that he desired to be admitted a third Person in their Friendship.

Therefore, should a Competition, arise in Friendship, between what is seemingly profitable and what is really virtuous, the former ought to be disregarded, and the latter preferred. Nay farther, in Point of Friendship, should we be called upon to do ought that is dishonest, let Conscience and Honour take place. By this Means, we shall attain to what we are now pursuing, I mean a Rule for the right Practice of this Duty.

XI. But in Affairs of Government, many Mistakes arise from the Appearances of Utility. Witness our utterly demolishing (*n*) *Corinth*. The *Athenians* acted still more unjustifiably by decreeing that the *Ægeians*, because they were powerful at Sea,

(*n*) *Corinth*] Our Author blames this Severity in another Part of this Work, and if the *Romans* had destroyed the Inhabitants as well as the City, it would have been indefensible; but he hints at a very good Reason they might have had for it, *viz.* the Advantages of its Situation, which might have provoked a Rebellion in future Times.

should have their Thumbs cut off. Even this, to them, had an Appearance of Advantage; because *Ægina* lay too contiguous to their Port of (o) *Piræum*. But nothing that is cruel can be profitable. For human Nature, which ought to direct us, is utterly averse to Cruelty.

It is likewise absurd in a People to expel and shut out Strangers from their Cities; as (p) *Pænus* did in former Times, and (q) *Papius* lately. It is true, that it would be impolitic to indulge a Stranger in all the Privileges of a Citizen; and two very wise (r) Consuls carried thro' a Law to that Effect; but to debar a Stranger from all Intercourse with your City is downright Barbarism. In those Cases, it is glorious to despise the Appearances of public Utility for real Virtue. We have had in our own Country many noble Instances of this Magnanimity, especially, in the second *Carthaginian* War, when our Ancestors, after the dreadful Defeat they received at *Cannæ*, discover'd more Spirit than they ever had done, in the Time of their Prosperity: No Indication of Fear—No Mention of a Treaty—so powerful is Virtue that it effaces every false Semblance of Utility.

(o) *Piræum*] This barbarous Cruelty we are told by other Authors; was inflicted by the *Athenians* on another Occasion, for they cut off the Thumbs of the Captives whom they took in the *Peloponnesian* War.

(p) *Pænus*] He was Tribune in the Year of *Rome* six hundred and fifty seven.

(q) *Papius*] He was Tribune in the Year of *Rome* six hundred and eighty, two Years before *Cicero* was Consul and restored the Law of *Pænus*, which had fallen into Desuetude. Now this Law regarded only the City of *Rome*, which was to be inhabited by none who were not Natives of *Italy*. But by the *Mucia-Licinian* Law, any Foreigner might have had the Privileges of a *Roman* Citizen.

(r) *Consuls*] viz. *Quintus Scævola* and *Licinius Crassus* who carry'd thro' the *Mucia-Licinian* Law.

When the *Athenians* found themselves utterly unable to stand the Shock of the *Persian* Power, and had resolved to abandon their City, to place their Wives and Children at *Trezæne*, then to go on board their Ships, and to defend, at Sea, the Liberties of *Greece*; they stoned to Death one (s) *Cyrillus*, who spoke for their remaining in their City, and opening their Gates to *Xerxes*. Now this Man seemed to plead for the most profitable Measure; but there can be no Profit without Virtue.

In the same War, after the great Victory that was gained over the *Persians*, (t) *Themistocles* said, in an Assembly of the People, that he knew of a Project, that would be of Service to the State, but that it must not be publicly known; he, therefore, desired the People to appoint some one to confer with him. *Aristides* was appointed. The Project was, privately to set fire to the *Lacedæmonian* Fleet, which had been brought down to *Gythæum*, and that would infallibly ruin the Power of *Lacedæmon*. When *Aristides* returned to make his Report to the Assembly of the People, who were very impatient to hear it, he acquainted them, that the Proposal of *Themistocles* was indeed profitable, but, dishonest. The *Athenians*, therefore, (because it was dishonest, concluding that it could not even be profitable) upon the Report of *Aristides*, flatly rejected the Proposal by the Lump, without hearing any Particulars. Their Conduct was more justifiable than ours, for we

(s) *Cyrillus*] *Demosthenes*, in one of his Orations, adds, that his Wife was murdered by the *Athenian* Women.

(t) *Themistocles*] We have the Story in the Life of *Themistocles* by *Plutarch*.

indemnify the Robbers, and oppress the Allies of our Country. Let us, therefore, lay it down as an invariable Principle, that nothing that is dishonourable or dishonest, can ever be profitable, not even after you are in Possession of what you took to be profitable. For it is most pernicious to imagine, that any Thing dishonest can be profitable.

XII. Now, as I observed before, Cases often happen, wherein there appears a Repugnancy of Utility to Virtue, but then we ought carefully to examine whether this Repugnancy is unsurmountable, and whether the two Principles are not fairly reconcileable together. Of such a Nature are the following Cases. Supposing a Man of Virtue, at a Time when the *Rhodians* are deeply distressed with Want and Famine, should import a large Quantity of Corn into *Rhodes* from *Alexandria*. At the same Time, he knows that several other Merchants have loaded their Ships with Corn, and saw them on their Voyage from *Alexandria* to *Rhodes*. The Question is, whether he is to conceal this Circumstance from the *Rhodians*, or is he to make the best Market he can? Now, supposing this Man to be a wise conscientious Person, what will be the Matter of Deliberation with him in this Case? He will make no Doubt of his not concealing the Matter from the *Rhodians*, if there is Dishonesty in that Concealment, but his Doubt will be whether there is Dishonesty in it or not.

In Questions of this Kind, there used to be a Difference in Opinion between (t) *Diogenes* of Ba-

(t) *Diogenes*] He was one of the three learned Men sent by the *Athenians* as their Ambassador to *Rome*, and was greatly admired by *Africanus* the elder and *Laelius*, and other wise and noble *Romans*.

bylon, a learned, serious, Stoic, and his Scholar (*u*) *Antipater*, a Man of great Penetration. *Antipater* was for laying every Thing open, and for concealing from the Buyer nothing that was known by the Seller. But *Diogenes* thought, that the Seller ought to discover, in the Terms required by the civil Law, the Faults of his Commodity, and, in every other Respect, to act upon the Square; but since he is come to Market, that he ought to make the best Market he can. I have imported my Cargo, I have exposed my Goods to sale, I sell no dearer than my Neighbours, (perhaps, *cheaper*, if the Imports increase) and pray who suffers by all this?

But, says *Antipater* in Answer to this, how do you mean? Will you, the very Condition of whose Existence, the very Principles of whose Nature, which ought to be your Mistress and Directress is, that you be the Friend of Man, that you contribute to the Happiness of human Society, whose Advantages are to be the same with those of the Public, and those of the Public the same with yours; will you, I say, conceal from your Fellow-Creatures their approaching Relief and Affluence? Here, *Diogenes* may reply. Concealment and Silence are different Things; if I am not, at this very Time, explaining to you the Nature of the Gods, or the final Good, Matters of greater Importance to you than the Benefit of the approaching Corn, yet I am not concealing them. But it is not necessary for me to speak all that may be profitable for you to hear. You will pardon me, replies the other, it is necessary, if you pay any Regard to that Society which Nature, has link'd to-

(*u*) *Antipater*] He was Master to *Panætius*.

gether. I do, (answers *Diogenes*) but is that Society of such a Nature, that nothing in it can be call'd a Man's own? If that is the Case, we are not to sell any Thing but to give it away.

XIII. You see that actual Dishonesty is entirely out on the one Side of the Question in all this Debate, which reaches no farther than the Expediency of the Measure. He does not say, I will do it, because though it is dishonest, yet it is profitable, but, that the Profit of it is attended with no Dishonesty; while the other Party maintains that it ought not to be done, because it is dishonest. A conscientious Man sells a Tenement of Houses, because of certain Faults which Nobody but himself knows of. They are infected, and they are thought to be healthy; Nobody knows that every Bed-Chamber is infested with Snakes; that the Materials are rotten, and the Building ruinous. All this is unknown to any but the Owner. Now I ask, whether, if the Owner of those Houses does not inform the Buyer of all this, but sells them for more than in his Conscience, he knows them to be worth, whether he does not act like a Villain and a Cheat?

No Manner of Doubt, he does, (answers *Antipater*) Why, 'tis every Whit, as bad, nay the same Thing, as not putting the bewilder'd Traveller into the right Road, to which the Laws of *Athens* annexed a public Curse; to suffer a Buyer to plunge into a bad Bargain, and thro' Ignorance to rush into a very great Misfortune! Nay, it is even worse than not shewing the Way, for it is, wilfully and willingly leading another Man into a Mistake. But, (says *Diogenes* on the other Hand) how so? Did the Seller force, did he so much as

invite the Buyer to make the Purchase? The one has advertised the Houses for Sale, because he dislik'd them, the other has purchas'd them because he liked them. Now if the Man who (x) advertises *TO BE SOLD A SUBSTANTIAL, WELL BUILT, HOUSE*, is not to be accounted a Rogue, even tho' it is neither *Substantial* nor *Well-built*, far less is the Seller to be blamed who does not say a Word one Way or the other. For when the Buyer buys according to the Evidence of his own Judgment, how can the Seller be guilty of any Imposition? Now if, as in the Case of an Advertisement, a Man is not obliged to make good all that he says, are you to oblige him to make good what he does not say? And, indeed, what can be more simple than for a Man to tell the Faults of a Thing he is about to sell? Could any Thing be more ridiculous than to hear a Common-Cryer proclaim, by a Landlord's Order, *I am about to sell an infested House*,

In some doubtful Cases, therefore, Virtue is defended on the one Part, and on the other Utility is so strongly inforc'd, that it is maintain'd, the doing a profitable Thing is not only virtuous, but, that it would be dishonest not to do it. Those are Instances of the Disagreement that often arises between Considerations of Profit and of Virtue. Now, let us come to some Determination upon the Cases I have put, for I have stated them not to perplex, but to be explained.

In my Opinion, then, neither the Corn-Merchant at *Rhodes*, nor the Landlord at *Rome*, ought

(x) *Advertises*] The *Romans* put up Bills advertising any Thing to be sold, in the same Manner as we do. Orig. *Proscriptis*.

to have kept their Buyers in the dark. As to Silence being no Concealment, it becomes so, if, for your own Profit, you want to keep others in the dark, as to Things that you know, and, at the same Time, concern them to know. Now, can there be a Doubt of the Nature of Concealments of this Sort, and of the Character of those who practise them? They surely are not consistent with that of an open, well-meaning, generous, honest, worthy Man; but of the crafty, the sneaking, cunning, deceitful, wicked, sly, juggling and the roguish. Must it not be a Detriment for any Man to lye under those, and many other Imputations, upon his Reputation?

XIV. But if they who say nothing at all are blameable, what Judgment are we to form of those who have employ'd downright Lyes, that they may over-reach another. *Caius Canius*, a Roman Knight, a Man of some Wit and Learning, when for the Sake of (y) Leisure, and not of Treasure, (to make use of his own Terms) he went to *Syracuse*, he was heard to say, that he wanted to buy a Seat, near that City, where he might entertain his Friends, and amuse himself without any Intruders upon his Retirement. When this Intention of his came to be a good Deal talk'd of, one *Pythius* a Banker at *Syracuse*, told him, that he had, indeed, no Seat to sell, but that he had a Seat that *Canius* might make use of as his own, and at the same Time he invited him to dine with him there next Day. *Canius* having accepted of the Invitation, *Pythius*, who

(y) *Leisure*] There is in the Original a Jingle, that I thought myself obliged to preserve in the Translation, viz, *Otiandi non negotiandi Causa*.

by

by dealing in Money had a great Deal to say with all Ranks of Men, sent for the Fishermen, and desir'd them to draw their Nets next Day, just before his Garden, and gave them Instructions what to do farther. *Canius* was punctual to his Invitation; the Entertainment *Pythius* gave was elegant; the Water before the Gardens was covered with Boats, and every Fisherman, bringing ashore the Fish he had caught, laid them before *Pythius*.

“ Prithee, *Pythius* (said *Canius*) what is the Meaning of all those Fishers, and such a Number of Boats? 'tis surprising! ” “ Not a Bit, replied the other, here we have all the Fish that is taken at *Syracuse*; it is here they have Depth of Water, these Fishermen could not carry on their Business but for this Seat of mine.” This made *Canius* so eager to have the Seat, that he was very pressing with the other to sell it. *Pythius* was very shy at first, but, in short, *Canius*, who was both rich and keen upon the Purchase, carried his Point; *Pythius* made his own Price, and sold his Seat ready furnish'd, Security is given for the Money, and the Bargain is finish'd. Next Day *Canius* invites his Friends. He comes himself early, he sees no Boat, he enquires of his next Neighbour whether that was a Holliday amongst the Fishermen, as he saw no Boats. Why, no, (reply'd the other) no Boats ever fish here, and I could not think what the Meaning was Yesterday. You may guess what a Rage *Canius* was in. But he had no Remedy.

For my Colleague and Friend (z) *Aquilius* had

N not

(z) *Aquilius*] He was *Cicero's* Colleague in the Prætorship. Before his Time, the Knowledge of the Civil Law, or rather the Law

not yet published his Provisions against Coufenage ; on which Occasion being required to define Coufenage, he said, " That it was pretending one Thing and doing another." This muft he owned to be a full and clear Definition, and, indeed, *Aquilius* had an excellent Talent in defining any Thing. *Pythius* therefore, and all who do one Thing and pretend another, are Traytors, Rogues, and Coufeners ; nor can any Thing they do be profitable, when it is polluted with fuch Scandal attending it.

XV. But if the Definition given by *Aquilius* is a true one, there ought to be no fuch Thing in Life, as either Simulation or Diffimulation. For a good Man will praftife neither, either to buy, or to fell, to Advantage. But in Fact, our Laws provided againft that Kind of Coufenage, witnefs the Provision in the twelve Tables about Wardships, and the Laws of (a) *Lætorius* about incapacitating young Men ; and the Decifions in Equity without any Law, but upon the Action of FIDE BONA AGITUR or *honeft Intention*. Now the directing Words in other Actions of Equity are, in a Reference upon a matrimonial Affair MELIUS EQUIUS, *more fair and more equitably*; in Matters of Truft, UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER, *to act as is ufe and wont amongst good Men*. Now, where the ruling

Law of the Twelve Tables was confin'd to the Lawyers, inſomuch, that we fee *Canius* above mention'd, did not know there was any Remedy for the Cheat that had been put upon him by the Banker; the Provisions here ſpoken of, were certain Forms of Words made ufe by the *Romans* in their Dealings, and if theſe were not agreeable to that Form, an Action at Law lay againft the Party.

(a) *Lætorius*] This was a Law to incapacitate all who were under twenty five Years of Age from making Contracts of a certain Nature,

Prin-

Principle is *more Fairness and more Equity*, can there be the least Room for *Cousenage*? And where the *Use and Wont of good Men* is the Direction, can any unjust fraudulent Practices take place? But, according to *Aquilius*, *dolus Malus*, or *Cousenage*, lies in Simulation, or pretending a Thing is, that is not; therefore in all our Transactions we ought to detest Lying of any Kind. Neither Buyer nor Seller ought to employ sham Bidders to enhance or beat down the Value of what is put up; when they come to make a Bargain, both of them ought to make but one Word of it.

Quintus Scaevola, the Son of *Publius*, wanting to buy an Estate, desired the Seller to let him know at a Word, what he must pay him; the Seller did so, but *Scaevola* told him, he thought it was worth more, and gave him a large Sum over and above. All Mankind must admit that this was acting like a conscientious Man, but some will say that it was not acting like a wise Man: For by the same Rule, he might have sold a Thing for less than he might have had for it. Thus a most damnable Distinction is introduced between virtuous Men, and wise Men. Hence *Ennius* says, *(b) that Wisdom is unwise if she cannot act so as to profit herself*. I agree she is, provided *Ennius* and I agree upon the Nature of what is profitable. It is true that *Hecato* *(c)* the *Rhodian*, a Disciple of *Panætius*, in his Treatise about the moral Duties, which he address to *Quintus* *(d)* *Tubero*, says;

(b) That Wisdom] *Nequicquam sapere sapientem.*

(c) Hecato] He lived about the Year of Rome 640.

(d) Tubero] He was a noble and learned Roman but, by his Attachment to the stoic Philosophy, he lost the Prætorship.

“ That it is the Part of a wise Man, while he does nothing to violate the Customs, the Laws, and the Constitution of his Country, to improve his private Estate. For it is not enough that we enrich ourselves, because, we ought likewise to enrich our Children, our Relations, our Friends, and above all, our Country. For the Riches of a State consist in the Power and Wealth of its Individuals.” This is a Doctrine very irreconcilable to the Action of *Scævola*, I have just now mentioned. For in Fact, *Hecato* tells us, that if he can keep out of the Reach of Law, there is nothing he will not do for his own Advantage. A Doctrine that is at once, ignoble and unamiable !

But if Couzenage consists in Simulation and Disimulation, few are the Occurrences of Life in which Couzenage is not practised ; and if the Characteristic of an honest Man is, that he does all the Good he can, without injuring any, I will take upon me to say, that such a Man is not readily to be found. Wickedness, to conclude, never can be profitable, because it is always disgraceful ; and because Honesty is always laudable, it is always profitable.

XVI. With regard to the Laws of Sale, the civil Constitutions have provided, that the Seller should discover all the Blemishes he knows of the Thing he sells. For tho' the Laws of the twelve Tables go no farther than to oblige a Party to perform all his parole Engagements, under the Penalty of forfeiting double, yet Lawyers have likewise annexed a Punishment to Concealment. For they have laid it down as Law, that if there is a Defect or Inconveniency in an Estate, and if it be known

known to the Seller, and he does not declare the same to the Purchaser, the same shall be made good by the Seller.

For Instance; when the Augurs were about to take some Auspices from the augural Observatory, they ordered *Titus Claudius Centumalus* to demolish his House that he had upon the *Cælian* Mount, because the Height of it obstructed their Observations. *Claudius* advertised the whole Estate, and, sold it to *Publius Calpurnius Lanarius*, who received the same Notice from the College of Augurs. *Calpurnius* accordingly pulled the House down, but when he came to know that *Claudius* had advertised it for Sale, after the Notice he had received for demolishing it from the Augurs, he brought the Matter into a Court of Equity, *that he might have such Amends as Right and Conscience should award.* *Marcus Cato*, Father to *Cato* our Friend, (for tho' it is common for Sons to be known by the Names of their Fathers, yet the Father of this Light of the Age is to be known by his Son) was on the Bench. The Decree of this Judge therefore, was, that as the Seller, knew before he sold the Estate, of the Notice from the Augurs, and did not declare the same to the Buyer, the Seller was therefore bound to make good the Damage to the Buyer.

Thus, he thought it was a Maxim in Equity, that a Buyer should be made acquainted with every Blemish that is known to the Seller. But if his Decree was right, neither our Corn Merchant nor the Landlord of the infected House can be justified in their concealing what they knew. It is true our civil Constitutions could not guard against every Species of such Concealment, but they have very strictly guarded against all they can. *Marcus Marius Gracilianus*, who is related to our Family

ly, had sold an Estate in Houses to *Caius Sergius Orata*, which very Estate he had bought from *Sergius* a few Years before. The Estate held (e) in Servitude of *Sergius*, but *Marius* had made no Mention of that, before he made the Conveyance. The Matter was litigated. *Crassus* was Council for *Orata*, and *Antonius* for *Graditianus*. *Crassus* hinged upon the Point of Law, which says, that if a Seller knows of an Inconveniency, and conceals the same, he shall make it good. *Antonius* on the other Hand, argued upon the Equity: That as *Sergius*, who had sold the House, could not be ignorant of that Inconveniency, there was no Necessity to tell him of it: That he was not imposed upon, because he was perfectly well acquainted with the Title under which he bought. But what does all this prove? You will only see from it, that Craft and Shuffling was by no Means agreeable to our Ancestors.

XVII. But the Laws proceed in one Method, and Philosophers in another, against Frauds. The Laws have Cognisance of them only when they are palpable, but Philosophers, as they are Sins against Reason and Conscience, be they ever so concealed. But Reason requires that nothing be done insidiously, nothing hypocritically, nothing deceitfully. Now is it not insidious to plant a Gin, tho' you don't rouse and hunt the Creatures into it, for they often fall into the Trap without being driven. Thus, you advertise a House to be sold, you plant Advertisements in public Places as

(e) Orig. *Hæc Sergio serviebant*] This is a law Expression made use of to express certain Privileges upon them which the Seller of an Estate or House reserves to himself when he sells them.

so many Gins ; you sell your House because of its Faults ; and some one, for not knowing better, falls into the Snare.

The Depravity of Custom has, I know, rendered this Practice neither scandalous in Life, nor punishable by Law ; but tho' it is cognisable neither by Law nor Statutes, yet it is by the Law of Nature. I have said it often, and I must say it again, that Society, in the most general Acceptation of the Word, is, of Men with Men : In a more contracted Sense, of Men of the same Nation, and in a more contracted still, of Men of the same City. Our Ancestors therefore made a Distinction between the Law of Nations, and the municipal Laws. The (f) municipal may not in every Respect be always the same with the Law of Nations, but the Law of Nations ought always to be the Groundwork of the municipal. We (g) have

N 4

no

(f) *The Municipal*] Orig. *Quod civile non idem continuo Gentium, quod autem Gentium, idem civile esse debet.* Doctor Cockman translates this Passage as follows, and is very full in his Notes upon it. *Whatever we are bound by the civil Constitutions to do to our Citizens ; we are not obliged by the Law of Nations, to do the same to Strangers : But whatever we are bound by this latter to do to others, the same we ought to do to our Citizens also.*

For my own Part, I think Cicero's Sense to be very plain without any Paraphrase : Amongst the Romans the civil Law was the Law of their own State and City, and was therefore made use of by them in the Sense in which I use the Word municipal, which amongst them was confined to their *Municipia*, but we extend it to the Laws that are peculiar to each State. Now tho' a particular State may thro' Conveniency or some other Reason, make Ingraftments upon the Law of Nations, yet they ought to do nothing contrary to it, because the Law of Nations contains the Fundamentals of human Society.

(g) *We have, &c.*] This elegant Passage is exceedingly difficult to translate, as it alludes to the Arts of Sculpture and Drawing. I have expressed it as literally as I cou'd, but for the Reader's Satisfaction, I shall here set down the Original. *Sed*

no original Mould taken from the very Figure of living Law and genuine Justice; Delineations and Sketches are all we have, and I wish we could follow them, for they are taken from those excellent Copies that were drawn by Nature and Truth.

For how much Force is there in the Form, THAT ENSNARED BY TRUSTING TO YOU AND YOUR HONOUR, I BE NOT COUSEN'D. How much is implied in that golden one, AS OUGHT TO BE IN HONEST DEALINGS AMONGST HONEST MEN, AND WITHOUT DECEIT. But who those honest Men, and what those honest Dealings are, is the great Doubt. I know that the high Priest *Quintus Scævola* said, there was the greatest Force in those Proceedings that were in their Forms ACCORDING TO GOOD FAITH, for he thought that the Expression *Good Faith* was of the most extensive Influence, and reached to Wardships, Companies, Trusts, Commissioners, Purchases, Sales, Letting and Lending, which make up the System of social Transactions. It requires a very discerning Head (especially as there is such Contrariety of Opinions) to determine in such a Variety of Circumstances that may happen, how one Man ought to act towards another.

Away therefore, with all Craft, and all that Cunning which affects to look so very like Knowledge; but has very, very different Properties. For Knowledge consists in distinguishing rightly in the Choice of Things good or evil: But Cunning (if every Thing is evil that is dishonest) prefers the

nos veri Juris, Germanæque Justitiæ solidam & expressam Effigiem nullam tenemus: Umbris & Imaginibus utimur: eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturæ & Veritatis Exemplis.

Evil to the Good. Nor is it only in the Purchases of Lands and Houses that the Laws of our Government, which are taken from Nature, punish Cunning and Fraud. For in buying of Slaves, all Fraud in the Seller is guarded against: For the Edict of the Edile presumes, that he knows whether the Slave is sickly, a run-away, or a Thief, and provides against all Imposition accordingly. The Case, however, is different with Regard (b) to an Heir.

From hence it follows, that, Nature, being the Source of Law, the Property of Nature is that we do nothing to take advantage from another Man's Ignorance. Nor is there in Life any Thing more pernicious than (i) Roguery that wears the Mask of Understanding: because she creates that Multitude of Cases which seem to set the profitable and the virtuous at Variance with one another. For where is the Man to be found, who will be proof against wronging his Neighbour, if thro' the Impossibility of being detected he knows himself secure against all Punishment?

XVIII. Let me now, if you please, make some Enquiry with Regard to those Cases, in which, perhaps, the common Run of Mankind think they do nothing amiss. For you are to understand, that

(b) *Heirs*] Because being newly come to his Estate he is not presumed to be acquainted with the Dispositions of his Slaves.

(i) *Roguery*] Orig. *Militia simulatio Intelligentiæ*. I think this Passage has been misunderstood' Dr. Cockman translates the whole of this Sentence, *And indeed there is no greater Mischief in the World than this Wisdom, falsely so nam'd, joined with Baseness and Knavery*. But I cannot think that this comes up to our Author's Sense. *L'Estrange* seems to have had no Idea of the Original for he translates it, *Craft under the Mask of Simplicity*.

I am not in this Place to speak of Murderers, Poisoners, Forgers, Thieves and public Robbers; for such People are not to be reclaimed by the Precepts and Disputations of Philosophers, but by Jails and Fetters. No, I am to examine the Conduct of those who are, in Habit and Repute (*k*), Men of Worth. Some People brought out of Greece to Rome a forg'd Will, suppos'd to be that of *Minucius Basilus*, a rich Man; and the better to succeed in their Designs, they made *Marcus Crassus*, and *Quintus Hortensius*, two Men of the greatest Eminence at that Time, joint Heirs with themselves. Now, tho' those two great Men suspected the Forgery, yet being satisfy'd in their Consciences that they had no Hand in it, they did not refuse the small Present that was made them, thro' the Guilt of others. Well, was it enough, do you think, for them to be conscious of not being active, or concern'd, in the Crime. No, in my Opinion, it was not; though I always was a Friend to the one while he liv'd, and am no Enemy to the other, now that he is dead.

But after *Basilus* had design'd *Marcus Satrius*,

(*k*) *Men of Worth*] Orig. *Boni*, I wish our Critics and Translators had paid a little more Attention to the Importance of this Word with our Author, when he applies it to certain of his Countrymen; for it generally conveys a conceal'd Satire along with it. In short, he uses the Word *Bonus* here and elsewhere in his Writings. to signify a good MAN, as that Expression is understood upon the Exchange of London, or in Lombard-Street. VIZ. a Man of Credit, who preserves all Fairness and Integrity, and, for any Thing that appears to the contrary, really possesses the Virtues themselves. Doctor Cockman translates it *Men of Honesty and Integrity*, but these Words does not convey our Author's Idea. I have translated it *Men of Worth*, because there is a kind of double Meaning in the Word *WORTH*, which *Cicero* certainly had in his Eye here and elsewhere, when he uses the Word *Bonus* in this Sense.

his Sister's Son, to carry his Name, and had made him his Heir (the Words are, *I make him the Lord of my Picenian and Sabine Estates*) is it not an Infamy, is it not a Stain upon the Justice of those Days, that two of the most leading Men in Rome, should possess the Estate, while the true Heir succeeded to nothing but the Name of his Uncle? For, if, as I observ'd in the first Book of this Treatise, the Conduct of a Man, who does not resist or repel an Injury, when it is offer'd to any he is concern'd with, is blameable, how are we to judge of a Man, who is so far from repelling, that he promotes an Injury. To me, I speak for myself, even real Legacies are dishonourable, when they are acquired by the Arts of Fawning, Deceit, and Flattery; by Hypocrisy, and not by Sincerity. Now, in those kinds of Matters, Utility and Virtue seem sometimes to be on different Sides. But that is a Mistake; for the Principles of true Utility and real Virtue are the same. And the Man who is not convinc'd of that, must be expos'd to commit every Fraud, and every Villany. For, by Reasoning within himself in this Manner, "such " or such a Measure, it is true, is virtuous, but " the other is profitable;" he blindly presumes to tear asunder Considerations, that Nature has joyn'd together; an Error that is the Source of all Fraud, all Wickedness, and all Guilt.

Therefore, if a Man, truly good, had the Art of slipping his Name into the last Wills of rich Persons by only snapping his Fingers, yet would he not use that Art, even tho' he was secure against all Suspicion, But endow *Marcus Crassus* with the Knack of slipping into a Will of a Man, to whom he is no Way related, by snapping his Fin-

gers, and he shall even agree to dance in the (l) Forum. But an honest Man, or a Man who lives up to my Idea of Honesty, will never make what ought to be another Man's Property, his own. The Man who is in Love with such Practices, admits in Fact, that he is ignorant of what Honesty means.

Now were a Man to examine the naked uninfluenced Sentiments of his own Heart, it would instruct him; that an honest Man, is he who does good to all he can, and who injures no Man, unless he is provok'd by Injury. Yet how? does that Man who removes as it were by a Charm, the true Heir, and gets himself substituted in his Place, commit no Injury? But, it may be said, is a Man to do nothing for his own Profit or Conveniency? To be sure he is; but, at the same Time, he ought to be sensible, that nothing can be either profitable or expedient, if it is dishonest. The Man who is ignorant of this cannot be a good Man.

When, I was a Boy, I have heard my Father tell how *Fimbria*, a Man of consular Dignity, was (m) upon the Tryal of *Marcus Lutatius Pintbia*, a Roman Knight of very fair Character, who was

(l) *Forum*] Which was accounted infamous.

(m) *Upon the Tryal*] Orig. *Judicem fuisse*. The Reader may perceive how very tender I am in translating the Word *Judex* which I have already observ'd, signify'd in *Cicero's* Time no other than a Jury-Man; and this Story in some Measure confirms my Observation which is founded upon a Plenitude of other Proofs; because, had *Fimbria* been sole Judge, his declining to give any Judgment would have put a Stop to the Course of Justice; but as their Verdict was concluded by the Plurality of Voices, and as any single *Judex* or Jury-Man had a Liberty of not delivering his Opinion, *Fimbria* might very well do what *Cicero* says he did.

liable to forfeit his Deposit, (n) unless a Verdict went for him, *that he was a good Man*. But *Fimbria* refus'd to join in any Verdict, lest by giving it against *Pintia*, he should ruin the Character of a Man of Reputation; or, by giving it in his Favour, he should seem to pronounce any Man to be a good Man, a Character that is made up of such an Infinity of Duties, and excelling Qualities. *Fimbria*, therefore, as well as *Socrates* form'd his Idea of a good Man upon his being incapable of thinking any Thing to be profitable, that was not virtuous. Such a Man, far from presuming to commit, will not even think of, a Thing, that he dares not publicly avow. Is it not, therefore, scandalous that Philosophers should differ in a Matter that is clear to Peasants; who on this Occasion have invented a well-known old Proverb. For when they want to praise any Man for his Sense, Sincerity and Virtue, they say, that you may venture to *play with him in the Dark at (o) Odd and Even*. A Proverb that can have no other Meaning, than that nothing can be profitable that is immoral, even tho' we could attain to it without the least Check. You may, therefore, perceive, that, according to this Proverb, we are neither to suffer *Gyges* to make Use of his Ring, nor the other whom, I mentioned a few Lines above, of the snapping of his Fingers, in Order to make himself general Heir

(n) *Deposit*] In Cases of Law-Suits, both Parties made a *Sponsio* or Deposit in the Hands of the High-Priest and while it remain'd there it was called a *Sacramentum*; and the Money of the losing Party was detain'd by the Priest for sacred Uses, that is, I suppose, for the Use of himself and the Fraternity.

(o) *Odd and Even*] Orig. *Qui cum in Tenebris mices*. This is a Diversion still frequent in *Italy*, and is no other than one holding two or three Fingers above the Head of another, who was to guess at the Numbers.

to all Estates. For as that which is disgraceful, let it be ever so secret, never can be render'd honest, so whatever is not virtuous, never can be render'd profitable; because it would be a flat Contradiction to the Nature of Things.

XX. Now the Greatness of the Reward is often a Source of Immorality. When *Caius Marius* had lost all Hopes of the Consulship, and had past seven Years after his Prætorship, without any public Notice being taken of him, and without his making any Dispositions to stand for the Consulship; he was sent by that great General and Patriot *Quintus Metellus*, whose Lieutenant he was, to *Rome*, where he accus'd his General to the People, of protracting the War; Telling them that if they would make him Consul he would, in a short Time, surrender *Jugurtha* either alive or dead into the Power of the *Roman* People. It is true, he thereby obtain'd the Consulship, but at the Expence of his Honour and Honesty, by wrongfully impeaching the Character of his own General, a great and a wise Citizen, whose Lieutenant he was, and who had charg'd him with the Commission he was to execute at *Rome*.

Neither did our Kinsman *Marius Gracchianus* act quite like an honest Man in his Prætorship, when the Tribunes of the Commons applied to the College of Prætors for a general Regulation, to fix the Standard of Money, which was, at that Time, so uncertain and fluctuating, that no Man knew what he was Worth. They therefore with common Consent drew up an Edict, allowing a Tryal and a Penalty in Case of Conviction; and they appointed to meet all in a Body in the Afternoon at the Rostrum: upon which, they separated

some one Way and some another. But *Marius* went directly to the People who were assembled before the Rostrum, and by himself, declares the Result of their Joint Deliberations ; which let me tell you got him great Favour ; his Statues were erected at every Turning of a Street, Perfumes and Incense blaz'd before them, in short, never was there a Man more popular.

Such are the Considerations that sometimes embarrass Mankind in deliberating upon their Duty, when the Violation of it appears to them but slight, but great Profit is to result from it. Thus *Marius* thought there was no great Harm done in prepossessing the People in Favour of himself, and engrossing that Popularity, that ought to have been in common with his Colleagues, and the Tribunes of the Commons. He knew that it would greatly favour his Pretensions to the Consulship which he was then aiming at. But there is a general Rule to which I would have you familiarise yourself ; and that is : Either be sure that the profitable Consideration be not disgraceful, or if it is disgraceful, never think it profitable. Fow how ! can we think either the one or the other *Marius* a Man of Virtue ? Recollect, and put to work all your Understanding that you may figure in your own Mind the Picture and Idea of a good Man. Will that Idea correspond with a Man's lying, flandering, anticipating and misleading, for his own Profit ? By no Manner of Means. Can any Consideration be so important, can any Profit be so desirable as to induce you to forfeit the Glory and the Character of being a Man of Virtue ? Can an imaginary Interest bring us a Recompence equivalent to what it takes away, if it

robs

robs us of our good Name, if it forfeits our Honour and our Honesty? For where is the Difference between a Man's changing himself into the Form of a Beast, and his carrying about with him the Insensibility of a Brute in the Form of a Man?

XXI. Again; the Man who disregards all (p) Rectitude, all Simplicity of Heart, for the Attainment of Power, does the same as a certain Person did, who chose for his Father-in-Law a Man whose audacious Presumption was to strengthen his Power. He thought it a convenient Measure if he could encrease his own Interest at the Expence of another Man's Unpopularity; without regarding how disgraceful, how ineffectual this was, and how detrimental to his Country. As to the Father-in-Law, he had always in his Mouth two *Greek Lines* taken from the *Phœnissæ* of *Euripedes*, which I here translate, inelegantly perhaps, but intelligibly.

*In all Things else be honest; but the Prize
Of sovereign Pow'r dissolves the moral Ties,*

It was a (g) bold Stroke in *Eteocles*, or rather in *Euripedes*, who excepted out of the Rank of Vices, that very Vice which of all others is the most abominable.

Why

(p) *Rectitude*] Orig. *Omnia recta et honesta*. Doctor Cockman translates this *All Justice and Honesty*. But I can't help thinking, that there is a Meaning in the Words of our Author, that is not express'd by the Doctor's Translation. For what he blames in *Pompey* is not a gross Disregard of *all Justice and Honesty*, but his neglecting that Delicacy of Conduct which is dictated by the Simplicity and Sincerity of Intention: or the *Rectum* and the *Honestum*. There was no Disregard of Honesty express'd by *Pompey* in marrying *Cæsar's* Daughter, there was nothing blameable in it, but the concealed Intention.

(g) *Bold Stroke*] Orig. *Capitalis*. Doctor Cockman translates this

Why then do I dwell upon trifling Matters, such as fraudulent Successions, Bargains, and Sales? Here is an Instance of a Man who wished to be the Monarch of *Rome* and the Master of the World, and succeeded in his Wish: But should any Man pronounce that to be an honest Wish, I will pronounce that Man to be a Madman. For in Fact, he justifies the Ruin of Law, and Liberty, and rejoices in their being flagitiously and execrably destroyed. But should any one confess, that it is indeed wicked for a Man to become the sole Master of a State, that always has been, and always ought to be, free, but that it would be to the Profit of any Man who could effect it, is there a Reproof, or rather is there a Reproach, sharp enough, by which I can reclaim such a Man from so dangerous a Mistake? Immortal Gods! Is it possible for any Man to find his Advantage in the most horrible, the most execrable of all Parricides, that of his Country, even tho' the Murderer should, by his oppressed Fellow-Citizens, be stiled their FATHER? Virtue therefore, must direct Utility, and in such a Manner too, that tho' differing in Sound, they may be the same in Sense.

(q) I so far agree with the vulgar Opinion that I think nothing can be more beneficial than the
O than

this Expression by the Word *villanous*, but neither the Original nor the Sense will bear it. *Shakespeare* cannot be deemed a Villain for making a Villain of *Iago*. The Word *Capitalis*, unless joyned to *Causa*, does necessarily carry a villanous Idea. For it may be taken as I have translated it, and then *Cicero* is guilty of no Absurdity.

(q) I so far agree] The Original as printed in our Author's Text is, *Non habeo ad Vulgi Opinionem, quæ major Utilitas quam regnandi esse possit.* Doctor *Cockman* translates the Passage, "I know the common People are apt to imagine, that nothing
in

than the Exercise of absolute Power may be; but then, when I examine the Matter according to the Standard of Truth, I find that nothing can be more unprofitable to the Man who has acquired it thro' unjustifiable Means. For how is it possible for any Man to find his Account in Pangs, Agonies, alarms by Day and Night, while the whole of his Life is full of nothing but Conspiracies and Dangers.

*Many, a Monarch's Throne betray,
And few are loyal to his Sway.*

says *Accius*; but what Throne does he mean? Even a Kingdom that descended in a lawful Lineage from *Tantalus* and *Pelops*. But how many more will betray a Throne that has been erected by an Army of the *Roman* People upon the Ruins of the *Roman* Liberties, and had enslaved a State, that before was not only free, but the Mistress of Nations. What a Gloom must Conscience throw over the Mind of such a Man? What Stings must he feel?

in the World can be better than to govern." But I think this scarcely expresses our Author's Meaning; nor do I conceive that a Translator is at Liberty to reject a common Reading, tho' it may be somewhat perplex, and tho' in Order to remove that Perplexity some Copyists of the Text have altered it (as is the Case here) so as to agree with their Sense of the Words. The Manner in which I have translated this Passage is uncommon, but is defensible even according to the common Reading, *Ad Vulgi Opinionem non habeo* (subintellige *Utilitatem*) *quæ possit esse major Utilitas quam Utilitas regnandi*. This Sense naturally and easily contrasts with what follows, and gives quite a different Turn to the Sentiment; which otherwise becomes jejune and trite. *Cicero* here does not inveigh against all absolute Power in Government, for, that would be absurd, because it was admitted into the *Roman* Constitution in its freest Times, as in the Case of the Dictatorship, but he abuses *Julius Cæsar* for acquiring the Dictatorship in the Manner he did.

For where can be the Benefit of Life, if a Man holds it upon such Terms, that to take it away becomes a meritorious and a glorious Action. If, therefore, Things that appear the most beneficial are, in Reality, not so, because they are accompanied by Disgrace and Dishonesty, it seems to be abundantly evident that nothing can be beneficial but what is virtuous.

XXII. Mean time, this Point has been several Times determined by our Senate, especially during the War with *Pyrrhus*, when *Fabricius* was General, and in his second Consulship. For after *Pyrrhus*, without any Provocation, had declared War with the People of *Rome*, who thereby were to fight for Dominion with a Monarch of high Blood and great Power, a Deserter from him came into the Camp of *Fabricius*, and promised that, if *Fabricius* would reward him, he would go back, as he came, privately, and kill *Pyrrhus* with Poison. But *Fabricius* carefully sent him back to *Pyrrhus*; for which he was highly applauded by the Senate. Now if we are to regard only the Shew and the Appearance of Utility, this single Deserter would have at once put an End to a dangerous War, and a powerful Enemy of their Empire. But the Disgrace would have been deep and indelible, had they conquered the Man with whom they had a Contest for Glory, by Wickedness and not by Valour.

Which therefore, was most profitable? For *Fabricius*, who in *Rome* was the same that *Aristides* was at *Athens*, and a Senate, that never separated Utility from Dignity, to encounter their Enemy with Arms or with Poisons? If Glory is our Motive for courting Empire, away with all

Wickedness, for Wickedness has no Fellowship with Glory. But if we are to court Power by any Means, Power never can avail us, if it is attended with Infamy. Unavailing, therefore, was the Opinion of *Lucius*, Son to *Quintus*, *Philippus*, for again rendering tributary, those States that *Sylla*, for a Sum of Money, had made free by Consent of the Senate, and that too, without repaying the Money they had advanced for their Freedom. The Senate indeed came into his Opinion, to the Disgrace of our Government, for Robbers are more to be trusted, than a such Senate. Our Revenue was improved. Was it therefore a profitable Measure? How long will Men dare to say that any Thing can be profitable that is not virtuous?

For is it possible that Detestation and Infamy can be profitable to any Government that ought to be founded upon Glory and the Affections of our Allies? My Friend *Cato* and I, therefore, used to differ upon this Head; for I thought him too inflexible an Advocate for the Treasury and the Revenue. The Farmers could gain nothing from him, and our Allies very little; tho' we ought to be kind to the latter, and to treat the former, as we would our Tenants; and the rather, because that good Correspondence between the two Orders, which I then recommended, was (r) beneficial to the Public. It was likewise a wrong

(r) Was beneficial] Orig. *ILLA Ordinum Conjunctio ad Salutem Reipublicæ PERTINEBAT*. Doctor *Cockman* translates this, "All the Safety and Welfare of the Republic depends upon the Agreement of the several Orders in it." But that is not the Meaning of our Author, who by the Word *illa* plainly enough alludes to a well known Fact, viz, that he endeavoured before

wrong Maxim in *Curio*, while he approved of the Equity of the Petition of the People beyond the *Po*, to add always, LET PROFIT TAKE PLACE. He ought to have said, It is not (*s*) equitable, because it is not profitable to the State, rather than by admitting it to have been profitable, to imply that it might not be equitable.

XXIII. The sixth Book of *Hecato* concerning Duties, is full of Questions of this Kind. Whether it is the Part of a good Man not to maintain

the late Revolution, to oppose it, by uniting the Order of the Knights with that of the Senate, which *Cato* prevented by his Severity, and thereby made a Breach by which all the public Calamities entered. The Fact, alluded to, is very fully laid down by him in his Epistles to *Atticus*.

(*s*) It is not equitable] The Original by the common Reading runs thus, *Potius diceret non esse æquam, quia non esset utilis Reipublicæ quam cum utilis esse diceret, non esse æquam fateretur*. *Grævius*, and Doctor *Cockman*, both able Men, have understood this in a quite different Light, from that in which I have translated it. *Grævius* thinks, that in express Disagreement with all MSS and Books, the Original ought to run thus, *Potius diceret non esse utilem Reipublicæ, quia non esset æqua, quam cum utilem esse diceret, non esse æquam fateretur*; and the Reason he gives for this Alteration is extremely plausible. *Curio*, says he, admitted the Measure to be equitable, but was against it, because it was not profitable; therefore, *Cicero* thinks he ought to have said, *Let Equity prevail, tho' Profit be against it*; for when Equity and Profit differ, Equity ought to take place. Doctor *Cockman* translates it in the same Sense.

As I am very unwilling to admit a Variation, if the undoubted Reading can be retained; I have examined this Passage, and, cannot admit, that *Curio* voted or spoke against this Measure, because it was unprofitable. I am rather of Opinion, that *Cicero* blames him for giving so bad a Reason for his voting for it as that of Utility, when he might have given a much better, that of Equity. For our Author, having again and again inculcated, that true Utility and Equity are inseparable, says, that if *Curio* had found the Measure to have been detrimental to the State, he ought boldly to have pronounced it to be unjust: but it was wrong for him to put his Speaking for it upon the Footing of Utility only, as if that Consideration ought to have overborn all Equity.

his Slaves during a very great Dearth of Provisions? He takes both Sides of the Question. But after all, he measures his Duty by what he mistakes for (†) Utility, rather than by Humanity. He examines the Case, whether, when something must be thrown into the Sea, one ought to throw into it a Horse of Price, or a worthless little Slave? Interest inclines him to the one Side, Humanity to the other. Whether, if a Fool has, in a Shipwreck got a Plank, a wise Man may take it from him if he can? He is for the Negative, because the Taking it would be unjust. But supposing the Owner of the Ship to come, may not he seize upon what is his own? By no Means, answers *Hecato*: No more than if he should order one of the Passengers to be thrown out of the Ship into the Sea, because the Ship

(†) Utility] Orig. *Utilitate putat Officium dirigi magis quam Humanitate*. I cannot think that Doctor *Cockman* has translated this Passage rightly. His Words are, "But at last concludes, that he should rather be guided by his Interest, than Humanity." This gives us a shocking Idea. But the Meaning of *Hecato*, according to *Grævius* is, that the Consideration of the Good of a Man's Wife, Children, Relations, and himself, ought to be his Rule in this Case, and that he ought to take care they should not suffer, by his giving to his Slaves what they may want to support their Lives. In this Sense, the *Utilitas* that *Cicero* mentions here, is no other than one humane Consideration attended by a prudential Consideration, oppos'd to a humane Consideration without a prudential one. But I own, I am not pleas'd with this Sentiment, chiefly because it is too laboured.

But it is surprizing, that Doctor *Cockman* should have mistaken our Author's Meaning here, since he himself, in his *Latin* Edition of this Piece, mentions some of the best Manuscripts at *Oxford*, that read the Whole of the Passage *Utilitate, ut putat Officium dirigit*; and *Gronovius* the younger says, that all the old Editions and almost all the Manuscripts, preserve this Reading, which makes the Sense clear and consistent with the whole Tenor of *Cicero's* Reasoning upon the *Utilitas* (see the last Note) and I have translated it accordingly.

is his own. The Reason is, till he comes to the Place for which the Ship is freighted, the Ship is not the Property of the Owner, but of the Passengers.

Again, supposing the two Persons shipwrecked to have got hold of one Plank, both of them equally wise, are both to tug for it, or is the one to resign it to the other? Let one of them resign it, if that others Life is more valuable either in a public or a private Capacity. But supposing them to be equal in both these Respects, what then? Why, then there can be no Debate upon the Matter, and whoever resigns it, the Thing must be looked upon as a meer Chance, and a Toss up at Odds or Evens. Supposing one's Father to pillage Temples and undermine the Exchequer: Is the Son to lodge an Information against him with the Magistrates? It would be unnatural in him if he did. No, he ought rather to defend his Father, if he is impeached. Is not our Country, then, to have the Preference in all our Duties? By all Manner of Means. But it is for the Service of every Country, that Children be affectionate towards their Parents. Supposing a Father shall design to seize the Government, and to betray his Country, is the Son to be silent? Why, he is, in that Case, to beg his Father not to proceed: if he cannot prevail, he is to reproach him; he is even to threaten him. At last, if the Matter points to the Ruin of his Country, he is to prefer the Safety of his Country to that of his Father.

Hecato likewise enquires whether, if a wise Man should unwittingly take in Payment bad Money for good, is he to pay it to a third Hand, for good Money, after he knows it to be bad? *Dio-*

genes is for the Affirmative, but *Antipater*, and I think with more Reason, for the Negative. If a Man is about to sell Wine that he knows will not keep, is he to discover it? *Diogenes* thinks he is not obliged to do it; *Antipater* thinks he cannot be an honest Man, if he does not. These are what we may call Disputable Principles amongst the Stoics. In selling a Slave, you are to tell his Faults (I don't only mean those, that, if you do not tell them, will throw him back upon your Hands) but whether he has a hankering after lying, pilfering, gaming, or drinking. Some think that they all ought to be told; others, that they need not. Whether, if a Man should offer a Lump of Gold to sell, thinking it to be Copper, the Buyer is, in Conscience, obliged to tell him, that it is Gold; else, if he may buy for one Crown that which may be worth a thousand? You may now have a clear Notion both of my Opinion and of the Matters in dispute between the Philosophers I have mentioned.

XXV. Whether are we always to observe those Agreements and Promises, which we make, neither thro' constraint, nor misled (to use the Prætor's Term) by Fraud and cunning? For Instance; supposing a Man gives another a Remedy for a dropical Disorder, but, upon this Condition, that, if it shall cure him, he is never to make Use of it again. Some Years after he falls ill of the same Disorder, without being able to prevail with the Person who gave him the Medicine, to grant him leave to use it again. What is the Patient to do in this Case? Why, as the other is so inhuman and so obstinate in his Refusal, and as he cannot receive any Detriment by the Patient using the Remedy,

medy, the latter is to take Care of his own Health and Life.

Farther; supposing a wise Man were to be requir'd by another who makes him his Heir, and leaves him seven or eight thousand Pounds, that, before he touches a Farthing of it, he shall publicly, and at broad Noon-Day dance in the Forum, and the Person agrees to do it as being the only Condition by which he can enjoy the Legacy. Is he to perform his Promise, or is he not? I think it would have been better, and more suitable to the Character of a wise Man, if he had not made the Promise; but, as he did make it, he will, by touching none of the Money, break it with a better Grace than he can keep it; unless the Money were to be apply'd to do some important Service to the Public in its Distress, so that it would be no Disgrace for him even to dance, since the End was to assist his Country.

XXVI. Neither, indeed, are all those Promises to be kept that are not for the Advantages of the Party to whom they are made. To give another Instance from Mythology; *Sol* promised to his Son *Phaeton* to do whatever he desired him to do. *Phaeton* desired to mount his Father's Chariot; the giddy Boy did mount it, and, before he had well seated himself, he was struck dead by Lightning. How much better would it have been, in this Case, for the Father not to have kept his Promise? Again, when *Theseus* obtain'd a Promise from *Neptune*, what was the Consequence? After *Neptune* had promised to indulge him in three Wishes, he wished for the Death of his Son *Hippolitus*, whom he suspected of Incontinency with his Step-mother; and being gratified in his Wish, it threw him into the most dreadful Agonies.

What shall we say to *Agamemnon's* Vow, who promised *Diana* the most beautiful Mortal that was born, for a certain Year, in his Kingdom, and in consequence of that Vow, sacrificed to her his Daughter *Iphigenia*. Had he better not have fulfilled his Promise, than to have committed so horrid an Action? Promises, therefore, are sometimes not to be kept: Neither are Deposites always to be returned. Should a Man in his Senses, entrust you with his Sword, and, when he is out of them, demand it back: In this Case, to return it is a Crime, not to return it, is a Duty. Supposing again; that a Man deposits Money in your Hands, and then becomes an Enemy to your Country, are you to return the Deposite? By no Means. For, if you do, you act against your Country, which ought to be your dearest Consideration. Thus many Things that, naturally are honest, occasionally, become dishonest. It is dishonest to perform Promises, to stand to a Bargain, to return a Deposite, when the Purposes they were to serve, when they were made, are revers'd.

I think, I have said enough concerning those Objects that carry an Appearance of Profit under a Mask of Wisdom, tho' contrary to Honesty. But as I, in the first Book, deriv'd the moral Duties from four Sources of Virtue, I shall, in Pursuance of that Plan, shew that all Objects which are *seemingly* profitable are *really* not so, if they are inconsistent with Virtue. We have already discours'd of that cunning, that seeks to pass for Prudence; and of Honesty or Justice, which always is profitable. It remains now, that I treat of two Divisions of moral Duty, the first consisting in the well principled Greatness of a vir-

tuous Mind ; the other, in adapting and guiding our Lives according to the Rules of Integrity and Moderation.

XXVI. It is pretended by dramatic Poets (for I find nothing of it in the noble Poems of *Homer*) that, *Ulysses* thought it would be for his Advantage to (x) pretend Madness, because he wanted to be excus'd from serving in the Expedition against *Troy*. This was a dishonest Purpose. But, (it may be said by some) it was for his Advantage to reign, and to indulge himself in *Ithaca*, with his Parents, his Wife, and his Son, and can you imagine that the Glory which is acquired by incessant Toils and Dangers, is comparable to such a Life of Tranquillity ? If I am ask'd this Question, my Reply is, that, I think such a Life of Tranquillity is mean and despicable, because, I think, that nothing that is dishonest can ever be advantageous.

Had *Ulysses* persever'd in his Dissimulation, what reproaches must he have undergone, when, after all the glorious Exploits he perform'd, he met with the following from *Ajax*.

*The Chief, you know it, who propos'd the Oath
Is the sole Chief, who perjur'd thro' his Sloth,
That Crime to cover, Madness did pretend,
And had compleated his inglorious End ;
But Palamedes sagacious Eye beheld
His perjur'd Craft, and drag'd him to the Field (y).*

(x) Pretend] Orig. *Infimulant. Simulatione.*

(y) Field] These Verses are probably from a Play of *Pacuvius* concerning the Contest for the Arms of *Achilles* between *Ajax* and *Ulysses*. The Story here alluded to was, *Ulysses* counterfeiting himself mad, in Order to evade his going upon the Expedition. But he was discovered by *Palamedes*.

Now he ought to have chosen to fight, not only his Enemy, but with the Waves; as was his Case afterwards, rather than have deserted from the common Cause of all the *Greeks*, who were Confederates in a War against the Barbarians.

But let us have done with Fables and Foreigners, that we may come to a real Fact, and, that too, performed by a Countryman of our own. *Marcus Attilius Regulus*, when he was Consul for a second Time, being taken prisoner by *Xantippus* a *Lacedæmonian* Captain, (*Hamilcar*, the Father of *Hannibal*, commanding in chief,) was sent to the *Roman* Senate upon his Oath, that if certain noble *Carthaginian* Prisoners were not given up, he should return to *Carthage*. When he came to *Rome*, he saw, indeed, the Appearance of Advantage, but, as his Conduct declared, he judged it to be a false Appearance. Here, it was in his Power to remain in his native Country, to live at Home with his Wife and Family; and, looking upon the Misfortune of his Defeat and Captivity as only the Fate of War, to have returned to the Exercise of the consular Dignity. Can all those be denied to be happy Circumstances? How say you? I say that Magnanimity and Courage will think they are not. Can you desire Authorities of greater Weight?

XXVII. For the Properties of those Virtues are to fear nothing; to look down upon all transitory Considerations; and to think that nothing can happen in Life so bad, but that it may be borne. How then did *Regulus* act? Why, he came to the Senate, he laid before them what he had in Charge,
he

refused to (z) conceal his own Opinion, but said, that while he was bound to the Enemy by Oath, he was no Senator. He even went so far (*what a Fool*, say some, *and what an Enemy he was to himself!*) as to deny that it was for the Benefit of the Public to deliver up the Captives; because they consisted of young Men, and able (a) Officers; but that he was now worn out by old Age. His Opinion prevailed; the Prisoners were detained, he himself returned to *Carthage*, without being stopt by the Endearments of his Country, his Family, and his Friends; and all this while, he knew, that he was returning to an inhuman Enemy, and a tormenting Death: But he thought, that he must keep his Oath. For this Reason, even at the Time when he was put to Death, by being kept (b) from Sleep, he was less to be pitied than if he had lived at Home, an old Captive, and a perjured Consular. “But what a Fool was he, (it may be said,) not only to give his Opinion against

(z). *Refused to conceal*] I can't help doubting the Propriety of Doctor Cockman's Translation, or rather Reading of this Passage. Orig. *Sententiam ne diceret, recusavit*. Which he translates, “He refused to give his own Vote in the Case.” But I understand *Cicero* to mean, that tho' being a Captive, he could not give his Suffrage as a Senator, yet that he was not debarred from speaking his Opinion: Which we see in Fact he does, tho' possibly the Senators would have persuaded him not to do it, for fear of exasperating the *Carthaginians*. This Translation is countenanced by one or two of the MSS, consulted and quoted by the Doctor himself.

(a) *Able Officers*] Orig. *Illos enim Adolescentes, esse et bonos Duces*. I cannot see the Reason why Doctor Cockman has translated this Passage, “That they were young Men and might make able Leaders.” It certainly is much better Sense as the Original stands, and the Reasoning of *Regulus* is much stronger.

(b) *Kept from Sleep*] We are told that he was shut up in a small Machine stuck all round with sharp Spikes, after his Eyelids were cut off; and kept there till he died.

deli-

delivering them up, but persuaded the Senate to detain them." How a Fool? Supposing that thereby he served his Country. And can any Thing be profitable for an Individual that is against the Interest of the whole?

XXVIII. When Men separate Profit, or Expediency, from Virtue, they confound the very fundamental Principles of Nature. Because we all of us, pursue what is profitable for us; we are impelled to it; and it is impossible for us to do otherwise. For where is the Man who declines what is profitable for himself? Or rather who does not eagerly pursue it? But as Nothing can ever be profitable, but what is consistent with Glory, with Gracefulness, and with Virtue, we therefore look upon those, as being the chief and the highest Considerations in Life, and understand the Word Profit, or Expediency, as a Matter that is more necessary than glorious.

Here, some one may say, "And what mighty
 " Matter is there in an Oath? Do we fear
 " the Vengeance of *Jove* in Wrath? No; it is
 " an agreed Principle with all Philosophers (not
 " only of those who say, that the Godhead has
 " no Concern about any Thing, nor expects that
 " any other Being will trouble itself about any
 " Object, but, even of those who think that the
 " Godhead is for ever acting or contriving some-
 " what) that he never is angry or mischievous.
 " But, suppose he is, could *Jupiter*, even in a Pas-
 " sion have hurt *Regulus*, more than *Regulus* hurt
 " himself? It was not, therefore, any religious
 " Scruple that made him forego so great an In-
 " terest. Was it for fear of doing a disgraceful
 " Thing

“ Thing? In the first Place, of two Evils, we
 “ are to chuse the least. Now, whether was
 “ there most Evil in breaking his Oath, or in suf-
 “ fering the Torments he endured? We are like-
 “ wise to consider, what *Atcius* says, *Have you not*
 “ *broke your Promise?* The Answer is, *I neither*
 “ *gave it, nor do I give it to any Traytor.* For, tho’
 “ this was spoke by a wicked King, yet there is
 “ great Reason in it.

To this, they add, “ That, as we maintain that
 “ some Things appear to be profitable without be-
 “ ing really so, so some Things appear to be virtuous
 “ that are not virtuous. For Instance, there was an
 “ Appearance of Virtue in *Regulus* returning to be
 “ tormented, that he might keep his Oath. But,
 “ in Fact, it was dishonest; because he ought
 “ not to have performed a Promise that was for-
 “ cibly extorted from him by an Enemy. They
 “ go farther, and say, that when a Thing is ex-
 “ tremely profitable, it becomes virtuous, tho’ it
 “ appeared otherwise before.” So much for the
 Arguments against the Conduct of *Regulus*, let us
 now examine them, as they stand.

XXIX. “ We are not, say they, to be afraid that
 “ *Jupiter* will do us any Hurt, in a Fit of Passion,
 “ because, he has in his Nature neither Anger nor
 “ Harm.” Now, this Argument holds equally a-
 gainst the Performance of any Oath, as against the
 Conduct of *Regulus*. But in the Case of an Oath, we
 are not to regard the Penalty, but the Obligation.
 For an Oath is a religious Affirmation. Now
 whatever you promise affirmatively calling God;
 as it were, to witness it, ought to be observed.
 The Question therefore, does not relate to the
 Resentment of the Gods, for in Fact, they have
 Truth,

no Passions, but to the Obligations of Justice and Truth. For it is a fine Exclamation in *Ænnius*.

(c) *Fair, pinion'd Truth! thou Oath of mighty Jove!*

The Man, therefore, who violates an Oath, violates Truth, whose Image, as *Cato* tells, us in an Oration, was placed, by our Ancestors, in the Capitol, next to that of *Jupiter*, THE BEST AND THE GREATEST.

But it was said, "That *Jupiter* would not have "hurt *Regulus* more than *Regulus* hurt himself." That is true, if Pain is the only Evil we can endure. But Philosophers, upon the (d) strongest Grounds affirm, that Pain, so far from being the greatest

(c) *Fair pinion'd*] Orig. *O Fides alma, apta pinnis, & juvandum Jovis!* It seems the Statue of Truth, like most of the other moral Deities, had Wings to denote its Excellence.

The Whole of our Author's Doctrine here is perhaps too sublime for human Imperfection; for, tho' he supposes that *Jupiter* does not trouble himself about the Punishment of Perjury, tho' he is invoked to be Witness to the Oath, (the Propriety of which, is not very clearly explained by our Author,) yet he supposes, that the Crime is punished by the very Commission of it. I cannot, however, from the Passage that is before us help thinking, that the old *Romans* here spoken of, believed in Providence, and the Distribution of Rewards and Punishments in this Life, for we see that they put the Statue of Truth by the Side, and under the Protection, of their greatest God.

(d) *Strongest Grounds*] Orig. *Maxima Auctoritate Philosophi affirmant; quorum quidem Testem non mediocre, sed haud scio an gravissimum, Regulum nolite, quaeso, vituperare.* Doctor Cockman translates this Passage, "If we may credit some of the chief "Philosophers, among whom, I pray you, let *Regulus* be "counted of no small Authority; if I may not rather say of "the greatest and most weighty." But I cannot be of Opinion, that this comes up to our Author's Sense. *Philosophi, magna Auctoritate*, is not usual with our Author in the Sense the Doctor takes the Expression. *Autoritas* signifies an indecisive Opinion, and is borrowed from the Practice of the Senators, whose *Autoritas*, (tho of great Weight) was indecisive on Account of some Interposition of the great Magistrates who hindered it from being decisive.

Evil; is no Evil at all. I therefore beg that you will not disregard the Example of *Regulus*, who is no indifferent, perhaps the most weighty, Evidence of this Truth. For what more unquestionable Evidence can we have, than that of one of the Rulers of *Rome*, who voluntarily chose to suffer a tormenting Death that he might not depart from his Duty? As to their Argument, "That, of two Evils to chuse the least"—they can mean nothing else by it, than that, Dishonesty is preferable to Calamity. But can there be a greater Evil than Dishonesty? If bodily Deformity disgusts us, how shocking ought to be the Deformity and Pollution of a dishonest Mind? They, therefore, who have, handled this Subject with the greatest Strictness, venture to call nothing an Evil, but Dishonesty; and they who discourse less severely, readily admit it to be the greatest Evil. As to their Argument from the Poet, *I neither gave, nor do I give, my Promise to a Traytor*, he has put it very properly into the Mouth of *Atræus*, whose Character it suits. But if we lay it down as a Principle, that no Faith is to be kept with a Traytor, let them take care that they do not open an Inlet for Perjury.

Even War has its Laws, and an Oath is inviolably to be kept to an Enemy; therefore, whatever is sworn ought to be kept according to the Construction that (e) Conscience puts

P

upon

(e) Conscience] The Morality of *Cicero*, in his Doctrine of Oaths, has been very much questioned, and his Expression here in the Original is not a little obscure, *Quod enim ita juratum est ut Mens conciperet fieri oportere, id servandum est: Quod aliter; id si non feceris, nullum est Perjurium*. Now, in the first Place, it seems a little absurd to suppose, that the Meaning of the

Person

upon the Words of the Oath ; but you are to mind that alone ; for all other Constructions may be disregarded without being guilty of Perjury. For (f) Example, supposing that you bargained

Person, to whom the Oath is given, should be the Rule for the Performance of it ; because, that Person may have a secret Meaning, as well as the Person who takes the Oath. Doctor Cockman, in order to avoid this Absurdity, translates the Whole of the Passage thus. " For whatever you swear, for Example, in such a Manner, as that all your Conscience tells you it ought to be done, you are bound most inviolably to perform it. " But this Translation, I am afraid, makes our Author guilty of a still greater Absurdity, by making the Conscience of the Taker of the Oath, the Rule of its Performance. Every Body knows how apt Mankind are to impose upon, or to deaden, their Consciences, by mental Reservations, and the like, and what wild unjust Things Conscience often prompts Men to do. But, in Fact, I think, our Author ought to be charged with neither of those Absurdities, because, he speaks neither of the *Mens deferentis*, that is, the Conscience of the Person who administers the Oath ; nor does he say *tua Mens*, as Doctor Cockman makes him say, but he speaks of *Mens* in general, that is, the general Notion of Right and Wrong, Fitness or Unfitness, and the like, which is, or ought to be, in the Breast of every Man. In this Sense, the Reasoning of our Author is extremely clear and consistent, for it includes not only the Sense, in which the Person who administers, or the Person who takes the Oath, understands it, but the Sense in which each thinks the other understands it, provided that their Understanding is directed by Reason and Conscience.

(f) Example] Our Author has been pretty severely handled by some of his greatest Admirers, for the Position that here follows. Grotius, after approving of the Conduct of *Pomponius Regulus*, and other Instances brought by *Cicero*, tells us, that Oaths not only take place amongst public Enemies, *Sed inter quos vis*, " but amongst all Manner of Men. " The Reason he gives for it is, *Non enim Persona sola respicitur, cui juratur, sed is qui juratur Deus, qui ad Obligationem pariendam sufficit.* " For " says he, the Person to whom the Oath is sworn, is not alone " to be regarded, because our Regard for God, by whom the " Oath is sworn, is sufficient to bind us to the Performance of it. " But this is a very bad Reason with Respect to *Cicero*, who puts the Resentment, and all Regard of the Deity, quite out of the Question here, and grounds the moral Obligation entirely upon the *Honestum*, which every Man ought to possess within himself.

Grotius

gained with Robbers to give them a Sum of Money to save your Life, and did not pay the Money; you will, in this Case, be guilty of no Crime, even tho' you had sworn to perform it, because a Robber is not to be counted a fair Enemy; but the common Enemy of all Mankind. Therefore, no Faith is owing to him, nor has he a Right like other Men, to exact the Performance of an Oath: For, to (g) swear to what you do not

Grotius goes on to say, "That tho' the Law of Nations, has made a Distinction, between an Enemy, and a Robber; yet no such Distinction can obtain here, because the Question does not regard the Man but the Deity." One would be almost tempted to think, from Grotius insisting so much upon this Objection, that he had not read, or not sufficiently consider'd the Context; in which Cicero admits, that the Deity does not mind us, nor regard whether we mind him or not.

Grotius goes on, *Neque id quod sumit Cicero verum est, nullam esse cum Prædone Juris Societatem. Nam Depositum ex ipso Gentium Jure, reddendum Latroni, si Dominus non appareat.* That is, "Not is Cicero defensible in his Assertion, that by Law we ought to have no Connexion with a Robber, for it is laid down by the very Law of Nature, that a Deposit is to be return'd to a Robber if the lawful Owner does not appear;" and for this, quotes Tryphonimus. As I do not intend, to enter upon our Author's Defence, as a Casuist, but as a Translator, I shall not examine whether this Opinion of Tryphonimus is right, but, I think, it is pretty plain, that whether it is or not, it cannot affect our Author's Reasoning. For if the Conscience of the Man, who swears to the Robber, tells him, that he is under an unlawful Restraint, and that the Oath, were it not for that Restraint, would be unlawful, and that even the Robber himself, in his own Conscience, either is, or ought to be of the same Mind, Cicero says, that such an Oath cannot be obligatory, and that the Illegality of it arises from the Robber's having no Right to impose it upon you. Whereas no such Illegality arises from the Performance of an Oath given to a public Enemy, because all public Enemies stand in the same Light towards one another, which is not the Case between an honest Man and a Robber.

(g) For to swear] Our Author's Expression here, is pretty remarkable, *Non enim falsum jurare perjurare est: Sed quod ex Animi tui Sententia juraris, sicut Verbis concipitur More nostro, id non facere, Perjurium est.* It is plain, however, that our Author's Meaning must be as I have translated it.

perform, is not Perjury, but it is Perjury not to perform that which you have sworn to perform "according to the best of your Conscience," for so our Law-forms run. It is therefore very properly said by *Euripides*, *With my Tongue I swore, but my Mind was free*. As to *Regulus*, it would have been wrong in him, as he had to do with an open and declared Enemy, to have transgressed the Laws of War, which prevail in Times of Hostility, by committing a Perjury so expressly condemned by the Fæcial (*b*) Law and many civil Statutes; otherwise, our Senate never would have delivered up, to their Enemies, so many *Roman* Citizens of Eminence, with their (*i*) Hands tyed behind their Backs.

XXX. This puts me in Mind of (*k*) *Titus Veturius* and *Spurius Posthumius*, who, in their second Consulship, were delivered up to the *Samnites*, for making a Peace with them without being warranted by the People and Senate, after the unfortunate Engagement at *Caudium*, where our Troops underwent the Disgrace of marching beneath a Gibbet. At the same Time, *Titus Numicius*, and *Quintus Mælius*, who were then Tribunes of the People, were likewise delivered up for giving their Opinions in Favour of the Peace, that the Obligation of it might be cancelled. Now *Posthumius* himself moved and

(*b*) Fæcial] See Note p. 22.

(*i*) Hands ty'd behind their Backs] This was, because they had concluded Treaties with the Enemies of their Country which their Country did not think proper to ratify, and, therefore, they sent them back as Prisoners and Malefactors.

(*k*) *Titus Veturius*] We have the Whole of this Story in *Livy*. It happened about the Year of *Rome* 433, but I am not Casuist enough to determine whether the *Romans* delivering up some of their general Officers, sufficiently cancelled a Treaty made under such Circumstances as that of *Caudium* was.

spoke for this Rendition, though he himself was one of the Persons who was to be delivered up. The same happened, many Years after, to be the Case of *Caius Mancinius*, who spoke earnestly for the Bill, which, by Order of the Senate, *Lucius Furius* and *Sextus Attilius* carried to the People, for delivering him up to the *Numantines*, with whom he had made a Peace without Warrant from the Senate; and, upon the Peoples passing the Bill, he was accordingly delivered up to the Enemy. This was acting more honourably than *Quintus Pompeius* did, whose Case was the very same, but, upon his humble Application, the Bill for delivering him up, was rejected by the People. In this last Instance, seeming Utility got the better of real Virtue. But in the other Cases, that I have mention'd, the Shew of Utility gave Way to the Authority of Virtue.

But it has been said, “that *Regulus* ought not to have performed what was extorted from him by Force.” But, let me tell you, that Force has no Power over a determin'd Mind. Why then, it may be said, did he go to the Senate, especially as he was resolved to speak against delivering up the Captives? But you censure the very Circumstance, that is most glorious in all his Conduct, for he was not determined by his own Opinion, but became an advocate for a Measure upon which the Senate was to determine, and had not he himself argued for that Measure, it is most certain, that the Captives would have been delivered back to their Countrymen. By this Means, *Regulus* would have remained in (1) honourable Safety at *Rome*,

P 3

but

(1) Honourable Safety] Orig. *Incolumis*. This Expression,

but, because he knew that this would not be for the Advantage of his Country, he conceiv'd it to be more for his Honour to speak and to suffer, as he did. As to what we are told, "That what" "is extremely advantageous, becomes virtuous." It must be in its present, and not in its future, Existence, that it is virtuous, for nothing can be advantageous, that is not virtuous. Nor is Virtue the Consequence of Advantage, but Advantage is the Result of Virtue. Upon the whole, amongst many wonderful Instances of Virtue, it will be hard to find one that is more glorious, or more excellent, than this of *Regulus*.

XXXI. But of all his Merit in this Conduct, the Circumstance that strikes us with the greatest Admiration is his giving his Opinion for detaining the Captives. For there is nothing very extraordinary in his returning to *Carthage*, when we consider, that in those Days, it was impossible for him to have acted otherwise; so that it was no Merit of his, but of the Age he lived in. For our Ancestors thought there was no Tie so obligatory to the Performance of a Promise, as an Oath. As a Proof of this, I may appeal to the Laws of the Twelve Tables; I may appeal to the (m) great

which Dr. Cockman has translated by the single Word *SAFE*, appears, from many Passages in *Cicero*, and other classical Authors, to imply *Safety with Dignity*, and, in this Sense, our Author's Reasoning is more strong. For neither the *Carthaginians*, nor the *Romans* could have blamed *Regulus*. On the contrary, he must have appeared to great Advantage with both People, had he been for sending back the Prisoners, and therefore, the Opinion he gave, was the more meritorious.

(m) Great Charter] Orig. *Sacratæ*. These were the Laws which the People of *Rome* obtain'd about sixty Years after the Expulsion of Kings, and which they as much considered as the Basis of their Liberties, as the People of *England* do their *Magna Charta*.

Charter of the Liberty of the Commons ; I can appeal to those Treaties which bind us to good Faith even with an Enemy ; I can appeal to our Censors, who in all the Course of their (n) Cognisances and Punishments never were more severe in any Case than in that of an Oath.

After the Dictatorship of *Lucius Manlius*, the Son of *Aulus*, was expired, *Marcus Pomponius*, a Tribune of the Commons, brought an Indictment against him for having exercised that Office a few Days longer than he ought. He was likewise ac-

(n) *Cognisances* Orig. *Notiones*. Dr. Cockman translates this Word *Punishments*, but that is not precisely the Meaning of *Notio*. It is a Term in the Civil Law, and is the same with *Notatio* and *Nota*. It signified a Power of taking Cognisance of a Matter, but without having any actual Jurisdiction over it. This was sometimes the Case with the Censors, when they made a Report to the Senate of a Misdemeanor, either to get it punished, or to get the Punishment, they had inflicted upon it, confirmed. In many Cases, however, they had, as the Prætor had, a *Notio cum Jurisdictione*, that is, both the Power of taking Cognisance and of pronouncing Sentence. We are farther to observe, that neither the censorial Cognisance or Punishment disabled any Man from enjoining all the Privileges of a Roman Citizen, unless the same came to a legal Trial, or a particular Provision was made by the Senate for that Purpose. *Cicero* in his Oration for *Cluentius*, mentions some Senators who had been punished by the Censors, and came afterwards to be Censors themselves, and very illustrious Senators. He adds, in the same Oration, that no Man, unless brought before a Jury, which he and his Antagonist agree to be tried by, could suffer any legal Disability, or to be adjudged in one Farthing of Money which the Law could oblige him to pay. I shall only add to this Note, that when the City-Prætor, or whoever was the Judge, named the Jury, or the *Judices*, that was to try a Cause, both Parties had a Copy of the Pannel, and, out of that, a certain Number was balloted to be upon the Jury. Each Party then was allowed a Challenge, and, if any were objected to, others were balloted in their Room, and, when the Jury was agreed upon and impanelled, each of the Jurymen, or *Judices*, were sworn to act impartially, but the Prætor, or the Judge, was not, he having been sworn at his Entrance upon his Office.

cused of his having banished, from the Society of Men his Son *Titus*, who afterwards had the Surname of *Torquatus* or the *Collar'd*, by ordering him to live in the Country. As soon as the young Man heard that his Father was brought into Trouble on his Account, we are told, that he immediately ran to *Rome*, and by Break of Day, was at the House of *Pomponius*.

The latter being told of this Visit, imagining that the Youth, out of Resentment to his Father, was come to give in some Information against him, immediately got out of Bed, and clearing the Room of all Company, he ordered *Titus* to be called in. But no sooner was the Youth entered, then drawing his Sword, he swore that he would, that Instant, put *Pomponius* to Death, unless he would promise by an Oath, to drop the Prosecution against his Father. *Pomponius* swore this under the Influence of Terror; he laid the whole of the Matter before the People, and telling them the Necessity he was under for proceeding no farther, he discharged *Manlius*: So powerful in those Days, was an (o) Oath. Now this was the *Titus Manlius* who acquired the Surname of the *COLLAR'D* by killing a *Gaul* who had challenged him, near

(o) *An Oath*] This is a very extraordinary Story, and as it comes from so good Authority is very proper for the Stage. But after our Author's reasoning against keeping our Oaths to Highwaymen, and Pyrates, I cannot think that the Example of *Pomponius* proves any more for his System, than that the *Romans* were most unreasonably scrupulous in the Matter of an Oath. In the Case here described, young *Manlius*, tho' his Intention was pious and commendable, appears to be no better than an Assassin, and as such he ought to have been treated. I am therefore, apt to believe, that the Prosecution was dropt, not thro' any Regard which the People had to the Obligation of the Oath of *Pomponius*, but thro' their Admiration of the young Man's Affection.

the

the River *Anis*, and stripping him of his Collar. In his third Consulship, the *Latins* were routed and put to flight near the River *Veseris*. He was a very extraordinary Person, and proved equally barbarous as a Father, as he had been affectionate as a Son. (p)

XXXII. But, as *Regulus* is deservedly celebrated for keeping his Oath, so the ten *Romans*, who after the Battle of *Cannæ*, were sent by *Hannibal* to the Senate, after swearing to return to the *Cartaginian* Camp, if they did not succeed in getting the Prisoners ransomed; they, I say were to blame if they did not return. Authors differ in their Relations of this Fact. For *Polybius*, (q) an Author of the highest Credit, says, that of ten *Romans*, Men of the greatest Quality, that were then sent, nine returned, not having succeeded in their Commission, but that the tenth, (who, as if he had forgot somewhat returned to the *Cartaginian* Camp, a little after he had left it,) staid at *Rome*, because he thought that his returning to the Camp freed him from the Obligation of his Oath. But in that he was mistaken; for Deceit, instead of removing, aggravates, Perjury. This, therefore, was a foolish Piece of Craft, awkwardly aping Wisdom. The Senate, therefore, decreed, that this Juggler, this Player with an Oath, should be sent back to *Hannibal* in Fetters.

But the greatest Instance of all was the following. *Hannibal* made eight thousand *Romans* Prisoners, but not in the Field, or in the Rout of the

(p) Son] He order'd his Son's Head to be cut off, for fighting and conquering without Orders.

(q) *Polybius*] He was a noble and a celebrated Historian; the Friend of *Scipio* and of *Lælius*. The greatest Part of his History, which was written in *Greek*, his native Language, is now lost.

Battle.

Battle, for they had been left in the Camp by the Consuls *Paulus* and *Vairro*: And tho' they might have been ransomed with a Trifle of Money, yet the Senate gave an Opinion against ransoming them at all; that our Soldiers might hold it as a fixt Principle, that they were either to conquer or to dye. *Polybius* adds, that the Report of this, broke the Spirit of *Hannibal* when he saw how magnanimously the *Romans* behaved in that low Condition of their Affairs. This may serve as an Instance of the Preference, which Virtue has over a seeming Profit in the Competition of Duty.

But (r) *Accilius*, who wrote a History in *Greek* says, that several of the *Romans* had returned to the Camp, in order to evade the Force of their Oath by that Equivocation, and that all of them were branded with Infamy by the Censors. I now finish what I had to say upon this Head; for it is plain that Actions proceeding from a cowardly, abject, mean, and dastardly Spirit (such as the Behaviour of *Regulus* would have been had he either de-

(r) *Accilius*] He was *Questor* and *Tribune of the People*, and wrote the *Annals of Rome* in *Greek*, which are quoted by *Livy*. It is pretty surprising there should be such jarring Accounts of so recent a Fact. For besides the two contradictory Accounts we have here, I find another in *Aulus Gellius*, who tells us, that eight of the Captives returned to *Hannibal*, but that two of them, upon the frivolous Pretext of having returned before to the *Carthaginian* Camp, after being sworn, remained at *Rome*, and claimed the *Jus Postliminii*, or the Protection of their Country, for which they were severely punished by the Censors. The same Author acquaints us, that *Cornelius Nepos* gave a fourth Account of the Matter, and wrote, that there was a Debate in the Senate about sending back those that remained at *Rome*, but that, upon a Division, it was carried in the Negative. He adds, however, that they who remained were so detestable to the Public, that their Lives became a Burthen to them, and that they put themselves to Death.

livered

livered his Opinion concerning the Captives according to his own seeming Interest, and not according to that of his Country, or had he wanted to remain at Home) are not to be deemed profitable, because, in Fact, they are wicked, disgraceful and dishonest.

XXXIII. A fourth Head remains; and that comprehends Gracefulness, Moderation, Modesty, Abstinence, and Temperance. Now can any Thing be profitable, that contradicts the Assemblage of such Virtues? Notwithstanding that, some Philosophers, who from (s) *Aristippus* were termed *Cyrenaics*, and another Sect termed (t) *Annicerians*, have placed all Good in Pleasure; and have been of Opinion, that Virtue is desirable, only because it is an Efficient of Pleasure. Tho' their Doctrine is now out of Date; yet that of *Epicurus* is in Vogue, who, is, as it were, the Supporter and Maintainer of the same Opinions. We are to encounter them (u) Horse and Foot, as the Saying is, if we intend to defend and maintain the Cause of Virtue.

For if, as (x) *Metrodorus* writes, nor only Utility, but all the Requisites of a happy Life, consist in a healthful Habit of Body, and a great Probability of its Continuance, then, surely, this Utility, supreme, as they make it, must clash with Virtue. For, in the first Place, what is the Post assigned to Prudence, but to be the universal Caterer of Delights? Miserable must this Domestic

(s) *Aristippus*] This Philosopher was born at *Cyrene* a Town in *Afric*.

(t) *Annicerians*] From one *Anniceris*, the Founder of a new Sect of the *Cyrenaics*.

(u) *Horse and Foot*] Orig. *Viris Equisque*, a proverbial Expression to signify "with all our Force"

(x) *Metrodorus*] He was the Disciple and intimate Friend of *Epicurus*.

of Virtue be, when degraded into the Slave of Pleasure. But what Properties is she to exert in this Employment? She is to make a judicious Choice of Pleasures! Admitting that nothing can be more delightful, can any Thing more scandalous be thought of, than such an Employment? As to the Man who thinks Pain to be the greatest Evil, what can such a Man have to do with Fortitude, which consists in despising Pain and Trouble? For though *Epicurus*, in many Passages, and in this I have quoted in particular, speaks with great Spirit on the Subject of Pain, yet we are not so much to regard what he says, as the Consequences of the Principles he maintains, when he makes all Good terminate in Pleasure, and all Evil in Pain. In like Manner, hear him talk of Abstinence and Temperance, he says a great many very fine Things, but, as we may say, he is troubled with the Strangury in his Sentiments. For how can the Praise of Temperance flow freely from a Man, who places the highest good in Pleasure? Now Temperance lays a Check upon the Appetite, and the Appetites are ever upon the scent after Pleasure.

And yet they make a Shift to shuffle about those three Heads, with some Art. They recommend Prudence as the Science that furnishes Pleasure, and averts Pain. They have a Way of Dressing out Fortitude, as the Principle thro' which we despise Death and endure Pain. As to Temperance, they recommend it, but with a very bad Grace; however, they do as well as they can. For they tell us that the Consummation of Pleasure is the Privation of Pain. As to Justice, she totters, or rather tumbles down, together with all the Virtues that are practised either in the greater,

or the lesser Affociations of Mankind. For they leave no Room for Goodness of Heart, for Generosity, for Gentleness, nor Friendship, because they tell us, that those Virtues are desirable in themselves, no farther, than, as they serve the Purposes of Pleasure or Profit.

XXXIV. But to come to a close. Having shewn, that no real Utility can exist in Opposition to Virtue, I now maintain that all sensual Pleasure opposes Virtue. I therefore look upon (y) *Calippo* and *Demonax* to be the more blameable, when they thought they could solve all Difficulties, by coupling Pleasure with Virtue, a Brute with a Man. Virtue resists, disdains and repels such a Junction, nor indeed is it possible that the supreme Good, which, in its own Nature, ought to be simple, should be a compound and a Mass of contradictory Qualities. But I have treated of this Subject, for it is a weighty one, at large in another Work.

To proceed: What I have said will be sufficient to instruct us, how we are to be determined in our Choice, if a seeming Utility, should it at any Time, come in Competition with Virtue. But, should even Pleasure be said to carry the Appearance of Utility, there can, I maintain it, be no Agreement between her and Virtue; for though, perhaps, we may allow Pleasure to give, as it were, a little Relish to Life, yet we absolutely deny, that she ever can be attended with Utility.

You have here, my Son *Marcus*, your Father's Present, and, in his Opinion, a valuable Present too, but the Value of it to you, will, in a great Measure, depend upon the Reception you give it.

(y) *Calippo*] These two Philosophers coupled Pleasure and Virtue together, in order to constitute Happiness.

I insist

I insist, however, that these three Books be admitted with the Civility due, to Strangers, amongst the Lectures of *Cratippus*. Had I come to *Athens*, (which I would have done, had not the Voice of my Country loudly called me back, after I had proceeded half-way) you should sometimes have attended my Lectures likewise; but, as you receive in these Books, the Sense of all I had to say, my Request is, that you will bestow upon them as much Time as you can, and I know you can as much as you please. When I understand, that you take Delight in those Studies, I will converse with you, (as I hope soon to do) in Person, and I will correspond with you in Absence. Farewel, my Son, and depend upon it, that the very great Affection which I now bear you will be redoubled, if you take Pleasure in such Writings and Studies.

The End of CICERO'S OFFICES.





C A T O M A J O R,
C O N C E R N I N G
O L D A G E :

O R,

Conferences about the Means of making OLD
AGE happy and comfortable, between
CATO, SCIPIO, and LÆLIUS.

Address'd by CICERO to POMPONIUS ATTICUS.

I N T R O D U C T I O N,

C H A P. I.



*AY, (a) TITUS, should my friendly Arts
controul,*

*The teasing Tumults of thy restless Soul;
Will it avail me ought?*

You see, my Friend, that I take the Liberty to
accoft you with the same Lines, in which *Flaminius*
was address'd by the Man

(a) *Say Titus*] These Verses are from an old Poet, perhaps
Ennius, and are address'd to that *Flaminius*, who procur'd King
Prusca's Consent to give up *Hannibal*, who upon that poison'd
himself.

Of low Estate, but of unshaken Truth.

Meanwhile, I am entirely sensible that your Case is not the same with that of *Flaminius*,

Whose anxious Thoughts nor Day nor Night assuag'd.

For I well know the Gentleness and the Smoothness of your Disposition, and that you have imported from *Athens*, not only your Surname, but Politeness and good Sense. And yet I suspect, that you and I, are sometimes deeply affected with the very (b) same Considerations: But the Cure that is to be administer'd to them is of greater Difficulty and must be delay'd to a more proper Season. At present, I propose to address somewhat to you upon the Subject of *Old-Age*. For I own, that I want to render light, to you and myself, that (c) Load of Old Age, which equally presses, or at least approaches, upon us both. And yet as to you, I am quite satisfied, that you will keep up to your Character in this, as in every Thing else, and that you endure, or will endure it, with Temper and Wisdom.

But after I had resolv'd to write somewhat concerning *Old-Age*, it struck me, that I should make you a proper Present, that might be equally of Service to us both. For my own Part, I took such Pleasure in Writing the following Treatise, that it has, in me, not only cancell'd the Troubles of *Old-Age*, but has render'd it pleasing and delightful. Never, therefore, can we sufficiently admire Philosophy, since by obeying her,

(b) *Same Considerations*] Meaning their Concern for the Loss of Public Liberty.

(c) *Load of old Age*] Our Author was then about 62.

we may pass every Stage of Life without a disagreeable Incident.

As to other Points of Philosophy, I have treated, and continue to treat of them very fully; but I have address'd this Book upon Old Age to you. Now, I have not like (d) *Aristo* the *Cbian*, given a *Tithonus* for an Interlocutor, for Fable would have debas'd the Dignity of the Subject; but I have given to my Dialogue the weighty Sanction of the Elder *Cato's* Name, in whose House I have introduc'd (e) *Laelius* and *Scipio*, admiring the Unconcern with which he bore his Old Age; and have given his Answers to their Observations. Some may, perhaps, think, that his Style here is more polish'd than that of his own Writings, but I give you Leave to attribute that to the Study of *Greek* Learning which he grew so fond of in his Old Age. But to cut short, let us hear *Cato*, into whose Mouth I have put all my Sentiments concerning Old Age.

(d) *Aristo*] He was a Stoic Philosopher, and a Native of *Cbios*. *Cicero* mentions him in other Parts of his Works, as being an elegant and polite, but an enervate, Writer. The Treatise here mention'd is lost.

(e) *Laelius* and *Cato*] Many learned Men have committed egregious Blunders thro', what we may call, the Duplicates of those illustrious Names. The *Scipio Africanus* mentioned here, is not the same with the *Scipio Africanus* mention'd p. 144. and who defeated *Hannibal* in the second punic War. The *Scipio* here mentioned was the Son of *Paulus*, and adopted by the *Scipio* Family, and finish'd the third punic War, by the Destruction of *Carthage*. Each of these *Scipiones* had a *Laelius*, the one, the Father, the other the Son, for his intimate Companion and Friend: so that we are to distinguish between the two *Laelii*, as well as the two *Scipiones*. The eldest *Scipio*, and the eldest *Laelius* had for their Companions *Panætius* and *Polybius*. The younger *Scipio* and the younger *Laelius* had for theirs the Poet *Terence*.

C O N F E R E N C E the First.

C A T O, S C I P I O, L Æ L I U S.

II. S C I P I O. *Marcus Cato*, my Friend *Lælius* here, and I, have taken many Occasions to admire your distinguish'd, consummate, Wisdom in every Respect, but in nothing more than your bearing, without any visible Uneasiness, the Burthen of Old Age, which others represent to be more intolerable than that of *Ætna* itself.

C A T O. The Matter, *Scipio* and you *Lælius*, which you wonder at, is easily accounted for. For when Men have, within themselves, no Resources for making Life virtuous and happy, to such Men, every Age of Life is a Burthen. But they who look no farther than into their own Breast, for all that is good, never can consider as an Evil any Circumstance we are subjected to by the Tenure of our Nature. Of those Circumstances, the chief is, Old Age. For all Mankind wish to arrive at it, yet (f) so wavering and so froward is Folly, that they no sooner reach it, than they curse it. They tell you, that it has stolen upon them unawares. Now in the first Place, who is to blame that they reason absurdly? For how can Old Age creep sooner upon Youth, than Youth did upon Childhood? In the next Place, instead of their eightieth, supposing them to be in the eighth hundredth Year of their Life, pray would Old Age be less troublesome to them then, than now? For the Length of

(f) *So wavering and so froward is Folly*] The Stoics held, that the wise Man was alone consistent with himself.

Elaps'd Years never can administer Comfort or Consolation to an old Age of Folly. I wish the Wisdom you compliment me upon may be worthy your Esteem; and answerable to my (g) Sur-name, but if you admire it, it is because I follow and obey as a God, Nature, that best of all Guides; nor is it likely, that after highly finishing the preceding Scenes of Life, she should, like a slovenly Poet, fail in the last Act of her own Drama. Yet there is a Necessity, that Life should have some Period; after being as it were mellow'd, and declining, like Fruit upon a Tree, or Corn upon the Ground, that are ripen'd and ready to drop thro' the Kindness of the Season. A wise Man will bear this without Concern: — To resist the Course of Nature — Why, it is the same as, like a new Set of Giants, to make War upon the Gods.

LÆLIUS. *Scipio* and I, hope, and, therefore, wish to be long liv'd, therefore, *Cato*, you will highly oblige us both, (for I will answer for my Friend) if you will give us some Instructions before Old Age shall overtake us, as to the most proper Means to render the Burthen of it tolerable.

CATO. That I will, *Lælius*, and I comply with the more Readiness, if my Compliance is agreeable to *Scipio* likewise.

SCIPIO. It is extreamly so to me; for, if it be not too great a Trouble to you, *Cato*, as you are, in a Manner, far advanced in the Path that we hope

(g) *My Surname*] It is plain from this, and other Passages, both of our Author and other Writers, that this old Gentleman lov'd to play upon Words. His Sur-name *Cato*, in old Latin, signified *Prudent* or *Wise*.

to tread, we are very desirous to know the Nature of the Road in which you now are travelling.

CATO. Well, *Lælius*, I will oblige you to the best of my Abilities. For, in Consequence of the old Proverb *Like to like*, I have been often present when my Companions, *Caius Salinator*, for Instance, and *Spurius Albinus*, both of them Consulars, and almost as old as myself, used to bewail and bemoan their Condition. Sometimes, they were without Pleasures, which they thought to be the *Life of Life*; sometimes, they were neglected by those who had formerly revered them. Now, in my Opinion, their Complaints were misplac'd. For if all those Mortifications proceeded from Old Age alone, they must have happen'd to me likewise, and to all other old Men. Now I have known many a Man bear Old Age without repining; and without being neglected by their Friends, have been pleased that they no longer dragg'd about with them the Chains of sensual Appetite. But, as I take it, all such Complaints proceed not from the Years, but the Tempers of the Parties. For an Old Man who is moderate, and mild, and good humour'd, can very well reconcile himself to his Years. As to Men of stormy, rugged, Dispositions, they are unhappy in every Time of Life.

LÆLIUS. I agree with you, *Cato*, but it may be thought, that your Riches, your Power, and your Preferment in the State, have reconcil'd you to Old Age; now those are Circumstances that happen to few.

CATO. Why, really, *Lælius*, there is somewhat, but not every Thing, in what you observe. As *Themistocles* was engag'd in an Alterca-
tion

tion with a (i) *Seriphian*, who told him, that he was eminent, only thro' the Eminence of his Country ;
 " And yet, answered, *Themistocles*, had I been born
 " in *Serypbos*, and you in *Athens*, let me perish, if
 " I could ever have been noble, or you, illustrious."
 The same may be said of Old Age ; for even a
 wise Man will repine under an Old Age of pinching
 Poverty ; and the greatest Plenty cannot make it
 tolerable to a Fool.

The Arts, my *Scipio* and *Lælius*, and the Prac-
 tice of Virtue are the Weapons that are best suited
 to Old Age ; when these are cultivated thro' all
 the Stages of busy and lengthened Life, wonder-
 ful are their Effects ; not only because they never
 forsake us, even when, thro' extream Old Age, we are
 dropping into the Grave, but because the Consci-
 ousness of a Life well spent, and the Remembrance
 of many, past, good Deeds, are, of all Things, the
 most delightful.

IV. When I was but a Stripling I (k) loved old
Quintus Maximus, the same who recover'd *Tu-*

(i) *A Seriphian*] *Seriphus* was an obscure Island in the *Ægean*
 Sea. But some Editions tell the Story differently, and, I think
 with more Wit. For, instead of *Themistocles* saying, *Non, Hercle,*
 & *Ego Seriphus essem, Nobilis* ; they make him say, *Non, Hercle,*
 & *Ego Seriphus essem, ignobilis*. And the Sense then will be,
 " that no Birth-place can debase Merit, or ennoble the Want of
 " it."

(k) *I loved old Quintus Maximus*] The young Gentlemen of
 Rome generally apply'd themselves to imitate some Person that
 was eminent in that Course of Life which they were to pur-
 sue. The Facts related here by *Cato* are well known in Histo-
 ry, and, indeed, want no Explanation, which would be endless ;
 specially as our Author differs a good Deal from other Writers
 both in his Facts and his Chronology. But the latter is probably
 owing to the mangled Condition, in which his Editors found
 the Manuscripts of this Work.

rentum, as if he had been my Companion in Years, He was an old Man in whom Age had not alter'd his Manners, and he possess'd a Gravity, that was temper'd with good Humour. He was not, indeed, very far stricken'd in Old Age; but pretty well advanc'd in Years, when I first became his Admirer; for he was Consul the Year after I was born. In his fourth Consulate, I was little better than a Boy, and I carried Arms under him at *Capua*; five Years after, I was his Quæstor at *Tarentum*; then I was created *Ædile*, and four Years after that, *Prætor*, while *Tuditanus* and *Cethegus* were Consuls; and then, indeed, he was very Old, and seconded the Bill brought in by *Cincius* concerning Gratuities and Rewards. When he was far advanc'd in Age he serv'd in the Field at the Head of his Army, with all the Vigour of Youth, and yet, by Patience and Perseverance, he tam'd the Spirit of *Hannibal*, who had wantonly exulted with Conquest. His Character as drawn by our Friend *Ennius* is a very just one. He was, says he,

*The Man who saved his Country by Delay ;
No Tales could move him, and no Envy sway ;
And thus the Laurels on his honour'd Brow
In Age shall flourish, and with Time shall grow.*

What Quickness, what Abilities did he not shew, when he recover'd *Tarentum*? I remember, that in my hearing, as *Salinator* who had lost the Town, and had retir'd to the Citadel, was vaunting and boasting; *It is*, (said he,) *Fabius, thro' my Conduct, that you have recover'd Tarentum. No Doubt of it,* (replied the other with a Smile,) *for if you had not lost it,*

it, *I never had recover'd it.* Nay, he was as great a Statesman, as he was a General. For in his second Consulship with *Spurius Carvilius*, who, on that Occasion, remain'd unactive; he oppos'd, with all his Interest *Caius Flaminius*, a Tribune of the Commons, as he was dividing out, in single Portions, all the Territory of *Picenum* and *Gaul*, in Contradiction to the Sense of the Senate. And when he was Augur, had the Courage to say, "That, (1) all Undertakings for the Good of our Country, were sanctified by the best of all Auspices; but that all Auspices are against whatever is against the Interest of the Public."

I perceiv'd many illustrious Qualities in that great Man; but none more wonderful than the Manner in which he bore the Death of his Son *Marcus*, an eminent Nobleman, and of consular Dignity. The Funeral Discourse he compos'd for him is now extant; and, when we read it, how contemptible all Philosophers appear! Nor was he a great Man only in the Eye of the Public, and the Presence of his Fellow Citizens; for he appear'd within himself, and in his Family, to, still, greater Advantage. What Conversation, what Precepts, what Knowledge of Antiquity, what Skill of Augural Knowledge, have I heard from him? And, considering he was a *Roman*, he was very learned. He carried in his Memory the History of all Wars,

(1) *All Undertakings*] This is one of the finest Sayings of Antiquity, but it has been little attended to by the Moderns. It gives us to understand, that amongst the *Romans*, the Men of Sense look'd upon the Arts of Augury, Divination and the like, to be no better than political Amusements for busy Spirits, who might otherwise disturb the Government.

not only domestic but foreign, and the more greedily did I devour his instructive Conversation, as I guess'd at what afterwards happen'd, that when he was no more, I could profit by none of his Survivors,

V. But why, you may say, do you so much enlarge upon *Fabius Maximus*? Why, to say the Truth, that you may be sensible, it is next to Blasphemy to say, an Old Age, like his, could be miserable. But every Man cannot be a *Maximus* or a *Scipio*, to entertain himself with the Remembrance of the Cities he has taken, his Victories by Land and by Sea, the Wars he has manag'd, and the Triumphs he has enjoy'd. The Old Age of a Life spent in the Calm of an elegant virtuous Retirement is mild and gentle. Such was that of *Plato*, who, we are told, died while Writing, at the Age of eighty-one; such was that of *Isocrates*, who, in the ninety-fourth Year of his Age, is said to have compos'd the Treatise entitled *Panathenaicus*; and liv'd five Years longer. But his Master *Gorgias* of *Leontium*, compleated the Hundredth and seven Year of his Life; and that, without any Intermission of his Labours and Studies. When he was ask'd, why he was fond of living so long? "*I have no Reason* (answer'd he) *to quarrel with Old Age.*" A noble Reply, and worthy a Man of Learning. For Fools alone charge their own Follies, and their own Miscarriages, to the Account for Old Age. But this was far from the Way of Thinking of *Ennius* the Poet, I just now mentioned.

*Thus the fleet Steed, when gone his conquering Rage,
In Rest and Quiet spends his drooping Age.*

Thereby,

Thereby, comparing his own Old Age to that of a sprightly successful Courser; and, very likely, you may remember the Man himself. For our present Consuls *Titus Flaminius* and *Marius Acilius* enter'd upon their Office just one and twenty Years after his Death, which happen'd in the second Consulship of *Cepio* and *Philip*, in the forty-fifth Year of my Age, at which Time I seconded the (m) *Voconian Law* with a clear Voice, and sound Lungs. At seventy Years of Age, (for so long did (n) *Ennius* live) he bore Poverty and Old Age, the two Burthens that Mankind think the most intolerable, with so much Chearfulness, that they seem'd to give him Delight.

VI. And, indeed, when I seriously reflect, I can find out four Causes why Men look upon Old Age to be miserable. The first, because it disables them from Business. The second, because, it weakens their Persons. The third, because it deprives them of almost all their Pleasures. The fourth, because of its Neighbourhood to Grave, Now if you please, we will examine the Justice of the Complaints arising from those several Causes.

Does Age disable us from Business? What Business? That which employ'd our Youth and our Vigour? But does it follow, that there is no Province of Business proper for old Men, nothing

(m) *Voconian Law*] This Law limited the Property which Women could hold in Dowry out of an Estate.

(n) *Ennius*] The Poverty of *Ennius* was not brought upon him by any Excess of his own, but was the Consequence of the little Esteem which the *Romans* had for his Art. The Circumstance, however, of his excessive Poverty does no great Honour to the great Men of *Rome* at that Time, such as this *Cato*, who were enamour'd with his Poetry, admir'd his Virtue, and loved his Person.

that can be manag'd by the Strength of Mind, when that of Body is gone? Was *Maximus* unemploy'd? Did *Lucius* (o) *Paulus*, your Father, *Scipio*, and the Father-in-Law to that excellent Man who was my Son, transact no Business? Did other old Men, such as the *Fabricii*, the *Curii*, the *Coruncanii*, do no Business, when by their Conduct and Advice they defended their Country? (p) *Appius Claudius* was not only old but blind. Yet, when the Senate inclin'd to Peace, and to make a Treaty with *Pyrrhus*, he express'd those Sentiments, which *Ennius* has put into Verse.

*Tho' frantic now, ye were not still the same,
Why thus rush headlong upon Loss and Shame?*

With all the other weighty Matters in that spirited Passage, which you are so well acquainted with; nay, the genuine Speech of *Appius* is now extant. This happen'd seventeen Years after his second Consulship, which fell out ten Years after his first; and, before he was Consul, he had been Censor. From all which, we may conclude him to have been very old at the Time of the War with *Pyrrhus*, and yet he is represented by our Ancestors in the light I have shew'd him.

They, therefore, who say, that old Men are improper for the Management of Business, argue as absurdly as if one should say, that the Pilot of a Ship does nothing, because others mount the Shrouds, run about the Deck, or ply the Pump.

(o) *Paulus*] This was the famous *Paulus Æmilius* the real Father of the *Scipio* who speaks here.

(p) *Appius Claudius*] He was Consul in the Years of Rome 446 and 457.

It

It is true, he sits calmly in the Prow and manages the Helm, without doing what younger Seamen do; but then he does what is better and more difficult: Great Undertakings are not effected by the Strength, the Agility, or the Swiftneſs of Body, but by Wiſdom, Authority, and Judgment, Qualities that, far from being deſtroy'd, are increas'd by Old Age.

I have been a General, a Tribune, a Legate, and a Conſul. I am experienced in all military Matters; and, perhaps, you may imagine I am idle, becauſe I am not carrying on War. Notwithſtanding that, I direct the Senate in the Meaſures they are to purſue, and the Manner in which they are to be executed. I am denouncing War againſt *Carthage* long before it can happen, becauſe ſhe has been long meditating our Deſtruction, nor ſhall I ever ceaſe to dread her, till I know that ſhe is demolish'd: A Glory, *Scipio*, which I hope the immortal Gods reſerve for you, that you may finiſh what your Grand-father began. He has been dead three and thirty Years, but never, to the End of Time, ſhall his Glory be forgot. He died the Year before I was Cenſor, nine Years after my Conſulſhip, and was created a ſecond Time Conſul along with me. Now, had he lived to the Hundredth Year of his Age, would he ever have been wearied of Old Age? It is true, he no longer ſallied forth, he was not longer nimble, no longer could he dart the Spear, or handle the Sword; but he was arm'd with Wiſdom, Reaſon and Senſe. Did not theſe Qualities exiſt in the Seniors of a People, our Anceſtors never would have called the ſupream Council of their State, a SENATE.

Amongſt

Amongst the *Lacedæmonians*, their chief Magistrates both were, and are term'd, *Old Men*. And by all that we either hear or read of foreign History, we find, that the greatest States have been weaken'd by young Men, but supported and recover'd by Old. "Tell me, why did ye so quickly ruin so great an Empire?" Is the Question that *Nævius* (q) the Poet puts, in one of his Plays. Several Causes are assign'd for Answer, but the chief is, "Raw, foolish, youthful, Speakers came strutting into the Management of the Public." Intimating that Rashness is the Character of Youth; and Wisdom, of Old Age.

VII. But it may be said the Memory of Old Men fails them. Possibly it may; if they do not keep it in Practice, or if they are naturally dullish. *Themistocles* knew the Names of all his Fellow-Citizens. Now, can you imagine, that, when he came to be in Years, that he used to salute *Aristides* by Name of *Lyfimachus*. For my Part, I know the Persons, not only of the present Generation, but I knew likewise their Fathers and Grand-fathers. And when I am reading the Monuments, I think myself in no Danger of (r) losing my Memory, according to the vulgar Notion, for the very reading them puts me in Mind of the Dead. Neither did I, yet ever hear of an old Man who forgot where he had buried his Treasure. They remember all the Objects of their Concern; such as a Law-suit depending, and the Debts that are owing them.

(q) *Nævius*] He was an old Dramatic Poet; and serv'd in the first punic War. His first Performance was exhibited about the Year of Rome 519.

(r) The Romans, according to *Erasmus*, had a Notion, that reading monumental Inscriptions hurt the Memory.

What

What is your Opinion of Lawyers? Of Pontiffs? Of Augurs? Of philosophic old Men? What Variety of Matter do they remember? For, while old Men retain their Study and Application, they retain their intellects likewise. And this does not happen to the distinguished, and the honour'd, in Life, but to the obscure and the retir'd. *Sophocles* compos'd Tragedies at a very advanced Old Age, and he was brought before a Court for neglecting his private Affairs on an Account of his dramatic Studies; (s) (in the same Manner, as, with us, Prodigals are prohibited from spending their Family-Estate that ought to be reserv'd for their Children,) that the Judges might grant an Injunction for removing him, as being insane, from all Management of his private Fortune. We are told, that upon this, the Old Man read over to the Judges his last wrote Play, *OEdipus Coloneus*, which he brought along with him; and ask'd them, whether they took it to be the Work of a Mad-man? Upon which, he was acquitted by the Court.

This being the Case, did Old Age chill into Inactivity the Studies of a *Sophocles*, a *Homer*, a *Hesiod*, a *Simonides*, a *Stesichorus*, an *Isocrates*, or a *Gorgias*, (both whom I have already mentioned)

(s) *In the same Manner*] This Passage has been misunderstood, and tamper'd with in the Original by the Critics, who did not know that, amongst the *Romans*, a Father of a Family, if a Spendthrift, might be interdicted from spending the Family-Estate. The Form of the Interdiction (*Paulus Lib 3. Sen. 4.*) is very curious. *Quando tua bona paterna a-vitaque, Nequitia tua, disperdis, liberosque tuos ad Egestatem perducis, ob eam Rem, tibi ea Re, Commercioque, interdicto.* That is, "Whereas you squander the Estate of your Father and Fore-fathers through your Wickedness, and are bringing your Children to Poverty, I, for that Reason, forbid your enjoying, or having any Thing to do with the said Estate."

a Py-

a *Pythagoras*, the Prince of Philosophers, a *Democritus*, a *Plato*, a *Xenocrates*, or, after them, a *Zeno*, a *Cleanthes*, or a *Diogenes* the Stoic whom you yourselves have seen at *Rome*. In all these, was not the Period of their Studies, the same with that of their Lives?

But, to descend from the divine Studies of such Men; I can name you *Roman* Farmers, my Friends, and Neighbours when I am on my *Sabinæ* Estate, who never suffer any Thing of Consequence to be carried on without putting their own Hand to it. Without them, there is no sowing, no reaping, no sinning of the Fruits of the Earth. That, however, is the less to be wonder'd at, because no Man is so old as not to think that he may out live another Year: but they toil at Works which they well know can never avail them; and, as our Friend (t) *Statius* says in his *Ephebi*,

They plant, what after Ages will enjoy.

And a Farmer, be he ever so old, if you ask him, for whose Sake he plants, will readily answer you;
 “ For the sake of the immortal Gods, whose
 “ Pleasure it is, that as I receiv'd those Blessings
 “ for my Ancestors, I should transmit them to my
 “ Posterity.”

VII. *Cæcilius* has describ'd an old Man taking a Look into Futurity better than he has succeeded in the following Lines, viz.

*Indeed Old Age I'd hate thee, didst thou bring
 No other Woes, than that, by living long,
 We live to see, that which we grieve to see.*

(t) *Statius*] He is the *Statius Cæcilius* quoted here, and elsewhere, by our Author, under both Names: He was a dramatic Poet, and liv'd and died about the same Time with *Ennius*.

Yes, and perhaps what you *wish* to see too: nor is YOUTH free from this Reproach, for very often young Men *see what they grieve to see*. But the same *Cæcilius* is more out when he says,

*The greatest Misery that Age entails,
Is knowing, that 'tis hateful to the World.*

So far from being *bateful*, that it is *agreeable* to the World. Observe the Youth of the best Dispositions, how much they are caress'd by sensible old Men, who bear their Age with more Pleasure thro' the Regard and Esteem that is paid them by Youth; so the latter are benefited by the Dictates of the aged; which lead them to the Pursuits of Virtue: and I dare to say, that you two are as much, at present, pleas'd with my Company as I am with yours. But old Men do not think it enough, that their Age be void of Listlessness and Indolence; for they are active; always working, always planning somewhat or other; I mean, that is suitable to the Pursuits of their former Life. Nay, old Men even fall to learn somewhat that is new to them? For we see *Solon* in his Verses making a Merit of becoming an old Man, and yet, every Day adding to his Knowledge; and, to go no farther than myself, who after I was an old Man studied the *Greek* Language and Learning, which I snatch'd at with as much Greediness as if I had wanted to quench a Thirst that long had parched me up; that I might render myself Master of that Reading from which you now hear me quote Examples. Nay, hearing, that *Socrates* had learned to play upon string'd Instruments of Music, I intended that too, (for the Antients learned to
play

play on such Instruments) but I certainly applied myself very closely to their Learning.

IX. The next Defect charg'd upon Old Age is Weakness. Now, I no more, at this Time of Life, covet the Vigour of Youth, than, when young, I coveted the Strength of a Bull, or of an Elephant. The Abilities a Man has ought to be put to their proper Uses; and, whatever he does, he ought to do it to the best of his Power. Could there be a more silly Speech, than that of *Milo the Crotonian*, who, when he was an old Man, and saw the Wrestlers practising in their Place of Exercise, is said to have look'd with Tears upon own Arms, with this Expression, *Alas, these are now dead!* No Dotard, not they but thou art dead. For never hadst thou a Grain of Merit, but from thy Back and Brawn. This was far from the Way in which (t) *Sextus Ælius* thought, in which *Titus Corunnus* thought many Years ago, and *Publius Crassus*, lately. Their Dictates were Laws to their Fellow-Citizens; and their Knowledge in the Constitution of their Country lasted with them, to the Extremity of Old Age.

The Excellencies, of an Orator may droop, I am afraid, in Old Age. For they do not consist in Genius only, but in Lungs and Vigour. And yet, I know not how it happens, there is in their Voice, a Mellowness that has an agreeable Effect. You perceive how aged I am, and, to this Day, I retain it. Besides, the gentle, calm, Manner, in which an old Man talks, is very becoming; and it often happens that the polite and sedate Address of

(t) These were all of them *Romans* of great Ages and Merits.

well.

well (*u*) spoken Old Age draws the Attention of an Audience ; and if it is out of an old Man's Power to keep that Attention up, yet still he may make it over to a *Scipio*, or a *Lælius* ; for what can be more agreeable than Old Age, attended and courted by the young for Instruction ?

Shall we deny, to Old Age, its Efficacy in instructing, teaching, and forming Youth to all the several Duties of Life ? A Province the most honourable in Society. For my Part, I always thought the two *Scipiones*, *Cneius* and *Publius*, and your two Grandfathers *Lucius Æmilius*, and *Publius Africanus*, happy in being attended by Numbers of young Noblemen. Nay, we are to look upon every Man who instructs others in the Arts of Virtue to be happy, even when their Vigour droops and languishes thro' Age. This Failure of Vigour, however, is generally not so much the Effect of Age, as of Vice ; for a Youth, wasted with Lust and Intemperance, delivers over, to Old Age, a Carcass over-run with Loathsomeness, and Rottenness. If you believe *Cyrus*, as he is represented by *Xenophon*, in his Speech, which he made upon his Death-bed, when he was very old, he declared, that he was sensible of no Weakness in his Old Age more than in his Youth. I remember *Lucius Metellus* when I was a Boy. He was made high Pontiff four Years after his second Consulship was expired, and continued in that Station for twenty two Years ; but even in extream Old Age, he possessed such Vigour, that he never regretted the Loss of Youth. I have no Occasion to mention myself ;

(*u*) The Original is very obscure here but I believe *Cicero* meant it as I have translated it.

R

though

though it is natural for an old Man to mention himself, and he commonly has that Indulgence. 1

X. You see how many Harangues *Homer* puts into the Mouth of *Nestor* concerning his own Virtues; the Reason is, he had seen three Generations of Mankind, and therefore, while he confin'd himself to Truth, he was not a Bit apprehensive of being thought troublesome or talkative, because from his Mouth, as *Homer* tells you, the Words flow'd more sweet than Honey; and yet he was not indebted to the Vigour of his Body for that Sweetness. Meanwhile, the Captain General of the *Greek* Confederacy never wish'd to have in his Army ten such Men as *Ajax*, but ten such as *Nestor*, in which Case, he said, he did not doubt to be able to demolish *Troy* in a very short Time.

But that I may return to myself. I am now four Years after four-score. I wish I could say the same Thing of myself as *Cyrus* did; but still I can say, that, though, it is true, I am not possess'd of such Vigour as when I first served in the Punic War, or when I was Quæstor in the same War, or when I was Consul in *Spain*, or four Years after, in the Consulship of *Manius Accilius Glabrio*, when I served as (*) Field-Deputy in the Battle near *Thermopylæ*, yet, as you see, Old Age has not quite wither'd and depress'd me. I am not yet unserviceable in the Courts of Law, in the Rotrum, to my Friends, to my Clients, nor to my Guests. Nor have I ever given any Countenance to that receiv'd old Saying, that, *the Way to be long old is to be soon old*. For my Part, I should rather

(*) *Field Deputy*] There is a great Dispute here about the Original *Tribunus Mil*; I have endeavour'd to express it by a Word which removes all Objections to the Post of military Tribune.

chuse a short Old Age, than be old before I really am so. Therefore, I never have shifted, by frivolous Pretences of being otherwise employed, any Business I once took in Hand.

Yet I am not so vigorous as either of you, nor are either of you so vigorous as the Centurion *Titus Pontius*, but does this make him more valuable than you are? No, if a Man has but a moderate Share of Strength, and makes the most of it, take my Word for it, he will find himself at no great Loss for Want of more. *Milo* is said, at the *Olympian* Games, to have carried a live Ox upon his Shoulders for a whole Furlong. But would you prefer the Strength of Body that *Milo* possessed, to the Strength of Mind that *Pythagoras* possessed? It is, in short, an Advantage while you have it; but you are not to be uneasy when you lose it: This would be as absurd as for a young Man to desire to become a Boy again, or for a full grown Man, to wish to be again a Youth. Life has its fix'd Stages; Nature has but one Course, and a plain one it is. Every Scene is marked by its proper Character; the Wildness of Boys, the Fervour of Youth, the Gravity of advanced Years, and the mellow Ripeness of Old Age, are all design'd by the Hand of Nature to disclose themselves at their proper Periods.

I suppose, *Scipio*, you hear how your Grand Father's Guest (y) *Massinissa*, who is now ninety Years

(y) *Massinissa*] This is the famous Prince who sent his Wife *Sopboniba* the Bowl of Poison. *Fulvius Ursinus* says, that he had in his Possession the Original Brazen Tablet, upon which the *Thorian* Law was engraved, and by which the People of *Rome* gave so much public Land to *Massinissa*.

of Age spends his Time. If he sets out upon a Journey on Foot, he positively refuses to get on Horse-back. When he is on Horse-back, he will not alight; neither Rain, nor Cold, though ever so excessive, can make him cover his Head, and he is so clean in the Habit of his Body, that he can go through all the State, and all the Duties of a King. Thus, you see that Exercise and Temperance can preserve to an old Man something of his former Vigour.

XI. Is Old Age destitute of Strength? It has no Occasion for Strength. Human Laws and Institutions have exempted Men of my Years from those Duties which cannot be practised without bodily Strength: Therefore, so far from being required to do what we cannot do, we are even excused from doing all we can do. But many old Men are so feeble, that they are unable to perform any Part of Duty, or indeed any Character in Life. But this may not be the Effect of Old Age entirely; for it often proceeds from Want of Health. How weakly was the Son of *Publius Africanus*, who adopted you, *Scipio*, into his Family? Health he had little, or, rather, none at all, otherwise he would have become the second Luminary of our State, for he would have succeeded to his Father's Lustre, with the additional Improvements of Learning. Are we then to be surprized, that old Men sometimes have their Infirmities, when even the young cannot escape them? You are, my Friends, therefore, to repel Old Age, you are by Care and Attention to guard against its Failings. You are to combat Old Age, as you would combat a Disease.

You

You are to regard your Health, to use moderate Exercise, and to eat and drink, as much as may repair your Vigour; without oppressing it. But your Care must not be confined to the Body alone. The Mind and the Spirits demand it much more, for these are extinguished by Old Age, like a Lamp, when you with-hold its Oil. Our Bodies grow tired and stiff with too much Exercise and Fatigue, but our Understanding, the more we employ it, becomes the more vigorous. *Cecilius*, the Poet, it is true, has brought foolish old Men upon the Stage, but then their Follies consist in their Credulity, their Forgetfulness, their Debauchery, which are Faults not attending Old Age itself, but an Old Age that is indolent, slothful, and sleepy. In like Manner, Haughtiness and Lust, are incident to Youth, rather to Age, but not to all Youth, only the immodest Part of them. Thus, those reverend Follies, which we call by the Name of Dotage, are not the Attendants of all old Men, but only the inconsiderate Part of them.

Appius, when he was not only old, but blind, managed four stout Sons, five Daughters, a great Family, and numerous Dependents. For he had a Mind, which, like a Bow, he could keep upon the bend: thus, it never languished or drooped under the Weight of Years. He held all about him not only in Awe, but in Subjection; his Slaves dreaded, and his Children revered, him; but all loved him. In his House, his Family-Customs and Regulations were always kept up.

An old Man, therefore, appears with Dignity, if he maintains his Authority, if he asserts his

Rights, if he is engross'd by none; and if, to his latest Breath, he vindicates his Privileges. I own, I love in a young Man, to see somewhat of an old Man; and, in like Manner, to see somewhat of the young Fellow in the old one. Whenever this happens to be the Case, a Man's Person may droop with Age, but his Mind never will. Here, I have got in my Hand the seventh Book of my Antiquities. I collect all the Monuments of former Days, and, at this very Time, I am busied in writing out the Orations, which I made in all the principal Causes I have been engaged in. I treat of augural, pontifical, and civil Constitutions: I dip pretty deep into the *Greek Learning*, and, like the *Pythagoreans*, in Order to exercise my Memory, I re-capitulate in the Evening whatever I have said, heard, or done, throughout the Day. These, these are the Sweatings of the Genius, these are the Bouts of the Understanding; While I am thus training, while I am thus breathing myself, I am very little at a Loss with regard to my bodily Vigour, I am ready at the Call of Friendship, I attend frequently at the Senate, where I make Motions upon Measures, that I have long and deliberately weighed within myself, and I defend them, if a Debate happens, by the Strength not of my Body, but of my Mind. Now, supposing I could not do all this, yet still, I should take a Delight in ruminating, while a-Bed, upon such Matters, tho' unable to carry them into Execution. But by the Course of my former Life, I still have that Ability; for a Man who applies himself to such Pursuits and Business, is insensible when Years, creep

creep upon him. Thus, (z) we slowly, softly, silently, steal to the Grave, and the Flame of Life, is not hastily extinguished, but leisurely burns out.

XII. Now comes the third Reproach of Old Age. For, some tell us, it is void of Pleasures. What a glorious Character this gives to Age, since it takes from us, all that is most disgraceful to Youth! Now, my *Scipio*, and you, my *Lælius*, I will give you a Passage from an old Oration of *Archytus* the *Tarentine*, a Man of the greatest Eminence and Abilities, and which I heard when I was a young Man at *Tarentum* with *Quintus Maximus*. He said; “That the Principal of all Plagues, that
 “ Nature has conferr’d upon Man, is sensual Pleasure; by which the Passions become violent and
 “ unruly, in Order to be gratified. Thence proceed
 “ Treasons against our Country; thence, the Subversion of lawful Government, and thence too
 “ private Correspondences with public Enemies.
 “ That, in short, there is no Wickedness which
 “ Mankind are not impelled to undertake through
 “ the Love of Pleasure. But, with regard to
 “ Rapes, to Adulteries, and all Iniquity of that
 “ Kind, Pleasure is the only Bait, through which
 “ they are committed. He added, that, as Nature or Providence, has endued Man, with
 “ nothing more valuable than his own Soul,
 “ so nothing is so destructive, as Pleasure is, to
 “ that divine, unvaluable Gift. For when our

(z) Thus] The Alterations in this Passage, are remarkable in the Original, and I have endeavoured to imitate them in the Translation. *Ita, sensim, sine Sensu, Ætas senescit.*

“ loose Desires once get Dominion, adieu to
 “ Temperance and Virtue, which, must sink,
 “ when Pleasure bears the Sway.” *Archytus*, in
 Order to illustrate this, recommends it to us, “ To
 “ figure to ourselves a Man, affected with as
 “ much sensual Pleasure, as it is possible to con-
 “ ceive.” He then pronounces, that, “ as long as
 “ such a Man is thus affected, he certainly never
 “ can consider of any Thing, he never can act
 “ with Reason or Reflection. Nothing, there-
 “ fore, is so execrable, or so pernicious, as Plea-
 “ sure, inasmuch that, were it to rise to any
 “ higher Pitch, or to last for any considerable
 “ Time, it would extinguish every Faculty of
 “ the Mind.” *Nearchus* of *Tarentum*, our Guest,
 who was always a Friend to the People of *Rome*,
 said, that he heard from old Men, that these were
 the Sentiments delivered by *Archytus* to *Caius*
Pontius the *Samnite*, the Father of him who con-
 quered the Consuls *Spurius Postumius*, and *Titus*
Veturius, at the Battle of *Caudium*; and, that *Plato*
 of *Athens*, who, I find came to *Tarentum* during
 the Consulship of (a) *Lucius Camillus* and *Appius*
Claudius, was present at the Conversation.

To apply all this. From hence you may be
 sensible, that, if neither Reason nor Wisdom can
 get the better of Pleasure, we are the more obli-
 ged to Old Age, which takes from us the Abi-
 lity of doing what we ought not to do. For
 Pleasure, that Enemy to Reason, embarrasses De-
 liberation; and hoodwinks, as it were, the Mind,
 to keep her from having any Communication with

(a) *Lucius Camillus*] The Original here is very imperfect.

Virtue. I own it was with Reluctance that I expell'd from the Senate (*b*) *Lucius Flaminius*, the Brother of the brave *Titus Flaminius*, seven Years after he had been Consul: But I thought it necessary to put a Brand upon Lust. For while he was Consul, he was prevail'd upon by the Entreaties of a Prostitute to knock down with an Ax, a Prisoner who lay in Chains under a capital Sentence. His Brother *Titus*, who was Censor immediately before me, took no Notice of this Fact; but neither *Flaccus* (my Brother Censor) nor I could suffer so wicked, so profligate, an Instance of Lust to escape; especially as in the Cruelty of the private Man, he contaminated the Dignity of the Roman General.

XIII. I have often heard old People declare, that when they were Boys they were told by old Men,

(*b*) *Lucius Flaminius*] Our Author is not critically exact in many of his Anecdotes; for *Livy*, whose Information was from *Cato's* Speech in the Senate against *Flaminius*, gives a much more shocking Account of this Fact, *viz.* That the Prostitute here spoken of, was a Male; whom *Flaminius* was passionately, and infamously fond of; and that the Boy having attended him to the Field, us'd to complain, that he had thereby lost the Pleasure of seeing the Exhibitions of Gladiators at *Rome*, for that Year. That soon after, a Nobleman of the Country came with his Family to put himself, and them, under the Protection of the Consul, who order'd him to be brought into his Tent, where he was at Supper with his Pathic, and a little touch'd with Liquor. While the Nobleman was in the Middle of a Speech, address'd by an Interpreter, to the Consul, the latter ask'd the Prostitute, whether seeing that Nobleman dye would be agreeable to him, and make amends for his losing the Shews of the Gladiators that Year. The Lad thinking the Consul only in jest, said, *it would*; upon which the Consul flew with his drawn Sword upon the Nobleman in the midst of his Speech, and though he fled and implored the Protection of all the Gods of Hospitality, the *Roman* never left him till he had most inhumanly put him to Death with his own Hands.

that *Caius Fabricius* was surpriz'd, when, being sent Ambaffador to King *Pyrrhus*, he had heard from *Cyneas* the *Tbeffalian*, that there was, at *Athens*, a Profeflor of Philosophy who maintained, that Pleasure ought to be the ultimate End of all our Actions. When *Manius Curius*, and *Titus Coruncanius* were told of this by *Fabricius*, they used to wish that this Philosopher could make the *Samnites*, and *Pyrrhus* himself, Converts to his Doctrine; because it would be easy to conquer them after abandoning themselves to Pleasure. *Manius Curius* lived at the same Time with (c) *Publius Decius*, who five Years before the other was Consul, devoted himself to Death for his Country in his fourth Consulship. *Fabricius* knew the same *Decius*, *Coruncanius* knew him, and all these great Men were convinced, as appear'd from their own Conduct, (and their Conviction was strengthened by the noble Action of *Publius Decius* whom I just now mentioned;) that there is a Principle which, in its own Nature, is really lovely and glorious, desirable in itself, and courted by the best of Men in Contempt, and in Defiance, of Pleasure.

(c) *Decius*] The Family of the *Decii* produced two Martyrs for the Service of their Country. The first lived in the 414 Year of *Rome*, and, in a Battle with the *Latins*, while the Victory was yet doubtful, having devoted himself to Death in a solemn Manner, the Particulars of which we have in *Livy*, he rushed into the Middle of the Enemy where he was killed, and the *Romans* happening to get the Victory it was attributed to the Devotion of *Decius*. The *Decius* here spoken of was Grandson to the former, and was Consul in the Year of *Rome* 459. Being engaged in a Battle with the *Gauls* and *Samnites*, and, in Danger of being defeated on the Wing which he commanded, he called for the Pontiff and devoting himself in the same Manner as his Father had done, he was cut in Pieces by the Enemy. But his Soldiers were so animated by his Death, that they rallied and beat their Enemies.

But

But why so many Invectives against Pleasure? I answer, because so far from being a Reproach to Old Age, it can receive no higher Commendation; than that it is very indifferent about all sensual Pleasures; it covets no Banquets, no Luxuries in eating, no Debauches in drinking, and therefore it is free from all the Inconveniences of Drinking, from Crudities and Restlessness. But if Old Age does at any Time, indulge itself, for it is pretty hard to combat Pleasure, (which *Plato* divinely calls the Food of Evils, because Men are caught by Pleasure, as Fishes by the Hook) yet, I say, if old Men do indulge themselves a little, it is not in excessive eating, or drinking; but they have some Delight in Meals of Moderation, and Cheerfulness. When I was a Boy, I have often seen *Caius Duillius*, the Son of *Marcus*, and the same who first defeated the *Carthaginians* by Sea, returning, when he was an old Man, from Supper, attended by Numbers of Flambeaux and musical Instruments, in which he took great Pleasure. Now, there was no Precedent, for a Man after returning to a private Station, to appear in such Pomp, but his Glory gave a Sanction to his Vanity.

But, why do I ramble to others? Let me, now, return to myself. I had always my chosen Friends. Now, it was not till my Quæstorship, that the friendly Clubs, were instituted, upon the Introduction of the *Idean* Rites of the (d) MIGHTY MOTHER.

(d) MIGHTY MOTHER]. This was a celebrated Æra of the *Roman Republic*. The Truth is, those Republicans were often so busy and so hot headed, that the Government was obliged every now and then to have Recourse to somewhat of the marvellous

MOTHER. To say the Truth, I had Entertainments, with my Companions, of eating and drinking, but they were very moderate; and yet at that Time, I was in the Heyday of Blood; but (e) as that cools thro' Age, all our Sensations become more calm. Nor, did I really, ever value the Pleasure which those Clubs gave me for any sensual Gratifications, so much as I did for the Company and Conversation of my Friends. And, indeed, our Ancestors shew'd more Judgment, than the *Greeks* did in that Matter, by calling their eating and drinking in Company, a *CONVIVIUM*, or a *living together*, because, in Fact, the Thing is really so. Now the *Greeks* call it sometimes a *Company-carousing*, and sometimes a *Company-glutting*, by which they give the Preference to that Circumstance which really least deserves it.

XIV. As to myself, I own that, for the Sake of Conversation, I do take a Delight in long protracted Meals, not only with those of the same

vellous in Order to amuse their Spirits. The Story of the Introduction of *Cybele* into *Rome* was as follows. Before *Hannibal* had left *Italy*, that Country was visited by a Plague, and the *Romans*, as usual, had Recourse to the *Sybilline Books*, where they found, or pretended to find, a Prophecy importing, that when they were invaded by a foreign Enemy they might be delivered from their Calamities by bringing the *Idean Mother* to *Rome* from *Pacinum* in *Phrygia*, and within the Territories of King *Attalus*. Upon this the *Romans* fitted out five Ships, and sent them with solemn Deputation to *Attalus*; who either out of Contempt or Friendship, directed them to a great Stone which he said was the *Idean Mother*, and which the *Roman* Deputies carried with great Transport and Triumph to *Rome*. It is very probable that all this Farce, was intended to put the People into better Humour, for upon the Introduction of the *Idean Mother*, a great many Clubs and Societies, in which there was much, eating, drinking, and dancing were instituted to her Honour.

(e) *Hey-day*] Orig. *Fervor Ætatis*.

Age

Age with myself (for few of them are remaining) but with you and those of your Years; and I am thankful to Old Age, which, as it has blunted the Keeness of my Appetite, for eating and drinking, so it has sharpen'd it for Conversation; and, let me tell you, if even those sensual Delights are insisted upon (for I do not declare War against all Pleasures, because Nature herself has, perhaps, a craving after some) I am not sure whether old Men are void of all delightful Feelings even for sensual Pleasures. For my own Part, I love those Clubs that are under the Direction of a Chairman, according to the Customs of our Ancestors, and where the Subject of Conversation is given by the most respectable Man in Company. I would have our Wine served (as in *Xenophon's Symposium*) in small Glasses, so as to be (f) sprinkled with it, but not soaked in it. I love to be cool in the Summer, and in the other Seasons to be either in the Sun, or by a Winter-Fire. This is my Way of Living amongst my *Sabine* Neighbours, and I daily make one at their Clubs, which we endeavour to continue to last pretty late, by spinning the Time out in a Variety of Conversation.

It is true that old Men may not be so sensible of what we call, the Thrillings of Pleasure; but, we are at the same Time to remember, that we are without the Hankerings after it. Now you never can regret the Loss of a Thing that you don't want. It was no bad Answer of *Sophocles*, who, when an old Man was ask'd, *whether he still pursued any Enjoyments of Love*; "I thank

(f) Orig. *Rorantia Pocula*. There is somewhat elegant in this Allusion, which I was unwilling to lose.

" the

“ the Gods, I have not, said he ; for I rejoice
 “ in having escap’d from that madcap’d merciless
 “ Tyrant.” People who are fond of such Enjoyments may look upon their being depriv’d of them as a mortifying, disagreeable Thing ; but a Man who is satiated and glutted with them, has more Joy in being without, than with, such Gratifications. Now, as a Man, who has no Desire for a Thing, cannot, be said to want that Thing ; therefore, I maintain, that there is more Satisfaction in being without an amorous Inclination, than there is in gratifying it. Youth, it is true, has Pleasure in such Enjoyments, but then it begins with such as are not very high, and then proceeds, as we have said, to those which old Men, if they do not enjoy to the full, are still capable of having some Share in. Thus, they who sit (g) in the Pit have the highest Joy when the favorite Actor performs ; but they, who sit the farthest back from the Stage have their Joy too. So that young Men, by having the full View of Pleasures, may, perhaps, find more Charms in them ; but still old Men are not without their proper Share of Delight, tho’ they behold them at a Distance.

But how exquisite is the Enjoyment of a Mind that being, as it were, freed from the Service of Lust, of Ambition, Emulation, Animosities, and all inordinate Appetites, seeks for nothing beyond itself, and, as we say, lives at home ? But, if it is, (if I may speak so,) fodder’d by Study and Literature, nothing can be more delightful

(g) *In the Pit*] Orig. *Prima Cavea*. The Original corresponds so well with the modern Expression, that I have not been afraid of adopting it. The favourite Player here mention’d is *Turpio Ambivius*, who was famous in *Cato’s* Time.

than

than an Old Age of Leisure. We saw *Caius Gallus*, your Father's Friend, *Scipio*, almost at the Hour of his Death, studying the Fabrick of the Heavens and the Earth. How often was he surprized by Day in the Middle of a Calculation he had begun over-night; how often has he been overtaken by Darkness, in what he had begun in the Morning? And what Pleasure he had in fore-telling to us the Eclipses of the Sun or the Moon?

What shall I say of more superficial, but yet ingenious, Studies? What Delight did *Nævius* take in his Poem upon the *Carthaginian* War? And *Plautus* in his Play of *Tuculentus*, and the *Pseudolus*? I remember too to have seen old *Livius*, who six Years before I was born, had been teaching dramatic Poetry, under the Consulship of *Cethegus* and *Tuditanius*; and lived till I became a young Man. What shall I say of the Knowledge which *Publius Licinius Crassus* had in the pontifical and the civil Law? or of *Publius Scipio*, who, a few Days ago, was made High-Pontif. Now I knew all the great Men, whom I have named, when they were old Men, and burning in the Pursuit of their several Studies. As to *Marcus Cethegus*, whom *Ennius* justly calls, The Quintessence of perswasive Eloquence, with what Earnestness have I seen him labouring in that Study, even when he was an old Man? Can the Pleasures then of eating, of playing, of wenching, come in Competition with such Pleasures as those? Such are the Entertainments of Learning; Entertainments, which, at least in Men of Wisdom and good Principles, grow with their Age. So that it was finely said by *Solon* in one of the Verses I have already mention'd, " That, when he grew old, every Day added
to

“ to his Learning ;” and surely no sensual Pleasure can suppress the intellectual.

XV. I now proceed to the Pleasures of a Country-Life, with which I own myself to be wonderfully charm'd. These are never interrupted by Old Age, and, to me, they seem the best adapted to that Plan of Life, which the wise Man proposes. All those Pleasures have no other Object but the Earth, which is never refractory to our Commands, and always repays with what Interest he receives; in general, with great Usury, but sometimes with less. Now, I am not delighted with seeing the Fruits alone, but with contemplating the Power and the Nature of the Soil itself. For when the Earth receives the Seed, in its soften'd, cultur'd Bosom, at first, it hides it, after it has been what we call harrow'd over, then, it expands it, after being warmed with Moisture and its genial Pressure, and then shoots it out into verdant, vegetating, Foliage; which, fed by the Fibres of the Stalks below, gradually spring up; and, supported by the jointed Stalk, as it approaches to Maturity, is inclosed within a Hollow, from which when it pushes itself, it displays a Number of Ears in regular Order, guarded by a Grove of Awms to defend it against the pecking of the smaller Birds. Why, should I mention the setting, the springing, and the Growth, of Vines? The Pleasure, I would take, would, be endless, should I make you acquainted with these Amusements and Delights of my Old Age. I forbear to speak of the vegetating Properties of the Earth. For Instance, the small Grains of a Fig, or the Stones of a Vine, and other

other Plants, and Trees, which from the very smallest Seeds, produce such large Boles and Branches. Can a Man without a pleasing Admiration behold the Effects of propagating from the Shoot, the Slip, the Sucker, by Ingraftment, and by Quicksets? For the Vine, being naturally tender, unless it is supported, falls to the Ground; therefore, to keep it upright, it is furnish'd with Tendrils which hold, as it were, with Fingers, whatever they fasten on; and while it winds and twines itself round its Support with a thousand Curls, the Husbandman is forced to apply the pruning Knife, lest it should run into Wildness, and shoot out too-much all around. Thus, next Spring, upon the Knobs that are form'd by the Shoots of the standing Stock, appears what we call the Gem; and then the young Grape begins to form: The Moisture of the Earth, with the Heat of the Sun, swells and impregnates it, at first, with rough-tasted Juices, which, when ripen'd, afterwards become sweet; and when cloathed with Leaves it admits a proper Degree of the Heat, and yet keeps out the parching Rays of the Sun; till, at last, it produces a Fruit, in the highest Degree, grateful to the Taste, and beautiful to the Eye. And, indeed, I am pleas'd not only, as I said before, with its Utility when ripen'd, but with its Culture and Qualities when growing. Witness the ranging the Standards, the joyning them at the Top; the binding up, and training the Vine, and the cutting off some of the Shoots, I have mention'd, and encouraging others. Why should I mention the watering, the fallowing, and hoeing of the Ground, by which the natural Soil becomes

S

much

much more fruitful? Why should I speak the upon Benefit of dunging Lands? I have done it in the Treatise I wrote upon Husbandry, though the learned *Hesiod*, who wrote concerning the Improvement of Land, does not so much as mention it. But *Homer*, who appears to me to have liv'd many Ages before *Hesiod*, brings in (*b*) *Laertes* cultivating and dunging his Grounds, in order to divert the Melancholy, he had conceiv'd on Account of his Son. But a Country Life does not take all its Charms from Corns, or Meadows, or Vineyards, or Groves only; for a great Deal is owing to Gardens, to Orchards, to rearing Cattle, to tending Bees, and to the delightful Variety that appears in Flower-Beds; nor is the planting of Fruit-Trees more curiously pleasing, than their engrafting,

(*b*) *Laertes*] I don't know if there is any Passage in antient and modern Reading, more beautiful than this Description which *Cicero* here gives of rural Oeconomy, and Vegetation. It has every Beauty, but without any Exaggeration, and has, I believe, been equal'd in no Language. It is easy to infer from the Propriety, the Justness, and the Happiness of the whole, that our Author had studied the Subject, to the greatest Perfection, and it gives us a very high Idea, of the Elegance and Beauty of his Villa. In short, it's amazing that this whole Discourse has been so little consider'd, for if it had, it is more than probable, that the Elegancies of Gardening, and the Improvements of Agriculture would not have been of so late a Date, either in *England*, or other Parts of *Europe*. As to the Terms, I have translated them according to the best Information, I am able to receive, but it is impossible to come up to the Beauties of the Original.

In the Passage before us, *Cicero* has been accus'd of Inaccuracy by some Critics, who contend, that *Homer* no where assigns to this King *Laertes* such a dirty Employment as that of dunging the Land. It is certain, however, that he employs him in other Branches of Country-Business, and there is even some Doubt whether the Original does not come up to *Cicero's* Meaning.

which,

which, of all Improvements in Husbandry, is, I think, the most ingenious.

XVI. I could recount a great many more delightful Amusements in a Country-Life, but, in what I have already mentioned, I am sensible, I have been too prolix. But, you will pardon me, for I am carried away by my Fondness for rural Affairs, and Old Age, you know, is naturally talkative; so that you see I admit it not to be quite exempt from Failings. But, as I was saying, (i) *Manius Curius*, when he triumph'd over the *Samnites*, over the *Sabines*, and over *Pyrrhus*, spent his last Years in a Country-Life, and, indeed, when I consider his Villa, for it does not lye far from my Estate, I never can sufficiently admire either the Sobriety of that great Man, or the Virtues of those Times. For when the *Samnites* had brought him, as he was sitting by his Fire-side, a large Quantity of Gold, he refused it, and dismiss'd them, saying, that he thought it no Glory to be possess'd of Gold, but to command those who were. Now, is it possible for a Soul like his to feel any Thing in Old Age, but what is delightful?

But, that I may not depart from myself, I now come to Husbandmen. Our Senators, that is, our Seniors, then lived in the Country. *Quintus Cincinnatus*, for Instance, was at Plough, when he was made Dictator; and, by his Order, *Caius Servilius Abala*, his Master of Horse, attack'd

(i) *Manius Curius*] The Reader may, in the *Roman Authors*, see a full Account of this and all other great Men, mentioned here, to which I refer them; as I do not intend to swell these Notes into a History.

and kill'd *Spurius Maelius*, in his Attempt to possess himself of sovereign Power. *Curius* and other Heroes were summon'd from the Country to the Senate, and thence it was that the summoning Officers were called VIATORES or ROAD-MEN. Is it possible then, that the Old Age of those great old Men; who were delighted with a Country-Life, could have been miserable? In my Opinion, you cannot name any Age of Man more happy, not only thro' the Duties of a Country-Life, which are healthful to all Mankind by their cultivating the Grounds, but, thro' the Delights I have mention'd; and through that Fullness and Plenty of every Thing that belongs either to the Support of Mortals, or to the Worship of the Gods; inasmuch that, to please those who require Pleasure, I will even take it into Favour, and recommend it here. For good and industrious Masters have their Cellars always filled with Wine, with Oil, and with Provisions of all Kinds. And the single Farm has about it the Plenty of twenty Estates. There is Pork, Kid, Lamb, Poultry, Milk, Cheese, Honey in Abundance. Besides, Farmers call their Garden their other Barn-Yard; and then a Country-Life has the Amusements of Hunting and Hawking, to employ its idle Hours, and to give, as it were, a Relish to its other Enjoyments.

Why should I mention the Verdure of the Fields, the Regularity of the planting, with the fine Effect that the Vines and Olives have upon the Eye? I will be very short on those Heads. As to a well improv'd Field, nothing can be more profitable for Use, or more beautiful in Shew; and Old Age is so far from debarring us from, that

it

it invites and allures us to, rural Enjoyments. For where, in the Close of Life, can we be more conveniently warm'd by the basking Sun, or the glowing Hearth; or where, for Health, can we more purely Taste the Freshness of the Stream, or enjoy the Coolness of the Shade?

Let others, therefore, have their Arms, their Horses, their Spears, let them ply the Bat or the Racket, let them practise swimming, and racing, but let them leave to us old Men our (*k*) Trick-track Table with a Box and Dice, out of all their Diversions: and even that is a Matter of Indifference to us, for it is possible for Old Age to be happy without them.

The Works of *Xenophon* contain a great Deal of useful Matter, and I beg, you would read them with your usual Attention, that, you may see what large Encomiums he bestows upon Agriculture in the Treatise which he entitles *Oeconomicus*, and which concerns the Management of Family Affairs. And, (to make you sensible he thought no Employment is so truly royal, as that of Agriculture) *Socrates*, in that Book, discoursing with *Critobolus*, tells him, that when *Lysander* the *Lacedemonian*, a Man of consummate Virtue, came to *Sardis* with Presents from his Confederates, to *Cyrus* the younger King of *Persia*, a Prince distinguish'd by great Abilities, and a glorious Reign, amongst many other Civilities and Marks of Politeness which he bestowed on *Lysander*, he shew'd

(*k*) *Trick-track*] I have ventur'd upon a Word here which may seem very modern, but, I remember the learned *Salmassius* has not only proved, that the *Romans* had such a Game as *Trick-Track*, or *Back-Gammon*, but has actually given us, from the Antique, the Figure of one of those Tables.

him a Field, which was enclosed and planted with the greatest Exactness. *Lysander* immediately fell to admire the beautiful Taper of the Trees, the quincuncial Hedges, the Verdure of the Lawns, the Neatness of the Walks, and the fragrant Odour that exhal'd from the Flowers. He then told *Cyrus*, that he not only admired the great Industry, but the elegant Taste in which every Thing was planned and proportioned. Sir, (replied *Cyrus* to him) the whole was executed by me, the Plan and the Arrangement is all my own, and many of the Trees you see growing, were planted there by my own Hands. We are told, that *Lysander*, all this while, stood examining his Purple Robes, the fine Appearance of his Person, and his *Persian* Dress, which was embroidered with Gold, and powder'd with Jewels; and then, "*Cyrus* (said he) you may properly be term'd happy, because your Virtue, is correspondent to your Fortune."

Let old Men, therefore, enjoy this State of Life; for Age is no Impediment to our retaining, amidst other Enjoyments, that of Agriculture to the last Breath of our Life, be it ever so long. It is said that *Marcus Valerius Corvinus* lived to his hundredth Year, and that, after he grew very old, he lived in the Country and improv'd his Grounds. An Interval of forty-six Years happened between his first and his sixth Consulship; so that his Enjoyment of public Honours lasted as long as the Term which our Ancestors assign'd for a Man to begin to grow elderly; and the latter Part of his Life was so much the more happy than the preceding, in that his Authority encreas'd, and his Toil diminish'd:

diminish'd: For Authority is the most glorious Character of Old Age.

How great was the Authority of *Lucius Cæcilius Metellus*? How great that of *Atilius Calatinus*, who was single in this glorious Encomium? "That many Nations agreed, in his being the best Man of his Country." You know the Lines to that Purpose which are engrav'd upon his Monument. That Man, therefore, in whose Praise all Mankind agreed, was entitled to bear great Authority. What a great Man did we see in *Publius Crassus*? What a great Man in *Marcus Lepidus*, who succeeded *Crassus* in the High-priesthood? Need I to mention *Paulus* or *Africanus*? Or shall I again speak of *Fabius Maximus*? In all whom, not only their Speech, but their very Nod, carried with it Authority. Old Age, especially honour'd Old Age, has in it, an Authority that is of more value than all the Pleasures that Youth can enjoy.

But you are to remember, that through the whole of what I have been saying, I speak in the Praise only of that Old Age, that in Youth has laid a Foundation of Merit. Hence it was, that I once met with a general Applause, when I said in Public, "That wretched is that old Age, that requires the Protection of Words." It is not gray Hairs, it is not Wrinkles, that procure Authority; it is the former Part of a Life spent in virtuous Pursuits, that enjoys the highest Privileges of Authority.

Even Matters that appear to be slight and trifling carry with them Marks of Respect; such as, the Circumstances of having a Levee, of being follow'd after, of taking the Wall, of others rising to salute you, of being waited upon to and

from your House, and of being consulted ; all which, in our, and in every other State, are most exactly perform'd according to the good or bad Principles of the People. We are told that *Lysander* the *Lacedemonian*, whom I mention'd but a little ago, used to say, that the most honourable Residence of Old Age was at *Lacedemon* : for no where has it greater Privileges, no where has it greater Respect, paid it, than there. Nay, there is a Tradition handed down, that when some public Games were exhibiting at *Athens*, an old Man coming into the Theatre, could not, in all that great Assembly, get a Seat amongst his own Countrymen ; but when he came to the Place assign'd for the *Lacedemonian* Ambassadors to sit in, they all of them arose, and made room for the old Man to sit down. This Action meeting with a loud Peal of Applause from the whole Assembly, one of the *Lacedemonians* is said to have observ'd, “ That the *Athenians* knew what was right, but “ neglected to practise it.”

We have, in our augural College, many noble Institutions ; but one of the best of them relates to what I am now speaking of, which is ; that, according as a Man is advanced in Years, he has the Precedency of voting, or giving his Opinion. And the elder Augur takes the Place, not only of those who have been formerly in higher Posts than himself, but of those who are, at the Time, actually invested with public Power. What sensual Pleasures, then, are to be compar'd with the Privileges of Authority ? And, whoever makes a right Use of them, seems to me to have gone with Applause through the Drama of Life, without flagging, like unskilful Actors, in its last Scenes. . .

But

But it has been said that old Men are forever distrustful, peevish, and inexorable, nay, if the Truth were known, covetous too. But those are Failings, not of their Age, but of their several Dispositions. Sourness, however, and the other Failings I have mention'd, have a plausible, tho' not a justifiable, Excuse. For old Men think that they are despis'd, neglected and scott at: Besides every thing hurts a weakly Body: Yet even these Circumstances, sit easy upon a Man whose Disposition is sweet, and whose Studies are virtuous. We see this Truth exemplified not only in Life, but in the Play of the *Adelphi*, where two Brothers are introduced: But how peevish is the one, and how polite the other. This is a true Picture of real Life; for every Man, no more than every Kind of Wine, does not improve by Years. I love in Old Age Gravity, so that it be decent; as indeed every Thing else ought to be: but nothing can atone for Ill-Nature. As to Avarice, I don't understand what an old Man has to do with it; for surely nothing can be more absurd than for a Man to lay in the more Provision for a Journey, the nearer he is to its End.

XIX. The fourth Charge against old Age is, the Approach of Death, which greatly distresses and disquiets that Time of Life, because of its near Neighbourhood to Old Age. What a wretched old Man must he be, who, in a long Course of Life has not learned to look upon Death, as a Thing that is to be despis'd; for if it puts a final End to all Consciousness, it is a Matter of no Manner of Moment: but, if it leads us to an Eternity of Existence, it is devoutly to be wish'd for: And it is certain, there can be no third State.

What

What, then, have I to dread, if, after Death, I shall either not be miserable, or be happy? Mean while, can any one be so stupid, let him be ever so young, as to make himself sure of living till the next Evening? For the Chances that a young Man has for dying are more than an old one has: Young Men are more apt to catch Diseases: Their Sickness is more severe, and their Cure more slow. Few, therefore, arrive at Old Age, for, if they did, Life would be regulated to better Purpose, and with greater Prudence. For old Men are in Possession of Sense, of Reason, and good Conduct; and, were it not for them, there would be no such Thing on Earth as Government.

But to apply what I have said to Death ready to seize us. Can you impute that as a Reproach to Old Age, when you see that it is in common to Youth? I have had Proofs not only in my own excellent Son, but in your Brothers, *Scipio*, whom the Public hop'd to see in the highest Offices of the State, that Death is the Lot of every Age. A young Man, however, is in Hopes to live long, but an old Man has no Grounds for such Hopes. But they are foolish Hopes. For what can be more ridiculous than to take Uncertainty for Certainty, and Falseness for Truth? An Old Man has no Grounds for hoping. Then his Condition is more eligible than that of the young Man; because the one is in Possession of what the other only hopes for. The latter wishes for Length of Days; the former enjoys it: And yet, immortal Gods! what is there that can be termed LENGTH, even in the most lengthen'd Life of Man?

Supposing we have Reason to hope to live to the Age of the King of the *Tartarians*: for I

find it recorded, that one *Argothonius* at *Cales* reign'd eighty Years, and lived a hundred and twenty. Now, I have no Notion that a Thing can be call'd lasting after its Period is arriv'd. For when ever that Period comes, there is an End of all that is laps'd; and nothing remains but what you have gain'd by a Life spent in Acts of Virtue and Beneficence. Hours, Days, Months and Years fly away, the past Time never comes round again; nor is it possible, to pry into the Future: Therefore every Man ought to be contented with the Period that is allotted to his Life.

A Player is not, in order to gain Applause, to act in all the Characters of a Drama; it is sufficient if he is applauded in his own Part; nor is a wise Man to be active thro' all the Play of Life, till the Curtain is dropt. For though the Time of our Existence is but short, yet our Life may be long enough for the Practice of the moral Duties, and if you survive this active Part of Life, you are no more to grieve at its being over, than Husbandmen are to grieve that the Sweets of Spring are past, and succeeded by the Summer and the Harvest. For the Spring is an Emblem of Youth, and displays the future Fruits and Flowers; the other Ages of Life are proper for reaping those Fruits, and storing them up in Yards and Granaries.

Now, as I have already observ'd, the Fruits of Old Age consist in the Remembrance and the Plenty of the good Things we have reap'd in the former Part of Life. As to good Things, whatever is agreeable to Nature is such; and can any Thing be more agreeable to Nature than that old Men should dye? But when young Men dye, it is because Nature is over-power'd in her Struggles and Efforts to save them. To me, therefore, the
Death

Death of a young Man resembles the Force of Fire over-power'd by the Quantity of Water. Whereas Life goes out of old Men, as Heat naturally departs, when the Fire is consum'd to Ashes. And, as Apples, when green require some Force to pluck them from the Tree, but when they are ripe and mellow'd, fall of themselves, thus, the Death of a young Man comes by Violence; and the Life of an old Man drops thro' Maturity. This Reflection is so pleasing to me in this Voyage of Life, that, the nearer I approach to Death, I think I see the Land and the Harbour that is to receive me after a long and tedious Navigation.

XX. All the other Stages of Life have their fixt Periods; but Old Age has none; and its best Character is, when we are able to act up to the Duties that attend it; but at the same Time to have a just Contempt for Death. From this it happens, that Old Age may be both more resolute and better bottom'd than Youth. It was from this, that when the Tyrant *Pisistratus* demanded to know of *Solon* what had animated him to oppose him with so much Boldness? The latter answer'd OLD AGE. But the best Period of Old Age is, when in the full Enjoyment of our Reason and all our Senses, Nature dissolves the Work that her own Powers have produced. For as the Man who has built a Ship knows best how to take it in Pieces, so Nature knows best how to undo what she has put to together. Now the Work that has been but lately join'd is taken asunder with great Difficulty, but when it grows old, it is easily unjointed. Therefore, old Men are neither to court with Eagerness, nor abandon thro' Whim, their short Remainder of Life.

Pythagoras forbids us to quit our Post or Station of Life without the Orders of the Commander, that is God, who gave it us. It was finely and wisely said by *Solon*; "That he did not wish, his Death to be unaccompanied by the tender Feelings and the Tears of Friendship;" meaning, that he desir'd to be dear to those, he had lived amongst. And yet I don't know, whether the Sentiment of *Ennius* is not finer, when he says, *Let none bewail me dead, nor wet my Tomb with Tears.* For he thinks, that Death is not to be bewail'd, when it is follow'd by Immortality. Now, the Pain of Death lasts but for a very little while, and, to an old Man especially, is next to nothing. As to what happens after Death, we either have no Consciousness at all, or if we have, it is such as is desirable. But, even from our Youth, we ought to be accustomed to look upon Death as a Thing that is to be despis'd; for, otherwise, we never can enjoy Tranquillity of Mind. For, we are certain of once dying, but we are uncertain as to the Time, whether it may not be this very Day. How, therefore, it may be said, can a Man enjoy himself calmly and sedately when he is under the hourly Apprehensions of Death? But this Point will require no very long Discussion, when we reflect upon *Louis Brulé*, who died for the Deliverance of his Country. Upon the two *Decii*, who, on Horse-back, voluntarily plung'd into Death. Upon *Regulus*, who return'd to a painful Death, rather than not keep the Promise he had made to an Enemy. Upon the two *Scipiones*, who, with their lifeless Bodies, made a Bulwark for their Country against the *Carthaginians*. Upon your Uncle *Paulus*, who, by his Blood, endeavour'd to wash

wash out the reproachful Rashness of his Colleague at the Battle of *Canna*: Upon *Marcus Marcellus*, whose lifeless Body, a most implacable Enemy would not suffer to be without the Honours of an Interment. Nay, (as I have shewn in my Book of Antiquities) upon our very common Men, who have, in whole Legions; often undauntedly and chearfully marched to those Posts from which they were sure never to return. If, therefore, young Men, not only without Learning, but without Conversation, despise Death, shall Men, when both learned and old, dread it?

It is my firm Opinion, that a Satiety of Enjoyments creates in Man a Satiety in living. Childhood has its proper Amusements; but do we see, that those Amusements are follow'd by young Men? These too have their Diversions; but without their being coveted by those of riper Years, or what we call the Middle-aged. The latter have their Pursuits; but they leave them off when they come to be old Men; They too have their Enjoyments, but they are the last that Nature is capable to pursue. Therefore, as the Enjoyments of all the former Parts of our Life fall off, so do those of Old Age, and when that happens, Nature having nothing farther to desire, points out the proper Pause for Death to enter.

XXI. And here, I can see no Reason why I may not venture to communicate to you my own Sentiments of Death, for the nearer I approach it, I can see it the more distinctly.

Now, my *Scipio*, and you, my *Lælius*, in my Opinion, that those great Men, and my dearest Friends, your Fathers, are now alive and enjoying
that

that Kind of Life, which alone deserves the Name of Life. Because, while we are clogg'd with these Fetters of Flesh and Blood, we are ty'd down to perform a certain necessary Rotation of Duty, and that too, attended with great Difficulty. For a heaven-born Mind is, here, degraded from its sublime Mansion, and fastened, as it were, to the Earth, that Enemy to its divine immortal Nature. But, in my Opinion, (1) the Gods have sprinkled thro' Mankind immortal Souls to be the Guardians of the Earth; and by contemplating the Order of the heavenly Bodies, to imitate them in the Œconomy and Regularity of their Lives. Nor am I induced to this Belief, only by Reflection and Reasoning, but by the Opinions of the most sublime Philosophers.

I have heard, that *Pythagoras* and his Followers, who were so near being our Countrymen, that they were formerly term'd *Italian* Philosophers, never had the least Doubt, but that our Souls are Emanations from the *Universal Mind*. I receiv'd a farther Conviction of this Truth from the Discourse, which *Socrates*, (who, by the Oracle of *Apollo*, was held to be the wisest of all Mankind) made upon the Immortality of the Soul, the last Day of his Life. In short, this Opinion, this Conviction, arises within me from my reflecting, that considering the mighty Quickness with which the human Soul is endow'd, its vast Re-

(1) Orig. *Sed credo Deos immortales sparfisse Animos in Corpora humana*. I know the Sense, in which I have translated this Passage, will be thought very uncommon and perhaps whimsical; but I cannot think, from the Word *sparfisse*, that *Cicero* intended the Word *immortales* to be join'd to *Deos*, but to *Animos*.

collection of past, and Provision for future, Events; the Variety of the Arts, and the Importance of the Sciences it possesses, with all its numerous Inventions; I say, considering all this, it is impossible for that Nature, that is the Receptacle of so many different Properties, to be Mortal. Add to this, that the Soul is never at Rest, and as it had no Beginning of Motion, because it is self-impulsive, so it can have no End of Motion, because it never can abandon its own Properties; and as its Nature is simple, without being mixt with ought that is unequal or unlike to itself, it therefore is not (*m*) discernible, and consequently is not perishable, (*n*). And it is a strong Argument that the Souls of Men have generally Consciousness before they exist in their Bodies, that when they are Boys, and learning the difficult Arts, they so quickly take in an infinite Number of Things. that they do not seem then first to learn them, but to recollect and to remember them:

XXII. Thus far our Favourite *Plato*. But when *Xenophon* brings in his *Cyrus* upon his Death-Bed, he speaks as follows. “Think not, my
“ most illustrious Sons, that, when I shall de-

(*m*) The Hints of our Author in this noble Disquisition admit of Improvement. For the *Indiscernibility* of the Soul is inseparable from its Existence, because if it is *discernible*, each Particle into which it is divided must be endow'd with the same Principle of Consciousness, which is absurd to suppose, and a Contradiction in Terms. Now if it is not *discernible*, it is not *material*, because Matter is discernible or divisible AD INFINITUM.

(*n*) *Perishable*] See the preceding Note. This Passage is a plain Evidence that *Cicero* or *Cato*, in whose Person we are to suppose *Cicero* here to speak, look'd upon Divisibility to be an inseparable Property of Matter; and, that if the Soul is not material, it is immortal.

“ part

" part from you, I shall be a NON-EXISTENCE
 " or NON-ENTITY. For while I was with you,
 " ye saw not my Soul, but ye knew, from my
 " my Actions, that it resided in this Body. Believe
 " ye therefore, that it still exists, though you per-
 " ceive it not. The honourable Memorials of il-
 " lustrious Persons never would have surviv'd them
 " had the Operations of their Souls contributed
 " nothing towards perpetuating their Memories.
 " For my Part, never can I be perswaded that the
 " Soul, which while she animates the mortal
 " Body is alive, but that as soon as she leaves it,
 " she perishes. Neither can I think, that the
 " Soul loses all Consciousness when she leaves
 " the unconscious Body ; but, I think, that when
 " she is freed from all Communication with the
 " Body, that she then begins to become pure,
 " self-collected, and truly knowing. Now, as
 " the Nature of Man is ended by Death, all the
 " constituent Parts of it are plainly seen to be
 " resolved into such or such Matter, according
 " to the Principles from which they sprung ; but
 " the Soul never appears either when she is with
 " the Body, or when she leaves it.

" You will allow that nothing is so like to
 " Death as Sleep is ; now, the Souls of those
 " who sleep, incontestibly manifest their own di-
 " vine Original, for when they are unbent and at
 " large they see many Futurities ; thereby in-
 " timating, what the Soul will be, once it is
 " freed from the Clogs of Flesh and Blood. If
 " this, then, is the Case, in (o) this Sense, do
 " ye

(o) *This Sense*] Our Author's Commentator *Grævius* has
 been very severe upon him for this Passage, and accuses him not
 only of having been unfaithful to the Words of *Xenophon* which

“ ye venerate me as an immortal Being. But if
 “ the Soul is to perish together with the Body, yet
 “ still, out of Respect to the Gods, who pro-
 “ tect and govern all this beautiful System of
 “ Nature, ye ought to have a pious and an in-
 “ violable Regard for my Memory.”

Such were the Sentiments of *Cyrus* when dying,
 now, if you please, I will give you my own.

XXIII. No Man, *Scipio*, shall ever perswade me, that either *Paullus*, your Father, or your two Grand-Fathers, *Paullus* and *Africanus*, or the Father, or the Uncle of *Africanus*, or many other excellent Persons, whom I need not mention, would have perform'd so many Exploits, that were to descend to Posterity, had they not, in their own Minds, been convinced, that they had an Interest in Posterity, and that (*p*) they were to superintend its Actions. Do you imagine that I (for I must be indulg'd in a little of an old Man's Boasting) would have undertaken so many Toils by Day and by Night, at home and abroad, did I think that the Period of my Glory was to be the same with that of my Life? Would it not have been wiser in me to have pass'd my Days in Ease and Retirement without Stir and without Struggle?

which he is translating, but of a gross Absurdity in making *Cyrus*, the most modest of all Mankind, ridiculously ordering his Sons to worship him as a God. As to the Original *Greek* it runs thus; *Καὶ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν καταιδέμενοι ποιεῖτε, ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω.* In *English*; *And ye, worshipping my Soul, do as I desire.* Now I can by no Means see either the Impropriety, or the Absurdity which *Grævius* here charges upon *Cicero*. *Cyrus* has been all along inculcating the Divinity of the Soul, and if it is divine he desires his Sons (*Sic*) in that Sense to venerate him. The Truth is, the Commentator over-look'd that material Particle, without which the Passage had indeed been improper and absurd.

(*p*) I have ventur'd to throw in two or three Words of my own to make *Cicero's* Sense the more plain here.

But, I know not how, my soaring Soul, always look'd upon Posterity in such a Light as if she was not to enjoy real Life till she had left the Body : And indeed were not our Souls immortal, never would it happen, that the Souls of the best of Men should always be the most passionate after an Immortality of Glory.

You see that the wiser a Man is, he goes with the greater Calmness out of Life, and the more stupid he is, he is the more disturb'd by Death. Are you not then sensible that the Mind, which has the most comprehensive and the most penetrating View, perceives that it is going to a better Place; which the dull Eye of more blunted Reason cannot discern? For my own Part, I am transported with the Hopes of again seeing your Fathers, whom, in Life, I honour'd and lov'd : And I pant to meet not only with those whom I have been acquainted with in Life, but with those of whom I have heard, of whom I have read, and of whom I myself have written. It would be indeed a masterful Power that should hinder my Journey to them, even though it should again grind me into Youth. Nay, should a God give me the Boon of going at this my Age into second Childhood, and of puling in the Cradle, yet would I reject it : For I have no Notion of beginning anew the Race I have finish'd, or being set back to the starting Post just as I have run round the Course.

Can any Man think that the Pleasures overballance the Toils of Living? But supposing they do; yet still Pleasures will cloy and they must end. And yet I have no Mind to complain, (as many learned Men have done,) of Life; neither do I repent that I have liv'd, because I have

liv'd so as to answer Life's Purposes; And I leave it, not as I would do my Home, but as I would an Inn : For Nature gave it to us not as our own Dwelling, but our Lodging Place.

O glorious Day! when I shall arrive at that divine Senate and Society of departed Spirits ; when I shall bid adieu to the Bustle and Pollution of this World. Then I will repair not only to the great Men I have mention'd, but to my *Cato*, to my Son, a Man never exceeded by any either in the Goodness of his Heart or the Excellency of his Morals. His Body I burnt, these old Hands *(q)* *perform'd for him the Duties, which, he ought to have paid to me.* Yet, did not his Soul forsake me? No, it is still looking back upon his Father, and he assuredly inhabits those Mansions to which he knew I would follow him. If I seem to bear my Loss with Fortitude, it is not because I am indifferent about it, but because I comfort myself with Thoughts that we shall not long be separated from one another.


Scipio, it is by those Means, that Old Age is lightsome to me, a Matter, which you have said, you and *Lælius* use to admire. Nay, it is so far from being a Trouble, that it is a Pleasure, to me. As to my Opinion, that the Souls of Men are immortal, if it is a Mistake, it is Mistake of the most pleasing Nature; and never, while I breathe, shall I be willing to be cur'd of an Imposition that gives me so much Delight. But if, as some minute Philosophers hold, all consciousness is at an End with Life, I shall not be

(q) The Words in Italics are Part of the Inscriptions that were put upon those Monuments which Parents erected for their Children.

afraid of being laught at by the dead Philosophers. But supposing we are not to be immortal, yet a Man ought to wish to leave the World at the proper Time. For Nature, as she prescribes Bounds to every Thing else, has likewise prescribed a Period for our Living. Now Old Age, like the winding up of a Play, winds up our Life, the Tiresomness of which we ought to avoid, especially if we are satiated with Living. I have, now, given you my Sentiments concerning Old Age, at which, I wish you may arrive, that you may have Experience of that which you have heard from me.

End of the Dialogue concerning OLD AGE.





M. T. C I C E R O
 H I S
L Æ L I U S,
 Being a CONFERENCE, concerning
F R I E N D S H I P.

Address to TITUS POMPONIUS ATTICUS.

INTRODUCTION.



LUENTIUS MUCIUS, the Augur, used, with greater Readiness and good Humour, to tell many Particulars concerning his Father-in-Law *Lælius*, whom in all his Discourse he constantly averred to be a wise Man. For my Part, I was introduced, after I had taken upon me the manly Gown, to this same *Mucius* by my Father, in such a Manner, that, as far as I could, or was permitted, I never departed from the old Man's Side. This gave me an Opportunity of committing to Memory many of his learned Differtations, and likewise many of his pithy, pat, Sayings ; and by that Knowledge I

endea-

endeavour'd to improve myself in Learning. Upon his Death I applied myself to *Scævola*, the Pontif; a Man, who, I will be bold to say, had not his Equal in our State, either for Abilities or Honesty. But I shall speak of him elsewhere, at present, I return to the Augur.

It often happen'd he fell upon a Topic that was then in every one's Mouth, and once in particular I remember, while, as usual, he was sitting in his Elbow-Chair, with nobody by but myself and a very few of his greatest Intimates; for you, my Friend, *Atticus*, must remember both the Admiration and Complaints of the Public upon that Occasion, and the rather because you was intimate with (a) *Publius Sulpicius*, when, being Tribune of the Commons, he commenc'd a deadly Enmity against *Quintus Pompeius*, who was the Consul, and with whom *Sulpicius* had before liv'd in the most friendly and affectionate Manner.

Upon this Occasion, therefore, *Scævola*, when he happen'd to mention that Matter, repeated to us a Discourse of *Lælius*, concerning FRIENDSHIP, which pass'd between him, and *Caius* the Son of *Marcus*, *Fannius*, another of his Sons-in-Law, a few Days after the Death of *Africanus*. I have committed to Memory the Sentiments contain'd in that Discourse, and have digested them to my own liking in this Treatise concerning *Friendship*; in such a Manner that I have brought them in as really conversing together, that I may the more easily get rid of the Troublesome Impletives of *I said*, and *he said*; you are therefore to

(a) *Sulpicius*] For the Character and Fate of this great Man see our Author *de Oratore*, particularly p. 344. of my Translation.

imagine them to be actually present and enter'd upon a Conversation.

For as you often have importuned me to write somewhat concerning Friendship, the Subject to me appeared both worthy to be known by all Mankind, and suitable to the Affection subsisting between us. It was, therefore, with Pleasure, that I laid hold of your Entreaties to be the Means of instructing many. But, as in the Treatise entitled *CATO Major*, which, I address'd to you concerning OLD AGE, I introduced the Discourse of *Cato* when an old Man, because I could find no Person more proper for delivering his Sentiments concerning Old Age, than the Man, who had long been old, and even in Old Age distinguished himself above all his Country-Men. In like Manner, having been informed by our Predecessors of the memorable Friendship, between *Caius Lælius* and *Publius Scipio*, *Lælius* appeared to me to be a proper Character for delivering those Sentiments concerning Friendship, which *Scævola* remembred he had made Use of. Now this Kind of Conversation, which is introduced under the Sanction of Men, both old, and eminent, is, I know not how, of greater Weight than any another. Nay, when I read my own Composition, I am sometimes affected in such a Manner, that I actually do not think, it is myself, but *Cato*, that is speaking. But, as on that Occasion I introduced an Old Man discoursing on Old Age, so I, as the most affectionate of Friends, have address'd to a Friend, this Treatise concerning Friendship. Upon the former Occasion, I brought in *Cato*, as a Speaker, few of that Age having lived longer, and none with greater Glory. Now, I introduce

Lælius, the wise, the confessedly wise *Lælius*, the Man whose characteristic was Friendship, discouraging of Friendship. For a Moment, then, my Friend, lose Sight of me, and imagine you are hearing *Lælius* speaking in Person. *Caius Fannius*, and *Quintus Mucius*, after the Death of *Africanus*, come to their Father-in-Law. They enter upon a Discourse: The whole Purport of which, is concerning Friendship, and *Lælius* is the Respondent, but you shall be yourself Judge of the Matter.

C O N F E R E N C E.

FANNIUS, MUCIUS, LÆLIUS.

II. FANNIUS. I agree with you, *Lælius*, for never was there a better, never was there a brighter Man, than *Africanus*. But you ought to reflect that the Eye of the Public is now fixed upon you, that they both pronounce and think you to be the only Man possessed of Wisdom. The same was the Character given to *Marcus Cato*. We know too, that the Epithet of Wise, was likewise given by our Forefather to *Lucius Attilius*; but, to both for different Reasons. To *Attilius*, because of his allowed Skill in the Constitution of our State; To *Cato*, because of his Accomplishments in many different Branches of Knowledge; he was famous for his wise Provisions, for his resolute Conduct, and smart Answers both in the Senate and in the Forum. For this Reason, when he was old he obtained the Epithet of *Wise*, by Way of Sur-name; but you are allowed to be wise in another Sense. For you are so not only by your Nature and Morals, but by your Knowledge and Learning; not

in the Sense, in which the vulgar use that Word, but in the Acceptation of the learned, according to which there is not, now, in all *Greece*, a WISE MAN. As to them who are called the SEVEN WISE MEN, they who examine into Matters critically, think they ought not to be reckoned in the Number of the Wise. We have heard of a wise Man at *Aibens*, who, by the Oracle of *Apollo*, was adjudged to be the wisest of Mankind. Now the Public think, that the Character of your Wisdom is, that you never look for any Thing farther than into your own Breast, and that you think Virtue to be superior to all Contingencies, that can happen to Mankind. Therefore, the Public enquires of me, and of you too, *Scævola*, I suppose, in what Manner, you bear the Death of *Africanus*, and the rather, because, on the fourth of the Month, when, as Augurs, we came to the Garden of *Decius Brutus*, the Augur, to compare Notes together, as usual, you was not present, though always before you had been a most punctual Observer of that Day, and the constant Attendant upon that Duty.

SCÆVOLA. The Public, *Lælius*, indeed are very inquisitive concerning the Matters that *Fannius* has mention'd. The Answer, I make is, that I observ'd you to bear with Decency, the Stroke you have receiv'd by the Death of that best of Men and dearest of Friends; but that it was impossible for one, affectionate and tender as you are by Nature, not to be touch'd. As to your being absent from our College, on the fourth, that you was prevented not by your Sorrows, but by your Indisposition.

LÆLIUS. Your Apology, *Scævola*, is both prudent and true; for I do not think myself at Liberty

erty, if I am in Health, to absent myself, through any Affliction that may happen to me, from the Duty which I have always attended ; nor do I conceive, that any Accident can put a Man of Resolution under the Necessity of failing in any Point of his Duty.

As to you, *Fannius*, your complimenting me upon what I neither am conscious of possessing, nor desirous of being thought to possess, is talking like a Friend. But, in my Opinion, you form a wrong Judgment of *Cato*. For either no Man (which I believe to be the Truth) ever was wise, or if ever Man was wise, *Cato* was that Man. I shall not mention his other Merits ; but how did he bear the Death of his Son ? I remember *Paullus*, I saw *Gallus*, under the same Affliction ; but their Sons were Boys ; the Son that *Cato* lost, was a Man, an accomplish'd, a valuable, Man. You are, therefore, to be cautious of preferring to *Cato*, even the Man whom, you say, *Apollo* pronounced to be the wisest of Mankind. For the Glory of the one lies in Words, that of the other in Actions (*b*). As to myself, since I have now an Opportunity of talking to you both, you are to take my Sentiments as follow.

III. Wise Men, if they please, may judge whether I should be in the right, if I were to deny that I am affected with the Death of *Scipio* ; be that as

(*b*) *Actions*] Orig. *Hujus enim Facta, illius dicta, laudantur.* This is either a wrong Reading, or a wrong Sentiment, or I don't understand it. *Socrates*, is as celebrated for the active and practical, as for the sedentary or the speculative, Virtues ; and he closed a Life, which was spent in fighting for, as well as in instructing his Country, with a Death for which there is no Parallel in the *Roman* History ; so that in whatever Light we consider him, his Character is far superior to that of *Cato*.

it will, I know if I did, I should tell a Falshood. Never, I believe, will, nay, never can Man feel what I feel, from the Loss of so dear a Friend : This Assertion is not too bold ; and yet, I stand not in Need of Medicine for my Sorrows. For I chiefly comfort myself with the Thought, that I am free from that Mistake, which generally torments others upon the Death of their Friends. For, I do not think that *Scipio* has met with any Disaster. The Misfortune, if any, is mine, and mine only ; now, when a Man is deeply afflicted with his own Loss, he gives Proofs of his Affection, not for his Friend, but for himself. As to my Friend, who can deny that he has finish'd his Life with Glory ? Immortality on Earth is what he never thought of ; but is there a Wish that ought to enter the Heart of Man, which he did not obtain ? When he grew up to be a Youth, his matchless Virtues outstrip'd the high Expectations which his Fellow-Citizens had conceiv'd of him when a Boy. Twice did he obtain the Consulship before he once ask'd for it ; the first Time before he he was qualified by Law to bear it ; the second, when indeed he was qualified by his Age, but when it was almost too late for his Country. By his utterly destroying (c) two Cities, the most inveterate Enemies of this State, he not only put an End to the then present, but has prevented future, Wars. Shall I touch upon the Sweetness of his Manners ; of his Affection for his Mother ? Of his Generosity towards his Sisters ? Of his Kindness to his Dependents ; and his Justice towards all Mankind ? All these are Circumstances known

(c) Vide *Carthage* and *Numantia*.

to yourselves; while the public Sorrow expressed at his Burial is a Proof how dear he was to his Country. Could such a Man be benefited by the Accession of a few Years? For tho' Old Age may not indeed be burthensome, as I remember *Cato* prov'd to *Scipio*, and me in a Conversation we held together the Year before his Death, yet still it takes away the Activity with *Scipio* posselt when he dyed.

Such, therefore, was his Life, that it could receive no Addition from Fortune, or from Glory. And the Quickness of his Death took from it its Pain (*d*). As to the Occasion of it, I am tender of speaking of it, but you perceive what the Public suspects. Yet this I will be bold to say, that of all the many glad and glorious Days, which *Publius Scipio* saw in his Life-Time, the most glorious was the Day before his Death, when, upon the breaking up of the Senate, he was attended home, in the Evening, by the conscript Fathers of the Senate, by the Allies of *Rome*, and the People of *Italy*: So that now being upon the Summit of Glory, he may be said to have mounted to the immortal Gods, rather than to descend to the Grave. For, I can by no Means agree with the new broach'd Doctrine, that our Souls perish with our Bodies, and that Death puts an End to all Conscioufness.

IV. I am more inclinable to the Opinion of the Antients; First of our own Ancestors, who have instituted such religious Rites for the Dead; an Institution that would of itself have been absurd,

(*d*) The Circumstances of his Death were very suspicious; for he was found dead in his Bed, with Marks about his Neck of his having been privately strangled. See *Valleius Paterculus*, Lib. 2. C. 4.

had they been of Opinion, that the Dead can have no Concern in fuch Things. Secondly, of the former Inhabitants of this Country, who, by their Institutions and Precepts, improved the greater *Greece*; a Country that then flourish'd, tho' now it has loft its Name. Laftly, of the Philofopher whom the Oracle of *Apollo* declared to be the wifeft of Mankind, who did not, like moft other Philofophers, hold fometimes one, and fometimes another, and a contrary, Opinion, but always invariably maintain'd, that the Souls of Men are divine, and that the Soul of every good and juft Perfon has a ready, and a quick, Paſſage into Heaven, as ſoon as it leaves the Body.

Scipio was of the ſame Opinion, and diſcover'd a Prefentation of the Truth of it in the Company of *Philus*, of *Manlius*, and ſeveral other Perſons (and you *Scævola* amongſt the Reſt came along with me,) when ſometime before his Death, he diſcourſ'd for three Days upon Government; the latter Part of which Diſcourſe related, almoſt wholly, to the Immortality of the Soul; which, he ſaid, he thought he learned of the former *Africanus*, in his Sleep. If this is the Caſe, and if the Souls of the wifeſt and juſteſt Men have the eaſieſt Paſſage from the Fetters, and Clogs of the Body, what Soul can we conceive to have had an eaſier Paſſage from this Life than that of *Scipio*? It would, therefore, ſeem the Effects rather of Hatred than of Friendſhip ſhould I grieve at a Conſummation of this Kind. But, if the other Opinion is the trueſt, that the Soul perishes along with the Body, and that there is then an End of all Conſciouſneſs; then, as there is in Death nothing that is good, it muſt follow, there can be nothing that

is

is evil. For, when Consciouſness is gone, a Man is the ſame as if he never had exiſted; and yet we are glad, and this STATE, while it is a STATE, ſhall ever rejoice, that ſuch a Man as *Scipio* exiſted.

His latter End, therefore, was, as I ſaid before, happy; but it fares worſe with me; for it had been more fitting, as I came into the World before him, that I ſhould have left it before him too: Yet ſuch is my Enjoyment of the Remembrance of our Friendſhip, that I think my Life has been happy, becauſe I lived with *Scipio*. In our public Concerns we were join'd together, we were the ſame in our private, at Home and abroad, we had one common Dwelling, and what gives to Friendſhip its full Powers, our Inclinations, our Studies, and our Sentiments, exactly correſponded. I have not, therefore, ſo much Delight in reflecting upon that Reputation for Wiſdom, which *Fannius* has juſt now mention'd, (and the leſs as it is built upon a miſtaken Notion) than I have, in the Hopes, that the Memory of our Friendſhip will be eternal. This I have the more at Heart, becauſe all Ages paſt have ſcarcely produc'd three, or at moſt four, Pairs of Friends; and I am in Hopes, in that Reſpect, that the Friendſhip between *Scipio* and *Lælius* will be known to all ſucceeding Generations.

FANNIUS. It cannot, *Lælius*, be otherwiſe; but as you have mentioned the Subject of Friendſhip, and as we are now at Leiſure, you will do what will be very agreeable to me, and I hope to *Scævola* likewiſe, if in your uſual Manner of diſcuſſing other Points which you are conſulted upon, you will diſcourſe to us of Friendſhip, that you will

will give us your Sentiments upon it, what you take it to be, and what Rules are to be laid down for it.

SCÆVOLA. Your Compliance will singularly oblige me likewise ; and *Fannius* has prevented me in the very Request I design'd to make ; you will, therefore, do both of us a very great Favour if you comply.

V. LÆLIUS. For my Part, I have no Objection but my own Insufficiency. For it is a noble Subject, and as *Fannius* observes, we are now at Leisure. But who am I ? What are my Abilities ? It is peculiar to the learned, even to the learned amongst the *Greeks*, to set before them a Subject for their discussing off-hand. The Undertaking is weighty, and requires no small Practice in speaking. Therefore, as to any set Discourse concerning Friendship, I refer you, to those whose Business lies in such Discourses ; all I can do is to exhort you to prefer Friendship to all human Considerations. For nothing is so agreeable as it is to the Nature of Man, nothing is so fitted for a State either of Prosperity or Adversity.

I must, however, premise it as my Opinion, that no Friendship can subsist but amongst the good. And yet I am not so tender upon this Point, as those Disputants are who refine away even common Sense in their Discourses : For they tell you, that none but a wise Man can be a good Man. With all my Heart. But then they give you such a Definition of Wisdom as no mortal Man ever yet attain'd to. For my Part, I shall pay regard to nothing but what is usual, and practicable, in Life, without minding what is fictitious, or what is rather to be wish'd than hop'd for.

Never

Never shall I say, that *Caius Fabricius*, *Manius Curius*, or *Titus Coruncanius*, whom our Ancestors look'd upon as wise Men, ever came up to that, which those Gentlemen propose as the Standard of Wisdom. They are, therefore, welcome to their unamiable, puzzling, Definition of Wisdom; all I want is, that they will allow the Persons, I have named, to have been good Men. No, they won't so much as allow that, and they deny that any but a wise Man can deserve that Appellation.

Let us then tread the beaten Road of common Sense. The Men whose Conduct and Life is such as to give Proofs of their Honour, their Integrity, their Affability and Generosity; of their being without Ambition, without Lust of any Kind, without Presumption, while at the same Time, like the Men I have named, their Resolution is invincible; such Men, I say, we may venture to call, what they are esteem'd to be, GOOD MEN; because, as far as Men can, they follow Nature, the most excellent Directress of a virtuous Life. For, in my Opinion, by the Tenure of our Existence we are born to a certain Kind of Society, which is more and more binding in Proportion as we approach to one another. For this Reason, our Fellow-Citizens are preferable to Foreigners; our Kinsmen to Aliens. Nature, has endow'd us with Friendship for our Blood-Relations but it is of a Kind not sufficiently stable. True Friendship; has this Advantage over Kindred, that Affection may be separated from Kindred, but it cannot from Friendship; for, take Affection away, you take away the Name of Friendship, but not of Kindred. But we may judge of the Value of Friendship from this Consideration, that in all

U

that

that unbounded Association of the human Species which Nature herself has knit together, Friendship is compendised, and contracted into such narrow Bounds, that all Endearment subsists between two, or amongst a very few, Persons.

VI. Now Friendship is nothing, but the compleat Harmony of all divine and human Considerations, with Kindness and Endearment. And I know not, if we except Wisdom, whether any greater Blessing has been conferr'd upon Mankind by the immortal Gods. Some prefer to Friendship, Riches, some, Health, some, Power, some, Honours, and many even prefer Pleasures, which are the Gratifications of the Brutes, while the other Enjoyments I have mention'd are frail and uncertain, and depend not so much upon our Fore-sight, as upon the Caprice of Fortune. As to those who place their chief good in Virtue, they do right; but Virtue herself both begets and cherishes Friendship, nor can Friendship by any Means subsist without Virtue.

Now, we are to form our Notions of Virtue from the general Practice, and common Language of Life; without disguising her as some learned Men do, in the Pomp of Words; and let us put amongst the Number of good Men, those who were counted to be really such, I mean the *Pauli*, the *Caton*es, the *Scipiones*, the *Galli*, the *Phili*: All these were Men who were satisfied with performing the common Duties of Life; but we shall omit those wise Men who are no where to be found. Amongst such Men, however, as I have nam'd, the Invitations to Friendship are many and almost inexpressible.

In the first Place, as *Ennius* says, *How can Life be said to be alive*, where it has not the mutual Endear-

ments

ments of Friendship? where it can repose? What can be more delightful than one to whom you can, as to yourself pour out your whole Soul? Where is the Benefit of Prosperity if you have not a Partner who has the same sincere Pleasure in it, as you have yourself? As to Adversity, it would be still more intollerable, were it not for a Companion who feels more for you, than you do for yourself? As to other Desirables in Life, each has its peculiar Property suited to the Passion of the Individual, who possesses them. You ask for Riches that you may enjoy them; for Power, that you may be followed; for Preferment, that you may be respected; for Pleasures, that you may be gratified; for Health, that you may be free from Pain, and have the full Vigour of Body. But Friendship comprehends many Considerations. Go where you will, it is present. No Place can shut it out. It never is unseasonable, it never is intruding; it therefore is of as general Use as are either Fire or Water. Now, I speak not of vulgar, or common, Friendships, tho' these are both amiable and useful, but of true and perfect Friendship; such a Friendship as was entertained amongst the few I have named. For Friendship gives Splendor to Prosperity, and, by sharing in Adversity, it renders it lighter.

Amongst the many and great Advantages of Friendship, the most excellent is, that it gilds with Hope our future Prospects, without suffering our Spirits to flag or to fail. The Man who looks upon the Face of a real Friend, sees, as it were, the Transcript of himself; Friendship can make the absent to be present, the needy to have Plenty, the sickly to be healthful, and, what is more extraordinary still, the dead to live; so great is the

the Regard, Respect and Affection which Men bear for a departed Friend. Hence it is, that the one is happy in Death, the others are honoured in Life. Abolish out of the System of Nature the Tyes of Benevolence, neither House nor City could stand, and the Fields must lie uncultured. If you are at a Loss to comprehend the wonderful Force of Friendship and Unanimity, you need but to reflect upon the Effects of Enmity and Dissention: Where is the House that is so well founded, where is the State that is so well established, as not to be rased to the Ground by the Prevalence of Rancour and Discord?

We are told, that a learned Native of *Agri-
gentum* sung in *Greek* Verses, “ that this whole Œconomy of moving Nature exists by Friendship, and will perish by Discord.” And this is a Truth that all Mankind understand and experience. If therefore any Act of Friendship is performed by either encountering or sharing the Danger of another, where is the Man who does not speak of it with Raptures? With what general Applause was the new Play of my Guest and Friend *Marcus Pacuvius* lately received, in the Scene, when, the King being at a Loss to know which was *Orestes*, *Pylades* affirms himself to be the Man, that he might dye for his Friend, while the real *Orestes* insists upon his being *Orestes*? If this Fiction met with such Applause from the Spectators, how would they have applauded it had it been an Incident in real Life? So readily does Nature discover her own Influence, when Men praise others for Actions which they themselves cannot perform. Thus far have I thought myself within my Depth in delivering my Sentiments con-

concerning Friendship. For what remains, (and I think a great Deal remains) you may, if you please, have Recourse to the Professors in the Art of speaking.

FANNIUS. But we chuse to hear it rather from you, tho' we have often, with some Pleasure, resorted to and heard those Professors; but the the Thread of your Discourse is very different from theirs.

SCÆVOLA. Ha! *Fannius*, what would you have said had you lately heard our Father-in-Law at *Scipio's* Country House, disputing upon Government; how nobly did he defend Honesty against the accurate Objections of *Philus*?

FANNIUS. There is no great Difficulty for the most honest of Mankind to stand up in Defence of Honesty.

SCÆVOLA. Then what do you say of Friendship? Is it not easy for a Man who has arrived at the Summit of Glory by his Perseverance in Friendship, with the strictest Honour, Uniformity and Justice, to discourse of Friendship?

LÆLIUS. Why, this is downright Violence. It does not signify how you put the Question; but Violence it certainly is. For, to stand out against the earnest, and, especially, the virtuous, Requests of two Sons-in Law, would be very hard, and I believe not quite honest.

Amongst many Reflections that occurred to me, upon the Subject of Friendship, one of my chief Considerations was, whether the Necessity of Friendship does not proceed from the Wants and Weaknesses of Nature? So that, by our reciprocally bestowing and receiving Services, one Man receives from another the Assistance which

he is unable to afford to himself; and repays the like to another. Whether this is the Character of Friendship; or whether it does not arise from a Principle, that is nobler, fairer, and better founded in Nature? For Love (which in Latin gives its Name to Friendship) is the chief Motive of Benevolence or Kindness. Now, as to Advantages, they very often accrue from those who, to serve a particular Purpose, are respected and revered under no more than the Mask of Friendship. But in true Friendship, there is nothing disguis'd. nothing deceitful; and all its Qualities center in Truth and Affection.

In my Opinion, therefore, Friendship arose from Nature, rather than from the Wants of Mankind, and from the Operation of the Mind, join'd to a Sensibility of Affection, rather than from any Consideration of the Profit that attends it. As to the Properties of Friendship, they are discernible even in some Brutes, who, to a certain Time love their own Progeny, and are loved by them in such Manner that their Sense is easily discernible; but this is much more perceptible in the human Species. First, by the reciprocal Affection that subsists between Children and Parents, which nothing but the most execrable Wickedness can efface. Secondly, because, when a Man is endow'd with a corresponding Sense of Love, if he happens to get another agreeable to himself in a Nature and in Morals, he, as it were, beholds in him the Brightness of Probity and Virtue.

For nothing is more amiable than Virtue; nothing is so apt to create Affection: As a Proof of that, we are in Love with those whom we never have seen, if we have heard of their Worth and their Vir-

ture. Shew me a Man who does not talk of *Caius Fabricius*, and *Manius Curius* with a certain Degree of Affection and of Kindness, tho' he never saw their Persons? And where is the Man who does not hate the Memory of a *Tarquin* the Proud, of a *Spurius Cassius*, or of a *Spurius Melius*? We have had in *Italy* a Struggle for Empire with two great Generals, *Pyrrhus* and *Hannibal*, and yet we do not detest the Memory of the Former, because he was a fair Enemy, but this State will ever hold the latter in Abomination on Account of his Cruelty.

IX. Now, if the Force of Probity is so great that we love it even in those whom we never have seen; nay, which is more, in our very Enemies, what Wonder is it, if the Minds of Men are touch'd by the Virtues and the Worth of those with whom they live familiarly? It is true, that Love is strengthened by receiving Benefits, by Proofs of mutual Regard, and by Intimacies in Life. By these Circumstances, join'd to the first Emotions of the Mind for a beloved Object, the Passion of Friendship is, as it were, kindled into a Blaze of Affection. Now, should any one think that this proceeds from the Insufficiency of our Nature, otherwise, to attain those Advantages which she is in Want of, they assign a mean, and, as I may say, a groveling, Original to Friendship, which they thereby suppose to take its Rise from Want and Weakness. But, supposing that to be the Case, the more poor and impotent a Man knows himself to be, the more apt he will be to cultivate Friendship; the Reverse of which is the Truth.

For the Man who is best supported within himself, the Man who is so effectually fortified by Virtue, and Wisdom, that he wants for nothing

and thinks that all he can desire is placed within himself; such a Man is the most apt both to conceive, and to cultivate, Friendship. Did my *Africanus* stand in need of my Assistance? No, by Heavens, he did not. Did I stand in need of his? No! I loved him for his Virtue; he loved me for the Opinion that perhaps he had conceived for my Morals; and Familiarity, encreased our Affection. It is true, the Benefits which we both received from this Union were afterwards many and great, yet they were only the Result, and not the Motives, of our Friendship.

Thus, Men are generous and liberal, not because they want to be thanked for their Bounty (for we are not to play the Usurers by good Actions) but because Nature has given us a Propensity to Liberality; I am therefore of Opinion that Friendship is desirable not for the Reward she brings, but because the Affection, attending it, rewards itself.

They who place the Origin of Friendship in sensual Pleasure, such as that of the Brutes, have Opinions very different from those I have now laid before you. For the Men who have degraded all their Sentiments into, so base, so abject, a Passion, never can have any Idea of what is noble, and of what is divine. Let us therefore put such Men out of all Question in this Discourse. But let us be convinced, that Nature herself has implanted in us the Force of Affection, and the Endearments of Friendship, after receiving Proofs of Virtue and Worth in the beloved Object. When these Proofs are plain, let Mankind apply and approach to that Object, that they may enjoy at once the Benefit of Friendship and the Beauty of Virtue in the Man whom they have thus begun to love. Let them

them be Equals and Companions in Friendship, and be more eager to deserve, than to demand, a Return. Let this, let this, be the only Contention (and a glorious one it is) in which they shall vie with one another. Thus, the most extensive Advantages will result from Friendship, while at the same Time, its Origin is derived, with greater Dignity and with greater Truth, from the Excellency of Nature, than from the Weakness of Mankind. For, if Profit could cement Friendships, the same Motive, when differently applied, could dissolve them likewise. But as Nature is not to be changed, therefore true Friendships are eternal. Thus I have accounted, at least, for the Rise of Friendship, unless you want me to add somewhat.

FANNIUS. Go on *Lælius*, for I think I have a Right to answer for *Scævola*, who is my Junior in Years.

SCÆVOLA. That you may very well do. Let us therefore be all-attentive.

X. LÆLIUS. Hear me then, my excellent young Noblemen, recapitulate the Sense of many Discourses, that passed between *Scipio* and myself, concerning Friendship. Mean while, it was his Opinion, that nothing was so difficult than for Friendship to endure to the last Day of one's Life. He thought it often happened, that Interests of Friends may differ, that they may differ in their Sentiments of public Matters, that Men's Tempers are often apt to alter, either by Adversity or Age. And, to strengthen his Opinion, he had Recourse to the Example of Boys, whose strongest Friendships are often laid aside, before they assume the manly Robe.

But

But supposing them to continue till they are young Men, yet are they at last broken in a Struggle for some favourite Point; by entering into the State of Matrimony, or by the Prospect of some Advantage which both cannot enjoy. Even they who have persevered for a long Time in Friendship, have, at last, weakened it in the Pursuits of Ambition, and in most Men, Avarice is the Bane of Friendship. In Men of more distinguished Stations, Friendship is undone by their Competitions for Power and Popularity; and hence it happens, that the greatest Rancour often succeeds the greatest Friendship between the same Persons.

A very great, and generally, very justifiable, Ground of Quarrels between Friends, happens when they are called upon by one another to do somewhat that is dishonest; either to be the Instruments of one another's Ambition, or their Assistants in their Oppression. In this Case, the Person who stands out, tho' he does it on virtuous Principles, is reproached by the other Party as being a Traytor to the Laws of Friendship. *Scipio* observed farther, that they who venture to insist upon a Friend's performing whatever they shall require, be it what it will, by that very Request, declare, that they are ready to do any Thing, be what it will, in their Turn, to serve that Friend.

In such Cases, when a Breach happens and grows wider and wider, it not only extinguishes all Friendship, but begets eternal Hatred between the Parties. He concluded by observing, that Friendship is subject to those numerous Inconveniences, as to so many Fatalities, which, taken upon
the

the Whole, not only defeat the Purposes of Wisdom but the Ends of Happiness.

XI. Therefore, if you please, let us first examine how far Affection ought to carry us in Friendship. Supposing, for Instance, a *Coriolanus* to have had Friends, were these Friends to fight on the Side of *Coriolanus* against his Country? were the Friends of a *Viscellinus*, or of a *Spurius Maelius* obliged to assist them in their treasonable Attempts on the Government? When *Tiberius Gracchus* begun his factious Practices against the State, we saw he was abandoned by *Quintus Tubero*, and other his Companions and Friends. But *Caius Blossius* of *Cuma*, (who used, *Scævola*, to visit in your Family,) when I was assisting the Consuls *Lena* and *Popilius* in their Measures, came and begged my Pardon, in the most earnest Terms, because he had such an Opinion of *Tiberius Gracchus*, that he thought it his Duty to obey him in whatever he should enjoin. Suppose, said I, he should enjoin you to set fire to the Capitol? Why, that, replied the other, never can come into his Head. But, continued I, supposing it had? Then, said *Blossius*, I would have obeyed him. What a treasonable Expression was this! and indeed he acted up to his Professions, nay, he exceeded them; for instead of obeying, he guided the Fury of *Tiberius Gracchus*; he was not the Companion, but the Director, of his Treasons. Therefore, afraid of being called to a public Account for his Practices, he fled to *Asia*, and, siding with the Enemies of his Country, he satisfied her Justice by a miserable Death. I say, therefore, that Friendship never can justify Treason, for as the Opinion you have of another's Virtue is your Motive of Friend-

ship for him, it will be difficult for Friendship to subsist after it revolts to Virtue.

But if we lay it down as a right Maxim, that we are to yeild to all the Desires, be what they will, of our Friends; and that they are to gratify us in every Thing, be what it will, that we shall require of them, we must possess consummate Wisdom indeed, if we can preserve such a Friendship from being blameable. Now, I talk of such Friends as we daily see, and keep Company with, or such as we have heard of, and are conversant with in the World. It is from such that we are to take our Examples, and from such of them too as come nearest to true Wisdom.

We learn that *Papus Æmilius* was the Intimate of *Caius Luscinus*, and we have heard from our Forefathers that they were twice joint Consuls and twice joint Censors. Tradition likewise informs us, that *Manius Curius* and *Titus Coruncanius* were their intimate Friends, and were dear to one another. We are not, therefore, to harbour a Suspicion, that, amongst Men like them, any one would require his Friend to do ought that could violate his Honour, that could violate his Oath, that could violate his Patriotism. It is, therefore, to no Purpose, to mention Men like them: had one of them demanded of the other an improper Thing, he would not have been obeyed, because they were, all of them, blameless Men.

Now, it is as wicked for a Man to obey any such Request, when it is made, as it is to make it. And yet *Caius Carbo*, and *Caius Cato* followed the Party of *Tiberius Gracchus*, as did his Brother *Caius*, but, tho' violent now to the last Degree, he was then the most moderate of the Party.

XII. Let us therefore lay it down as an indispensable Law of Friendship, that we never require our Friends to do any Thing that is wicked, or obey them, if they require us. For it is a shameful and insufficient Plea for a Man to urge, when he has been guilty of an Offence, either publick, or private; that he committed it on Account of his Friend.

For Men in our Situation, my noble Youths, ought to provide, long beforehand, for the future Contingencies of the Public. We have somewhat deviated from the Course of Duty practised by our Ancestors. *Tiberius Gracchus* attempted to possess himself of Sovereignty, and, in Fact, he reigned for a few Months.

Had the People of *Rome* heard of, or seen such an attempt before? My Tears will not suffer me to express what the Friends and Relations, who espoused the Cause of *Gracchus*, even after his Death, have perpetrated upon *Scipio*; for we have borne, in the best Manner we could, *Carbo*, because the Death of *Tiberius Gracchus* was so recent. As to the Tribuneship of *Caius Gracchus*, I have no great Satisfaction in the Prospect it affords. Matters are but yet gathering, but, when once they are ripe, they will burst into Destruction. Look upon our public Acts, and there you will see what Stains our Constitution has contracted; first, by the *Gabinian* Law, and two Years after by the *Cassian*. Methinks, I now see the People at variance with the Senate, and Matters of the last Consequence, under the Direction of the giddy Multitude; for many more learn how to bring about public Calamities, than how to prevent them.

But

But, you will say, to what does all this tend ? Why, no Man attempts any Thing of this Kind, without Accomplices. We ought, therefore, to lay it down as a Rule to Men of Virtue, that if, by Accident, thro' Inadvertency, they should stumble upon Friendships of this Kind, they are not to think themselves bound down, by those Friendships, in such a Manner, as does not leave them at Liberty to abandon such Friends, if they should pursue Measures of important, public, Mischief. We have Punishments for the Wicked; equally for Abettors, as for Principals, in Villainy. Was there in all *Greece* a Man more eminent than *Themistocles* was ? Was any Man more powerful ? This Man, after finishing the *Persian* War, and thereby delivering *Greece* from Slavery, was, through Envy, driven into Banishment ; but he did not bear, as he ought to have borne, the Wrongs done him by his ungrateful Country. He did the same as *Coriolanus* twenty Years before did in this Country. Yet neither of them found any one of his Countrymen to abett him ; both of them, therefore, put themselves to Death.

Upon the Whole, then, Friendship is so far from excusing a Confederacy in Guilt, that no Punishment can be too severe for it: So that no Man should think himself at Liberty to back his Friend, even tho' he should march in Arms against his Country. But, as Things have begun to take the Turn they have, I dont know if such an Event will ever happen again. As to myself, however, I am equally anxious about what the State of my Country will be when I am dead, as I am about what it is while I am living.

XIII. Let us therefore lay it down as a capital Rule

Rule in Friendship, that we require of our Friends only what is virtuous; that all the Services we perform for them be virtuous likewise, and that too, without waiting till we are required. Ever zealous, never backward. As to our Advice, let us give it chearfully and fully and freely; the Advice of a wise, worthy, Friend is of great Weight in Friendship: And we are to apply it not only with Freedom, but if the Case should so require, with Severity too, and, when applied, it ought to be followed.

Now I know that some who, in *Greece*, were accounted wise Men, took great Delight in Paradoxes: But indeed, there is nothing so absurd, that they will not maintain it by their Subtilties. Amongst other Paradoxes, they maintain'd, that Friendship ought never to go very far; lest one Man should suffer Disquiet for another besides himself; that every Man has enough, and too much, to do to manage his own Concerns; that it is disagreeable to be hampered with another Man's Business; that our best Way is to hold the Reins of Friendship as slack as possible; so as to be able, upon Occasion, either to pull them in or throw them loose; that Tranquility is the principal Ingredient of happy Life; and that it is impossible for the Mind to possess it, if it is, as it were, always in Labour for others.

Some Men, we are told of, are still more gross in their Sentiments, (I hinted at them a little ago,) for they say that Assistance and Profit, not Affection and Endearment, render Friendship desirable. The weaker, therefore, and more helpless a Man is, the more he covets Friendship.

From

From whence it will follow, that silly Women court the Resources of Friendship more than Men do; the needy more than the opulent; and the wretched, more than they who are accounted happy.

All glorious Friendship! remove it out of Life, and you remove the Sun out of the World: It is the best, the dearest of all Blessings the Gods have bestowed upon Mortals. Philosophers talk of Tranquility! What is that Tranquility? Its Appearances, indeed, are flattering, but it is in many Respects detestable in itself. To act consistently with this Doctrine, you never are to undertake a good Action or a virtuous Thing, or, if you have undertaken them, you are to drop them, lest you may be disquieted. Now, if we are to avoid Uneasiness, we are to avoid Virtue likewise; for she is necessarily disquieted by Things which she hates and rejects as being offensive to her Nature, as Goodness is to Wickedness; Chastity to Lust; Courage to Cowardice. Thus, you may perceive that Honesty gives the greatest Pain to the dishonest; the brave to the abject; and the virtuous to the profligate. From the same Reason we see that a well principled Mind always rejoices in worthy Actions, and feels Pain at their Contraries.

Should, therefore, a wise Man fall into Anguish of Spirit (which must be the Case, unless we suppose his Mind to be divested of all human Feelings) why should we extirpate Friendship out of Life for fear of its being attended with certain Disquiets? Now if we suppose the Affections of the Mind to be out of the Question, where is the Difference,

Difference, I will not say between a Man, and a Brute, but between a Man and a Stock, or Stone, or any unanimated Object. Mean while, we are to pay very little Regard to those who represent Virtue as a Thing that is very fullen, and very stubborn; for in many Cases, particularly in that of Friendship, she is tender and pliable. Thus, Friends are over-joy'd at the Prosperity of Friends, and dejected at their Misfortunes; therefore, the Anguish, which a Man often feels for his Friends, is not of Consequence enough to abolish Friendship out of Life, no more than we are to reject Virtue itself, because it is attended by certain Cares and Troubles.

XIV. But, as I said before, when Friendship is contracted from the Discovery of Virtue, which the Mind, from a Kind of Sympathy, courts and acquires; I say, when this happens to be the Case, Love is the necessary Consequence. For what is so absurd as to take Pleasure in a Number of Objects that are, in themselves, immaterial, such as Preferment, Popularity, Building, Dress, and Neatness of Person, and yet not be in Love with a Mind possess'd of Virtue, which in itself, is lovely, and loving; for nothing is more endearing than mutual Returns of Affection; and the Intercourse of Kindness and good Offices.

But if we add, and we may add it upon very good Grounds, that nothing in other Cases operates so endearingly, and so attractively, as Kindness of Manners does in Friendship; the Consequence will certainly be, that the good will love the good, and associate together thro' this Similarity and Principle of Nature. For nothing so courts,

X

nothing

nothing so covets what is like itself as Nature does. Therefore, my noble Friends, it is, I think, evident, that there is a necessary Tie of Kindness amongst good Men, and Nature has made this the Principle of Friendship. But the same ought to extend to all our Fellow Creatures. For Virtue has in her Composition nothing that is barbarous, uncouth, or haughty. She protects and provides for the whole Race Mankind, which she would not do, if she was a Stranger to general Benevolence.

I must farther observe, that they who contract Friendships for the Sake of the Profit attending them, take from Friendship its most amiable Tye. For we are not so much charm'd by the Profit resulting from Friendship, as by the Affection of the Friend himself. Whatever a Friend bestows upon us, if he bestows it with hearty Affection, then becomes the Delight of our Souls; and it is so far from being true that Friendships are cultivated to supply our Indigence, that they who having the greatest Share of Power and Wealth, and being most distinguished for their Virtue, (wherein Mankind may find great Resources) are above the Necessity of any other Person's Assistance, have generally the openest and the kindest Hearts. I am not sure, indeed, whether it be not requisite, that Friends should sometimes stand in Need of one another. For, where could I have given Proof of my friendly Affections, had my *Scipio* never stood in Need, either at home or abroad, of my Counsels, and my Assistance. Friendship, therefore, is not the Result of Utility, but Utility of Friendship.

Upon

XV. Upon the whole, we are to pay no Regard to Men sunk in Sensuality, when they Reason upon Friendship, a Passion with which they are unacquainted both in Theory and Practice. For, immortal Gods! let me appeal to you, where is the Man who, on Condition of neither loving, nor being beloved, would chuse to wallow in Wealth and to live in the most superfluous Plenty. That is the Life which Tyrants lead; and believe me, that, in a Tyrant, there can be no Honour, there can be no Endearment, nor can any Strefs be laid upon the Permanency of his Affections; theirs is a Life filled with Suspicion and Anxiety; it has no Room for Friendship.

For who either loves the Man whom he fears, or the Man by whom he thinks he is feared? And yet it may be necessary to preserve the Appearance of Respect and Reverence for them, for particular Purposes; but, (as generally is the Case) when they once fall, then we see how poor they were in Friends. We are told, that *Tarquin* said, that when he lived in Banishment he then knew what Friends had been faithful or unfaithful to him; for he was then in no Condition to requite either. Meanwhile, haughty and despotic as he was, it is surprising, that he should have any Friends; and yet, as those ill Qualities of *Tarquin*, disqualified him for real Friendships, so many a great Man is deprived of faithful Friends thro' the Excess of Power; for Fortune not only is blind of herself, but she generally blinds those whom she caresses the most. Her Darlings, therefore, are commonly puffed up with Pride, and Pre-
sumption; and nothing is so intolerable as a fortunate Fool: Nay, we have seen many Instances

of People, (who, in the former Part of their Lives, were of gentle, pliable, Dispositions,) being altered by Command, by Power and Prosperity ; of their despising their antient Friends, and caressing new ones.

Now, what can be more stupid than for a Man of Power, Abilities and Interest, to acquire all the Conveniences and Elegancies of Life, that Money can purchase, such as Horses, Servants, fine Cloaths, and a rich Sideboard, and yet not acquire Friends, that best, and, as I may say, most beautiful Furniture of Life? As to their Acquisitions of all other Circumstances, they are ignorant for whom they are made, nor know they for whose Sake they may then be Toiling. The longest Sword becomes their Masters, but Friendship is a permanent, a fixed, and settled Possession to every Man who enjoys it ; so that, supposing, a Man to enjoy all other Pleasures, which are no other than the Gifts of Fortune, yet Life when abandoned, or uncultivated by Friendship, never can be agreeable. But of this enough.

XVI. We are now to lay out the Boundaries of Friendship, and, as it were, to fix its March-Stones. I know of three Opinions, but I approve of none of them. The first Opinion is, that we ought to have the same Affections towards our Friends as towards ourselves. The second is, that our Kindness for our Friends should exactly and equally correspond with their Kindness for us. The third is, that a Man's Friends ought to put the same value upon him that he puts upon himself. I cannot absolutely assent to any of those three Opinions.

As to the first, that every Man should be affected towards his Friend in the same Manner as he

is towards himself, it is a mistaken Rule; for how many Things are there that we do for our Friends, that we would not do for ourselves? To ask, nay to entreat, a Scoundrel for his Interest; to be keen in our Invectives, and severe in our Reflections against another, are Things that might be disgraceful, if we employ'd them in our own Behalf, but may be most commendable when in Behalf of our Friends. And there are many Cases in which worthy Men wrong their own Interest, or suffer it to be wronged, that their Friends, rather than themselves, may enjoy the Benefit. The next Opinion makes Friendship to consist in the Parity of Duties and Affections.

Now this is descending to too minute and nice a Calculation, by stating the Ballance between one Friend and another by Way of Debtor and Creditor. In my Eyes, true Friendship is richer and wealthier than to be at the Pains to keep a strict Account, lest her Disbursements should be larger than her Receipts. For she has no Care about exceeding her Income, about any superfluous Expences, or about putting out more than her Share into the common Stock.

The third Opinion, however, is the most detestable of the three. For it requires one Friend to put the same value on another which that other does upon himself. Now, it often happens that some People's Spirits are sunk, and their Hopes of bettering their Fortune are very precarious. A Friend, therefore, is not to entertain the same Sentiments of such a one, that he entertains of himself. But he is rather to exert all his Endeavours, till he succeeds in raising the drooping Spirits of his Friend, and in bringing

him into better Heart and a more sprightly Way of thinking. Another Boundary of Friendship, therefore, may be laid down, after I have inform'd you of a Matter, that *Scipio* used to blame extremely. For, he said a Man can no Way be so destructive to Friendship, as by saying, "That we ought so to love, as if we were one Day to hate." *Scipio* added, that he could not bring himself to believe, that *Bias*, who is generally thought to be the Author of this Sentiment, really was so (for *Bias* was reckon'd, amongst the seven Wise Men of *Greece*) but that it had been broach'd by some detestable, designing Fellow, or one who was for making every Thing truckle to his own Power. For how can one be the Friend of a Man, when he thinks that he is one Day to become his Enemy? Nay, such a Man must necessarily wish and desire that his Friend should hourly disoblige him, that he may afford him the more frequent Opportunities of reproving him: In like Manner, he must be tortur'd, pain'd and stung with every Thing his Friend does that is obliging or laudable.

This Rule, therefore, whoever was the Author of it, is proper for abolishing Friendship. It would have been more proper to have recommended such a Caution in the Choice of our Friends, as never to suffer ourselves to entertain Affection for any Man whom we think we may afterwards hate. Nay, *Scipio* thought, that if we are not quite fortunate in the Choice of our Friends, it is a less evil than for a Man to be always figuring in his Mind a Day of Wrath.

XVII. The Boundary, therefore, I propose is, that after a Friend is reform'd, the most compleat

and

and unreserv'd Participation of all Interests and Inclinations should succeed. So that, if it should so happen, that we are to assist our Friend in any Affair, that is not quite justifiable, by which either his Life or his Reputation is endangered, we may warp a little from the Rigour of Justice, provided the Matter is not absolutely infamous. For some Allowances are to be made to Friendship, but still we are to have Regard for our own Character, and Credit amongst our Fellow-Citizens, is no despicable Mean of our Success in Business; though it is infamous to pick it up by flattering and cringing. The Popularity that arises from Virtue is commendable.

But *Scipio* (for I return to him, whose whole Discourse was concerning Friendship) often enquir'd into the Reasons, why Men are, in all their other Concerns of Life, so very exact, that every one can tell the Number of his Goats and Sheep, but not the Number of his Friends; and are very nice in their Choice of the former, but take no Care about the latter; being ignorant of all Marks and Characters by which they can form a Judgment of those who are proper for Friendship. We are then to pitch upon such as are firm, steady and resolute; a Breed of Mankind that is very scarce; and, let me tell you, it is extremely difficult to know the true any otherways than by Experience. For, even in Friendship itself, so apt it is to anticipate Judgment, and deprive us of the Opportunity of Trial, we ought to try before we trust.

A discreet Man, therefore, will manage his Career of Friendship as he does that of his Curricule; he will in some Measure be as well acquainted

with the Heart of the Friend he trusts, as with the Temper of the Horse he trains. A small Money-matter often serves to discover the fordid Disposition of some; while others don't mind a Trifle, but betray themselves when the Sum is larger. Supposing, however, that a few think it mean to prefer Money to Friendship; but where shall we find the Men who prefer Friendship to public Honours, Magistracies, Governments, Power and Influence? Who would reject all those Considerations should they be put in Competition with the Laws of Friendship? For Nature is too weak to bear up against the Temptation of Power, and, when a Man attains it at the Expence of Friendship, he thinks that his Frailty will pass uncensur'd, because it will be presumed, that it was for some very weighty Cause he violated his Friendship. For this Reason, it is very seldom we find true Friendship in Men who pursue public Posts and Employments. Where is the Man, amongst such, who will prefer his Friend's Advancement to his own? But, setting those Reflections apart; how irksome, how hard do most Men think it when they happen to be involved in a Partnership of Calamity? Nay, you find very few who can be brought to that length in Friendship. *Ennius*, therefore says, very rightly, *steady Friendship, is seen in unsteady Situations*; and either the Insolence, or the Meanness of Spirit is discover'd when Prosperity makes a Man despise his Friend, or Adversity makes him abandon him.

XVIII. The Man, therefore, who in both Situations approves himself to be a sincere, staid, unalterable, Friend, is to be consider'd as one of the greatest Rarities of Nature, and somewhat above

above human. Now Sincerity is the Principle that strengthens that Constancy and Perseverance, which we require in Friendship. For nothing insincere can be stable. We ought, likewise, to chuse for a Friend a Man, who has Simplicity and Plainness of Heart, one whose Sentiments and Inclinations are similar to our own; all which are Properties of Sincerity. A Man of a complicated, winding, Disposition, never can be sincere; nor can that Friendship be sincere and permanent, that is contracted between Men of Dispositions and Tempers, that are not touch'd and naturally affected in the same Manner by the same Objects.

We are, at the same Time, to add, that a Friend should neither be pleased with the Pursuit, nor easy in the Belief of, Calumny; all which are Properties of that Constancy I have been so long recommending. From all this it follows, as I observ'd in the Beginning of this Discourse, that Friendship can subsist only amongst the virtuous. For a good Man, and such-a-one I may venture to call a wise Man, will observe two Maxims in Friendship; In the the first Place, that he gives Way to nothing that is fictitious or dissembled; for declared Hatred shews more of a Gentleman, than an outward Disguise of Sentiments does. In the next Place, he will not only reject all Calumny, from whatever Quarter it comes, but will not harbour in himself the least Suspicion, as if something was always amiss about his Friend.

Add to this, a certain Gentleness of Conversation and Deportment, which gives a delightful relish to Friendship. As to serious, severe, Behaviour, it no Doubt has its Weight, but Friendship ought to be more free, more easy, more winning,
more

more engagingly endearing, and more plially polite.

XIX. Upon this Head, however, a pretty knotty Question presents itself; Whether new Friends, such as are worthy our Friendship, are to be prefer'd to old ones, in the same Manner as we prefer young Colts to old Horses. A Man ought to blush at starting such a Doubt; for Friendship ought not, like other Things, to know any Satiety. Old Friends, like old Wine, ought always to be the most agreeable; so true it is, *that Friends* (as the saying is) *must eat many a Peck of Salt with one another*, before they can fulfil all the Duties of Friendship.

As to new Friendships, if, like generous Plants, they discover a Promise of Fruit, they are indeed to be cherish'd, but the old ones are never to lose their Preference; for the Influence of Age and Habit ought to be very powerful: Even with Regard to the Simile of the Horse, which I mentioned just now; if he has no Fault, there is no Man, who will not, with greater Pleasure, ride the Horse he is used to, than one which is wild and unbroken. Now Habit is prevalent not only with Regard to living Creatures, but even with Regard to inanimated Objects: For we are delighted with the most wild, rugged, Countries, after living long in them.

It is of great Consequence in Friendship, that all Distinctions be laid aside; for it often happens, that one Friend is more illustrious than another: *Scipio*, for Instance, was distinguish'd from all the rest of our Knot, as I may term them; but he never prefer'd himself to *Philus*, to *Rupilius*, to *Mummus*, or to any of his Friends of a lower Rank

in

in Life. As to his Brother *Quintus Maximus*, who was an excellent Person, but by no Means equal to *Scipio*, he never put himself upon the same Footing with him, because he was younger than *Maximus*, but respected him as his superior, and his Study was to ennoble his Friends through his own Merits.

This Practice is worthy to be imitated and followed by all Mankind; for if they have attain'd to any Pre-eminence with Regard to Virtue, Abilities, or Fortune, they ought to share it with their Friends, and have it in common with their Relations. Thus, if their Parentage is mean, or their Kinsmen poor, either in their Understandings, or their Fortunes, they ought to encrease their Wealth, and supply their Want of Preferment and Power. As we see, in Plays, Persons who have liv'd long in a Family without knowing their own Quality and Parentage, when they come to be discover'd to be the Sons of Gods, or of Kings; they still retain an Affection for those Shepherds whom they consider'd, for so many Years, as their Parents. Now, this Affection ought to prevail more strongly when Men have real and acknowledged Parents. For we then enjoy the noblest Harvest of our Abilities, our Virtues, and our Excellencies of every Kind, when our Friends, and Relations are better'd by them.

XX. As they, therefore, who in the Connections and Practice of Friendship, are the most exalted, as to Rank, ought to put themselves upon a Level with their Inferiors; so their Inferiors ought not to repine for being excell'd by their Friends in Abilities, Fortune or Dignity. And yet most People are full either of Complaints or Reproaches on those

Heads;

Heads; and the more, if they think themselves entitled to say that they have acted with Duty, with Friendship, with Pain and Application. Such Men are extremely hateful who reproach others for the Services they have done them; for the Man who receives the Obligation ought to remember it, but the Man who confers it ought not to mention it. As the Men, therefore, who are superior in Advantages ought to stoop to their Friends, so; they ought to raise those Inferiors into Importance; for there are some who make their Friendships uneasy by thinking themselves slighted; which seldom happens, but to those who imagine that they deserve to be slighted, and they ought to be eas'd of this Apprehension not only by Words but by Actions.

Now, we ought to perform for a Friend, in the first Place, all that is in our Power; but, in the next Place, no more than what the Man whom you thus love and assist, is qualified for. For supposing you to be ever so powerful, yet it may not be in your Power to bring every one of your Friends to the highest Dignities.. Thus, *Scipio*, was able to make *Publius Rutilius* Consul, but not his Brother *Lucius*: Nay, supposing it in your Power to bestow any Thing upon another, yet we are to examine how his Qualifications answer.

Friendships are not absolutely to be accounted such, till Years and Judgment have given them Confirmation and Maturity. Nor, if, in the Beginning of our Lives, we are fond of Hunting or Tennis, there is no Reason why we should chuse for Friends the Men whom we then lov'd because they were fond of the same Diversions; for by that

that Rule, our Nurses and Teachers may plead their being our oldest Acquaintance to entitle them to the greatest Share of our Kindness: Not that they are to be slighted, but they are to be treated upon a different Footing. Friendship, when built upon any other Foundation, can have no Stability; for a Difference of Pursuits always attends a Difference of Dispositions; and thro' Dissimilarity dissolves the Tyes of Friendship: And the virtuous never can have Friendship for the profligate, nor the profligate for the virtuous; for this and no other Reason; that the Difference between their Pursuits and Dispositions is as great, as it possibly can be.

It likewise is a proper Maxim in Friendship not to suffer an ill judging Affection (as often is the Case) to deprive our Friends of the most important Advantages. For, that I may again return to Plays; *Neoptolemus* never could have taken *Troy* had he listened to *Lycomedes* who had brought him up, and who with Floods of Tears endeavoured to hinder his Expedition. Some Matters of Importance often happen to part us from our Friends; now, if one Friend unable to bear with the Absence of another, shall want to detain him, such a one is by Nature soft and puling; and for that very Reason unfit for the Duties of Friendship. In all Cases, therefore, you are to consider both what you require of your Friend, and how far you are to go in your Compliance with him.

XXI. We are, likewise, sometimes laid under the indispensable Misfortune of dropping our Friendship, (for now my Discourse shall slide from the Connections of the Wise to those of the

Vul-

Vulgar). The bad Qualities of one Friend often break out not only against another Friend, but against indifferent Persons; and, in the mean time, their unoffending Friend bears all the Reproach. Now, such Friendship, should be suffered to run into Disuse; and as I have heard *Cato* say, they ought to be *untack'd rather than unripp'd*, unless some very flagitious Circumstances should burst into Light, so that Decency, Virtue, nay the Nature of the Thing itself may oblige you to put a speedy and an immediate Period to all Connections with such a Man.

But if, (as often happens) either Party shall change his Disposition or his Views, or if they shall disagree upon public Measures; (I here repeat it that I now speak not of the Friendships of the Wise but of the Vulgar) great Care must be taken, lest not only an End is put to all Friendship, but that it be not succeeded by Enmity; for nothing is more scandalous than for a Man to commence Foe to him who has been once his Friend. *Scipio* (you know the Story) detached himself, on my Account from his Friendship with *Quintus Pompeius*; and he had a Variance with my Colléague *Metellus* on Account of the Factions that prevailed in the Government. In both Cases he behaved with Resolution and Weight; but without any Rancour of Spirit.

Our chief Care, therefore, ought to be to prevent all Misunderstandings in Friendship, but should they become unavoidable that we act so as that such Friendships may seem to have died gradually but not violently, great Care must likewise be taken to prevent Friendship

from turning into deadly Hatred; which produces Reproaches, Slanders and Affronts; and even those, if they are not quite intolerable, ought to be born with; for so much Allowance ought to be made to old Friendship, that the Man who offers, not the Man who receives, the Injury, may bear the blame. But there is one, and but one, Precaution, for preventing all such Mistakes and Inconveniences, that we neither fix our Affections too hastily, nor upon unworthy Objects.

Now the Men worthy of Friendship are such as carry within themselves a just Recommendation to our Affection. It is difficult, and rare (and indeed every Thing that is noble is rare) to find an all-accomplished Object. For, in common Life, most People form their Notions of Virtue entirely upon Profit; and chuse their Friends as they do their Cattle, only for those Qualities by which they expect to be the greatest Gainers. They thereby are deprived of that lovely Friendship which is best adapted to Nature, and which is desirable in itself and for itself. Neither have they any Experience of the Influence, the Nature, and the Extent of such a Friendship. For every Man loves himself, not that he may be rewarded for his Self-Affection, but because he is impressed with a Principle of Self-affection: Now, unless the same Passion is applied to Friendship, there can be no such Person as a real Friend; for a Friend, is to a Friend, as it were, another self.

Now if Self-love appears to be the first Principle in the Nature of Beasts, Fowls, Fishes, of all Animals wild, tame, and Savage, (and indeed

it is in common to all living Creatures; in the next Place, that Animals of the same Kinds search out and follow the Creatures with which they are to associate; and that too with Affection, and with a certain Resemblance of the human Passions; how much more prevalent ought this Principle to be in Man, who both loves himself and passionately searches after another with whom he may so mingle his Affections, that they two seem to become almost one and the same Being.

XXII. But some are so froward, I had almost said, so impudent, that they require from a Friend what they themselves are unable to perform for him; and demand more than they bestow. Now it is requisite, in the first Place, that a Man be virtuous in himself, and in the next Place, that he looks abroad for one resembling himself in that Respect. Between such Men, that Permanency of Friendship, which I have been so long speaking of, may be established. When Men are linked in the Bonds of Affection, they will be, first, the Masters of those Passions to which others are Slaves, and then they feel a Joy in the Practice of Justice and Honesty; there is nothing that the one will not undertake for the other; nor will either require from the other ought that is inconsistent with Virtue and Probity; and they will entertain one another not only with Regard and Love, but with Delicacy; for they who banish Delicacy from Friendship, deprive it of its noblest Ornament. For it is a most destructive Mistake to imagine, that Friendship ought to be open to the Practice of all Lust and Immorality. Na-

ture has bestow'd Friendship upon Man to be an Assistant to his Virtues, but not the Companion of his Vices; that as Virtue when unmated cannot arrive at Excellency, she may attain to it when paired and matched with another. If there is, or ever was, or ever shall be, upon Earth, a Connection of this Kind, such a Connection is to be esteem'd the best and the happiest Attendant of the supreme Good, which Nature can bestow.

Such, I say, is the Society that is composed of all the Ingredients which Men account to be desirable, I mean Honour, Glory, Tranquility of Spirit and Enjoyment of Soul: With these, Life is happy; without them, it cannot be so. Now, if we want to attain to that Consummation of earthly Bliss, we must apply in earnest to the Practice of Virtue, without which, we never can succeed in our Pursuit of Friendship, or of ought that is lovely. But the Man who neglects Virtue and yet imagines that he has Friends, will perceive his Mistake too lately, when some heavy Misfortune obliges him to have Recourse to them for Assistance. I must, therefore, again and again repeat it, that Affection ought to be the Result of Judgment, and not Judgment of Affection. But Negligence in many Concerns of Life gives us Cause to repent; especially in the Choice and the Treatment of our Friends. Here, we act preposterously, and are always *doing the same Thing over and over again* in Contradiction to the common Proverb. For after being thoroughly embarked in the daily Practice, or in the Duties of Friendship, some Disgust arises which suddenly breaks it off in the Middle of its Progress.

XXIII. The Negligence, therefore,, of Man-
Y kind

kind in a Matter so indispensible and of such Importance, is the more inexcusable. For in Life, Friendship is the only Thing which all Mankind agree to be profitable. Even Virtue herself is laught at by many, and treated as a Matter that is all Outside and Shew. Many despise Riches, because a little contents them, and they are best pleased with homely living, and a plain Dress. As to public Honours, which some so ardently pursue, many there are who slight them so much that they account them the very Nothingness of Nothing. The same may be said of all other Objects, which, while they are courted by some, are slighted by many. But all Mankind agree in their Sentiments of Friendship; they who apply to the Affairs of State; they who are engaged in literary Pursuits and speculative Studies; they who, in private Life, mind only their own Concerns; nay, they who devote the whole of their Lives to Pleasure, think Friendship to be the *Life of Life*, provided they have the smallest Notion of living in any Respect, with Freedom and Satisfaction. For I know not how it is, but Friendship has insinuated itself thro' all the Stations of Life; nor does it suffer any Plan of living to be without its Company.

Let us even suppose, a Man of so sour, so brutish, a Disposition as to avoid, and to hate all human Society, such a Man, I mean, as was one *Timon of Athens* I have heard of; yet even such a Man could not help searching carefully about for somebody with whom he might spue out the Venom of his Rancour. But that will best appear by supposing the Possibility of some God taking a Man out of human Society, and placing him in a
lonely

lonely Desert, where he is bountifully and plentifully supply'd with all that Nature can crave, but absolutely debarr'd from seeing the Face of any human Creature. Where is there a Man so insensible as to be able to endure a Life like this; and who by such Loneliness would not lose all Relish for the Pleasure it brought? I, therefore, think there is Truth in what (our old Men say they heard it from old Men who liv'd before them) fell from *Archytas* of *Tarentum*. "If, (said he) a Man was to go up into Heaven, where he could become acquainted with the System of Nature, and the Beauty of the Spheres, all his Contemplations, which would otherwise be most delightful, would be tasteless if he had no Body to whom he could impart them." Nature, therefore, abhors Solitude, and is ever inclining towards a Help-mate, and the more friendly always the more agreeable.

XXIV. And yet though this same Nature gives us so many Intimations of what she wills, of what she covets, and of what she wants, yet I know not how it happens, we are deaf to them all; for we hear none of her cravings. Various and many are the Uses of Friendship; there are in it many Causes of Jealousies and Distrusts; and it is the Part of a wise Man, sometimes to prevent, sometimes to soften, and sometimes to bear them. There is one Species of Disgust that we ought to be tender of, in order to preserve both the Utility and the Truth of Friendship, for we ought frequently both to admonish and reprove our Friends; and both ought to be taken friendly as they are meant kindly.

But I know not how it happens that a Friend of mine says, in his *Andria*, no more than the Truth, when he tells us, that *Obsequiousness begets Friends, and Truth Enemies*. Truth is a disagreeable Thing if Hatred, that Bane of Friendship, springs from it; but that Obsequiousness which by humouring his Follies, suffers a Friend to be carry'd headlong, is much more disagreeable. The Man, however, is most of all to blame, who despises Truth, and is push'd by Flattery upon Ruin. Upon the whole, this Matter requires great Care and Address to manage it properly. In the first Place, we ought to admonish without Bitterness, and reprove without Disrespect. As to Obsequiousness (for I am willing to keep by *Terence's* own Word) it ought always to be attended with Politeness, but without the least Tincture of Flattery, that Promoter of Wickedness. It is inconsistent with Friendship, nay with Freedom, to make Use of Flattery. For we live in one Manner with a Friend, and in another, with a Tyrant.

The Man who shuts his Ears to Truth, nor will hear it from a Friend, is in a desperate Condition. *Cato*, amongst other good Things, said very properly, it is better to make some Men our bitter Enemies, than to make Friends of Flatterers and Sycophants; for the former often tells us the Truth, but the latter, never. And indeed, there is an Absurdity in Life, that they who receive Admonition feel none of that Uneasiness which it ought to give; but are uneasy for what they ought not to resent. For having no Sense of their Faults, they are nettled at Reproof; whereas their Behaviour ought to be the very Reverse, they ought to

to be sorry for their Offence and glad of the Admonition.

XXV. As, therefore, it is the Characteristic of real Friendship, that it both gives and takes Admonition; the first with Freedom, but without Bitterness; the latter, with Patience, but without repining; we are, therefore, to think, that there is nothing so pernicious to Friendship as Adulation, fawning, or flattering. Meanwhile, the Crimes of cringing, glossing, and of saying every Thing excepting Truth, that can please, are detestable on many Accounts. But as Deceit, is in all Respects, execrable, so it is particularly baneful to Friendship, because it abolishes Truth without which Friendship must lose its Name. For as the Character of Friendship consists in its blending several Souls into a single one, how can that be the Case when the Soul of a Man is not single and always so; nay when it changes, shifts and doubles? For what can be so crooked and so warp'd as the Soul of that Man who conforms itself not only to the Sentiments and Pleasure, but to the Looks and Nods, of another? *You speak in the Negative? So do I. In the Affirmative? I'm your Man. In short, I have taught myself the Lesson of complying with every Man,* says Terence again, but in the Character of *Guatbo*, a profess'd Sycophant; and to make a Friend of such a Fellow would be Weakness itself. And yet we have many *Guatbos* in Men, whose Birth, Fortune and Rank are far Superior to Terence's Sycophant. The Flattery of such Fellows becomes very troublesome, because their Hollowness is recommended by their Quality.

Now, by taking Pains, a glosing Friend may be distinguished and known from a real one, in the same Manner as in other Concerns of Life, we distinguish what is false and counterfeited, from what is genuine and real. An Assembly consisting of the lowest and most ignorant of People, uses to know the Difference between a Citizen who wants to catch them by cringing, and Sycophantry, and one who is steady, inflexible, and virtuous. With what mean Arts did *Caius Papirius* lately tickle the Ears of the People when he brought in the Bill for re-capacitating the Tribunes: But, it was thrown out, thro' our Opposition.

However, as to the Share I had in that Opposition, I say nothing, but I can talk freely of *Scipio*. Immortal Gods! What Steadiness was in his Nature, what Majesty in his Eloquence? Such as spoke him, at first Sight, to be the Commander, and not the Companion, of *Romans*. But ye were present and the Speech is public; and through his Means, that Bill, so plausible for the People, was thrown out by the Voice of the People. But to return to myself; you may remember under the Consulship of *Quintus Maximus*, *Scipio's* Brother, and *Lucius Mancinus*, how specious the Bill appeared which *Caius Lucinius Crassus* brought in concerning the Priesthood; for it vested in the People the Power of filling up the Vacancies in the sacerdotal College. He, too, cajol'd the People and flatter'd them in the Forum. But the Service of the immortal Gods, for which I pleaded, soon defeated all the Design of his venal Speeches. Now, this happen'd in my Prætorship five Years before I was Consul. It was, therefore, the Reason of the

the Thing, rather than any Weight of Authority, that defeated that Measure.

XXVI. Now, if upon a Stage (o), or in an Assembly where there are many Opportunities of introducing fictitious, imaginary Matters, Truth has great Influence, when it is laid open and illustrated in the Catastrophe, what Influence ought it not to have upon Friendship, which depends upon Truth entirely? For there, unless you see the Sincerity of Heart and present your own equally sincere, you can have nothing you can trust, nothing you can rely on. Where the Certainty of a sincere Intention is wanting, you neither can love nor be beloved. And, yet, however pernicious the Adulation is, which, I have been condemning, it can hurt only the Man who admits it, and who is pleased with it; and thus it happens, that the Man who flatters, and who idolises himself, has his Ears most open to Flatterers and Sycophants.

Virtue, it is true, is lovely in her own Eyes; because she is best acquainted with herself and most sensible of her own amiable Qualities. But, I am not now speaking of real, but of supposititious Virtue: for the Numbers of the really virtuous are not so great, as they appear to be. The seemingly virtuous are they who love Flattery. When such Men are entertain'd with any Discourse that hits their Humours, the empty Sounds are

(o) *If upon a Stage*] Orig. *Quod si in Scena id est in Concione.* *Langius* and *Grævius* are against admitting the Words, *in Concione*, into the Original. But, I think, nothing can come more naturally in, after speaking of the Influence of Truth over the Assemblies in the Forum, to call an Audience an Assembly at the Theatre.

suck'd in by them as so many Evidences of their Merits. There can, therefore, subsist no Friendship between two Men, when the one constantly refuses to hear the Truth, and the other is always ready with a Lye. Even the Sycophantry of Parasites upon the Stage would lose all its Wit were it not for the vapouring Officer. *Well, Thais sends me, you say, a great many Thanks.* The natural Answer to this Speech is, *a great many, Sir : But, a Million,* says the Parasite. For when the Person whom a Sycophant wants to flatter calls a Thing GREAT, the Sycophant makes it EXCESSIVE.

Mean while, though this supple Adulation may prevail chiefly with those who encourage and invite it, yet Men of greater Weight and Resolution ought to be admonish'd to be upon their Guard, lest they too be infected with it. For any Man, unless he is a meer Booby, discovers a gross Flatterer; but we are to guard with great Caution against the Insinuations of the cunning, the conceal'd Sycophant. For he is not to be so easily discover'd, because he often works his Way by contradicting you; he pleases us by his seeming to wrangle, and wins us by, at last, appearing to yield to our superior Talents, and suffering himself to be the Convert of our better Sense. Now, what can be more shameful than to be impos'd upon in this Manner? We are, therefore, in that Respect, to be the more cautious, lest we resemble the old Fellow in the *Epiclesus*, who says, *To-day you tickled me up and bedizen'd me purely before all the gaping old Dotards.* For the Character, which we meet with in Plays of a thoughtless credulous old Fellow is, of all others, the most ridiculous. I have, however, I know not how, suffer'd myself to ramble from the

Friendships of accomplish'd, that is wise, Men, (I mean Men who are endowed with as much Wisdom as falls to the Lot of Man) to the Friendship of Fools and Rakes. Let me, therefore, return to the former and conclude.

XXVII. It is Virtue, it is Virtue, my *Fannius* and my *Mucius*, that acquires and preserves Friendship. It is Virtue that gives to human Concerns, their Fitness, their Duration, and their Permanency. When Virtue rears her Head, and sends abroad her Eye, when she perceives and finds she has influenced another; she then draws near to that Object; in her Turn, she feels the Affection she imparted; and from this Re-action, Love or Friendship catch their Flames; for both have the same Original. For to love is nothing but a Passion for the belov'd Object without any mean or mercenary Consideration.

Yet, let you be ever so disinterested, Profit will ever spring from Friendship. With the most sincere Affection, I, when young, lov'd *Lucius Paulus*, *Marcus Cato*, *Caius Gallus*, *Publius Nasica*, and *Tiberius Gracchus*, the Father-in-Law of my *Scipio*, who were all of them old Men. It is, however, still more conspicuous amongst Persons of the same Age; as amongst *Scipio*, *Furius*, *Rupilius*, *Mummius* and myself. Now when we grow old, we are, in our Turns, rewarded by the Affections of young Men, such as you two and *Quintus Tubero*; nay, I have a Pleasure in the Caresses of the very young, such as *Publius Rutilius* and *Aulus Virginius*. And as the System of Life and Nature requires, that this be succeeded by another Age, so it is devoutly to be wish'd that

that we finish the Race of Life with those Equals with whom we started.

But, as human Concerns are frail and fading, we ought to be curious in our Search of an Object which we may love, and by whom we may be beloved; for, take from Life Endearment and Kindness, you take from it all that renders it desirable. I lost my *Scipio*, suddenly indeed, but he lives and shall for ever live in my Affections: For it was the Virtue of my Friend that I loved, and Virtue dieth not; nor is he present only to me, who was familiar with him in Life, but his Fame and his Glory shall endure through all Generations; for never shall any Man form the Idea, or the Hope of a noble Achievement, who shall not look up to the Glory of *Scipio*, and propose his Example as the Model of his own Conduct.

For my Part, of all the Advantages, which either Nature or Fortune has bestow'd upon me, I have none that I can so much as compare to that of having had *Scipio* for my Friend. It was that which form'd our Unanimity in Public, it guided our Conduct in private Affairs; and it fill'd even Repose with Delight. Never, to my Knowledge, did I offend him in the smallest Trifle. Never did I hear an Expression that could displease me, fall from his Lips. One House, and one Table were common to both, and not only in our military Expeditions, but in our Travels, and in our Country-Excursions, we attended one another.

How shall I mention the unceasing Passion we both had for Improvement and Knowledge,
which

which, in our Retirement, employ'd all our leisure Hours? Had the Remembrance and the Recollection of those Circumstances perish'd along with him, never could I have supported myself under the Loss of that dearest, that most amiable of Friends. But they are so far from having perish'd, that they are nourish'd and improv'd by Remembrance and Reflection: Nay, were I even depriv'd of them, still this my advanced Age would bring me some Relief: For I cannot be long in this languishing State; now, every Thing that is of short Duration, even though it is weighty, ought to be born with.

Ye now, have my Sentiments concerning Friendship, and my Advice is, that ye so manage your Stock of Vlrue, without which Friendship cannot subsist, that excepting it, ye shall account nothing more valuable than Friendship.

End of the Conference concerning FRIENDSHIP.





M. T. C I C E R O
H I S
P A R A D O X E S.

Address to MARCUS BRUTUS.



H A V E often, my *Brutus*, observed, that your Uncle *Cato*, when he delivered his Opinion in the Senate, handled certain important Points of Philosophy which seemed irreconcilable with our Practice at the Bar, or in the Forum; yet, in the Course of his Speaking, he managed them so as that they became plausible to the Audience. Now, this was a greater Excellency in him, than it would be in you or in me, because we have been more conversant in that Philosophy which encourages the Variety of Expression, and its Subjects are pretty nearly suited with the Ideas of Mankind in general. But *Cato*, who, as far as I

can judge was a compleat Stoic, had Notions very incompatible with those of the common Run of Mankind; and was of a Sect that disclaims all Embellishments of Speech, and never spins out an Argument: He, therefore, succeeded in his Purpose by making use of certain pithy, and, as it were, stimulating Questions. There is, however, nothing so incredible that Eloquence will not make probable; she can give a Polish to the roughest, and culture to the wildest, Subjects.

Being thoroughly convinced of these Truths, I have made a bolder Attempt than ever *Cato* himself did. For *Cato*, let me tell you, when he treated of Magnanimity, of Modesty, of Death, of Virtues, all-comprehensive Merits, of the immortal Gods, and of Patriotism, used to dress the Sentiments of Stoics in the Ornaments of Eloquence. But I have, for Amusement, digested into common Places those Topics which the Stoics, even in their literary Retirement, and in their Schools, find difficult to prove. Such Topics they themselves term Paradoxes, on Account of their Singularity and Disagreement with the general Sense of Mankind. I have been ambitious enough to try whether they might not appear abroad, I mean in the Hands of Men of Business, and express in a Manner that should render them convincing to the Generality of People: And whether the Language of Learning is different from that of Life. I undertook this with the more Pleasure, because these very Paradoxes, as they are termed, appear to belong chiefly to *Socrates*, and contain the most important Truths of the Stoics. Please therefore to accept of this Trifle, the Product of these short Summer Nights, since your

Name

Name has appeared to patronise the Studies of my more deepened Hours. You have here a Specimen of the Manner I make use of, when I accommodate those Matters, which in the Schools are termed Propositions, to our oratorical Character and Practice of speaking. I do not, however, expect, that you will look upon yourself as indebted to me for this Performance, which is unworthy of being, like the *Minerva* of *Pheidias* amongst the *Greeks*, honoured with a Place of Safety and Distinction; and yet it will appear to be done by the same Hand with my former Works.

P A R A D O X the F I R S T,

V I R T U E is the ONLY GOOD.

I AM apprehensive that some amongst you may be of Opinion, that this Sentiment is not my own, but borrowed from the Schools of the Stoics. Yet I will tell you my real Opinion, and that too in fewer Words than the Importance of the Matter requires. By Heaven, I never was he who reckoned amongst the good and desirable Things of Life, Treasures, Palaces, Interest, Power, or those Pleasures to which the Men of this World are so strongly wedded. For I have observed, that they who wallowed in those Things, were the Men who, were, in Fact, the most eager after them; for our sensual Passions are boundless and insatiable: They are tormented not only with the Lust of encreasing, but with the Fear of losing, what they have. I own that I am often at a Loss to account for the good Sense

of our Ancestors, those Examples of Temperance to Mankind, who affixed the Appellation of GOOD to those weak fleeting Circumstances of Wealth, when in Truth and Fact their Sentiments were the very Reverse. Can a bad Man enjoy a good Thing? Or is it possible for a Man not to be good when he lives in the very Abundance of good Things? And yet we have daily Instances of all those good Things being in Possession of wicked Men who are Enemies to Virtue. Now, if any Man has a Mind to indulge his Raillery, he may, with all my Heart; but I never shall be laught out of following right Reason preferably to popular Opinion.. Neither shall I account a Man, when he loses his Stock of Cattle, or Furniture, to have lost his good THINGS. So far from that, I shall take frequent Opportunities of celebrating *Bias*, who, if I mistake not, is reckoned among the seven wise Men. For when the Enemy took Possession of *Priene*, his native Country, and when many of his Countrymen, in their Flight, found means to carry off with them their Effects; a Friend advised *Bias* to do the same. *Why*, answered he, *you see I do, for I carry with me all that is mine*: thereby intimating, that he did not esteem those Playthings of Fortune, which we term good THINGS, to be his own. But it may be asked, what then is a GOOD THING? My Answer is, that whatever is done uprightly, honestly, and virtuously, is done well; and whatever is upright, honest, and agreeable to Virtue, that, and that alone, is a GOOD THING.

But, when we reason abstractly, those Matters appear somewhat obscure; let us, therefore, as they

thy are refined too much upon in the Schools, illustrate them from the Lives and Actions of the greatest of Men. Let me then ask of you, whether you imagine, that the Men who founded, upon so noble a System, this Empire, which they have transmitted to us, ever thought of gratifying Avarice by Money; Delight by Delicacy; Luxury by Magnificence, or Pleasure by eating and drinking. Set before your Eyes any one of our Monarchs. Shall I begin with *Romulus*? or with the Patriots who made and left *Rome* a free State? By what Means then did *Romulus* become a God? By those which the Men of the World term GOOD THINGS? or by his Actions and his Virtues? What! are we to imagine, that the wooden or earthen Dishes of *Numa Pompilius* were less acceptable to the immortal Gods than the embossed Plate of others. I shall say nothing of our other Kings, for all of them, excepting *Tarquin the Proud*, were equally excellent. Should it be asked, what did *Brutus* perform when he delivered his Country? Or what were the Motives, what were the Views of the Patriots who joined him in that glorious Attempt? Can any Man alive think, that they were induced by Motives arising from the Love of Pleasure or of Riches, or that he had any other View, but that of acting the Part of a great and a gallant Man? What was the Motive that impelled *Caius Mucius* without the least Hopes of escaping Death, to attempt the Death of *Porfenna*? From whence sprung the Power that rivetted *Cocles* to the Bridge, when he singly opposed the whole Force of the Enemy? The Power that devoted the elder, that devoted the younger,

younger, *Decius*, and made them plunge amidst armed Battalions of Enemies! What View had *Caius Fabricius* for being so continent in his Manners, or *Manius Curius*, when he was so frugal in his living? What were the Motives of those two Thunder-bolts of the punic War, *Publius* and *Cneius*, *Scipio*, when they proposed to form with their own Bodies a Barrier for their Country against the Progress of the *Carthaginians*? What did the elder, what did the younger, *Africanus*, propose? What were the Views of *Cato* who liv'd between the Times of both? What shall I say, of Millions of other Instances; for our History abounds with such; can any one think that they proposed any other Object in Life but what was glorious and noble?

Now, let the Scoffers of this Sentiment appear, let them take their Choice, whether they will resemble the Man who is rich, in marble Palaces, adorned with Ivory, and shining with Gold, in Statues, in Pictures, in embossed Gold and Silver Plate, in the Workmanship of *Corinthian* Brass, or if they will resemble *Fabricius*, who had not, who disdained to have, any of those Luxuries. And yet, they are readily prevailed upon to admit that the Enjoyments, which shift from Hand to Hand, are not to be ranked among good Things, while at the same Time they stiffly maintain, and eagerly dispute, that Pleasure is the highest Good; a Sentiment that, to me, seems to be that of a Brute, rather than of a Man. Shall you, endowed as you are, by God, or by Nature, whom we may term the Mother of all Things, with a Soul, (the most excellent, the most divine Being that exists) shall you, I say, be so mean,

Z

and

and so object as to think, there is no Difference betwixt thy Nature, and that of the Brute? Where is that Good that does not make him, who possesses it, a better Man? For, as the Man who has the greatest Portion of Good, has likewise the greatest Share of Merit; neither is there a Good on which, the Man who possesses it, may not justly value himself. But does Pleasure contain any of those Qualities? Does Pleasure give a Man better Principles, or greater Merit? Where is the Man of Sense, who publicly praises himself for having enjoyed Pleasures? Now, if Pleasure, which has so many Advocates in its Favour, is not to be ranked among good Things, and if the greater it is, the more it discomposes, and disorders the Mind, surely, in Life, the good and happy Things of Life can mean no more than its just and its virtuous Things.

P A R A D O X the S É C O N D.

A M A N W H O I S V I R T U O U S I S W I T H O U T
N O R E Q U I S I T E O F H A P P Y L I F E.

N E V E R, for my Part, did I imagine *Marcus Regulus*, to have been distress'd, or unhappy or wretched; because his Magnanimity was not tortured by the *Carthaginians*; the Weight of his Authority was not; his Honour was not, his Resolution was not; not one of his Virtues was; in short, his Soul did not suffer their Torments, for a Soul that was guarded and attended by so many Virtues, never surely could be made Captive with its Body. We have seen *Caius Marius*; he, in my Opinion, was in Prosperity one of the happiest, and, in Adversity, one of the greatest of Men, a Character that forms the supreme Hap-

pinels of human Life. Madman, thou art ignorant, indeed, thou art ignorant, of Virtue's Force; thou only usurpest the Name of Virtue; but thou art a Stranger to her Influence. The Man who is well compos'd within himself; who finds all he wants and wishes for, within his own Breast, never can be otherwise than compleatly happy. But the Man who has no Hope, no Scheme, no Foresight but what depends upon Fortune, such a Man can have no Certainty, he can have no Grounds of Assurance that he can be Master of his Enjoyments for a single Day longer. If you have any such Man in your Power, you may terrify him by Threats of Death or Exile; but, whatever can happen to me in this my ungrateful Country, I will be so far from opposing it, that I will embrace it. To no Purpose have I toiled; to no Purpose have I acted; vain have been my Cares by Day and my Watchings by Night, if I have not yet learned to arrive at such a State, as that neither the Outrages of Fortune, nor the Injuries of Enemies can affect me. Do you threaten me, *Antony* with Death? Why, that is separating me from Mankind. With Exile? That is removing me from the wicked. Death is dreadful to the Man whose All is extinct with his Breath; but not to him whose Glory never can dye. Exile is terrible to those who, as it were, stint themselves to one dwelling Place; but not to those who look upon the whole Globe but as one City. Thou, happy and prosperous as thou thinkest thyself, art the Wretch that is beset with Wretchedness and covered with Misfortunes: Thou art tortured by thy Lusts; Day and Night thou art upon the Rack; tho' ever

dissatisfied with thy own Condition, yet thou art ever trembling lest it should not continue; the Remembrance of thy Misdeeds goads thy Conscience; the Terrors of thy Country's Laws and the Dread of her Justice appal your very Soul; look where thou wilt, thy Crimes like so many Furies stare thee in the Face, and hang a dead Weight upon thy Spirit. Therefore, as no Man can be happy if he is wicked, foolish, or indolent; so no Man can be wretched, if he is virtuous, brave, and wise. Glorious is the Life of that Man whose Virtues and Practice are glorious; and no Life that is attended with Glory is to be avoided, but we ought to abhor it, if attended with Misery. We are, therefore, to look upon whatever is dignified with Glory and with Merit, to be, at the same Time, happy, flourishing, and desirable.

P A R A D O X, the T H I R D.

T H A T A L L M I S D E E D S A R E I N T H E M -
S E L V E S E Q U A L, A N D G O O D D E E D S
T H E S A M E.

TH E Matter, it may be said, is a Trifle, but the Crime is enormous; for we are to form our Estimate of Guilt not from the Events of Things, but from the bad Intentions of the Agent. The Circumstances attending Guilt may differ in their Importance, but Guilt itself, in whatsoever Light you behold it, is the same. A Pilot oversets a Ship laden with Gold or one laden with Straw; the Loss no Doubt is somewhat disproportioned; but the Blunder of the Pilot is, in both Cases, the same. You have debauched a Woman of no

Family—'Tis true, fewer are concerned for her, than would be, had she been a young Lady of Rank and Quality. Nevertheless, you have been guilty, if it be guilty to start before the Signal. No Doubt it is; nor does it matter, in Aggravation of the Fault of Starting in that Manner, how far you run afterwards; for nothing can be more certain, than that Nobody has a Right to commit a Fault. Now, if one has no Right to do a Thing, that very Circumstance convicts him of Guilt if he does it. If this Guilt can receive neither Addition nor Diminution, (because if the Thing was against Right, there was a Fault in the Commission, and a Fault is perpetually and invariably a Fault) then all the Consequences and Circumstances attending it must be equal. Now, if Virtues are equal amongst themselves, it must necessarily follow, that Vices are so likewise; and nothing is more easy than to prove, that a Man cannot be better than good, more temperate than temperate, braver than brave, nor wiser than wise. Will any Man call a Person honest, who having a Deposit of ten Pounds of Gold made into his Hands, without any Witness, so that he can be in no Danger of Detection, shall account for every Farthings Worth of it, and yet should not behave in the same Manner, were the Sum ten thousand Pounds? Can a Man be accounted temperate who checks one inordinate Passion, and gives a loose to another? Virtue is uniform, and its Uniformity consists in unwearied Perseverance and Agreement with Reason. No Addition of Circumstance can make it more than Virtue? No Diminution can render it less. If good Offices are done with an upright Intention, nothing can

be more upright than upright is; and therefore it is impossible that any Thing should be better than what is good. It, therefore, follows that all Vices are equal, for the evil Affections of the Mind are properly termed Vices. Now, we may infer, that as all Virtues are equal, therefore, all good Actions being derived from Virtues ought to be equal likewise; and, therefore, it necessarily follows that evil Actions springing from Vices should be also equal.

You borrow, says one, all this Matter from Philosophers.—I was afraid you would have told me that I borrow it from Pimps and Panders.—But *Socrates* reasoned in the Manner you do — I am glad to hear it, for by all Accounts, he was a learned and a wise Person. Mean while, as the Dispute between you and me, is at present, carried on, not by Blows but Words, I make bold to ask you, whether, upon a Subject of this Kind, we are to take the Sense of the Scum and Slaves of the Earth, or that of the wisest of Mankind? Especially, too, as the Sentiment I here lay down is not only as agreeable to Truth, but as useful in Life as any Proposition can be. How must Men be influenced, how must they be deterred from the Commission of all Kinds of Evils, if they once become sensible there are no Degrees of Guilt? That the Crime is the same whether they offer Violence to private Persons, or to Magistrates. That Lust is equally criminal, whatever the Family is which it pollutes. But here it may be objected; What? Is there no Difference between murdering your Father or your Slave? If this Objection is to be taken simply without any Circumstances attending it, it has its Difficulties. If to deprive

deprive a Parent of Life is in itself a most heinous Crime, the *Saguntines* were then Parricides, because they chose that their Parents should dye in Liberty rather than live in Slavery. Thus a Case may happen in which there may be no Guilt in depriving a Parent of Life, and very often we cannot, without Guilt, put a Slave to death. The Circumstances therefore, attending this Case, and not the Nature of the Thing, must decide the Matter: Those Circumstances, as they are favourable or unfavourable, ought to weigh with us: But if there is no Difference in Circumstances there can be none in Guilt. It is true, that the Guilt of wrongfully killing a Slave stands singly without Consequences attending it. But, the Guilt of murdering a Father is complicated. You have murdered the Man who begat you; the Man who fed you; the Man who brought you up; the Man who gave you Property, gave you a Home, and qualified you for the Service of your Country. This Offence, therefore, being attended with Numbers of aggravating Circumstances is worthy the greater Punishment. But in Life, we are not to consider the Severity of the Punishment a Man is to undergo, but the Rule of Right which he is not to transgress. We are to consider every Action that we commit against Decency to be wicked, and every Action we commit against Rectitude to be criminal. What! in the most trifling Matters? To be sure; for if we are unable to regulate the Proportions of Actions, yet we may bound our Affections. If a Player ever so little transgresses the Decorum of Action or the Rules of speaking a Verse, longer or shorter, than it ought to be,

he is hooted and hissed off the Stage. And shall you, whose Life ought to be better proportioned than any stage Action, and more regular than any Verse, shall you be found faulty even in a Syllable of Conduct? I overlook the trifling Faults of a Poet; and shall I overlook my fellow Citizen's Life while he is counting his Misdeeds upon his Fingers? If some of them are too short does that make them less faulty, since the Jarring must arise from the Discord of Reason and Order? Now, if Reason and Order are disturbed, nothing can be added to aggravate the Misconduct which such Disturbance must introduce.

PARADOX the FOURTH.

THAT EVERY FOOL IS A MADMAN.

NOW, ^{now} (a) Sir, I will put you upon a short Allowance, not as I have often done on Account of your Folly, or as I always do on Account of your Villainy, but on Account of your Madness and Insanity. Could the Mind of the wise Man fortified, as with Walls, by admirable Foresight, by invincible Perseverance, secure against every Accident, and cloathed with every Virtue, a Mind that could not be expelled out of this Community, shall such a Mind be over-powered and taken by Storm? For what do we call a Community? Surely not every

(a) This Paradox is supposed by our Author to be address'd to *Clodius* who had driven him into Exile; and perhaps it will be difficult for any Reader to produce a Piece of more consummate vain Glory and self Applause, than *Cicero* here discovers; after his pusillanimous, disgraceful Behaviour under his Exile.

Assem-

Assembly of Thieves and Ruffians? Is it then composed of Out-Laws and Robbers assembled in one Place? Surely not. *Rome*, therefore, was no Community, when her Laws had no Force; when her Courts of Justice were disregarded; when her Constitution lay expiring; when her Magistrates had the Sword of Violence at their Throats; and when the Authority of the Senate was abolished within her Walls. Could that Gang of Ruffians, that Assembly of Villains, which you headed in the Forum, could those Remains of *Catiline's* frantic Conspiracy, then devoted to your lawless Rage, be termed a Community? I could not, therefore, be expelled from this Community, because no such then existed. I was introduced to this Community when the consular Authority, which had been abolished, was at the Head of our Government, when the Senate, which then lay gasping, resumed its Functions; when the Voice of the People was free; and when Laws and Equity, those Bonds of Community, were restored to their Force.

Thou shalt now be made sensible how much I despised the Arrows that were aimed at me by your Scoundrelship. That you darted, that you shot your villainous Wrongs at me, I never doubted: But that they hit or reached me, I never thought. It is true, you might think that somewhat belonging to me was tumbling down or consuming when you was demolishing my Walls and applying your accursed Torches to the Roofs of my Houses. But neither I, nor any Man, can call a Thing our Property if we can be deprived, if we can be stript, if we can be robbed, of it. Could you have robbed me of my Soul's di-

vine Constancy, of my Application, of my Vigilance, and of those Measures through which, to your Confusion, *Rome* now exists; could you have abolished from the Records of Immortality, the eternal Memory of my Services to my Country; far more, had you robbed me of that Soul from which all those Services sprung; then, indeed, I should have confessed that I felt your Blows. But as you neither did, nor could, affect me in that Manner, your Persecution rendered my Return glorious, but not my Departure miserable. I, therefore, was always a Citizen of *Rome*, but especially at the Time when the Senate charged foreign Nations with my Preservation, because I was the best of Patriots. As to you, you are, at this Time, no Citizen, unless we admit a Citizen, and an Enemy, of *Rome* to signify the same Thing. Can you distinguish a Citizen from an Enemy by the Accidents of Nature and Place, and not by his Affections and Actions? You have filled the Forum with Blood, and the Temples with Bands of Ruffians; you have set on fire the Temples of the Gods and the Houses of private Citizens. If, after all this, you are a Citizen, why are we to deem (*b*) *Spartacus* to be an Enemy? Can you be a Citizen in that City which, through you, for some Time had no Existence? And have you a Right to upbraid me, when all Mankind thought that *Rome* herself was gone into Exile, when I was driven out of her Walls? Never, thou most frantic of all Madmen, wilt thou turn thy Eyes upon thyself? Wilt thou never consider thy

(*b*) *Spartacus*] He was a Slave who raised a Rebellion which *Craffus* suppressed.

Actions or thy Words? Dost thou not know that Exile is the Penalty of Guilt: But that the Journey I set out upon was undertaken by me in Consequence of Actions, that were attended by the most consummated Glory? All the Criminals, all the Profligates, of whom you avow yourself the Leader, and on whom our Laws pronounce the Sentence of Banishment, are Exiles, and that too, without leaving *Rome*. At the Time when all our Laws doom'd thee to Banishment were thou not an Exile? Is not the Man an Enemy to the Peace of his Country, who carries about him offensive Weapons? A Cut-throat belonging to you was taken near the Senate-House. Who is to be deemed a Murderer? You; for you have murdered many. Who an Incendiary? You; for, with your own Hand, you set fire to the Temple of the Nymphs. Who was guilty of Sacrilege? You; for you shut up our Temples by pitching a Camp in the Forum. But what do I talk of well known Laws, all which doom you to Exile; for one of your bosom Friends carried through a Bill (c) pointing at you only, by which you was condemned to be banished, if it was found, that you had been present at the Mysteries of the Goddess *Bona*: and it is now become your Boast that you was guilty of that Fact. As, therefore you have, by so many Laws been doomed to Banishment, do you not tremble at the Appellation of an Exile? You tell me, you are still present in *Rome*. I know it, and that you were present at the Mysteries too: But though you were there, yet you had

(c) *Bill*] The Reader will find an ample Detail of this Matter in my Translation of *Cicero's Epistles to Atticus*.

no right to be there; and therefore, you are as an Exile from that Place where its Laws do not suffer you to remain.

PARADOX the FIFTH:

THAT THE WISE MAN ALONE IS FREE,
AND THAT EVERY FOOL IS A SLAVE.

IN this Place, I am dispos'd to praise a General, to let him be honour'd with that Title, or let him be thought worthy of it. But how, or where is the free Man who is to be commanded by a Man who cannot command his own inordinate Passions? Let him, in the first Place, bridle his Lufts, let him despise Pleasures, let him subdue Anger, let him get the better of Avarice and of every Thing that debases a rational Being, and then when he himself is no longer in Subjection to Disgrace and Dishonesty, the vilest all Tyrants, let him then, I say, begin to command others. But, while he is the Slave of his Lufts, he is so far from having a Right to the Title of a General, that he has none to that, of a free Man. This is the noble Doctrine laid down by the most learned Men, whose Authority I should not make Use of, were I now addressing myself to an Assembly of Rustics. But as I speak to Men of the most refined Understandings; who are no Strangers to what I am saying; why, should I falsely pretend, that all the Application, I have bestow'd upon this Study, has been lost. It is, therefore, a Maxim with the most learned Men, that none but a wise Man can be free. For what is Liberty, but the Power of living in the Manner most pleasing

pleasing to ourselves? Who then is he who lives in that Manner? The Man surely who follows Righteousness, who rejoices in fulfilling his Duty, and has laid out a well considered and well contriv'd Plan of Life. The Man who obeys the Laws of his Country, not out of Dread, but pays them Respect and Reverence, because he thinks such Obedience the most conducive to the Good of Society. Who is sincere and free in all his Words, in all his Actions, nay in all his Thoughts? The Man whose whole Plan of Conduct and Business arises from, and is terminated by his own Virtues. The Man who is sway'd by nothing so much as by his own Inclination and Judgment. The Man who is Master of Fortune herself, that most irresistible Comptroler of human Actions, agreeable to what the Poet says, that *Fortune is moulded according to the Manners of every Man*. It cannot happen to any but to a wise Man, that he does nothing against his Will, nothing with Pain, nothing with Force. It would, it is true, require a large Discourse to prove the Reality of this Character, but we may, in a very few Words, be convinced that no Man, but a Man of this Character, can be free. All wicked Men, therefore, are Slaves, and this is not so surprizing, and incredible *in Fact*, as it is *in Words*. For they are not Slaves, in the Sense those Bondmen are, who are the Properties of their Masters by Purchase, or by any Law of the State; but, if it be Slavery, (and Slavery no Doubt it is) to obey Passions that are irregular and unmanly, Passions that deprive us of the Exercise of our Reason; Then who can deny that all dishonest, all avaricious, in short, all wicked Persons are Slaves?

Can I call the Man free, who is governed by a Woman, who gives him Laws, who lays him down Directions, who orders him one thing, and forbids him another, according to her own Caprice; while he can deny, and dare refuse, nothing that she demands? Does she give the Word? his Purse must be open: Does she call? he must come: Does she chide? he must vanish: Does she threaten? he must tremble. For my Part, I call such a Fellow, be his Blood ever so noble, not only a Slave, but *the Slave of all Slaves*. Now, in a large Family of Fools, some Slaves look upon themselves; to be more genteel than others, such as those we employ as Ushers, or Gardeners, yet still they are Slaves. In like Manner, they who are immeasurably fond of Statues, of Pictures, of embossed Plate, of Works in *Corinthian* Brass, or magnificent Palaces, are equally Fools with the others. "Nay, but (say they) we are the chief "Men of the Government." It may be so; yet, you have no Preference over your Fellow-Slaves. But, as in a large House, they who are obliged to handle the Furniture, to brush it, to anoint their Masters, to sweep the House, and water the Hall, are not to be ranked among the genteeler Kind of Slaves; in like Manner, they who have abandoned themselves to their Passions, for the Things, I have mentioned, are next to the very lowest of all Slaves. Says one of these Gentlemen, "*But I have had the Direction of important Wars, I have had under me great Commands, and great Govern-*" "ments." Then, if you have, carry about you "a Soul worthy of Praise. You doat upon a "Painting of *Ecbion*, or a Statue of *Polycletus*; I "shall not mention, from whom you took it, or by "what

“ what Means you possess it ; but when I see you
 “ staring with Astonishment, gaping with Ad-
 “ miration, and exclaiming with Rapture, I look
 “ upon you to be the Slave of those Trifles. You
 “ ask me, *Are not these, then, elegant Amusements ?*
 “ To be sure, they are ; for I, too, have a
 “ judging Eye in the fine Arts ; but give me leave
 “ to tell you, that fine as they are, they ought not
 “ to serve as Fetters for our Manhood, but as
 “ Objects of our Amusement. Let me ask
 “ your Opinion ? If *Lucius Mummius*, after the
 “ Contempt that he expressed for all *Corinths*,
 “ had seen one of our great Men examining, in
 “ an Extasy, a *Corinthian Vase*, whether would he
 “ have look’d upon him as an excellent Citizen,
 “ or a busy Appraiser ? Supposing *Manius Curius*,
 “ or some of those *Romans*, who in their Villas
 “ and their Houses had nothing that was costly,
 “ nothing besides themselves that was ornamental,
 “ saw one of our modern great Men, after receiving
 “ the highest Honours his Country could bestow,
 “ taking out of his Stews his Mullets or his Carp,
 “ then handling them, and boasting how rich he
 “ was in Lampreys. Would not the old *Roman*
 “ think, that such a Man was so very a Slave,
 “ that he was fit for no higher Employment,
 “ than to be the Caterer of a Household ?” Can
 we have the smallest Doubt that those Men are
 Slaves, who from their Greediness for Wealth, rea-
 dily embrace the hardest Conditions of the vilest
 Slavery ? To what Meanness of Slavery will not
 the Expectation of succeeding to an Estate make
 a Man stoop ? How watchful he is to catch every
 Nod of the childless, rich, old Fellow ? His Words
 are suited to his Humour ; he obeys every Order

the

the other gives him ; he courts him, he sits by him, he makes him Presents. What is there that looks like Freedom about such a Man ? What is there about him that does not carry with it the most convincing Evidence of his being a beaten Slave ?

Well ! I will now consider the Passion that seems to be more peculiarly the Character of Liberty, I mean that for public Preferment, for Empire, and for Government ; and how severe is its Tyranny ! how imperious ! how irresistible ! It forced the Men, who thought themselves the greatest Men in *Rome*, to be Slaves to *Cetbegus*, a Person of a very questionable Character ; to send him Presents, to wait upon him a-nights at his House, to turn Suitors, nay Supplicants to him. If such Men are to be accounted free, who is to be accounted a Slave ? But, what shall I say, when the Sway of this Passion is over, and when Fear, another Tyrant, springs out of the Consciousness of their Misdeeds, and succeeds it ! What a hard, what a wretched Servitude, is that ? when they must be Slaves to every young Fellow who has got a tolerable Knack at talking ; when they must look up with Fear and Trembling to every Man, who they think can be an Evidence against them. As to their Judge, how powerful is his Sway over them, with what Terrors does he fill the Breasts of the Guilty ? And is not all Dread, Slavery ? What then is the Meaning, of that more eloquent, than wise, Speech, deliver'd by the accomplished Orator *Crassus* ? *Snatch us from Slavery*. How could a Man of his Eminence and Rank be a Slave ? Every Terror of a weak, a mean and a dastardly Soul is Slavery. He goes on — *Suffer*

us not to be the Slaves of any, (you perhaps imagine that he is now about to assert his Liberty; so far from that, he adds,) *but to the whole State,* (A Change of Masters does not effect Freedom;) *to whom we can be, and ought to be Slaves.* Now, we, whose Souls are lofty, exalted, and entrenched in Virtue, disown; that we either ought to be, or can be, Slaves to any. You may say, that you can be a Slave, because, in Fact, you are one; but you ought not to say, that you owe it as a Debt, because no Man can owe any Thing but that, which it would be disgraceful not to pay. But enough of this. Now let our General consider if he can deserve that Title, when Reason and Truth must convince him that he is not so much as a Freeman.

PARADOX the SIXTH.

THAT THE WISE MAN ALONE IS RICH

HOW vainly, how ostentatiously, *Crassus*, are you always making mention of your Money? Well; you say, you alone are rich? Immortal Gods! am I to thank you, that I have receiv'd this Piece of Information and Instruction; You, *Crassus*, the only rich Man! What, if you are not rich at all? What, if you even are a Beggar? For let me ask you, whom are we to mean by a rich Man? To what Kind of a Man is the Term applicable? If I mistake not, to the Man whose Possessions enable him to live with Freedom, and who is chearful and contented with what he has; who has no desire; no hankering after, no Wish for more. It is your own Mind, and not the Talk

A a

of

of others, nor the Greatness of your Estate, that must pronounce you to be rich; for it ought to think that nothing is wanting to your Happiness, and be void of all Anxiety about any more than what you enjoy. If your Mind is fatiated, or even contented, with the Money you have, I admit that you are rich; but if, for the Greed of Profit, you think no Means are too vile to obtain it, (tho' you are of an Order, *Craffus* that renders it impossible for you to make honest Profits,) if you, every Day, are cheating, deceiving, craving, jobbing, poaching, and pilfering; if you rob the Friends and the Treasury of the Public; if you are for ever hunting after, nay forging Wills, in your own Favour; I ask you, whether such Practices are the Symptoms of Poverty or Riches? It is the Mind, and not the Pocket, of a Man, that is to be accounted Rich. For, let your Pockets be ever so well cramm'd, when I see yourself empty, I shall not think you to be rich; because the Measure of Riches is taken from the Sufficiency that every Man has of the Means of Happiness. A Man has a Daughter. Then he ought to have a Fortune. But he has two. Then he ought to have a greater Fortune. He has more. Then he ought to have more Fortune still: And if, as we are told of *Danaus*, he has fifty Daughters, their fifty Fortunes require a Man to have a very great Estate. For, as I said before, a Man can only be call'd rich according to the Necessities he is under for having Money. Now if a Man, instead of having a great many Daughters, has a Million of inordinate Passions, which are craving enough to consume a very great Estate in a very short Time, how can I call such a Man rich, when his own Soul

Soul tells him that he is poor? You have often, *Crassus*, been heard to say, that no Man is rich who cannot, upon the Income of his Estate, maintain an Army; now this is what the People of *Rome* sometime ago; with all their Revenues, found a Difficulty to do. Therefore, according to your Maxim, you never can be rich before your Incomes enable you to maintain forty thousand Men, with a vast Body of auxiliary Horse and Foot. You, therefore, in Fact, confess yourself not to be rich, since you fall so far short of your own Description of a rich Man; you therefore, have made no Secret, that you are poor, that you are needy, nay, that you are a Beggar.

For, as we see that they who make an honest Livelihood by Commerce, by Industry, by farming the public Revenue, have occasion for all they earn; so, whoever sees your House crowded with Numbers of Accusers and Judges all in Compact with one another; whoever sees you presiding at all the Consultations held how to bribe Justice, or to acquit rich and guilty Criminals; whoever reflects upon the scandalous Wages you receive as a Patron, upon your pecuniary corrupting Practices in Elections for public Offices; upon your dispatching your Freedmen to pillage and plunder the Provinces; upon your dispossessing your Neighbours; upon your depopulating the Country by your Oppressions; upon your Confederacies with Slaves, with Freedmen, and with Clients; upon the Estates you have untenanted; upon the wealthy you have prescrib'd; upon the Corporations you have massacred, and upon the Harvest you have made during *Sylla's* Tyranny;

A 22

upon

upon the Wills you have forg'd, and the People you have secretly murder'd; in short, whoever reflects upon your unlimited Venality in your Levies, your Decrees, in the Votes you give yourself, in the Votes you make others give, in the Forum, in your House, in your Speaking and in your not Speaking; who, I say, when he reflects upon all this, must not acknowledge, that such a Man has Occasion for all he has acquir'd, a Character that by no Means suits with a rich Man. For the Advantage of Riches consists in Plenty, which is seen in the Overflow, and Abundance of the Means of Life; now, as you think you never can have enough, you never ought to be accounted rich. I shall say nothing of myself, because (and you have Reason) you despise my Fortune; what the Public thinks to be middling, you think to be next to nothing, and I think to be sufficient; I, therefore, confine myself to Facts. Now, if we are to form our Opinion and Judgment by Facts, whether we are more to esteem the Money which *Pyrrhus* sent to *Fabricius*, or the Contineny of *Fabricius* for refusing that Money? Which are we to value the most, the Gold of the *Samnites*, or the Answer of *Manius Curius*? The Inheritance of *Lucius Paullus*, or the Generosity of *Africanus*, who gave to his Brother *Quintus* his own Part of that Inheritance? Surely those illustrious Proofs of Virtue are more valuable than any Acquisition of Money can be. If, therefore, we are to rate every Man, rich only in Proportion to the valuable Things he possesses, how can we hesitate to pronounce that Man to have the greatest Riches who has the most


most Virtues, since no Estate in Land or Money is more to be valued than Virtue?

Immortal Gods! Little do Men consider what a Revenue Frugality brings in; for I now proceed, to speak of Men of Expence, I take my Leave of your Money-worms. The Revenue one Man receives from his Estate is thirty thousand Pounds a Year; my Estate brings me in one thousand a Year. Now, that Man is so expensive upon the gilded Roofs of his Villas, upon marble Pavements, so unbounded is he in his Passion for Statues, Pictures, fine Cloaths, and rich Furniture, that all his Estate is so far from defraying the Expence of his Living that it does not even pay the Interest of the Money he is forc'd to borrow; while, by confining my Desires to my Income, I can even save somewhat of my Pittance. Which, then, is the richest, he who wants, or he who abounds? He who is in Need, or he who has a Superfluity? The Man whose Estate, the greater it is, requires him to have the greater Means of supporting his Rank and Quality, or the Man whose Income is sufficient for all his Occasions?

But, why do I talk of myself, who through the Contagion of Fashion and the Degeneracy of the Times, am perhaps a little infected with those fashionable Follies. Our Fathers may have remember'd *Manius Manilius*, (that I may omit any farther mention of the *Curii* and the *Luscinii*) he came at last to be poor; for he had only a little House at *Carini* and a Farm near *Labicum*. Now, are we, because we have greater Possessions, richer Men? I wish we were. But we are not to form our Notions of Riches upon the Rent-roll of an Estate,

but upon the Manner in which the Possessor of it is inclin'd to live and appear. The having no inordinate Passion is Money in a Man's Pocket: his having no Turn for Expence is as good as an Estate in Land. Above all Things, Contentment, with what we possess, is the greatest and most durable of all Riches. If, therefore, they who are best acquainted with the Arts of Money are best pleas'd when they lay it out upon Fields and Ground-rents, because such Estates are the least liable to Accidents of any Kind, how much more valuable is Virtue, of which we never can be stript, we never can be robb'd? We cannot lose it by Fire, or by Water, and it remains our unalienable Property thro' all the Rage of Seasons, and Convulsions of Government. The Possessors of Virtue are the only rich in this Life: For they alone possess those Means that are profitable and eternal; and they are the only Men who, being contented with what they possess, think it sufficient, which is the most essential Property of Riches: They hanker after nothing; they are in want of nothing; they miss nothing, and they require nothing. As to the insatiable and avaritious Part of Mankind, whose Possessions are liable to Uncertainties and Accidents, they, therefore, are forever thirsting after more, nor was ever a Man, of that Turn, of Opinion, that he had enough; therefore, they are so far from being wealthy and rich, that they are to be look'd upon to be in Want and Beggary.

The End of the PARADOXES.



T H E

VISION of SCIPIO. *

SCIPIO *speaks.*

W H E N I arrived in *Africa*, you know, I was Tribune of the fourth Legion, and served under the Command of the Consul *Lucius Manlius*. At that Time I was highly delighted with having an Opportunity of an Interview with *Massinissa*, a Prince who lay under the strongest Obligations of Friendship to our Family. When I met the old

* *The VISION of SCIPIO.*] This is one of the most curious Pieces that we have from Antiquity. It is a Kind of an Episode, which our Author had introduced into a larger Treatise, which he had wrote concerning Government, and which is now lost. It was written in a Dialogue between *Scipio* and some of his Friends, and the following Dream was preserved by *Macrobius* who wrote a Commentary upon it. The scientific Part of it is taken partly from the *Platonic* and partly from the *Pythagorean* Philosophy. The argumentative Part seems to be *Platonic* entirely, and the sentimental Part is *Cicero's* own;

Man, he took me in his Arms, and shed Tears over me. Soon after, throwing his Eyes up to Heaven, I thank thee, (says he) ever glorious Sun, and ye the other Illuminaries of Heaven, that before I have left this Life, I have seen in my Kingdom and under my Roof *Publius Cornelius Scipio*, a Name that brings me back to my Youth; for never shall the Memory of that greatest, that most invincible of Men, leave my Senses. After this I inform'd myself from him about his Kingdom, and he himself, from me, about our Government; and thus the Day slip'd over in a Variety of Discourse.

After being most royally entertain'd at Supper, our Conversation lasted till Midnight; while the old King talk'd of nothing but of *Africanus*, and remembered not only all his Actions, but all his Expressions. Then taking our Leaves to go to Bed, I (being tired with my Journey and my sitting up later than I usually did) fell into a Sleep sounder than ordinary. Now, it is my firm Opinion, that what we generally think and Discourse of, all Day, produces in our Sleep somewhat like to what happen'd to *Ennius*, with Regard to *Homer*, of whom he was constantly while awake thinking and talking. Therefore it was undoubtedly from our talking so much of *Scipio*, that he seem'd to present himself to me in my Sleep, and I recollected his Person, not so much from any Remembrance I had of it, as from the Pictures and Statues of him which I had seen.

No sooner did I know him than I shudder'd. Draw near, said he, be of good Courage, lay aside your Dread, and treasure up my Words, in your
Memory

Memory. You see that (a) City; by me it was forc'd to submit to the People of *Rome*, but, ever restless, it is now renewing its former Wars; (he spoke these Words, pointing to *Carthage*, from an Eminence, that was full of Stars, bright and glorious,) You are now come, before you are a (b) compleat Soldier, to attack it. Within two Years you shall be Consul, and shall throw it to the Ground: And you shall acquire the Sur-name that you now inherit. After you have destroy'd *Carthage*, perform'd a Triumph, and been Censor, after in Quality of Legate, you have visited *Egypt*, *Syria*, *Asia* and *Greece*, you shall, in your Absence, be chosen, a second Time, Consul; then you shall finish a most dreadful War, and utterly destroy *Numantia*. But when you return to ascend the Capitol in your triumphal Chariot you shall find the Government thrown into Confusion by the Practices of my (c) Grandson; and here, my *Africanus* you must display to your Country, all the Lustre of your Spirit, Genius and Wisdom.

But at this Period I perceive, that a Cloud hangs upon the Paths that Providence has destin'd you to tread. For after the Sun has performed his

(a) City] Meaning *Carthage* which was utterly overthrown and raz'd to the Ground by the younger *Africanus*.

(b) Soldier] The Original is *nunc venis pæne Miles*, because *Scipio* was then only a young Man and one of the military Tribunes, which Post was looked upon as only a Kind of a Cadetship which they went thro' before they could be Generals.

(c) Grandson] Meaning *Tiberius Gracchus*, or his Brother; their Mother was Daughter to the elder *Africanus*. I cannot help being of Opinion, that *Virgil* took from this Vision his first Hint of the Discourse which he introduces in the sixth Book of the *Æneid* between *Æneas* and his Father.

363 *The VISION of SCIPIO.*

winding and direct Revolution (*d*) seven Times eight Times, over your Head, both which are compleat Numbers in different Manners, and in their natural Rotation will bring you to the Crisis of your Fate, then will *Rome* turn her Eyes wholly upon thee and thy Glory; the whole Body of the Senate, all virtuous Patriots, all our Allies, and all the *Latins*, shall look up to you, and to you only. Upon your single Person the Preservation of your Country will depend; and, in short, you will, as Dictator, settle the Government, if you can but escape the wicked Attempts of your Kinsmen. (*e*)—Here, when *Lelins* gave a Shriek, and the Rest of the Company expressed themselves in deep Groans, says *Scipio*, with a gentle Smile, I beg, my Friends, that you will not waken me out of my Dream, have Patience and hear it out.

(*d*) *Seven Times eight Times*] The Critics and Commentators have been very profuse of their Learning, in explaining this Passage. But, since the Doctrine of Numbers, and the Motions of the heavenly Bodies have been so well understood, it is a Learning of a very useless Nature. The Sum of what they tell us is, that the Numbers 7 and 8 are compleat Numbers, and when multiplied into one another, produce 56, which one of the Climaterics of the human Life. The Reasons they give for all this are so many and so fanciful, that though they are strengthened with the greatest Names of Antiquity, it can be of very little Use for a modern Reader to know them. I shall, however, here set down the Original of the whole Passage. *Sed ejus temporis ancipitem video quasi fatorum viam. Nam cum ætas tua septenos ostes solis anfractus, reditusque converterit, duoque hi Numeri, quorum uterque plenus, alter altera de Causa, habetur, circuitu naturali summam tibi fatalem consecerint.*

(*e*) There scarce can be a Doubt that this Passage was in *Virgil's* Eye, when he makes *Archifex* break out in that beautiful Exclamation in the sixth Book of the *Æneid* concerning *Marcellus*.

*Heu miserande puer si qua fata aspera rumpas.
Tu Marcellus eris* —————

But

But, proceeded my great Ancestor, to encourage you in the Service and Defence of your Country, know from me that a(*f*) certain Place in Heaven is assigned to all who preserve, or assist their Country, or encrease her Glory, where they are to enjoy an Eternity of Happiness. For nothing is more acceptable to that God of Gods who governs the System of the World, and directs all human Occurrences, than those Councils and Assemblies of Men, that, being united by social Laws from thence are termed STATES; of these, the Governors and Preservers go from hence, and hither do they return.—Here, frightened as I was, not from the Dread of Death, but from my Apprehension of domestic Treachery, I asked him, Whether my Father *Paulus*, and the other great Men, whom we thought to be dead, were yet alive? To be sure, they are alive, reply'd *Africanus*, for they have escaped from the Fetters of Flesh and Blood, as they would have done from a Prison. As to what you enjoy, and call Life, it is not Life but Death. But behold your Father *Paulus* approaching.—No sooner did I see him, than I dissolved into Tears; but he, embracing and kissing me, forbade me to weep. When I recovered the Use of my Tongue, which had been stopt by my Con-

(*f*) *A certain Place.*] All this is a very noble System, and not extremely irreconcilable, in some Parts of it, to the Christian Religion. Its Absurdities, however, have evidently given Rise to the *Romish* Doctrine of Purgatory; for we perceive, that *Scipio* does not suppose, that every Soul returns to that Mansion of Bliss; neither does he say positively, that those Souls are mortal that do not, but that being pressed with Sins, they are obliged to perform a very, very long Purgation, before they can return to Heaven, from whence they came.

cern.

364 *The VISION of SCIPIO.*

cern. Why, said I, thou beatified Being, thou best of Fathers, why am I ty'd to the Earth, since here, as *Africanus* inform me, and here only, Life can be enjoyed? Why am I debarred from flying to you?

Not so, my Son, replied he, unless that God, whose Temple is all you behold, shall free you from the Fetters of the Body, you can have no Access hither. For the Condition of Man's Existence is, that he garrison that Globe which you see in the Middle of this Temple, and which is called the EARTH. His Soul issues from those eternal Fires which you call CONSTELLATIONS and STARS, and which being globular and round are animated with divine Spirit, and compleat their Cycles and Revolutions with amazing Rapidity. Therefore, you, my *Publius*, and all good Men, must preserve (g) your Souls within your Bodies; nor are you, without the Order of that Power, who bestowed them upon you, to depart out of this Life, lest you seem to desert from that Post, which has been assigned you by God. Therefore, *Scipio*, in Imitation of this your Grandfather here, and me who begot you, live in the Practice of Justice and Piety; let your Affection for your Parents and Kinsmen be great, but, for your Country let it be unbounded. Such is the Life that will introduce you into Heaven, and

(g) *Your Souls within your Bodies, &c.*] The Reader will perceive from this admirable Passage, that the greatest and the wisest of the Antients disclaimed the Practice of Self-murder. The Figure, which our Author here makes use of, is taken, as our Author tells us in p. 269. from *Pythagoras*, and if I mistake not, the same Sentiment and Allusion is to be met with in *Plato*.

into

into the Assembly of those who have left the Earth, and, being freed from their Bodies, inhabit the Glories of the Place thou beholdest.

Now, the Place my Father spoke of was a radiant Circle of dazzling Brightness, amidst the flaming Bodies, which you, in Conformity with the *Greeks*, term the MILKY-WAY. While, from this Station I surveyed every thing around me, the different Objects filled me with Delight and Amazement. The Stars I saw are not discernable from this Earth, and their Greatness surpassed all that human Imagination can conceive. The smallest of those Bodies was that, which was placed upon the Extremity of the Heavens, but nearest to the Earth, and shone with borrowed Light. As to the globular Bodies of the Stars, they greatly exceeded in Bulk, the Earth, which now to me appeared so small, that I observed, not without Concern, this our Empire contracted into a very Point.

While I was gazing upon this Appearance, says *Africanus*, What, will you never raise your Attention from that groveling Spot? Come, observe with me the Glories of this Temple. You must know, that all Things are connected by nine Circles, or rather Spheres; one of which, (which is the uttermost) is Heaven, and comprehending all the rest, is inhabited by that all-powerful God, who bounds and directs the System of universal Nature; and in this Sphere are fixt those Properties that give eternal Motion to the Stars in their several Courses. Within this, are contained seven other Spheres, that turn round in a Motion which counteracts that of the Heaven. Of these
that

366 *The VISION of SCIPIO.*

that Planet which on Earth you call *Saturn*, performs one Revolution. That shining Body which you see next, is called *Jupiter*, and is friendly and salutary to Mankind : You next behold the gleaming *Mars*, whose Influence is dreadful to Mortals. The *Sun* holds the next Place, almost under the middle Region ; he is the Chief, the Leader, and the Director of all the other Luminaries ; he is the Soul and guide of the World, and so immense in his Bulk, that he illuminates and fills all other Objects with his Light. He is followed by the Orbit of *Venus*, and that of *Mercury*, in the Nature of Attendants ; and the *Moon* rolls in the lower Sphere, enlightened by the Rays of the Sun. Below this, every Thing has a mortal, transitory, Existence, excepting the Souls of Men, which are given them by the Gods. Whatever lies above the *Moon* is eternal. For the *Earth*, which is the ninth Sphere, and is placed in the Center of the whole System, is immoveable, and below all the rest ; and all Bodies by their natural Direction tend thither.

Recovering from the Amazement with which all these Objects struck me ; From whence, said I, proceed these Sounds so strong (*b*), and yet so sweet, that ravish my Ears ? The Melody, replies he, which you hear, and which, though

(*b*) *Sounds so strong, &c.*] Nothing can appear more whimsical than this *Pythagorean* Doctrine of the Music of the Spheres, if we take it in a literal Sense ; but even Christian Divines and sound Philosophers have made use of it as an Allegory, to express the moral and natural Oeconomy of the World, which arises from so many Principles seemingly contradictory in themselves.

com^a

composed of unequal Stops, is nevertheless made up of those due Proportions that constitute Harmony, is effected by the Impulse and Motion of the Spheres themselves, which, by a happy Temper of sharp and grave Notes, produces that regular Variety of Sounds. Now, it is impossible that such prodigious Movements should pass in Silence; and we are instructed by Nature, that the Sounds which the Spheres at one Extremity utters, must be sharp, and those on the other Extremity must be grave. Therefore, that most capacious Revolution of the Star-stuck Sphere, being performed with a swifter Motion, occasions a short and quick Sound; whereas the *Moon* which is situated the lowest, and at the other Extremity, moves with a heavy Sound. As to the *Earth*, the ninth Sphere, it takes up the Center of the World; and being immoveable, it for ever occupies the lowest Station.

Now, these eight Directions, two of which, that of *Mercury* and that of *Venus*, have the same Powers, effect seven Sounds differing in their Modulations, which Number comes very near to the Principle which combines the whole. Some learned Men, by imitating this Harmony in a Concert of Voices and Instruments, have opened a Way for their Return to this Place; as all others have done, who, endued with generous Qualities, have cultivated, in their Mansions of Earth, the Arts of Heaven.

These Sounds are so strong that they have deafned the Hearing of Mankind, for, of all your Senses it is the most blunted. Thus, the People who live near the Cataracts of the *Nile*, where that
River

368 *The VISION of SCIPIO.*

River rusheth down from very high Mountains, are without the Sense of hearing, so excessive is that Noise. Now, this Sound; which is effected by the rapid Rotation of the whole System of Nature; is so powerful, that human Hearing cannot comprehend it; in like Manner as you cannot look directly upon the Sun, because his Rays are too intense for your Sight and Senses.

I continued still struck with Admiration; and yet I could not help sometimes throwing my Eyes upon the Earth. I perceive, said *Africanus* observing this, that even now you are contemplating the Seats and Mansions of the human Race. Observe therefore, how comparatively small they appear; fix your Regard upon things above, and despise those below. (Let me ask you, what Enjoyment can you find in being the Subject of popular Applause, or what is human Glory, that it ought to be desired? Look at the Earth, how few, how narrow are its peopled Spots, and what prodigious Desarts are interposed between those Specks that are inhabited! As to the Inhabitants themselves, their Situations are at such impassable Distances, that it is next to impossible for them to have Communication with one another. Part lie upon one Side, Part upon another, and Part are diametrically opposite to you, and if such is the Disposition of the earthly Inhabitants, it is unreasonable surely to expect true Glory from them.

You are now to observe, that the same Earth is encircled and encompassed by, as it were, four Belts, of which the two that are most distant from one another, and seem, as it were, to bind the two Extremities of the World, are covered,

as

as you see, with Frosts and Snows; while the Middle and the largest Belt is burnt up with the Heat of the Sun. Two of those Belts, or Zones; are habitable; and the Feet of the Inhabitants of the southern one are planted directly opposite to yours; nor have they any Communication with your Empire. As to this more northerly Zone, which ye *Romans* inhabit, observe what a small Portion of it falls to your Share: For all that Spot which is inhabited by you, (i) which narrows towards the South and North, but widens from East to West, is no other than a little Island lying in that Sea, which on Earth you call the *Atlantic*, sometimes the great Sea, and sometimes the Ocean, and yet, with such a sounding Name, how diminutive does it now appear to you! Now, let me ask you, whether you think it possible for your, or my, or any Man's, Renown, to move from those cultivated and inhabited Spots of Ground, and pass beyond that *Caucasus*, or swim across yonder *Ganges*? What Inhabitant of the more eastern or the more western Parts of the Earth, of those Tracts that run towards the South or towards the North, shall ever hear of your Name? Now, supposing them cut off, how narrow is the Scene over which your Glory is to spread? As to those who speak of you, how long will they speak?

Let me even suppose, that Posterity shall be

(i) Which narrows towards the South and North, &c.] This is a very curious Passage, and if our Author's Interpreters are to be believed, he was acquainted with the true Figure of the Earth, a Discovery which is generally thought to have been reserved for Sir *Isaac Newton*, and to have been confirmed by some late Experiments: But I own, I am not without some Doubts as to our Author's Meaning, whether he does not here speak, not of the whole Face of the Earth, but, of that Part of it which was possessed or conquer'd by the *Romans*.

grateful enough to transmit your Renown or mine, as they received it from their Fathers, yet when we consider the Convulsions and Conflagrations that must necessarily happen in the Course of Things, we must be sensible that all the Glory we can attain to, far from being eternal, cannot be lasting. Now of what Consequence is it to you to be talked of by those who are born after you, and not by those who were born before you, who certainly were as numerous, and more virtuous; especially, as, amongst the very Men, who are thus to celebrate our Renown, not a single one is to be found who can recollect the Transactions of the last Year. For it is a mistaken Notion in Mankind to measure their Year by the Revolution of the Sun, which is no more than a single Planet. But when all the Planets shall return to the same Position which they once had, and bring back, after a long Rotation, the same Face of the Heavens, then the Year may be said to be truly compleated, a Year which will contain, I dare not venture to say, how many. For, as formerly, when the Spirit of *Romulus* entered these Temples, the Sun disappeared to Mortals, thus, whenever the Sun at the same Time, and with the same Symptoms of the Completion of the same Revolution, shall again disappear, then you are to reckon the Year to be compleat. But I must acquaint you, that the twentieth Part of that Year is not yet elapsed.

If, therefore, you hope to return to this place, which is the ultimate Object of the Wishes of all great and good Men, how despicable then must you look upon that Portion of popular Glory, that endures for a little, and but a very little, Part of
that

that Year? If your Thoughts, if your Desires, are raised to this sublime Object, to this Mansion of Happiness, to this Eternity of Bliss, you neither will devote yourself to the Pursuit of popular Applause, nor will you rest the Hopes of your future Condition upon human Considerations. Genuine Virtue has Charms enough to allure you to true Glory; let others talk of you, for talk they will, as they think proper. But all such Talk is confined to the narrow Limits of those Countries that you have now under your Eye. No man ever engrossed it long; when Man dieth, it wasteth away; and when Posterity remembreth it not, it perisheth.

Perceiving that *Africanus* had done speaking; Since, O *Africanus*, replied I, the Services we do to our Country open to us, as it were, the Gates of Heaven, though from my Childhood I have ever trod in your and my Father's Footsteps without disgracing your Glory, yet the noble Prize, that is now set before me, shall doubly animate me in my Duty.

Yes! replied my Grandfather, you ought to redouble your Efforts, and not to consider yourself, but your Body, to be mortal. For your true Existence consists not of that Flesh and Blood we see; the real Existence of Man lies in his Soul, and not in his tangible Body. Know, therefore, (k)

B b 2

that

(k) *Know therefore*) This Passage confirms what I have said in Note page 273. in Defence of our Author. It was the common Opinion of all the antient Philosophers, who followed the System of *Pythagoras*, that the Souls of Men, and even of Beasts, were Portions of Divinity. What Opinion our Author had of the Properties and Immortality of the Soul, is difficult to determine. For we are not to imagine, that in the Passage before us, and in many others, in which he mentions the Subject, he gives his own Sentiments,

that you are a God. Since it is Divinity that has Consciousness, Sensation, Memory and Foresight, it is Divinity that governs, regulates and moves that Body of yours, and that Divinity is directed by the ruling God of this System; and in like Manner, as an eternal God guides this World, which in some respect is perishable, so an eternal Spirit animates your frail Body.

For that, which is ever moving, (1) is without Beginning or End; now that which communicates, to another Object, a Motion which it received elsewhere, must necessarily cease to live, as soon as its Motion is at an End. Thus, the Being which communicates the Motion, is the only Being that is eternal, because it never is abandoned by its own Properties, neither is this self-Motion ever at an End; nay, this is the Fountain, this is the beginning, of Motion to all Subjects that are capable of Motion. Now there can be no Fountain of a Fountain, there can be no Beginning of a Beginning, for all Things proceed from a Beginning; therefore a Beginning can rise from no other Cause, for if it proceeded from another Cause, it would not be a Beginning; where, therefore, there is no Beginning, there can be no ending; for, supposing the Beginning to be extinct, it is impossible for any other Being to create it anew, or for it to produce any Thing else, because it is necessary that all Things should have

but those of others; accordingly, in his first book *De natura Deorum*, he makes *Velleius*, one of his Prolocutors, absolutely destroy the Doctrine which is advanced here.

(1) *For that which is ever moving*) All this Doctrine is taken almost Word for Word from the *Phædrus* of *Plato*, and *Macrobius* has reduced it to the following Syllogism. The Soul is Self-motive; now, Self motion contains the Principle of Motion, the Principle of Motion is not created, therefore the Soul is not created.

a Beginning. The Principle of Motion, therefore, can only exist in a self-motive Being, and it is impossible that such a Being should be born, or that it should die, otherwise all Heaven must go to wreck, and the whole System of Nature must stop, and being deprived of that Motion which it received from its first Impulse, all its Properties must cease.

Since therefore, it is plain, that whatever is Self-motive must be eternal, who can deny the Souls of Men to be impressed with this Property? For every Thing that is moved by a foreign Impulse is inanimated, but the Soul of Man has an inward and peculiar Principle of Motion, and in that consists its Nature and Property. Now if it is the only Being that is Self-motive, it must follow that it is uncreated and eternal. Do, thou, therefore, employ it in the noblest of Exercises, in the Service of thy Country. The Soul that is warmed with this, will fly the more quickly to this Mansion, which is its own home, and its Flight will be the more expeditious, if, while it is imprisoned within the Body, it sallies abroad, and detaches itself from its Enclosure, in Contemplation of those Objects that are without it; for the Souls of those Men who are devoted to, and enslaved by, the Pleasures of the Body, and who becoming the Servants of their prevailing Lusts and Self-Gratifications, violate all Laws of God and Man; such Souls, when they escape out of their Bodies, hover round the Earth, nor are they readmitted to this Place, till after a Consummation of many Ages. *Africanus* then departed, and I awaked.



M. T. C I C E R O

To his BROTHER

Q U I N T U S,

U P O N T H E

DUTIES of a MAGISTRATE.



HO' I am convinced that, before this Letter can reach you, you have receiv'd Intelligence both by Couriers, and by common Report, as well as by other Conveyances, that a third Year is now added to my longing and to your Labours, yet I think it proper for me, likewise, to inform you of this Piece of bad News. For while every one else despair'd of the Success, I still, by repeated Letters, gave you Hopes that you would speedily have a Dismission from your Government. This I did, not only, that I might amuse you, as long as possible, with that pleasing Expectation, but, because I presum'd that the strong Interest made both by me and the

Prætors; for that Purpose, could not fail of Success. Now, as it has so happened, that their Interest and my Zeal have both proved ineffectual, the Blow, it is true, is severe, but we ought never to suffer our Minds, which are employ'd in managing and supporting the arduous Affairs of Government, to be crush'd or dejected by Misfortune. And because those Misfortunes, which Men incur through their own Faults, ought most to afflict, there is, in this Transaction, somewhat more afflicting to me, than ought to be to you, for it happen'd by my Misconduct, contrary to your repeated Instances while you was parting, and by Letters since you have been gone, that your Successor was not named last Year. It is true, that I did this with a View of consulting the Welfare of our Allies, of crushing the Presumptuousness of certain (a) Traders, and of increasing my own Glory through your Virtues; yet still I acted imprudently, especially as the Consequence was, as has happen'd, of a third Year being added to that second.

Having thus frankly acknowledged my Misconduct, let your prudent Cares and generous Deportment, provide in your Application, a Remedy for my Mistake; and surely, if you exert yourself in all the Duties of Government so as to seem to vie not only with others but with yourself, if you call forth all your Spirit, all your Attention,

(a) Traders] Several Complaints had been carried to Rome against *Quintus*, and *Cicero* thought that his Brother remaining another Year in his Government might have stifled them. The Reader is to observe that this Government, was the Province of *Asia minor*, one of the best the Romans had, and that a great many Merchants resided there for the Benefit of Commerce.

all your Thought, and all that Love of Glory, which is so powerfully prevalent in all Transactions, believe me, that one Year added to your Toil will bring many Years of Pleasure, and transmit our Renown to our Posterity. The first Thing, therefore, I have to recommend to you is, that you will not suffer your Spirit to be damp or diminished, nor yourself to be over-whelmed, as with a Flood, in a Multitude of Business ; but that, on the contrary, you will arouse yourself, that you will encounter it bravely, nay provoke its Approaches ; for that Share of Government which has fallen to your Lot is not directed by Fortune, but may be happily conducted by a Man of Sense and Application. Had the Prolongation of your Command happened at a Time when you was involved in the Management of some great and dangerous War, then, my very Soul should have trembled within me, because I must have been sensible that the Power of Fortune over us was prolonged at the same Time. But, situated as your Province is at present, Fortune seems to have little or nothing to do with it, and your Success must be entirely directed by your own Virtue and Wisdom. If I mistake not, we are afraid of nothing from the Treachery of Enemies ; nothing from any Revolt of our Allies ; nothing from Want of Money or Scarcity of Provisions, and nothing from the Discontent of our Army : Yet these often happen to the wisest of Men, who are forced to yield to the Assaults of Fortune, as the best of Pilots sometimes are to the Violence of a Tempest.

Your Government is now in profound Peace and perfect Tranquillity ; but though those are Circumstances

stances that ought to give Pleasure to a vigilant Steersman, yet they may be fatal to a sleeping one. For your Province is composed, first, of that Kind of Allies, who of all the human Race are the most humanized; and in the next Place, of those *Roman* Citizens, who, either as Farmers of the public Revenues, are intimately connected with me, or as Merchants who have got rich by Trade, attribute all their Wealth, and all their Enjoyments, to the Happiness of my Consulship, "Yes! But they are miserably divided amongst themselves; they are perpetually harassing one another, and this gives Rise to Envy and Animosities." I am no Stranger to that: I am sensible that you have some Business upon your Hands, nay Business that requires great Wisdom, and great Address to manage. But still you are to remember, and I maintain it, that this is to be managed by Address more than by Fortune. If you restrain yourself, how easy is it to restrain those you govern. Self-Restraint is performed with great Pain, with great Uneasiness, by the Generality of Mankind; and it must be owned to be a Matter of great Difficulty; but the Practice of it was ever easy to you; and well it might be, because uninstructed Nature has formed your Mind to Moderation; while, at the same same Time, the Acquisitions you have from Learning are such, as are sufficient to correct the most vicious Extravagances of Nature. You check the Temptations of Money, of Pleasure, and of Ambition in every Shape: can I then be brought to believe, that you can have any Difficulty in checking an impudent Trader, or a fleecing Farmer of the public Revenue? As to the *Greeks*, when they

behold

your Life and Conversation, I know they look upon you as one of their antient Patriots revived; nay, as a Man that has been sent them from Heaven as a Blessing to their Country.

I write to you in this Strain, not to intimate that you ought to practise such Virtues, but to give you Joy of your having always practised them, and of your continuing so to do. What, a glorious Character is it for a Man to be invested with three Years sovereign Power in *Asia*, and yet preserve his Integrity and Moderation, inflexible against every Temptation of Statues, of Pictures, of Plate, of Furniture, of Slaves, of Beauty, and of Money, Commodities in which this Province abounds! Again, what can be a more distinguished, a more desirable Circumstance, than that this Virtue, this Moderation, this Purity of Mind, should not be buried, or concealed in Darkness, but displayed in the Sight of *Asia*, to the Eyes of the noblest of our Provinces, while its Fame reaches to the Ears of all People and Nations. How glorious is it for you, that those you govern are not alarmed at your Journeys! That they are not fleeced by your Expences! That they are not frightened by your Approach! That Transports of Joy, both public and private, attend wherever you go! That every Town receives you as its Guardian, not as its Tyrant! Every House as a Guest, and not as a Robber!

But, while I am upon this Subject, Experience, by this Time, must have instructed you, that it is not sufficient for you alone to practise these Virtues, but you are to give careful Attention, that invested as you are with this Government, not only you, but all Officers subordinate to you Authority,

are to act for the Good of our Allies, of our Fellow Citizens, and of our Country. You have, it is true, Deputies and Lieutenants under you, who will do Honour to the Offices they bear: And of these the Chief in Preferment, in Dignity, and in Experience, is *Tubero*, who I make no Doubt, especially while he is writing his History, will be able to chuse from his own Annals such Models of Conduct, as he both can and will imitate. As to *Allienus*, he is firmly attached to us in Affection and Inclination, and he forms his Manners by ours. Need I to mention *Gratidius*, who I know for a Certainty to love us both as we were his Brothers, and to make his Regard for our Character and Reputation as dear to him as his own. It was Chance, and not Choice, that gave you your (b) *Quæstor*, and I make no Doubt of his voluntary Moderation, and of his conforming himself to your Orders and Directions.

Should any of your Officers appear of a more selfish Disposition, my Counsel is, that you bear with him, while the Consequences of his Offences reach no farther than his own Person, but to check him, when he prostitutes for Interest that Power which you have annexed to his Office. In the mean while, as we live in an Age at once so indulgent and so aspiring, I would not have you to scrutinize too narrowly into every Piece of Mismanagement, or to probe every Offence to the quick, but to proportion the Trust you repose in every one according to the Degree of Honesty he

(b) *Quæstor*] This Officer had the Charge of the publick Money, and it was determined by Lot in what Province he should serve. He likewise paid the Soldiers, and acted as Contractor for the Army.

possesses. In like Manner, you are to treat those whom our Government has given you as Assessors and Assistants, provided you become answerable for their Conduct only under the Restrictions I have already laid down.

As to your menial Servants, or the Officers attending your Person, as the Guards do the Prætor, you are answerable not only for all their Actions, but for all their Sayings. I know, however, that you have about your Person a Choice of worthy Men, and should others act any Way inconsistent with your Character, they can easily be checked. Mean while, it is natural to suppose, that while you was unpractised in the Affairs of Government, they might have abused your Generosity; for the more virtuous any Man is in himself, he is the less apt to suspect Villany in another.

As you are now entered into the third Year of your Government, practise the same Integrity, but with still greater Circumspection and Exactitude, that you practised the two former Years. Let all the World see that your Ears are open to manly and honest Advice, without being the Receptacles of false and malicious Whispers, Insinuations and Complaints. Suffer not your Seal (c) to be used as a common Bit of Furniture, but consider

(c) *Suffer not your Seal*] Orig. *Sit annulus tuus not ut vas aliquod, sed tamquam ipse tu: Non minister alienæ voluntatis, sed testis tuæ.* It may be proper to tell some of our Readers, that the Romans generally wore their Seals in the Stones of their Rings. *Verburgius* has a very ingenious Note upon this Passage, for instead of *vas aliquod*, which all Editions but his own have, he reads *vas aliquis*, and then the Sense will be — *Use not your Ring as a Surety for an Appearance.* But this Reading being supported only by Conjecture, and the other making as good, if not better, Sense, I have retained the usual Reading.

it as your very self; let it not be the Tool of another's Pleasure, but the Evidence of your own. Let you Pursuivant keep the Rank assigned to him by our Ancestors, who looked upon that Office, not as a Post of Pleasure, but of Labour and Service, and were cautious of entrusting it to any but freed Men, over whom they exercised pretty much the same Command, as they did over their Slaves. Let the Lictor in punishing express *your* Lenity rather than *his own*, and let him wear his Ax and his Rods as the Evidences rather of his *Post* than of his *Power*.

In short, let all the Province be sensible, how dearly you prize the Welfare, the Children, the Fame and the Fortunes of all who are under your Command. Let the Public be convinced, that in all Cases which shall come to your Knowledge, you are equally the Enemy of the Man who gives, as of him who receives, a Present: For no such Presents will be made, when once the People are convinced, that they, who pretend to have the greatest Interest with you, have really not at all.

Now, you are not to imagine, that by Writing to you in the Manner I do, I would have you treat your Dependants in a severe or suspicious Manner: For if any of them have kept themselves clear for two Years of all Suspicion of Avarice, as I hear *Cæsius*, *Cherippus* and *Labeo*, have done, and I believe it because I know them well; I say, where that happens to be the Case, I see no Reason, why you may not very properly commit to them, and Men of their Character, any Trust or Charge whatsoever. But if there is a Man, whom you have already Cause to suspect, or whom you have already caught tripping, never
entrust

entrust him with any Part either of your Power or your Confidence. But, if within your Province you have got any Person whom you are intimately familiar with, and who is unknown to me, you are to examine how far you ought to trust him. Not but that I believe there are many worthy Men amongst the Provincials; at least I hope so, for it is dangerous to prove them. For every Man is dressed out in false Colours. His Nature, his Brows, his Eyes, and very often his Countenance belye him, but his Speech is a perpetual Lye.

Amongst the *Romans* settled in your Province, a Set of Men devoted to the Love of Money, and without any one inherent Principle of Virtue, where can you find one who will sincerely love you, a meer Stranger to them, and who will not treat you, from interested Views, with meer outside Professions? If you did, to me it would seem very extraordinary, especially as those very Men pay seldom any Regard to any private Man, while they are always pretending the greatest for the *Prætors*. However, if amongst such Kind of Men you should find one (for the Thing is not impossible) who shall give you convincing Proofs that he loves you more, than he does his own Interest, I advise you, by all Manner of Means, to treasure up such a Man in your Heart; but if no such Man is to be found, you are then to guard with particular Caution against the whole Set; because they know all the Arts of getting Money, they do nothing but for Money, and they are indifferent about any Man, who they know is soon to leave them.

With Regard to the Natives of your Province, who are *Greeks*, you are to be very cautious how

far you carry your Connections with them, unless you find amongst them, here and there, a Man worthy of antient *Greece* : For take my Word for it, in general, they are deceitful and treacherous, and trained up, by perpetual Subjection, in the Arts of Sycophantry. Meanwhile, I would be civil to them, nay the most eminent of them I would entertain and treat with Friendship. But avoid all Intimacies with them, for though they dare not fly in the Face of a *Roman* Magistrate, yet, at the Bottom, they hate, not only us, but their own Countrymen.

I am afraid that in the Matters I have already touch'd upon, you may think me too severe, while all my Meaning is to be guarded and circumspect. Now, what do you think of my Sentiment with Regard to Slaves; a Set of Men who ought to be under the strictest Command in all Places, but especially in the Provinces? Upon this Head, I could say a great Deal; but the shortest and the plainest Method, I can recommend is, for your Slaves, in all your *Asiatic* Journeys, to behave so, as if you were travelling over the *Appian* Way; and that they think, there is not the least Difference whether they enter (*d*) *Tralle* or (*e*) *Formia*. But if any of your Slaves should distinguish'd himself by his Fidelity, let him be employed in your domestic and private Affairs, but not let him have the smallest Thing to do with any public Concern, or any Thing relating to the Business of your Government. For though we may very properly entrust the Management of many Affairs to our faithful Slaves, yet we are not

(*d*) A City in the Extremity of *Asia*.

(*e*) A City in the Heart of *Italy*.

to do it, because of the Censure and Reflections which it might Occasion.

But, I know not how, I have deviated from the Purpose I set out with, and have slid into a dictating Strain, and that too, to a Man whose Knowledge in all Matters of this Kind is not less than mine, and his Experience greater: But I thought it would give you a Pleasure, if your Conduct should have the Sanction of my Authority. Now, your public Character ought to rest upon the following Particulars. In the first Place, your own Integrity and Moderation; in the next Place, the modest Behaviour of all who are about you, joined to a very cautious and circumspect Choice of your Acquaintance, whether they be Provincials or *Greeks*, and add to this a decent, constant Regularity in your domestic Œconomy. All those Particulars are commendable in our private Concerns, and daily Practice, but they must appear divine in a Man clothed, as you are, with great Power, and at the Head of a Province filled with Corruption and Degeneracy of Manners.

Such is the Plan, such are the Regulations, that, in all your Resolutions, and all your Decrees, will be sufficient to support that Severity, which you exercised in those Matters, that, to my great Pleasure, brought both of us into Enmity with certain Persons, for sure you cannot imagine that the Complaints of the Fellow, one *Paconius*, who has not the Merit of being ever a *Greek*, but is some *Myssian*, nay some *Phrygian* Rascal, made any Impression upon me; or that I was moved by the Vociferations of *Tuscenius*, that frantic mean spirited Wretch, from whose polluted Maw you so equitably rescued a dishonest Prey. I repeat it again, that

that it will be no easy Matter for us to act up to those and the other Instances of Severity, which you have practised in your Government, without a constant Perseverance in the most untainted Integrity.

You ought, therefore, to be inflexible in your judicial Capacity, provided it never is warped by Favour, but remains steady and even. It is, however, of no great Consequence, that you, in your Person, are impartial and circumspect in your Decisions, unless you are imitated by those to whom you have delegated some Part of your Power as a Magistrate. Now, in my Opinion, at least, the Government of *Asia* affords no great Variety of Business, and the whole of it is chiefly employed in the Exercise of judicial Powers, the Discharge of which, especially in Provinces, is attended with no great Difficulty. They must indeed be exercised with Resolution, and with a Severity that is above all Partiality, nay above all Suspicion of it. To this must be added Affability in hearing, (f) Deliberation in examining, and Accuracy (g) in explaining and enforcing your Opinion.

C c

By

(f) *Deliberation in examining*] Orig. *Lenitas in discernendo*. The whole of this is a very fine Passage, but the Expression before us may very easily be misunderstood. *Discernere* with *Cicero*, as a Term of Law, never signifies to decree or pass Sentence, but to examine and to weigh the Circumstances upon which it is to be grounded. Neither does *Lenitas* properly signify what we call *Gentleness* or *Lenity*, but that calm dispassionate Manner in which such an Examination or Enquiry ought to be conducted.

(g) *Accuracy*] Orig. *In satisfaciendo ac disputando Diligentia*. I am not quite sure, if I have translated this difficult Passage rightly. I have the Authority of *Hotoman*, an excellent Latinist as well as Civilian, on my Side, for the Sense in which

I have

By a Conduct like this, (*b*) *Octavius* lately rendered himself universally agreeable. His was the first (*i*) Tribunal, before which the Lictor had nothing to do, and the Crier had nothing to say; for every one spoke when he pleased, and as long as he pleased. This perhaps was carrying his Gentleness too far; but we are to remember, that this Gentleness was the (*k*) Warrant of that Inflexibility, which was one Part of his Character, for he obliged *Sylla's* Party in his Province to restore what they had violently and forcibly seized. Such of the Magistrates, as had been guilty of Injustice, were reduced to private Stations and made to suffer the Penalties they had inflicted. Now this Severity would have looked like Cruelty, had it not been tempered with great Seasonings of Humanity.

If this Gentleness is agreeable at *Rome*, where reigns so much Arrogance, such unbounded Liberty, such unrestrained Licentiousness, such nu-

I have translated *satisfaciendo* and *disputando*: and that great Man gives us Instances both from our Author and from *Livy* of Judges who deigned to argue with the Parties in a Suit before them, that they might give them Satisfaction as to the Rectitude of their Decrees. But I suspect the Meaning of the Word *Diligentia* has not been attended to, for with our Author it not only signifies *Diligence*, *Application*, and *Accuracy*, but an *Observation of Propriety*, which gives this Passage a beautiful Turn; for, in that Sense, *Cicero* advises his Brother to be very careful not to prostitute the Dignity of his Character, as a Judge, by entering, upon all Occasions, into Altercations and Explanations with the Parties before him, and never to do it, but with the utmost Regard to the Propriety of such a Condescension.

(*b*) *Octavius*] He was Father to *Augustus Caesar*, and had been about this Time Governor of *Macedonia*.

(*i*) *First Tribunal*] The common Reading of the Original here is *apud quem primus licitor quievit*, &c. but I think the Reading recommended by *Malespina*, of *primum* instead of *primus* is more elegant.

(*k*) *Warrant*] Orig. *Nisi hæc lenitas illum severitatem tueretur*.

merous Magistracies, where Auxiliaries are so numerous, where power is so irresistible, and where the Senate is so absolute, how agreeable must the Affability of a Prætor be in *Asia*, where such Numbers of our Countrymen and Allies, where so many Cities, and so many States, are observant of one Man's Nod? Where they have no Resource, no Tribunal, no Senate, and no Assembly of the People to apply to? It belongs, therefore, to the Character of a great Man, of a Man humane by Nature, and that Nature improved by Learning, and the Study of the noblest Arts, so to employ his great Power, as to take from those he governs all Desire to live under any other Government.

The great *Cyrus* is represented by the Philosopher *Xenophon* (not according to the Truth of History, but that in his Conduct we may have the Idea of right Government) as, joining the greatest Firmness to the sweetest Manners: It is no Wonder indeed that our Countrymen *Scipio Africanus* was continually reading his Works, for in them he omits no Duty of active well tempered Government; and if *Cyrus*, who could never be reduced to a private Station, was so diligent in the Discharge of those Duties, what ought a Man to be, who must give back the Power which he receives, and who must return to be judged by those Laws from whence his Authority was derived?

Now, in my Opinion, the ultimate End of Government is to render its Subjects as happy as possible; and constant Report, and the Acknowledgment of all you have had to do with, have done you that public Justice, as to say that this

is your favourite View, and has been so, ever since you first landed in *Asia*. Let me go farther, and observe that it is the Duty not only of those who govern the Allies and the Subjects of *Rome*, but of those who have the Care of Slaves and Cattle, to contribute to the Happiness of all committed to their Charge. In this Respect, I perceive it is universally allowed that your Conduct has been irreproachable; that the States of your Government have been loaded with no new Debts; that you have discharged many old ones, with which many of the Cities were burthened and oppressed; that you have repaired many ruinous and almost abandoned Towns, amongst others *Samus* the Capital of *Ionia*, and *Halicarnassus* the Capital of *Caria*; that your Towns of Strength are free from all the Spirit of Mutiny and Discontent; that, by your Cares, the several Districts of your Government are governed by Men of Worth; that you have suppressed Rapine in *Mysia*, and Bloodshed in many Places; that you have established Peace all over your Government; that you have chased Thieves and Robbers, not only from the High-ways and Country Places, but from Towns and Temples, where they were more numerous and more dangerous; that Calumny, the merciless Tool to the Avarice of Prætors, no longer attacks the Reputation, the Fortunes and the Retirement of the rich; that Taxations are equally raised upon the Inhabitants of the several States who pay them; that in your Person you are extremely easy of Access; that your Ears are shut to no Man's Complaint; that the poor and the helpless always find Admittance, not only to your public Audiences and Tribunals, but even

even to your House and your Bed-chamber ; and that, in short, in the whole of your Government nothing appears that is spiteful, nothing that is merciless, but that it is filled with Clemency, Gentleness and Humanity.

How important was the public Service you performed, when you freed *Asia*, from the unjust burthen some Tax imposed upon them by the *Ædiles*, (1) though you thereby have raised us powerful Enemies ; for if one Man of Quality publicly complaints that you have deprived him of almost 100,000 £. by prohibiting him from collecting the Tax for public Exhibitions, what vast Sums must have been raised, had the Custom continued for raising Money for the Use of every *Ædile* who exhibited public Shews at *Rome*. I fell, however, upon a Method to stifle the Complaints of this Kind, with Regard to my Province, and it is a Method, that however it may be relished in *Asia*, is highly applauded at *Rome*. For when the States of my Government had voted a Sum of Money for Building a Temple, and for erecting a Monument to me, and when on Account of my great Deserts and your extraordinary Services, they did it voluntarily and chearfully, and though the Law has expressly provided THAT GOVERNORS MAY RECEIVE MONEY FOR ERECTING A TEMPLE OR A MONUMENT, nay, tho' the Money of this Grant was not to be appropriated to any parish-

(1) *Ædiles*] The whole of this Paragraph is to be understood, as I have translated it, though some have so egregiously mistaken it, as to imagine that those *Ædiles* imposed those Taxes upon the Diversions that were exhibited in the Provinces ; when the Truth is, that the Provinces were taxed for the Diversions that were exhibited at *Rome*, the Expence of which ought to have been defrayed by the Magistrates who exhibited them.

able Purpose, but to be laid out upon the Ornaments of a Temple, that was to appear to future Times, not more a Compliment to me than a present to the People of *Rome*, and to the immortal Gods; and yet I thought proper to reject the Offer, though warranted by Dignity, by Law, and by the Affections of those who made it; and this I did for this Reason, amongst others, to take all Cause of Complaint from those Magistrates who levy Money against Justice, and against Law.

Apply yourself, therefore, with all your Spirit and all your Zeal, to that Plan which you have already practised, that of loving the People which your Country has committed to your Care and Protection; and pursue every Measure that can prove you to intend their Prosperity and Happiness as the End of your Government.

But if Fortune had set you over the *Africans*, the *Spaniards*, or the *Gauls*, those fierce barbarous Nations, yet still your Humanity would have induced you to have studied their Interests, and to have promoted their Advantage and Welfare. But when we govern a Set of Men, that are not only of themselves humanised, but have been the Means of humanising others, it surely is our Duty to repay them what we have received from them. For as I am in that way of Life, and in those Circumstances that never can fall under any Suspicion of Indolence or Unsteadiness, I am not at all ashamed to acknowledge, that all the Improvement I have made in Learning, and in the Arts, is owing to what I have studied of the Writings, and Compositions of the *Greeks*. Therefore, besides the common Faith which we owe to all Mankind, there seems to be a Tye upon us to have a particular Regard for this Race, and to
 repay

repay to those, who were our Masters in the Arts of Life, the Virtues which they taught us. *Plato*, that Philosopher so distinguished by his Genius and Learning, thought that Governments would be happy, if they either fell into the Hands of wise and learned Men, or if the Governors would apply themselves wholly to the Study of Learning and Wisdom : Meaning, that this Union of Power and Wisdom must be salutary to that State in which it happened. This may possibly, some time or other, be the Case of our whole Empire ; but at present it is the Case of one Province, that he who governs it, has been engaged from his Childhood, in a constant Pursuit of Learning, of Virtue, and Humanity.

Take care, therefore, my *Quintus*, that this Year which is added to your Government prove to be a Year that is added to the Welfare of *Asia* ; and because *Asia* has been more successful in detaining you, than I was in procuring your Recall, do you behave so as that my Languor may receive some Mitigation from the Joy of the Province : For if you have so indefatigably applied yourself to deserve greater Honours than perhaps ever Man did, your Application ought to be redoubled in your Endeavours to maintain them. I have already given you my Sentiments concerning that kind of Honours. I have always been of Opinion, that if they are prostituted, they are mean ; if bestowed to serve a Purpose they are contemptible : but if, as is your Case, they are the Rewards of Merit, I think you cannot bestow too much Pains upon their Preservation.

As, therefore, you are invested with the highest Command and Power in those Cities, where

you see your Virtues are consecrated and deified, you are, in all your Transactions, in all your Resolutions, in all your Business, and all your Behaviour, never to lose Remembrance of what you owe to the Opinions and Judgments of Men, who are prepossessed so strongly in your Favour. The Result of this will be, that you will provide for all, that you will remedy their Inconveniences, and be so careful of their Welfare, that you will both be called and esteemed the common Parent of *Asia*.

I make no doubt, but the Farmers of the Revenue will throw a great Bar upon your Zeal and Assiduity. If I should oppose them, I must separate from myself, and from the Public, an Order of Men to whom I am under the strongest Obligations, and who, by me, were attached to the Service of our Government. If, on the other Hand, we should indulge them in every Respect, we must wink at the utter Destruction of those Men, whose Welfare, nay, whose Convenience, we are bound to consult. To say the Truth, this is the Difficulty in all your Administration. For Integrity, Self-denial as to all inordinate Affections, the regular Oeconomy of your Family, the impartial Distribution of Justice, your Readiness in hearing Causes, and your Easiness of Access to all who address you in Person, are Virtues more glorious than difficult in the Practice: for they consist not in tiresome Application, but in the Turn of the Mind and the Affections.

Now that I am speaking of the Farmers of the Revenue, we had a Proof, how very oppressive they were to our Allies, in those Cities, who, when the Tolls of *Italy* were lately abolished, complain-

ed not so much of the Heaviness of the Tolls as of the Insolence of the Toll-gatherers. This makes me sensible of the Hardships, which our Allies, in remote Countries, must suffer, when I hear such Complaints from our Fellow-citizens in *Italy*. It will, therefore, require a divine, that is, your Virtue, in this Situation of Things, to keep upon your Side, the Farmers of the publick Revenue, especially such of them as have taken their Farms at an excessive Rent, and at the same time not to suffer our Allies to be ruined.

But, in the first Place, as to the *Greeks*, the Hardship which they most bitterly complain of, that of their being taxed, is, in my Opinion, no great Hardship, because by their own Constitutions, before they became Subjects of the *Roman* Empire, they always taxed themselves. As to the Name of a Farmer of the Revenue, the *Greeks* ought not to hold it in such Contempt, because without their Assistance, they could not have paid the Capitation-Tax imposed upon them by *Sylla*. Now the *Caunians* some time ago, who inhabit the Islands that were annexed by *Sylla* to the Division of *Rhodes*, petitioned the Senate that they might pay their Taxes to our Farmers, rather than to the *Rhodians*, which, to me, is a plain Proof, that the *Greeks* are fully as severe, as our Farmers are, in the Collection of the public Revenue. They therefore, who always have been taxed, ought not to hold the Name of a Tax-gatherer with Horror ; nor ought they to despise him, without whom they cannot pay their Taxes ; nor ought they who have petitioned for him, to reject him. The *Asiatics* ought, at the same time, to reflect, that were they not under our Government, they must

perpetually be suffering every Calamity of foreign War and domestic Dissention. Now Government cannot be supported without Taxes, and, therefore, they ought cheerfully to pay to the Public some Part of their Incomes, in Consideration of the uninterrupted Peace and Tranquillity they enjoy. When once they come to endure with Patience the Profession and Name of a Farmer of the Revenue, your prudent Measures and Conduct will reconcile them the better to other Considerations. They will come not to reflect so much upon the Rigor of the Censors in letting out the Farms of the public Revenue, but rather upon the Advantages they enjoy in following their Business, and their being freed from all kind of Molestations. You can likewise continue, what you have always so nobly and so successfully endeavoured, to put them in mind how much Dignity there is in the Office of a Farmer of the Revenue, and how much we owe to that Order. By those Means, without calling in the Assistance of Power, and without the Terrors of the Fasces, you will bring the Publicans into Favour and Credit with the *Greeks*. You may even go so far, as to entreat those whom you have so highly obliged, and who owe their All to you, that, by their Compliance, they will suffer us to cherish and continue those intimate Connections that subsist between us and the Farmers of the Revenue.

But why do I exhort you to those Measures, which you are so well disposed to pursue, though I did not recommend them, and which, in a great Degree, you already have happily executed: For the most honourable and considerable Bodies of our Empire are daily paying their Compliments to

me, which are the more agreeable, because the *Greeks* do same. Now, it is a Matter of great Difficulty to reconcile to one another the Affections of Men, whose Interests, whose Advantages, and whose Natures, I had almost said, are repugnant: But what I have here written, I have written not for your Instruction (for Wisdom, such as yours stands in need of no Instructor) but I am charmed with the Exercise of Writing, when your Virtue is the Subject. This Letter, however, has run to a greater Length, than I designed it should.

There is one Thing which I must incessantly recommend to you, for, if I can help it, your Glory shall be without the smallest Speck of Blemish. All the *Asiatics* who come to *Rome*, while they praise your Virtue, your Integrity, and your Humanity, even in their greatest Raptures, they still blame you for being so choleric as you are. This is a Vice, which in private and common Life indicates a Slightness and Weakness of Temper, but when a passionate Behaviour is joined to sovereign Power, nothing can be more unamiable or monstrous. I shall not, however, endeavour to give you the Sentiments of learned Men, concerning the Passion of Anger, both because I want to finish this Letter, and because you can easily learn them from their Writings which are very numerous. It is, notwithstanding, the Duty of a Correspondent, and therefore I think it my indispensable Duty to inform the Person to whom he writes of whatever he is ignorant of. Now, I am told, almost by every Body, that when you are free from Choler, you are the most amiable Man in the World; but when you are work'd up into a Passion by the Impudence or Perverseness of another, you are under such violent Agitations, that

no Man can think you had ever been possessed of Humanity.

As therefore Ambition, Interest, and Fortune, have concurred to lead us into that Walk of Life, by which we become the perpetual Subject of Conversation amongst Mankind, we ought to do, and to strive, all we can, that Mankind may not have it to say, that we are guilty of any signal Failing. It is true, such is the Nature of Mankind, especially those of our Years, that it is very difficult for a Man to alter his Disposition, or suddenly to pluck out a Failing that has settled into a Habit; I therefore do not insist upon that. But my Advice to you is this, if Passion gets the Start of Reason, and takes Possession of your Temper, before Reason could shut it out, so that it is impossible for you to discard it, you should undergo a Course of Preparation, and be every Day meditating upon the Means of resisting the Attacks of Passion, and the more violent they are, the more you ought to set a Watch upon your Lips, that you offend not with your Tongue: This, in my Opinion, is as exalted a Proof of Virtue, as it is not to be angry at all, because the latter Virtue may proceed from Phlegm as well as from Philosophy. But, when you are touched with Anger, to be guarded both in your Actions and Expressions, even to hold your Peace, and to repress every Extravagance, and every Anguish of Mind, these are the Properties, I will not say, of consummate Wisdom, but of extraordinary Understanding.

I am, however, informed, that in this Respect you are become much more pliable and gentle. I now hear nothing of your violent Emotions of
Passion,

Passion, of your imprecating Expressions, and opprobrious Behaviour, all which are as repugnant to Authority and Dignity, as they are reproachful to Learning and good Breeding. For those Sallies of Anger, which are not appeasable, carry with them an Excess of Cruelty; those which are, an Excess of Weakness; the latter, however, are more eligible than the former.

That the first Year of your Government gave Rise to a great Deal of Talk upon this Subject might be owing to your unexpectedly encountering intolerable Injustice, Avarice and Insolence in those you had to deal with. As to the second Year, you was then much gentler, and more patient, and that Reformation was effected by your being better used to those Ways, by your reasoning with yourself, and, if I mistake not, by my Letters. Now, your third Year ought to admit of such Amendment, as to be liable to no Manner of Reproach upon that Account.

While I am upon this Subject, I address you in the Terms neither of Exhortation nor Command, but of brotherly Intreaty, that you employ your whole Abilities, Care and Concern, in meriting a good Opinion from all Men in all Quarters. Did not our Situation expose us to being the Subject of public Conversation and Discourse, in an uncommon Degree, nothing would be required of you beyond the ordinary and common Practice of Life. But placed, as we are, in the strongest and the brightest Point of Light, on Account of the Employments we fill, it will be difficult for us not to incur the highest Ignominy, unless we acquit ourselves with the highest Glory. We are so situated, that all good Men are our Friends, but they require and

expect, in Return, from us, Application and Virtue in their most extensive Sense; in the mean while, all the reprobate Part of Mankind, because with them we have declared eternal War, will make a Handle of the very smallest Circumstance to our Prejudice.

Asia is the Theatre that has been assigned you for the Display of your Virtues, a Theatre where the Spectators are celebrated by Fame, (m) flourishing in Power, and distinguish'd by Discernment, but naturally so noisy that the Expressions of their Censure or Applause reach even to *Rome*; as this, I say, is the Case, I beg that you'll exert your utmost Powers to appear by your Merits not only to have equalled, but to have more than equalled, this glorious Destination, and as Chance has fixed my Share of the public Administration in *Rome*, and yours in *Asia*; while I yield to none in my Conduct, do you excel all in yours.

You are likewise, my Brother, to reflect, that we are not now labouring for a Glory, that is in Expectation and Reversion, but we are struggling to preserve, what is actually in our Possession, a Glory, that we had not so much Reason to covet, as we have Interest to preserve. Believe me, had I any Interest that is distinct from yours, I could desire nothing more than that Situation of Life in which I am now placed; but as the Case is, that unless all your Words and Actions are answerable to my Conduct here, I shall think that I have lost the Fruit of all the mighty Toils and Dangers I

(m) *Celebrated by Fame*] Orig. *Celebritate refertissimum*. Notwithstanding the Sense in which I have translated this Expression, it may have another Meaning, viz. a Place filled by a Resort of Company.

have undergone, in all which you was a Sharer. Now, if you was the chief Fellow-Labourer, I had, in Working my Way to this high Degree of Honour I now possess, you ought to be my principal Assistant in maintaining it.

You are not to Regard the Opinion and the Judgment of the Age we live in, but you ought to have an Eye to Futurity, whose Verdict will be the more just, as it will be free from Detraction and Malevolence. In the next Place, you are to reflect, that the Glory you pursue does not terminate in your own Person; (nay, if it did, you would not be indifferent about it, especially as you have thought proper to consecrate the Memory of your Name by the noblest Evidences of Glory) but you are to share it with me, and it is to descend to our Posterity. You are therefore, to be the more cautious, for, by Inattention, you may not only appear to have injured yourself, but to have defrauded your Children of their Due.

This I throw out, not that my Words may rouse you from the Slumber, but that they may encourage you in the Race of Glory, for you are incessantly persevering to Merit the Applause of all, for your Equity, your Moderation, your Inflexibility, and your Integrity. But so unbounded is my Affection for you, that I am possessed with an insatiable Passion for your Glory. In the mean while, I am of Opinion, that as you are now as well acquainted with *Asia*, as any Man is with his own House, and, as great Experience has been added to your great Wisdom, there is nothing that pertains to Glory, of which you are not fully sensible, and which does not daily occur to you, without being exhorted to it by any one. But I

who,

who, when I read your Letters, think I hear you, and when I write to you, think I converse with you, the longer your Letters are, they give me the more Pleasure, and for the same Reason I make mine longer likewise.

I shall conclude, with exhorting and entreating you, that, in Imitation of good Poets and skilful Actors, you will redouble your Attention, while you are going through the Catastrophe and the winding up of your Piece; that this last Year of your Government, like the last Act of a Play, may appear to the greatest Perfection, and with the greatest Lustre. This you may easily do, if you think that I, whom singly you have endeavoured to please more than all the World besides, take an Interest in all that you do or say. Lastly, I entreat you, as you value my Welfare, and that of all your Friends, that you will take particular Care of your own Health.

F I N I S.



